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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and poverty. The 
thesis consists of four parts. First part reviews the related literature addressing different 
aspects of fiscal decentralisation and poverty and highlighting the research gap that this 
thesis intends to address. It also explains the possible channels through which fiscal 
decentralisation potentially affects poverty. Second part describes the political economy, 
fiscal decentralisation and poverty in Pakistan. It underlines that fiscal policy decisions 
in Pakistan are made to reflect many vested interest groups and institutions that may be 
failed to provide basic social services. Additionally, it discusses the development of 
federalism and fiscal decentralisation in Pakistan and shows that how the vertical and 
horizontal resource distribution affect the social and economic development of the 
provinces. This part also discusses various approaches, measurements and trends of 
poverty in Pakistan. Third part presents a systematic relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical 
framework implies that if the federal transfer rate is larger, then the decentralisation 
measure will be greater. Since a larger federal transfer rate reduces poverty, poverty and 
expenditure decentralisation are expected to be negatively related. In addition to the 
model, there is an extensive empirical study on Pakistan to look at the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on poverty besides investigating the potential channels through pro-
poor sectoral outcomes. Ordinary Least Squared, Fixed and Radom Effect Models and 
Generalised Method of Moment Instrumental Variables methodology is used on simple 
time series as well as panel datasets covering four provinces of Pakistan over the period 
from 1975 to 2009. The empirical results suggest a strong relationship between 
expenditure decentralisation and poverty – proxy alternatively by headcount poverty, 
poverty gap, severity of poverty and the human development index. Both rural and 
urban poverty reduction have statistically significant relationship with expenditure 
decentralisation.  The results also reveal that decentralisation improves pro-poor sectoral 
outcomes of education, health and agriculture that consequently affect poverty.  
vii 
 
The last part illustrates the effectiveness of the devolution reforms by transferring fiscal, 
political and administrative authorities to local governments on certain social and 
economic sectors that are believed to be pro-poor. The evidence shows that the 
devolution significantly changes the size and magnitude of investment on many social 
and economic sectors.  In all provinces, the investment increases in sectors such as 
education, healthcare, agriculture, water management, water supply and sanitation, rural 
development and the civil work. Since these services are strongly associated with local 
needs, it is reasonable to conclude that the devolution implicitly enhances the living 
standard of the local communities, especially the poor.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1    INTRODUCTION 
A key argument supporting fiscal decentralisation reform is that it can improve the 
public sector services and help reducing poverty. This thesis evaluates the impact of 
fiscal decentralisation on poverty within a political economy framework. We describe 
and estimate several possible direct and indirect impact of fiscal decentralisation on 
poverty and pro-poor social services delivery. The review of theoretical and empirical 
literature reveals that albeit the quest of fiscal decentralisation and its potential 
effectiveness on various aspects of society has received a considerable attention in 
public finance and development economics literature, a robust and systematic research 
assessing the possible impact of fiscal decentralisation on poverty and pro-poor social 
services delivery has not been conducted. In order to meet this academic need, we 
therefore conduct a systematic theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation, poverty and social service delivery, considering other 
political economy aspects.  
After thorough review of the related literature of fiscal decentralisation and poverty we 
develop a political economy model based on legislative bargaining principles, where we 
predict that fiscal decentralisation is an effective policy tool for poverty reduction. 
Considering the theoretical prediction an empirical analysis is carried out using Pakistan 
as test-bed. The issue is complex because fiscal decentralisation could have positive or 
negative impact on poverty. The empirical analysis is based on simple time-series as 
well as on panel regression with 35 (34) observations and four provinces. Various 
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indicators of poverty are examined to assess the impact of decentralisation on poverty. 
The overall conclusion is that fiscal decentralisation actually helps poverty reduction.  
1.1   BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY AND MOTIVATION  
Undoubtedly, the topic of fiscal decentralisation has received considerable attention 
over the last three decades both in developed and developing countries for different 
reasons. The developed countries seek to put in place a more effective public services 
provision mechanism, especially as an alternative to the welfare state model. The 
developing countries seek to escape from the centralised planning of the political 
economy, which causes inefficiency in public services delivery and generates 
malfunctioning in governance and encourages bureaucratic corruption (Jonhnston, 2000; 
Fisman and Gatti, 2002). In developing countries the push for fiscal decentralisation has 
been powerful, where in all international institutions‘1 development programmes 
decentralisation has been included as a major policy agenda for these countries. The 
latter therefore have promptly initiated and incorporated decentralisation in order to 
strengthen their political and socio-economic institutions. For instance, in 2001 
decentralisation was launched in Indonesia as a policy reform to support regional 
development, boost economic growth and alleviate poverty (Salim, 2009). In Vietnam, 
because of the decentralisation scheme in 1998, 43% of total national expenditures 
shifted to the local governments, which allowed the local governments to play a major 
role in  human development: about three-quarters of education and two-third of health 
was undertaken by local governments in Vietnam (Rao, 2000). Bolivian economy 
decentralised in 1994 where 20% of tax revenue and 40% of expenditure responsibilities 
have been devolved to local and municipal governments (Faguet, 2004). Brazil also 
embraced fiscal decentralisation in 1988 through a constitutional mandate and 
consequently augmented sub-national fiscal autonomy to 22.5% of total revenue 
collection
2
 (Shah, 1990). Among other Latin American countries, Argentina is believed 
                                                 
1
 The World Bank for International Development and Reconstructions, International Monetary Fund, 
Asian Development Bank and the United Nation Development Programme are the leading International 
Development agencies. Aids and donations to developing countries, trade agreements and other treaties 
put pressures on central governments to devolve the critical functions to sub-national governments.  
2
 However, Brazil failed to devolve expenditure responsibilities to sub-national governments, therefore, 
had to face fiscal imbalance at federal level.  
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to be the most decentralised economy in the region with about half of the total public 
expending are carried out at the subnational government level (Inter-American 
Development Bank, 1997).  
 Similarly, decentralisation has initiated in Tanzania under the Local Government Act of 
1982, wherein sub-national governments‘ sources have been increased significantly that 
eventually led to improve the efficiency and enhance the responsiveness of local 
governments in services delivery (Slater, 1989). In Morocco, political unrest and 
regional inequity led to decentralisation in 1975 to reform its politico-administrative and 
economic system as well as strengthen the sub-national governments‘ financial structure 
(Nellis, 1983). Likewise, in Tunisia decentralisation was introduced as policy to reform 
the political economy in 1987 (Manor, 1999). Similarly, to improve the essential 
services delivery and generate employment opportunities to uplift the poor in Colombia, 
a Law of local governments‘ functions was promulgated in 1993 to bring together the 
decentralisation and poverty alleviation programmes (Iregui, 2005). India, though 
constitutionally a federal structure since the inception (1947) with clear demarcation of 
financial resources between union and state governments, has initiated more 
decentralisation reforms in 1992 through  the 73
rd
 and 74
th
  constitutional amendments 
and in 1994 through Panchayati Raj Act to revitalise the decades old local government 
system (Rao, 2000; Chaudhuri, 2005). Mexico implemented decentralisation reforms 
during 1995-1998 in which 20.5% of tax income (previously collected by the federal 
government) are now being distributed amongst the states under the regulation of 
National System of Fiscal Coordination (Fausto and Brenda, 2008).  
The wave of decentralisation was not confined to above mentioned countries, but ensued 
in many other countries across all continents. For instances, Ethiopia decentralised its 
governing system in 1991 (Egziabher, 1998), Ghana in 1988 (Crawford, 2008), Uganda 
in 1997 (Azfar and Livingston, 2002) to name but a few.  
 Fiscal decentralisation gained acceptance as a reform policy in above mentioned and 
other countries with the realisation that the complex politico-economic and social issues 
may not be handled through central planning, execution and implementation (Rondinelli 
and Cheema, 1983). The decentralisation process was further reinforced when local 
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people started demanding more political and democratic powers at local level. It is 
widely believed that locally elected governments, mandated with the fiscal and 
administrative authority, are expected to perform far better and with more efficiency in 
developing, planning and provision of the public services than a remote central 
government. To support this argument, Smith (1985) and Manor (1999) consider the 
fiscal decentralisation as an effective policy tool that may help in resolving issues such 
as regional inequity and disparity, poverty reduction and political instability.  
However, opponents of fiscal decentralisation believe that it causes inefficiency in 
economics, increases social inequality and adversely affects poverty alleviation (Samoff, 
1990; Tanzi 1995; 2002; Blair 2000; Katsiaouni 2003; Devas 2004). Samoff (1990), for 
example, shows that decentralisation as policy tool has been largely failed around the 
world. Supporting his conclusion, Slater‘s (1989) study on Tanzania illustrates that 
decentralisation was failed to enhance the local capacities in implanting local 
programmes.  
Simultaneously, the issues related to poverty have also been in the interest of 
development community, international institutions, research organisations and the 
governments of developed and developing countries. These issues include the 
measurement of poverty, identifying and targeting the poor. Moreover, these 
organisations and countries have been engaged in shaping new poverty reduction 
programmes and adopting poor-oriented economic policies to provide economic 
assistance to the poorest of the poor and disadvantaged.  
While, the two concepts attract equal attention from the development agencies when 
examining the reform policies and dealing with the structural adjustment of developing 
countries, it is fair to claim that little or no systematic effort has been made to examine 
the interaction of both concepts and develop a theoretical and empirical link to the wider 
public finance and development economics literature. The reasons have been asserted in 
the leading works of Musgrave (1959); Oates (1972; 1999); Feldstein (1975); Bird 
(1993); Smoke (2001); Yilmaz and Robert (2002; 2003) where it is argued that fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty alleviation are two distinct themes of public finance and 
development economics literature. While, fiscal decentralisation and fiscal federalism 
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are related to the concept of efficiency in public service delivery, poverty reduction or 
alleviation as a policy is well connected to the concepts of ‗redistribution‘ of income and 
wealth of a nation. The literature, therefore, maintains that central government is better 
equipped in dealing with the externalities that are serious economic issues, which may 
not be handled by decentralised governments. Similarly, the same literature assigns the 
redistribution responsibilities to the central government because the latter can adopt and 
launch more effective re-distributional policies that affect the poor.    
However, considering poverty reduction as purely a redistributive matter and assigning 
this responsibility to central government not only limits the understanding of poverty 
and dealing  with it from a broader socio-economic and political perspective, it also 
restricts the literary scope of the public finance literature that fails to link fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty. It is true that a recent strand of literature
3
  has made a 
strong attempt to understand the poverty alleviation outcomes through the fiscal 
decentralisation, ironically however their results are inconclusive, programmes/sectors 
specific and indeed skeptical about the role of the fiscal decentralisation in poverty 
reduction. Therefore, it is appropriate to argue that this literature has failed to provide a 
systematic theoretical underpinning and empirical evidence that help in understanding a 
relationship between the two concepts.  
1.2 AIM, OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
The studies mentioned above reveal the fact that both theoretical and empirical 
perspectives of the impact of decentralisation on poverty are divided and inconsistent. 
The inconsistency in empirical work on decentralisation and its potential impact on 
poverty and social service provisions therefore warrant a systematic research. In 
addition, the lack of a political economy model, where fiscal federalism and welfare are 
interlinked, demands a thorough and in-depth academic research illustrating the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation/fiscal federalism and poverty within a 
political economy setting. This thesis is an attempt towards this direction in order to fill 
                                                 
3
 Brown and Oates, (1987); Boone, Bird, (1993) and (1998); Braun and Grote, (2000); Crook and 
Sverrisson, (2001); Alderman, (2002); Lindaman and Thurmaier, (2002); Crook, (2002); Krishna, 2003; 
Schneider, (2003); Faguet (2004); Bardhan and Mookherjee, (2005); Galasso and Ravallion, (2005). 
 6 
 
this academic gap in public finance literature.  Thus, the primary objective of this 
research is to investigate the political economy setting under which the evolution of 
fiscal decentralisation and devolution process takes place and processes through which it 
helps reducing poverty and improving social services delivery.  
This research has germinated from the idea that efficient provision of public services 
and goods to the poor and disadvantaged is the basis of any poverty reduction 
programme, and that fiscal decentralisation potentially enhances the efficacy of certain 
kinds of poverty reduction interventions. The thesis proposes that because the sub-
national governments possess the local knowledge and understanding about the local 
people needs, whereas the central government lacks while designing and implementing 
poverty reduction policies. Therefore, the sub-national governments have a strong role 
to play in poverty reduction policies.  
After providing an in-depth analytical survey of the dynamics of fiscal policymaking, 
evolutionary processes of fiscal decentralisation and poverty, this thesis develops a 
legislative model that gives insights into how fiscal decentralisation may affect the 
welfare level and reduce poverty in county level. 
To the best of our knowledge, no in-depth theoretical study has been carried out so far to 
examine the relationship between fiscal federalism, welfare and poverty reduction 
outcomes. Some of the studies, like Oates (1972, 1985); Brown and Oates (1987); 
Lockwood (2002, 2006); Besely and Coate (2003); Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005); 
Galasso and Ravallion (2005); Faguet (2004) modeled and showed both the positive and 
negative impact of decentralisation on some anti-poverty programmes. They therefore 
provide a fine background for the construction of a theoretical framework to evaluate 
the interaction of fiscal federalism and poverty reduction in a political economy setting. 
However, Marsiliani and Renström‘s (2007) work on bargaining game and medium 
voting theorem provides a solid background to develop a legislative bargaining model 
on fiscal federalism to answer the research question(s) of this study. The theoretical 
model of this thesis therefore is expected to bridge the current theoretical gap and 
contributes to both academic and policy-making circles.  
 7 
 
The theoretical model of this thesis demonstrates that in the bargaining equilibrium the 
ratio of local expenditure to total expenditure is increasing in the federal transfer rate. 
Thus, the model proposes that if the federal transfer rate is larger, then the fiscal 
decentralisation measure is greater. Since a larger federal transfer rate alleviates poverty, 
we would expect poverty and expenditure decentralisation to be negatively related. 
The use of legislative bargaining model of fiscal federalism for this study is rationalised 
in chapter 9 with more details.  However, at this poin it is worthwhile to mention that 
the kind of political and economic structure that Pakistan has, would certainly demands 
a legislative theoretical framework to analyse the political economy of fiscal 
decentralisation and its consequent impact on social services provision and poverty 
reduction. The theoretical model is applied on Pakistan to test the validity and prediction 
of its main proposition. This model suffices to the empirical purpose that we are aiming, 
using Pakistan as test-bed because; the latter is a federation of four provinces (second 
tier of government) and with several district governments (third tier of government). 
Moreover, the federal government of Pakistan collects almost all resources and then 
shares the same with provinces, and the latter subsequently distributes a part of the 
transferred resources to district governments. The federal and provincial legislators 
bargain in the legislative assemblies to grab more funds for their respective jurisdictions. 
As we will explain and analyse in this thesis that fiscal resource allocation and 
intergovernmental resource transfer take place, largely, on political economy 
considerations. Therefore, we expect that a bargaining legislative model is suitable to 
capture the political economy situation and hence provides us an appropriate framework 
to assess the efficacy of fiscal decentralisation on poverty reduction within a political 
economy setting.   
As mentioned above, fiscal decentralisation has been widely used around the world as a 
reform policy to improve the socio-economic well-being, economic and political 
stability, good governance and particularly to tackle poverty related issues (Dillinger, 
1994; Campbell, 2001). However, in spite of its importance in poverty reduction 
strategy and its potential effectiveness in poverty alleviation policy, a countrywide 
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empirical research has not been conducted to analyse the link between decentralisation 
and public goods and services provisions and hence poverty reduction.  
Thus, besides exploring the theoretical foundations that link these two concepts, this 
study seeks to undertake an in-depth empirical study that will cover the width and 
breadth of a country (Pakistan) to see whether a link exists between poverty and fiscal 
decentralisation. Interestingly, the available literature does not discuss Pakistan with 
regard to fiscal decentralisation in any aspect, let alone the impact of the latter on 
poverty alleviation. Pakistan provides a good case to this study because; first, she is a 
federal country comprising four federating units (provinces) and numerous local 
governments. The diversity across provinces requires Pakistan to adopt a decentralised 
federal structure where the provinces can exercise internal autonomy to run their local 
fiscal, political and administrative affairs. Therefore, since inception of the country there 
has been a strong demand for decentralisation by the federating units. Second, Pakistan 
adopted a widespread devolution plan in 2000-01 to empower the local governments by 
transferring multiple political, fiscal and administrative powers to the latter. In this way 
Pakistan‘s case allows us to examine the effects of fiscal decentralisation and devolution 
carefully throughout the country. Focusing on one country allows us to avoid problems 
such as controlling for external shocks and other exogenous factors, political regimes, 
data comparability, political regimes and social and historical factors.  
In order to statistically prove the theoretical prediction(s), this study empirically tests the 
following main hypotheses using case of Pakistan: 
 Hypothesis 1: Holding everything else constant, an increase in provincial governments‟ 
spending power, as measured by fiscal decentralisation, leads to an improvement in the 
standard of living of the poor, as proxy either by headcount poverty, poverty gap, 
squared poverty gap or the Human Development Index ranking.  
Hypothesis 2: Fiscal decentralisation is likely to have a statistically significant positive 
impact on education, which in turn may translate into poverty reduction outcomes. 
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Hypothesis 3: Fiscal Decentralization has a positive relationship with healthcare 
outcomes, since fiscal decentralization provides more resources to subnational 
governments to spend on healthcare sector. Statistically significant impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on healthcare outcomes may in turn lead to have a positive impact 
poverty reduction. 
Hypothesis 4: Provincial governments‟ fiscal and political autonomy (fiscal 
decentralization) leads to more expenditure/investment in agriculture that will 
transform into improving the livelihood of the poor and the marginalized communities 
in Pakistan. 
Hypothesis 5: After the devolution, the pattern of public investment changes, and sectors 
related to social services provision receive more expenditure; this may translate into 
poverty reduction.  
In Pakistan fiscal decentralisation may entail great political economy complexities in 
terms of the intergovernmental fiscal relations and coordination failure in fiscal relations 
between the federal and provincial governments that are likely to have a strong bearing 
on the fiscal position of provincial governments in pursuing social services and poverty 
reduction policies. This research analyses various dimensions of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations of Pakistan and its potential impact on poverty reduction outcomes. We 
argue that fiscal policy making in Pakistan has not only been guided by economic 
principles. Instead, the influence of various lobbyists (military, politicians, bureaucrats 
etc.) has been the significant reason in diverting the majority of public sector resources 
to unproductive sectors, leaving an insufficient share for the social sector. The 
horizontal and vertical composition of the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award 
– a resource distribution mechanism between federal and provincial governments – 
reveals that albeit the expenditure share of provincial governments to total national 
expenditure has increased however population being the sole criterion for the horizontal 
resource distribution has given the most populated province (the Punjab) a 
disproportionate share in resources. This consequently led to a great regional inequality 
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among provinces and socio-economic backwardness and rampant poverty in less 
populated provinces. 
 For empirical investigation we use Ordinary Least Square, Fixed Effects model and 
Random Effects model, Generalised Method of Moment Instrumental Variable and 
Tobit model empirical procedures. STATA package is used for empirical investigations. 
Our empirical analysis covers simple time series as well as panel datasets covering four 
provinces of Pakistan over the period of 1975 to 2009. The period of 1975 to 2009 is 
chosen because of the data availability. Data that are required to calculate fiscal 
decentralisation along with use for other variables are available from 1975. The end of 
the time series is 2009 because the latest poverty data available are till 2009. However, 
for the third and last empirical chapter the end point of the time series is 2008 instead of 
2009. It is 2008 because the newly devolved local government setup completed its 
second terms in that year and further elections were suspended till the writing of this 
thesis.  
The empirical analysis‘s results suggest a strong relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty – proxy alternatively by headcount poverty, poverty gap, 
severity of poverty and Human Development Index. Both rural and urban headcount 
poverty reduction have statistically significant relationship with fiscal decentralisation. 
Thus, the postulation that fiscal decentralisation is instrumental in reducing poverty is 
empirically proven. Along with fiscal decentralisation, pro-poor expenditures, size of 
government, corruption index, governance, unemployment and inflation have significant 
impact on poverty outcomes. Moreover our estimation results show a highly significant 
relationship between the interaction terms and poverty which suggests that proximity of 
elected government to people boosts the effectiveness of the former in terms of poverty 
reduction outcomes. In addition, we empirically examine the potential transmission 
mechanism of the effect of fiscal decentralisation on poverty through education, basic 
healthcare and agricultural sectors that have been suggested in the literature as basic 
needs and that have a significant bearing on the well-being of the poor. Our empirical 
investigation shows fiscal decentralisation to be very effective in enhancing the 
performance and quality of these sectors. 
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These findings are important because they suggest, contrary to the traditional public 
finance theory, that sub-national governments can play an important role in the 
reduction of poverty.  
In addition, in this study a whole section is devoted to elaborate and critically evaluate 
one of the key political economy concerns in Pakistan: the relation of the latter to one of 
her federating units, Balochistan. This issue justifies a separate treatment, because 
unlike other federating units constituting Pakistani federation, Balochistan‘s case has 
been entirely different. Prior to the colonial rule on India, Balochistan had been a 
sovereign state with its functioning institutions, although far from international standard 
(Harrison, 1981). After the British departure from Indian subcontinent and consequently 
the formation of two independent states, India and Pakistan, Balochistan who gained its 
independent status back from British was asked to either remain an independent state or 
become part of Pakistan on the basis of shared religion and geographical integration.  
However, the democratically elected parliamentarians of Balochistan unanimously voted 
against the merger. Nonetheless, Pakistan disregarded the decision of Baloch parliament 
and invaded Balochistan on 27, March 1948 (History, 2011). Moreover, Balochistan has 
always been the poorest and least developed of all of Pakistan‘s provinces. Since the 
mid-1970s its share of the country‘s GDP has dropped from 4.9 to less than 3% of in 
2000 (Bengali and Sadaqat, 2002). Balochistan has the highest infant and maternal 
mortality rate, the highest poverty rate, and the lowest literacy rate in Pakistan (Baloch, 
2007). The government has often tried to co-opt Balochs with development projects, but 
none has achieved any measure of success. While economic development usually 
dominates the rhetoric coming from Islamabad, the larger issue for the Balochs remains 
resource exploitation (Adeel, 2005). Despite being Pakistan‘s most abundant province in 
natural gas, Balochistan has seen little benefit from its gas fields relative to the Sindh 
and Punjab provinces. This is because a new constitution introduced in 1973 set 
provincial gas royalties at 12.5%. However, the wellhead price of gas from each 
province was differentiated, based on per capita provincial income in 1953. While this 
tremendously disadvantaged Balochistan, the dismissal of the provincial assembly in 
February 1973 left them without recourse. 
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This has resulted in a wellhead price five times lower than in Sindh and the Punjab, 
meaning that Baloch receives less in royalties. Furthermore, the government has 
returned little of the royalties owed to the province, citing the need to recover operating 
costs. Consequently, Balochistan is heavily in debt and deep economic problems which 
resulted into widespread poverty.  
Thus, in order to redress the allegedly forced annexation of Baloch land with Pakistan, 
there have five major insurgencies that consequently caused massive human causalities 
and physical and infrastructure destruction. But more importantly this phenomenon 
points to an unpleasant relationship between Balochistan with the federation of Pakistan, 
which resultantly left a great deal of impact on the political economy of the latter.   
Moreover, this thesis also looks at the efficacy of the devolution to the third tier of 
governments (the local governments) in terms of better public services supply. Here we 
assert that the economic, political and administrative empowerment of the local 
governments change the course of public resource allocations in the favour of sub-
sectors that potentially augment the well-beings of the people, particularly the poor and 
disadvantaged. The devolution of power to local governments also provides a platform 
to enable people in exercising their social and political rights at the grassroots level.  
Pakistan launched a widespread Devolution Plan in 2000-01 that promulgated through 
―Local Government Ordinance.‖4 Thus, besides the federal government and its four 
federating units‘ fiscal distribution principles, the local governments‘ autonomy 
provides a good scenario to see a  statistical exploration through a country-wide 
quantitative analysis, showing, how effective financially empowered district/ local 
governments have been in reprioritising their social and economic expenditures and 
poverty alleviation through the provision of access to the basic services. We therefore 
conduct a panel analysis by comparing the pre and post decentralisation (devolution) 
quality and quantity of basic public services. The evidence shows that the devolution 
                                                 
4
 The ordinance formulated the responsibilities and authorities of local governments ranging from the 
functions related to primary healthcare, education, some basic tax collection, land revenue, water supply, 
sanitation, roads, bridges, flyovers, streets, traffic signals, solid or waste, urban and rural infrastructure, 
master planning etc. Later on, they empowered to enforce laws and functions assigned under the Police 
Ordinance 2002. 
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significantly changes the size and magnitude of social and economic investment. In all 
provinces, the investment increases in sectors such as in education, healthcare, 
agriculture, water management, water supply and sanitation, rural development and the 
civil work. Since these services are strongly associated with local needs, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the devolution implicitly enhances the living standard of the local 
communities especially the lower income groups and the impoverished. 
The analysis of the devolution to the local government is presented in a separated part 
(Part IV). The local government system is different from the federal and local 
governments in Pakistan. The political, economic and fiscal structures of local 
government differ from the both upper tiers of government in various aspects. In 
addition, historically the local government system has been markedly different from the 
provincial governments; since the latter does not enjoy a constitutional mandate, 
therefore, it has been suspended and subsequently revived many a time. Although, the 
local government system is an integrated part of the federation of Pakistan and same law 
of the land applies equally on local government as it is the case with other two tiers, 
however, structural differences of latter may provide a plausible ground to devote a 
separate part for its analysis, where the evolution, development and significance of local 
government system is aligned with the empirical analysis in one chapter. The idea 
behind such a scheme is that it provides the readers a consistency of the historical 
background of local government and its empirical plausibility on essential social 
services delivery and in turns its effectiveness on poverty reduction, which is of course 
is the theme of this thesis.    
The outcomes of this research will help policy designers and international development 
agencies, and concerned officials about the strengths and weaknesses of fiscal 
decentralisation in attacking poverty directly through poverty alleviation programmes 
and indirectly though the provision of access to basic services in Pakistan as well as 
other developing countries. Further, the study will contribute to academic literature of 
public finance on the impacts of fiscal decentralisation and poverty alleviation.  
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1.3 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS 
The followings may be the main contributions of this research study to the existing 
literature 
The first major contribution is the legislative bargaining model which shows that under 
the game theory framework, how fiscal decentralisation helps in reducing poverty.  
The second key contribution of this study is an extensive systematic, robust and vigour 
empirical analysis of the impact of fiscal decentralisation on poverty reduction 
outcomes. The empirical examination further shows the indirect impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on poverty by looking at the key social and economic indicators by 
focusing on three main sectors: education, healthcare and agriculture.  
The third contribution of the study is the description of the devolution reform – local 
government empowerment – and empirical evaluation which shows that how fiscal, 
economic and political empowerment of local government changes the pattern of 
investment in those sectors that are more pro-poor.  
Fourth, this study critically evaluates the issues of fiscal decentralisation and poverty in 
Pakistan. Notwithstanding the importance of fiscal decentralisation in the political 
economy discourse in Pakistan the current literature has not done such a thorough work 
covering all aspects of fiscal decentralisation and fiscal federalism. In addition, a detail 
elaboration of poverty in Pakistan conducted in this study is likely to opens up a debate 
in general, and particularly it helps in understanding whether or not (if yes how) fiscal 
decentralisation may implied as a policy tool to tackle issues related to poverty.  
Fifth, the thesis develops a counter argument to the established believe that since 
poverty reduction is a redistributive phenomenon, and central government is more 
effective in undertaking distributive work, therefore, in terms of poverty reduction the 
latter agency (the central government) is likely to be more effective. However, contrary 
to this notion, this thesis demonstrates that poverty reduction is not only a redistribution 
process, rather a whole range of social, economic and political, and institutional 
mechanism determine the role of each tiers/levels of government in affecting poverty. 
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This thesis ascertains that considering the accountability, proximity and knowing the 
needs and preferences of the jurisdictions, the subnational governments are more 
effective in knowing the poor. Moreover, under the new approach to poverty, where 
political and socio-economic empowerment of the poor is imperative for them to come 
out of poverty, and local institutions provide a better platform to the poor to exercise 
their social and political voice to influence the intended poverty reduction polices.  
Sixth, this study constructs a unique set of data which did not exit hitherto. Variables 
such as ‗fiscal decentralisation‘, ‗development expenditure‘ and the ‗index of pro-poor‘ 
expenditure among others are the variables which do not have data in Pakistan. So this 
study takes the first initiative to measure these variables to not only use for this research 
but makes it available for future research.   
Seventh, this study highlights and brings to the attention of the importance and 
imperativeness of other factors for the success of fiscal decentralisation. The study 
emphasises that the long term success of fiscal decentralisation as policy tool depends 
upon many institutional factors such as democracy, accountability, people‘s 
participation, rule of law and equal treatment of all ethnic, religious and other 
groups/nationalities. The study argues that these institutional factors hold the key to 
determine the success or failure of fiscal decentralisation 
1.4    STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is divided into two volumes and four parts. There are two chapters in part 
one. The chapter one gives the introduction, identifies the research gaps and underlines 
the contribution of this study. Chapter two deals with various definitions of and 
approaches to decentralisation and poverty, and supplies a review of relevant literature 
on fiscal decentralisation and poverty. The same chapter also provides an overview of 
related literature dealing with the relationship between fiscal decentralisation, 
healthcare, education and agricultural outcomes.  
Part two, dealing with historical background and current issues of Pakistan‘s political 
economy, fiscal decentralisation and poverty, has three chapters. The first chapter deals 
with the issues of political economy of Pakistan. This part suggests an explanation for 
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the failure of fiscal policy to reflect the social and economic conditions and 
developmental needs of the country. The same chapter discusses the social sector of 
Pakistan, concentrating on education and health, to show that how weak socio-economic 
indicators lead to impede economic growth and cause poverty. It gives explanations of 
Pakistan-Balochistan (one of the federating units of Pakistan) relations and political 
economy of the latter that caused immense poverty and deprivation to the province. The 
following chapter examines political economy of fiscal decentralisation in Pakistan. It 
offers an explanation of why certain resource distribution criteria between central 
government and provincial governments as well as among the provincial governments 
were chosen and their link with the subsequent political consequences. It discusses the 
dominant role of one unit in the federation and implicitly suggests an explanation of its 
effects on the social and economic development of other federating units. The third 
chapter contains an analysis of factors affecting poverty in Pakistan. It also provides a 
profile and trend of poverty over the years. 
Part three, dealing with the interaction of fiscal decentralisation and poverty, is divided 
into four chapters. The first chapter develops a simple theoretical model discussing 
implicitly the interaction of fiscal federalism, welfare and poverty under the legislative 
bargaining framework. The second chapter of part three lays down the empirical 
methodology and discusses the data sources and estimations techniques. The third and 
fourth chapters of same part probe into the empirical evidence of the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty. These chapters examine the causes and consequences of 
fiscal decentralisation on various measures of poverty along with other pro-poor sectors: 
health, education and agriculture.  
Part four contains one chapter. The chapter gives an overview of the devolution reforms 
in Pakistan and discusses its impact on social and economic services provision. Finally, 
chapter 11 concludes the entire thesis and offers suggestions for further research.   
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
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CHAPTER 2 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND POVERTY 
REDUCTION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we discuss the concept of decentralisation with particular emphasis on 
fiscal decentralisation and survey the related literature. A parallel review of the 
definition of poverty, various approaches of poverty and the policy environment that 
potentially affects poverty are presented with some depth. Dealing separately with these 
concepts enable us to develop a conceptual framework where the interaction of fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty is examined directly and through various channels with the 
help of the available theoretical and empirical literature.  
2.2 FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
In 1945 Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the USA were the only functioning federal 
countries in the world, whereas in 2011 some 20 to 30 countries with 40% of the 
world‘s population are federal (Anderson, 2011).  95% of the democratic countries have 
elected regional or local governments with different level of fiscal, administrative and 
political decentralisation (World Bnak, 2000). Sub-national governments in some 
countries (the USA, Canada, Switzerland and India) are more autonomous while in 
many other countries (Thailand, Spain, Indonesia and Chile) they exercise only a 
restricted autonomy. Several developing countries have adopted decentralisation as 
policy strategy to resolve many compelling political and fiscal problems, as well as 
improving the social and economic services delivery (Bird, 1993).   
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But what is decentralisation all about? Certainly, it is hard to give a straightforward and 
precise definition of decentralisation. Fesler (1965) considers that decentralisation is 
rich with conceptual and empirical significance that reflects the dynamic political and 
fiscal realities, and incremental changes of a society. Many scholars believe that the 
problems related to decentralisation are purely conceptual, and ironically in many 
developing countries it is proposed and implemented without the true meaning and spirit 
that it commands (Fantini and Gittell, 1973; Rondinelli, 1981). Therefore, 
decentralisation is used differently in different contexts with distinctions among fiscal 
decentralisation, political decentralisation, administrative decentralisation, 
deconcentration, delegation and devolution (Martinez-Vazquez 1998; Litvak and 
Seddon, 1999). 
Fiscal decentralisation is broadly defined as the transfer of fiscal decision making and 
the authority of planning and management of public functions from central government 
to subnational governments (regional/provincial/local). It encompasses four important 
elements that are commonly referred to as the key pillars of fiscal decentralisation: 1. 
transfers of expenditure responsibility to subnational governments; 2. revenue raising 
authority to subnational governments; 3. the intergovernmental fiscal transfers; and 4. 
borrowing power to subnational governments (Bahl, 2006). The advocates of 
expenditure decentralisation assert that because of the absence of significant spillover 
effect, the provision of public goods and services by subnational governments increases 
the efficiency (Oates, 1968 and 1972; Ostrom et al. 1993; Qian and Weingast, 1997) and 
ensures national unity (Litvack et al., 1998).  
The first element of fiscal decentralisation is expenditure decentralisation, which is 
measured as the share of sub-national government expenditure over total public 
expenditure. It is concerned with the assessment of functional and expenditure 
responsibilities of each tier of government. It suggests that the public goods and services 
should be provided at the lowest level of government with required level of capacity to 
provide these goods and services (Martinez-Vazquez, 1998).  
The second pillar of fiscal decentralisation, revenue decentralisation, is the process of 
transferring tax and non-tax sources to local governments. Revenue assignment to local 
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governments is supported on the grounds that for smooth running and the 
implementation of essential social and economic services, subnational governments 
should have stable revenue sources. Moreover, those taxes should be transferred to 
subnational governments that can easily be administered at local level and provide direct 
benefits to local people.  
The third pillar of fiscal decentralisation is intergovernmental resource transfers.  Given 
the mismatch between expenditure and revenue decentralisation, the subnational 
governments receive transfers from upper tier of government(s). In addition to 
intergovernmental transfers the subnational governments are usually given the 
borrowing authority – the fourth pillar of fiscal decentralisation – to finance the budget 
deficit that may occur when subnational governments‘ own revenues and 
intergovernmental transfers are not sufficient to balance the expenditure needs of the 
local governments.   
Under political decentralisation subnational governments are given certain political 
authority within the constitutional framework set by the central government. Political 
decentralisation largely reflects the power of the subnational governments to allow 
regional political parties to participate in the electoral process, strengthening the 
legislature, promoting and protecting the local public interest groups (Litvack and 
Seddon 1999).  
Administrative decentralisation refers to the transfer of administrative authority, 
particularly over the control of local bureaucracy, implementation of local services 
provision and financial management to subnational level. Administrative 
decentralisation aims to empower the subnational governments to deal with their local 
affairs under a local regulatory framework. 
In deconcentration the central government grants only limited responsibilities to its 
regional offices that are run by bureaucrats appointed by and accountable to the central 
government. On the other hand, delegation is much boarder than deconcentration, in 
which the central government transfers certain decision making and administrative 
responsibilities to local governments. However, the latter is answerable to central 
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government having to report to central authorities (Hutchcroft, 2001). Delegation is the 
common form of decentralisation that is practiced in many countries. The last form of 
decentralisation is devolution, in which the central government transfers decision-
making authorities related to administration and finance to local or regional 
governments (Utomo, 2009). In a way the devolution is a complete and inclusive form 
of decentralisation under which the subnational governments are autonomous in electing 
the local governments that in turn raise their own resources, identify and execute 
projects as per local people‘s needs (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998). For this research we 
focus only on fiscal decentralisation and devolution.   
2.3 FISCAL FEDERALISM 
Though federalism does not command a unanimous described, however, Wheare‘s 
(1953) pioneering work on federalism provides an academic foundation for the later 
works on the subject. To him federalism is: ―…the method of dividing powers so that 
the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and 
independent‖ (Wheaere, 1953:10). Thus, federalism is a system of government in which 
each level - federal government and its federating units in the majority of federations - 
of government possess a scope of responsibility granted and protected by a written 
constitution.  
The economic and fiscal perspective of federalism, however, may be quite different 
from the one used in political science. Politics mainly prescribes the legal and 
administrative responsibility among various levels of government.  Economics on the 
other hand is primarily concerned with the production and allocation of resources among 
various groups in a given society within a given economic system in order to obtain an 
optimum welfare level. Thus, the federal structure is more attractive to the economists, 
because it gives a framework through which the lower tier of governments can ensure 
social services delivery as per the needs and preferences of local communities in various 
geographical locations. With this background, Oates‘ classic definition of economic 
federalism seems very pertinent in which he states that: ―…A public sector with both 
centralized and decentralized levels of decision-making in which choices made at each 
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level concerning the provision of public services are determined largely by the demands 
for those services of the residents of the respective jurisdictions‖ (Oates, 1973:17). 
He further underlines that contrary to political federalism the economic federalism does 
not concern itself with the matter whether the decision regarding provision of specified 
goods and services is undertaken by delegated authority or sub-nationally autonomous 
authority. What is more important in economic federation, however, is that the provision 
of social services made by either authority is tailored to the needs and preferences of 
that constituency/jurisdiction or not. Nonetheless, it is not to suggest that constitutional 
and legal restrictions of federalism, which are the essence of political federalism, are 
irrelevant to economic federalism. Instead, the legal and constitutional provisions of 
federalism are important whereby they reflect the local preferences in social services 
delivery, which is the pivotal concern of economic federalism.  
Economic or fiscal federalism implies that apart from small number of countries with 
stark unitary form of government, the public sector of the majority of the countries 
around the world is federal, though with various degree. Hence, the key point in fiscal 
federalism is how much responsibility needs to be exercised by each level of 
government in providing a certain degree of decision-making power pertaining public 
functions. This may be ascribed as the central theme of fiscal federalism debate  which 
Oates rightly describes as: ―the deterministic on the optimal structure of the public 
sector in terms of the assignment of decision-making responsibility for specific 
functions to representatives of the interests of the proper geographical subsets of 
society‖ (Oates, 1973:19).  Thus with this background of federalism in which a system 
of governance may be selected in order to gain a certain welfare level by providing 
social services as per the needs and preferences of the local people, while maintaining a 
balanced political structure, a legislative bargaining model of fiscal federalism is 
developed and presented in chapter 5.  
2.4 DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENTS OF POVERTY  
The elimination of poverty occupies a central place for those whose main concern is to 
ensure economic growth and development as well as social and political freedom of 
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underdeveloped nations.  The act of attacking poverty and its subsequent elimination is 
unanimously supported by world development community, international financial 
institutions and many governments in developing countries committed to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations to halve poverty by 2015 around 
the world.  Yet, there exists a wide disagreement of what poverty actually is and how to 
measure its correct nature, depth and width. Hence, the definition and measurement of 
poverty and what it constitutes has been a challenging task for poverty researches, donor 
community and concerned government departments (Saunders, 2004; Retchiffe, 2007).  
For some
5
 the definition of poverty is the deficiency of  required calories intake (mostly 
2550 calories intake per adult per day), while for others
6
 the definition of poverty goes 
beyond the caloric norms and hence includes  socio-economic dimensions (for example, 
healthcare, education, freedom and self-esteem) of human life.  
The concept of poverty has evolved over the last many decades and widened to 
incorporate more dimensions in its scope. Till the 1970s the definition of poverty was 
limited to the material aspect of human life: lack of income and consumption to meet a 
required level of calorie intake was the dominant concept of this approach, which is 
dubbed as ‗basic need approach‘. In its simplest form the poverty with basic need 
approach was the lack of getting access to the basic means of living and consequently 
destined to various preventable diseases and pre-mature death.
7
 Thereafter, the concept 
of poverty has evolved to include other dimensions of human life. Thus, during the 
1980s and 1990s basic need approach expanded onto human deprivation and included 
the social, political and cultural characteristics of human life. The latter definition 
includes socio-economic and political dimensions like education, health, access to social 
services along with freedom to exercise political choice with a minimum level of 
income required to meet a socially acceptable standard of living.  
Nonetheless, a consensus exists largely among the economists, development 
practitioners and social researchers that low level of income and consumption should be 
                                                 
5
 See for example, Ravallion (1996); Wodon (1997); Chen and Ravallion (2001); Bowles et al. (2004).  
6
 See for instance, UNDP (1990; 1997); Ravi Kanbur (1991); Sen (1993; 1999). 
7
 See Moisio (20040; Musick and Robert (2004); Sala-i-Martin (2006) for more information.   
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the fundamental element to any definition of poverty. The income or consumption 
poverty approach relies on a ―Poverty Line‖ based on household or individual incomes 
that suggests the minimum subsistence level of livelihood. The consumption or income 
approach to poverty is strongly associated with the monetary concept of poverty.  
The monetary poverty approach was first introduced by Charles Booth in 1888 in his 
seminal study on the poor in London, where he divided the dwellers into two broad 
categories of poverty (Gillie, 1996). Booth further states that:  
By the word ‗poor‘ I mean to describe those who have a sufficiently regular though bare 
income ‗very poor‘ those who from any cause fall much below this standard. The ‗poor‘ 
are those whose means may be sufficient, but are barely sufficient, for decent 
independent life; the ‗very poor‘ those whose means are insufficient for this according to 
the usual standard of life in this country. My ‗poor‘ may be described as living under a 
struggle to obtain the necessaries of life and make both ends meet; while the ‗very poor‘ 
live in a state of chronic want (Charles Booth, 1888: .278). 
 Another step in understanding the monetary poverty was put forward by Rowntree 
(1902), which is thought to be the first scientific research on poverty (Ruggeri et al., 
2003), wherein he introduced the ‗minimum household budget‘ concept to meet the 
basket of consumption of basic needs (Williamson and Hyer, 1975). Rowntree‘s 
definition of the poverty line is based on a monetary income sufficient to meet adequate 
calories requirement together with housing and clothing. The poverty line separates poor 
from non-poor: households or individuals with per capita income or consumption level 
meeting the benchmark of poverty line are considered non-poor, whereas, those with per 
capita income or consumption level below the poverty level are poor (Rowntee, 1901). 
It is important to mention that the monetary approach focuses more on consumption 
rather than income of individuals or households. The idea behind this assumption is that 
the consumption measurement controls the income and other resources (access to credit 
market included) fluctuations in the short term, hence, makes the consumption pattern 
smooth for an extended time period. Therefore, compare to the income, consumption 
information is more useful in understanding the monetary approach of poverty (Deaton, 
1997). Atikson and Francois (1982), on the other hand, are of the view that the income 
approach is a better indicator in understating the minimum rights of a community than 
consumption approach to poverty. 
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Issues related to the objectivity and inclusiveness of the monetary approach may be 
criticised on multiple grounds. For instance, although theoretically it is assumed that 
both consumption and income approach of monetary poverty consider non-marketed or 
public goods and services, in practice it excludes the publically provided goods and 
services (healthcare, education, sanitation etc.) and includes only the private income or 
consumption of individuals. Therefore, it may be maintained that in the policy arena the 
monetary approach may tend to be biased against public service provision and instead 
favours the private income.    
Poverty can be seen in absolute as well as in relative terms. The absolute poverty, as 
succinctly discussed by Booth (1888), is characterised by the failure in meeting a 
minimum income and consumption level or socially acceptable living standard set 
through the poverty line. It is the case of establishing a line at a given income level at 
which the individuals or households can attain a basket of essential goods and services. 
An absolute poverty line may be described as the critical benchmark differentiating the 
poor from the non-poor based on an efficient wage rate. The efficient wage rate concept 
is applied and critically evaluated by Dasgupta (1993) and Sukhatme (1981) in their 
respective studies. However, the argument of efficiency in wages is contended on the 
premise of the ambiguous nature and scope of its definition. For instance, it is still 
debatable whether the elderly and disable people, who are not in workforce, should be 
included into the wage efficiency argument of poverty or not.  
Nevertheless, Ravallion‘s definition of absolute poverty line is considered to be more 
precise and translucent, in which he explains it as: ―Rather an absolute poverty line is 
one which is fixed in terms of living standards, and fixed over the entire domain of the 
poverty comparisons‖ (Ravallion, 1992:25). 
Thus, it commands a simple and straightforward mechanism of understand the poverty: 
individuals or households lacking the adequate calorie
8
 intakes fall below the threshold 
                                                 
8
 Yet the specification of minimum calorie requirement seems problematic. That is because the calorie 
requirement not only differ by age groups – adults need more calories than children –, but it varies by sex, 
geographic condition and working environment. Albeit the available data provide some of the various and 
assigned particular caloric norm to that specific group, however, it fails to capture many potential 
determinants of poverty.   
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of the poverty line and so considered to be poor. The same logic has been applied by 
various organisations and government departments including the World Bank (1990
9
) 
and the UNDP (2000) in their respective poverty definition of a community based on 
average $1 or $1.25 daily earning per person. 
However, it is maintained that the absolute poverty line does not compare the income of 
the individuals around them, and therefore, fails to provide a clear picture in 
understanding the living standard in relative terms. In addition to this, the absolute 
poverty line is criticised for being externally determined concept that may not reflect the 
indigenous characteristics of the poor within a community. That is to say that: ―..the 
absolute poverty line has no interpretation of its own. Such absolute poverty measures 
which are ‗borrowed‘ from a particular country and/or year, and frozen in real term, will 
subsequently be called ‗quasi-absolute‖ (Niemietz (2011: 43). 
While relative poverty, in contrast to absolute, is the comparison of the bottom fifth 
income strata of population to its upper counterpart. In other words, it relates to the level 
of income distribution of a society that compares the income of bottom docile to the 
mean income of a society.  Ravallion (1993) suggests that the relative poverty level of 
society is higher than the average standard of living. That is, an individual or household 
is said to be relatively poor if his/her income falls short of the mean income of the 
society. Niemitz states that: “…relative poverty is a fixed fraction of the central 
tendency of the income distribution. Thus households are considered poor if their 
income is far below those of typical income of a particular time and place‖ (Niemitz, 
2011: 41).   
Since the relative poverty refers to the gap between the average income of the society 
and the income of an individual or household, therefore, relative poverty approach helps 
to understand the level of income inequality prevailing in that society. 
Relative poverty does not necessarily follow the absolute poverty trends (Jamal, 2002). 
For instance, if the gap between the upper and lower class of a society shrinks down at 
                                                 
9
 World Bank developed a poverty line based on I dollar a day on 1985 purchasing power parity prices, 
and used it subsequently to analyse poverty situation within countries  and compare poverty profile of 
various countries.  
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the cost of declining standard of material well-being of the former, while relative 
poverty may decline, the absolute poverty increases. Unlike the absolute poverty line, 
the relative poverty line changes overtime in order to adjust with the changing nature of 
the living standard and average income level of the society.  
It is worth pointing out that while the relative poverty approach is more useful in 
developed countries where the absolute poverty is not of paramount importance of 
policy debate, in developing countries on the contrary greater attention is given to the 
absolute poverty. That is because in the latter the acute problems related to poverty – the 
hunger, starvation, malnutrition, homelessness etc. – need to be arrested first before 
moving to place any emphasis on reducing income inequality. 
Although the headcount poverty ratio (both absolute and relative poverty) is a 
commonly used method in poverty analysis, it has been criticised for failing to take into 
account the other serious issues of poverty i.e. the depth and severity of poverty among 
the poor. For example, a policy intervention that seeks to make the poorest of the poor 
better off, but cannot raise them above the poverty line, would appear to be failing in 
reducing the poverty in absolute terms. Yet perceiving poverty solely on absolute terms 
such policy measures may seem unsuccessful. However, looking at the depth and 
severity of poverty, it indicates that such policy interventions are effective in reducing 
the average poverty level, without changing the actual number of the poor below the 
poverty line. Therefore, to understand a broader nature of poverty and the effectiveness 
of poverty reduction measure, it is essential to know the poverty gap and the severity of 
poverty alongside headcount poverty ratio.  
Poverty Gap Index (PGI) is used to measure the depth of the poverty within a 
community. It calculates the average gap of individuals or households from the 
primarily determined/set poverty line. In other words, the PGI is the distance of the 
mean income of the poor to the poverty line. The PGI for the non-poor is zero and a 
population mean is taken from the entire population (Chen and Ravallion, 2001a; 
2001b). PGI measurement is thought to be an effective instrument for policy planners 
intending to reduce/alleviate poverty through targeted transfers. It equips them with the 
prior knowledge of how much resources need to be transferred in order to bring the poor 
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out of the poverty line. Thus, through poverty gap measurements one can understand 
how far the poor are from the poverty line and how much transfers are required to lift 
them out of poverty. Therefore, it can be argued that PGI enables the policy planners to 
dent poverty more efficiently, provided that the transfer mechanism is free of distortion 
and targeted only to the desired community. However, PGI measure is also not without 
its limitations. For example, although PGI measures the average depth of poverty, it fails 
to describe how much inequality exists among the poor: the severity of poverty.  
The severity of poverty or the Index of Square of Poverty Gap (ISPG) adds up the 
squared average income of the poor, and then measures its distance from the poverty 
threshold. In other words it measures the level of living standard of the poor.
10
 The 
severity of poverty is the square of PGI, and gives more weight to the poorest among the 
poor; therefore, it reveals the magnitude of severity of poverty among the poor. ISPG is 
one of the practicable instruments through which unequal distribution of income 
amongst the poor is measured. In addition, it plays a vital role in identifying the chronic 
poverty, therein the severity and duration of poverty remains for a long period. Hence, it 
provides a clearer picture to the policy actions aiming to target the most deserving and 
ultra-poor: those who are too poor to get any advantage from general public policies in 
one hand and are incapable of taking part in any socio-economic activity generated by 
the market-driven mechanism on the other. Moreover, together with the poverty gap and 
the expenditure inequality among the poor, this index also reflects some of other 
dimensions of poverty related to human deprivation (we shall discuss them shortly).  
In short, the headcount ratio, the poverty gap and the severity of poverty are summed up 
concisely under the Foster Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) Index of Poverty. FGT (1984) 
propose an Index (    that captures the fundamental elements that should by measured 
by poverty indices. Such as: 
1. The incidence of poverty: the number of people falling below a predetermined 
poverty line. 
                                                 
10
 For more information on poverty measurements, please see Coudouel et al. (2002). 
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2. The intensity of poverty: this measures the depth or gap of poverty - how far the 
poor are from the poverty line. 
3. The severity of poverty: this reflects the inequality among the poor.  
 
FST index is best described algebraically in following formula:    
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Where      represents the income of (i) individual, ( ) is the number of poor out of total 
population (n) and (α) is the aversion for poverty. As (α) increases, more and more 
weight is given to the poorest of the poor.  
When α = 0,    yields the headcount poverty measure (H). And when α = 1,    becomes 
the poverty gap. Similarly, when α = 2,    generates the square of poverty gap or the 
severity of poverty. 
Over the last two decades poverty is studied and analysed with much broader 
perspective. This new thinking of poverty evolved many approaches that are briefly 
explicated in subsequent pages.  
A multifaceted approach to poverty is expounded by the Human Development Index 
(HDI). The HDI is developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
in early 1990s with the underlining theme that the human development and progress 
cannot be realised only by enhancing the GDP per capita. Instead, the human 
development needs to be measured through a composite index of three dimensions of 
human life. The human development report (1990) of the UNDP for the first time 
brought the HDI concept to the light by stating that human development ―is much more 
than just the expression of income and wealth‖ (UNDP, 1990:10). The HDI is the 
composite index of three broad dimensions, which are reported as under.
11
  
 
1. A long and healthy life, measured by life expectancy at birth. 
                                                 
11 For more explanation of HDI see UNDP report (1990).   
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2. Being educated or knowledgeable, measured by educational attainment, the adult 
literacy rate – with two third weights – and the combined primary, secondary and 
tertiary gross enrollment ratio – with one third weight.  
3.  A decent and socially acceptable living standard, captured by the GDP per 
capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollar terms.  
Each index of the HDI needs to be calculated separately before constructing the HDI 
itself. The HDI is simply obtained as the average of the three indices, such as; 
 
     
 
 
                         
 
 
                    
 
 
                                                
           (2.2) 
Hence, HDI provides a broader framework to assess the human development‘s three 
highly important socio-economic dimensions of human life. For example, education is 
not only crucial for human development by itself; it is also instrumental in improving 
the healthcare, creating awareness and imparting empowerment to the people.  
However, skeptics criticise the Index for being incomprehensive measurement of human 
well-being. For instance, the Index fails to explain the social and political rights of 
individuals in one hand; it ignores the income inequality on the other. For more 
discussion with related strengths and potential weakness of the HDI (please see, Anan, 
1992; Foster et al., 2005; and Grimm, et al., 2008; Jenkins, 2009; Kenneth and Stephan, 
2012). 
In addition to the HDI another multifaceted approach to poverty is Amartya Sen‘s 
concept of capabilities and functioning. Sen‘s concept, a non-monetary approach to 
poverty, refers to the expansion and development of human capabilities against the 
traditional welfare economics approach of opulence and utility maximization derived 
from a monetary income or consumption (Sen, 1999). His capability approach holds that 
the actual or real outcome of well-being does not come from a money income; rather, it 
can be derived in terms of real freedom of life. The concept of ‗functioning‘ relates to 
the activities a person is capable of doing and being in achieving certain material well-
being. However, the central principle of ‗capabilities‘ is the human freedom to attain 
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such functioning (Sen, 1999:73-75).
12
 Therefore, the functioning concept refers to the 
achievement of a person, whereas capability concept seeks to materialise certain 
functions. These functions include, being healthy and literate; to be the part of active 
and productive labour force; and to participate in socio-cultural and political affairs. In 
other words, the well-being of a person should be viewed according to what s/he can do 
rather than what actually they do. Thus, according to this approach poverty is viewed in 
terms of deficiency in human rights (be social, economic, political or legal rights) and 
capability to exercise his functions to achieve material well-being and these rights in a 
given society.  
Sen‘s criticism to the traditional approach to poverty on the ground that it does not have 
enough information and scope to encompass all spheres of human life is also endorsed 
by other (for example, Wilson and Ramphele, 1989; Clark and Andrew, 1996; Moore et 
al., 1998; Saith, 2001; Alkire, 2002; Clark, 2003). Sen postulates that neither utility 
maximisation nor the state of being affluent captures the multi-dimensional aspect of 
human life. The utility being mental and satiated satisfactions while the latter is 
materialistic well-being that fails to value the socio-economic and political well-being of 
people.   
A central issue facing the capabilities and functioning approach of poverty, is the 
problem of its translation into something measureable: i.e. how to measure and quantify 
the capability. Furthermore, it fails to provide a list of culturally and historically 
insensitive elements to identify the capabilities of human beings
13
 (Nussbaum, 2000a; 
2000b). However,  Nussbaum (2000a) notwithstanding criticising Sen‘s approach to 
poverty,  argues that yet an ‗overlapping consensus‘ exists among communities on the 
very question of human well-being (for example, life, health, emotion, affiliations, 
senses etc.) thereby it needs to be viewed on an  international basis.  
A strong criticism on traditional poverty assessments – be it monetary/basic need 
approach or capability approach – is because of its nature of being somewhat ―externally 
imposed‖ and thereby fails to understand the perceptions and views of the poor 
                                                 
12
 Interested readers are referred to Sen (1984; 1993; 1999; 2005) for a more discussion on this issue. 
13 It is worth mentioning that Sen does not explain what capabilities are and how to define them. 
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themselves. To its response, Chambers (1994; 1995; 1998; 2001) introduces the 
participatory approach by arguing that: ―The realities of poor people are local, complex, 
diverse and dynamic. Income-poverty, though important, is only one aspect of 
deprivation. Participatory appraisal confirms many dimensions and criteria of 
disadvantage, ill-being and well-being as people experience them. In addition to 
poverty, these include social inferiority, isolation, physical weakness, vulnerability, 
seasonal deprivation, powerlessness and humiliation‖ (Chambers, 1995:173).  
The central tenet of this approach is that community development and poverty strategy 
is more useful if it involves the poor in their policy decisions.  Initiatives that are viewed 
important to the poor and instrumental in addressing their poverty related issues ought to 
be incorporated in institutional mechanisms and poverty reduction strategies. Thus, the 
participation of the poor in policy mechanism provides four broader elements that 
underline the vitality of any programme aims to targeting the poor. First, it creates a 
sense of ownership of the poor towards the programmes and policies designed and 
devoted in mitigating their own poverty (Duraiappah et al., 2005). Second, once the 
poor and the marginalised community are included in policy decisions and their issues 
are part of the policy agenda, which the poor value the most, the effectiveness of such 
policies would inherently enhance. Third, it increases the poor and local people‘s 
capacity to engage and effectively influence the direction of poverty alleviation 
programmes. Finally, it not only ensures the participation of the poor in their matters but 
also empowers the poor and makes them autonomous in dealing with their issues. In 
addition to this, it also capitalises the institutions with the knowledge and understanding 
of the causes of poverty through the eyes of the poor. 
It is relevant to mention that the importance of participatory approach increased when it 
was endorsed and adopted by the international financial institutions, particularly the 
World Bank
14
 and the IMF, in their poverty assessments that later  institutionalised the 
approach in action.  
                                                 
14
 For more discussion please refer to World Development Report (2000) ―Voice of the Poor‖, and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of various countries.  
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Skeptics (d de Cunha et al., 1997; Howard and Milward, 1997 among others) however 
point out certain shortcomings and difficulties concerning with the participatory 
approach. First, the multidimensional characteristic of participatory approach makes its 
measurement difficult and complex. Second, due to the heterogeneous nature of the poor 
in terms of taste, priority, and perception of their status of poverty, it becomes 
challenging for the policy makers to decide who among community members should be 
heard of. de Cunha et al. (1997) are of the view that since the participatory approach 
places the social relation at central importance, and yet the latter gives preferences to 
more powerful amongst the community. Therefore, it is highly likely that the poor 
remain misrepresented within the community. Furthermore, normally the marginalised 
people of the community are fearful to challenge the ‗local elite‘, due to the fact that the 
latter can use their social cleavages to intimidate the former and suppress their opinions. 
Likewise, very often in commune life – particularly in rural areas – the ultra-poor are 
not only excluded from the communal structure, they are also considered untouchable, 
hence, not allowed exercising any social input in community affairs (Howard and 
Milward, 1997). Thus, it may be argued that even though the central focus of the 
participatory approach of poverty is the community participation and inclusiveness, yet 
the exclusion of many of the poor from engaging in these social and economic affairs 
creates similar difficulties as we saw in Sen‘s capability approach as well as monetary 
approach.  
Another key approach to poverty that gathered a considerable attention is the social 
exclusion approach. This approach focuses on the relative deprivation and 
marginalisation of people. This concept gained particular attention in developed 
countries to arrest the threat of social exclusion of the weaker and dispossessed 
communities in political participation.
15
 According to the European Union, the social 
exclusion refers to a situation in which individuals or households are not included in the 
process of social life. In other words, they are fully or partially excluded from 
participating in socio-economic activities of the society (European Foundation, 1995).  
                                                 
15
 For more information please see Micklewright (2002; Ruggeri (2005). 
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Atkinson (1998) points out the relativity, dynamics and agency as central elements of 
social exclusion concept of poverty. He argues that social phenomenon relates to a 
particular society (of being relative), and poor are excluded from the social life due to 
certain acts of the agents (is the characteristic of agency). Moreover, both present social 
circumstances and future events have potential to affect the social exclusion of the poor 
(is the characteristic of dynamism).   
The review of various approaches to poverty presented above highlights that there exists 
no unique way of defining and measuring poverty. None of the approaches is fully 
inclusive and therefore contains some levels of arbitrariness and subjectivity. The 
monetary approach albeit has been criticised for being most inconsistent empirically, but 
equally it  is the most  widely used method for defining and measuring poverty both in 
theoretical and empirical research compare to other approaches. The capability 
approach, in contrast, is less arbitrary when it defines poverty which is crucial for 
human development and applies equally to all and focuses on the provision of public 
goods. Other approaches also involve a large element of construction in their respective 
identification and measurement of poverty. Each approach possesses its own strengths 
and shortcoming, therefore, have different impacts for targeting and policy implications. 
Although inherently overlapping, each approach to poverty points to different policy 
outcomes. Hence, policy implications with different aims of targeting may choose the 
right approach appropriate to their goals. As mentioned earlier that monetary approach, 
despite being more subjective when compared to its counterparts, is largely used.  The 
common reason, among others, being that it is easy to identify and measure poverty 
using this approach. Following the trend, the same approach, along with the UNDP‘s 
adopted HDI approach, is used for our empirical analysis in poverty.  
2.5  POTENTIAL IMPACT OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION ON POVERTY 
Observing the impact of fiscal decentralisation on poverty and establishing a direct or 
indirect link (either positive or negative) between these two variables has been and still 
remains a challenge for both public and development economists, respectively. Fiscal 
decentralisation and federalism should promote human development that is explained by 
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the growth and expansion of people‘s capabilities and range of choices. Fiscal 
decentralisation contributes to poverty reduction and human development through 
positive influence on participation, efficiency, accountability, governance and other such 
channels that are presented in figure 1.      
The interaction of fiscal decentralisation and poverty may take place through multiple 
and complex channels. Figure 1 presents a schematic framework that maps the 
mechanisms through which fiscal decentralisation is expected to have positive impact on 
poverty reduction, improved efficiency and better targeting of social and economic 
services. Public services that potentially affect the living standard of the poor include 
health, education, water and sanitation, local infrastructure, agriculture and irrigation, 
and rural development. Poverty is also indirectly influenced by other socioeconomic 
factors, which determine the implementation of fiscal decentralisation and in turn are 
influenced by the latter. These factors include macroeconomic stability, social and 
political system of the country, market arrangement, institutional setting, 
democratisation and demographic configurations. Thus, fiscal decentralisation plausibly 
affects poverty through certain macroeconomic variables, social elements and 
institutional arrangements.  
As noted above, fiscal decentralisation operates under the combination of its four 
elements of expenditure decentralisation, revenue decentralisation, intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers and borrowing authority. Expenditure decentralisation should be equal to 
the subnational governments‘ own resource through taxes, intergovernmental transfers 
and the borrowings. Fiscal decentralisation system basically runs under the combination 
of these four elements and each of them has its own impact on poverty directly and 
indirectly through other factors. Oates (1972), and Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 
(2011) exhibit that fiscal decentralisation improves social welfare by focusing on public 
expenditures. Considering the proximity to local people and being accountable to them, 
the subnational governments‘ expenditure decisions are likely to be in line with 
preferences of the people, which, therefore, generate efficiency gain for the entire 
society. 
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Looking at the fiscal decentralisation‘s impact on poverty within political economy 
framework, one may notice that fiscal decentralisation is likely to increase the 
participation of the poor, promotes the culture of accountability and governance, and 
enhances the chances of the selection of pro-poor investment. The engagement of the 
poor in selection and implementation and monitoring of public services makes the 
subnational governments more accountable that in turn augments the efficiency of 
public service delivery. Hence, a more decentralised mechanism and framework helps to 
identify and implement projects that are efficient in terms of costs and benefits as well 
as having the potential to reach to poor and needy.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework of the Potential Impact of Fiscal Decentralisation on Poverty 
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2.5.1   FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND POVERTY: THEORETICAL 
PRINCIPLES   
In the literature of public economics decentralisation or more specifically the fiscal 
decentralisation is not a new issue. Rather it goes back to the fiftieth decade of the 
last century when Teibout (1956) and Musgrave (1959) presented their respective 
pioneering works. This literature has a range of researches that involve the structure 
of the public sector and types of government that are best suited to fulfill these 
functions. Since that, economists and policy makers theorised the issues of fiscal 
decentralisation to assess its various impacts on economics and governance of a 
country and the well-being of her people.   
The current theoretical literature of fiscal decentralisation may be divided into three 
major areas. First strand presented by Musgrave (1959); Oates (1972); Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980), among others, examines the optimal division of powers shared by 
national and subnational
16
 governments and their roles in public sector expenditure. 
The main outcome of this research is best concluded in Oates (1972) 
―Decentralisation Theorem‖. The theorem demonstrates that under certain conditions 
(for example, heterogeneity of taste and no spillovers effects) the subnational 
governments are more efficient in providing the Praeto-efficient levels of services to 
their constituents compare to a central government that provides a uniform level of 
good across the jurisdictions. One of supplementary arguments of the 
decentralisation theorem is that the advantage of decentralisation is strongly 
correlated with the variance in demand of public goods (Panizza, 1999). 
The second strand of the literature studies the benefits of fiscal decentralisation 
which come as a result of the competition across jurisdictions. Tiebout (1956); 
Whiteman (1987); Donahue (1997); Kolllman et al. (1997) and others are the major 
contributors to this theory. Tiebout (1956) examines the horizontal competitions 
among the jurisdictions, argues how citizens with options of multiple jurisdictions to 
reside, ―vote in their feet‖, and dwell in jurisdictions where the fiscal policies best 
suited their preferences. Buchanan (1980) further studies the vertical competitions 
                                                 
16
 Subnational governments cover provincial, state, regional and local governments.  
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among various types of government for controlling and managing the size of their 
budgets.   
The final and perhaps the most effective strand of this literature discusses as fiscal 
federalism and decentralisation in the light of political economy. Brown and Oates 
(1987); Seabright (1996); Bird et al. (1998); Alesina at al. (1999); Lockwood (2002); 
Besely and Coate (2003); Faguet (2004); Shaw (2004); Bardhan and Mookherjee 
(2005); Galasso and Ravallion (2005) and others are the main contributors to this 
literature. We shall discuss the entire set of the literature in turn next.  
In local public finance literature a remarkable groundbreaking transition took place 
in the year of 1956. This was when Tiebout (1956) presented his famous free 
mobility model. He proposes that the households are perfectly mobile and select a 
locality for residence based on their demand for local public services. Hence free 
mobility of household is the central themes of his theory. However, the assumption 
of households‘ free mobility across jurisdictions seems unrealistic in the context of 
developing countries in which ethnicity, religion, castes among other factors are 
some major impediments to migration. In addition to this, high cost of transportation, 
that may incur in case of migrating from one locality to an another, as well as the 
illiquid nature of  housing market – households may not easily sell their houses in 
old locality and buy new ones on competitive market prices. In the presence of these 
and other such constraints perfect mobility assumption of Teibout model is hard to 
maintain. Thus, evidence is very limited, even within advanced countries, to support 
Teibout‘s voting with the feet model (Conning and Michael, 2002). Nonetheless, 
Weingast (1995) supports Teibout‘s argument of ‗free mobility‘ and maintains that 
within the framework of ―market preserving federalism‖ fiscal decentralisation 
makes the market efficient. This efficiency, in his view, is achieved in a public sector 
where decentralised governments face ‗hard budget constraints‘ and free mobility of 
economic units across subnational governments.  
Fiscal decentralisation is considered by its proponents as the mechanism to enhance 
the provision of public goods at the local level. For instance, Musgrave (1959) in his 
profound theory on public finance assigns ‗resource allocation‘ function to 
government, along with macroeconomic stability and income distribution. He 
suggests that resource allocation function may be assigned to sub-national 
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governments to allow the latter to reflect the preferences of their populaces. 
Extending the same line of argument, Oates (1972) in his ―Decentralisation 
Theorem‖ believes that public goods provision under decentralised government is 
welfare enhancing with the reflection of tastes and preferences of local population 
compare to its central counterpart with uniform level of provision, or in his words 
―one size fits for all‖ across all districts and jurisdictions. He further argues that 
outputs at the district level are determined to maximise the welfare level of that 
particular district and, therefore, enhance the overall economic efficiency. This 
argument is based on the claim that local government due to its proximity to local 
people is better able to cope with local preferences.  
However, he is equally aware of the disadvantages, which may emanate from 
decentralisation in terms of spillover effects. That is, decentralised system of 
governance tends to ignore the advantages (disadvantages) of spilling over to the 
neighbouring jurisdiction(s). In the presence of spillover, local public goods may be 
under-provided. Thus, his theorem proposes a trade-off between spillovers across the 
jurisdictions and extents of the heterogeneity in preferences among various localities. 
In case of overwhelming spillovers, central government would achieve some 
economies of scale in production.  
Shaw (2004), surveys the fiscal decentralisation developments and constraints in 
both developing and transition countries worldwide, demonstrates that the success of 
decentralisation largely depends upon citizens‘ participation in the decision-making 
process. The theme of his study is that the impact of fiscal decentralisation is blurred 
unless the democratic rights of localities are evolved and elected representatives are 
accountable to their voters.  
Literature with political economy approach considers a great potential for the 
decentralised form of government for the provision of local public goods. Studies 
that are surveyed in great detail below cogitate that local government‘s 
representatives being more accountable and less corrupt, perform much better in 
public service delivery than a distant and less accountable central government 
(Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005). 
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Besley and Coate‘s (2003) proposed model provides an insight of the trade-off 
between centralised and decentralised form of government in the provision of local 
public goods. In centralisation the local governments may need to share equally the 
cost of the public goods, which may cause a conflict among the localities. That is 
because it is very likely that some localities get excessive spending at the cost of 
others. This would cause misallocation of funds and uncertainty amongst the 
jurisdictions regarding the nature of the fund which they expect to get from the 
central authority. Their analysis, similar to Oates (1972), largely depends upon 
preference level of the citizens and the degree of spillover in determining which 
system of governance is better suited for public service provisions: more is the level 
of heterogeneity less desirable is the centralisation. They go on to add that 
centralisation with the minimum coalition and non-cooperative arrangement is 
preferred if heterogeneity is high: districts out of coalition would reap the public 
spending. However, if centralisation runs with ‗cooperative legislature‘, the policy 
outcome will maximise the joint outcomes of the representatives that generates the 
Nash Bargaining between two representatives with equal weights. 
However, there exists a major caveat in their model. While describing the political 
rules of the model they assume that under the decentralisation the elected 
representatives maximise their own utilities rather than their voters, which totally 
contrasts to the conventional theory of decentralisation wherein the decentralised 
government considers public preferences. Furthermore, the model assumes under 
centralisation the government representatives are randomly drawn from the already 
elected representatives from the localities that are hard to happen in actuality.  
Seabright‘s (1996) study compares allocations of powers to various tiers of 
governments in order to motivate them to function as per the wishes of citizens.  His 
―incentive effect‖ accountability model shows that centralisation in spite of having 
benefits in policy coordination in the public good provision, has a significant cost in 
terms of diminished accountability. The lack of accountability, therefore, hampers 
the probability that welfare of the given region will ensure that the incumbent is re-
elected. To him decentralisation is capable of improving the accountability of the 
governments to its citizens, even preference differences between localities may not 
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exist. He mentions that redistributive policies under centralisation are distorted, 
because it increases the externalities. 
An interesting issue raised in the Seabright model is the choice of system of 
governance in which the incumbents may entirely be different from their voters. 
Especially in developing countries, people‘s representatives usually hold decisions 
regarding centralisation and decentralisation in line to pursue their own vested 
interest
17
: far remote from the notion that they cater to welfare maximisation of the 
citizens. Nevertheless, the model ignores the fiscal rules that ought to be an 
imperative component of any political economy based framework. That is, it does 
not discuss the distributions and compositions of tax revenues: whether it should 
entirely be the responsibility of central, regional or local governments to collect the 
taxes and distribute them under what formulae.  
An important point raised in the decentralisation literature is the existence and 
prevalence of ―elite capture‖. Theorists believe that elite capture makes the fiscal 
decentralisation ineffective in poverty alleviation, because it may enhance the 
strength of local elite to usurp the rights of the poor (Dellinger, 1994; Krishna, 
2003). Bardhan and Mookherjee‘s (2005) theoretical framework in this regard 
provides a fine insight to understand more of the elite capture phenomenon over the 
antipoverty programme to local governments. They propose that in the absence of 
transparent electoral process, the lack of political awareness among the poor, and the 
presence of strong and rich lobbies to influence political parties and representatives 
through their finances, the decentralised anti-poverty programmes become very 
prone to elite capture.  
The scale of capture is high in those locality or jurisdiction where the incidence of 
poverty is higher compare to the neighbouring jurisdictions. This happens because in 
poor jurisdictions people have less political awareness and incentives to hold the 
representatives accountable. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) further highlight that 
under centralisation, given the ―bureaucratic corruption‖ the poor may receive better 
allocation provided that aggregate supply is greater than the black market demand, 
which comes from the rich. Thus, ‗elite capture‘ and ‗bureaucratic corruption‘ 
                                                 
17
 This is similar to the assumption of Besley and Coate (2003) political economy where the utility 
maximisation is the key to decentralization model. 
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depend largely on the incidence and severity of poverty, and the scale of black 
market in the economy.  However, the model proposes, though for simplicity, some 
unrealistic assumptions which are hard to exist in the real world. For instance, it 
seems unrealistic to assume that the poor are entirely out of elections process in a 
democratic setup. Although the poor may be misled while casting their votes, but it 
is true that in all democratic system based on adult franchise the poor and the rich 
have the equal voting power. Similarly, the model posits that centrally appointed 
bureaucrats – who are responsible for running and monitoring the anti-poverty 
programmes at the local levels – are not accountable to any authority.18     
Unlike Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005), Galasso and Ravallion (2005) do not find 
elite capture in anti-poverty programmes in a decentralised setting. They model and 
assess the outcomes of such programmes under decentralisation and test the same on 
Bangladesh‘s Food for Education programme.19 It is shown that the effectiveness of 
such programme depends largely on its incidence and magnitude of poverty in the 
targeted area. They identify various factors such as inequality, remoteness of locality 
from centre, poor intuitional setup in the village, where the programmes are  
launched, and skewed distribution of land potentially make the programme less 
targeted to the poor. 
 The consequence of decentralisation on poverty in a country level was conducted by     
Faguet (2004). His study shows that how decentralisation affects the pattern of 
investments on social sectors and human capital formations. He applied his simple 
model on a dataset from Bolivia during 1992-96, which demonstrates that the 
poorest provinces would invest greater amounts of the devolved funds on high 
priority projects which meet the basic needs of local people. His argument supports 
the common assertion
20
 that the fiscal decentralisation changes the pattern of public 
expenditures to the provision of services that are related to poverty alleviation.  
                                                 
18
  It is true that the bureaucrats who are appointed and posted by central government at the local 
levels, however, they have to follow certain rules that make them accountable to the central 
government and its elected representatives if not to local people directly.  
19
 The programme was launched by the Government of Bangladesh in 1993 to provide free monthly 
ration to poor families provided that their kids attend primary school. This programme was aimed to 
increase literacy rate and quality of education.   
20
 For example (Crook, 2003) shows that fiscal decentralisation may change the composition of public 
expenditure if the subnational government choices in term of types and size of public services 
provision are different from the central government choices. 
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Conventional literature on fiscal decentralisation justifies local/regional government 
based on the notion of heterogeneity and asymmetric information. However, 
Rubinchik-Pessach (2005) shows that even asymmetries are removed; the existence 
of local government is still justified. That is because the central objective of the local 
governance system is to improve welfare level of local people through efficient 
service delivery. His complex model, though very peculiar, assumes three regions, 
with each one having a unity cost. Hence, every region is ready to pay R amount as 
average cost with a uniform tax bill ‗α‘ and pivotal voters, ‗m‘ in order to approve  a 
project, ‗b‟. The utilitarian welfare that is drawn from a project, therefore, is: 
            
 
      
Under centralisation the set of projects that generates enough benefits to the voters 
is,         M is the set of projects which are accepted at the equilibrium, whereas 
under decentralisation the projects set includes ones with high extreme benefit to 
cover the cost R.                
Thus, adding local government as a tier to the system of governance adds another 
project          to the accepted set of projects. Rubinchik-Pessach‘s (2005) 
assertion is somewhat contrary to the traditional view of federalism, in which the 
decentralisation is not welfare-improving if spillover between jurisdictions exists and 
preferences of the people are homogenous across the country. Rubinchik-Pessach, on 
the other hand demonstrates that: 
..it is the prevalence valuable global issues along with the projects of local importance 
that generates the need for local governments. The hierarchy induces specialisation of 
each tier on the corresponding issues, thus, enhancing the overall welfare, which can 
justify possible costs associated with the additional level of government. Thus, the 
main argument does not stem from an assumed deficiency of a central government, 
but rather, rests on the idea of specialisation (Rubinchik-Pessach, 2005: 243).   
Lockwood (2002) investigates the fiscal policy choice between centralisation and 
decentralisation in a particular political economy arrangement. Within centralisation, 
the decisions about project selection and implementation are undertaken through 
national legislative rules. In legislative bargaining, in which the delegates comprising 
regional representatives, vote for the projects that are regional specific. Projects 
outcomes in this case are not sufficient ―because the choice of projects is 
insufficiently sensitive to with-in region benefits‖ (Lockwood, 2002:316). His 
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analysis somehow supports Oates (1972) intuition that in case of weak externalities 
and heterogeneity, decentralisation is an efficient arrangement for public goods and 
services delivery. Lockwood‘s theory is best described in the following equations: 
                    
                                  .  
   is the welfare under decentralisation,    is the project in locality i, and    
presents cost incurs to the the citizens of locality i.    
  is the private consumption. 
Thus, the gain in decentralisation is higher provided that the spillover (     is not 
present. The first term supports the argument that decentralisation is responsive to 
subnational level benefits from projects. The second critical point is the project 
spillovers,      , that may be positive or negative. Fiscal decentralisation is not 
efficient if the project has externality effects. On the contrary fiscal decentralisation 
may be more beneficial than centralisation as project externalities are partially 
internalised by legislative process.  
Brown and Oates (1987) examine the role of various tiers of government in assisting 
the poor. Assuming utility interdependence of poor and non-poor, they show how the 
level of poor assistance programmes varies with the extent of mobility of the poor 
under the decentralisation and centralisation support mechanism. The study 
examines the matters of poor assistance in a federal system of governance with the 
assumption of a perfect mobility. Since the relief programme is to be financed 
through non-poor tax, therefore, the utility
21
, of the non-poor plays a vital role. 
In locality i the utility of non-poor depends on his own income and post transfer 
income of the poor, while the poor‘s utility depends on his post transfer income, 
  
    
     
  . Thus, it implies that, 
   
 
    
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
    
 . Non-poor keeps transferring 
until marginal utility of a unit of currency to him is equal to marginal utility of same 
unit given to the poor.  
More poor is less desirable, but as free mobility assumption holds, a programme for 
the poor follows more immigration from other jurisdiction, therefore,  
  
  
  .   is 
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the elasticity of migration function. Thus, bigger the fear of immigration the lower 
would be the transfers‘ response by the non-poor of that jurisdiction.  
Supporting the same notion, Wildasin (1991) argues that such decentralised system 
of poor assistance produces fiscal externalities. Supporting the same argument, Ladd 
and Doolittle (1982) show that poor relief assistance should be assumed by central 
government in order to avoid externality.   
Focusing on the political effects instead of tax competition and mobility of tax bases 
of centralisation, Persson and Tabellini (1994) deal with a positive question of 
federalism: whether the fiscal programmes (transfer schemes, social insurance etc.) 
are smaller or larger if they run through decentralised government? They show that 
by centralising the provision of public goods gives benefits only to the specific local 
populace, produces the incentives for rent-seekers or free-riders. Their model 
assumes j symmetric localities with population one each so the representative of 
locality j has the preference:            .     is the local public good. If   is 
locally provided and financed through local lump-sum tax then all would be agreed 
on the optimal provision of g with budget constraint:        . If instead the same 
good is provided by central government and financed through federal lump-sum tax 
then the budget constraint is:        , which clearly shows that all agents strive to 
obtain more   . This is because in case of success they need to pay only a fraction of 
      of the total cost. In this way it creates a room for rent seeking and resultantly 
over-production of public goods.  
Koethenbuerger (2008) rules out the role of externalities in determining the efficacy 
of decentralised and centralised system of governments, which of course is in stark 
contrast to the mainstream view. He rather emphasises that the presence of high 
amount of spillovers/externalities as the merit of decentralisation. Using a quasi-
linear, iso-elastic preference model for two regions with different preference level 
for local public goods, he shows how consumption spillovers influences relative 
merits of both systems of governance. The demand for centralisation increases with 
more spillovers:      
 
   
    
   
  . Where G is the public good and   is the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of public consumption. In a decentralized system the 
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policy making changes when spillovers increase: 
     
  
 
     
     
     
  
 
   
   
 
     
      
      
  
    . 
  is the level of spillovers and  i and j are respective localities. Keeping the 
contributions level as it is, when   increases district i benefits more from district j‟s 
public expenditure. The intuition is, in the presence of high spillovers the welfare 
level becomes non-monotonic, which narrow-downs the welfare difference between 
centralisation and decentralisation. 
However, Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) differ from this view point. To Hindriks 
and Lockwood (2009) centralisation reduces the electoral discipline as rent seeker 
(corrupt) politicians target only the minimum coalition region to retain offices. 
Therefore, decentralisation is desirable if the target is to attain equity and efficiency. 
Their argument is on the contrary to the accepted notion of the comparison of 
centralised and decentralised form of government based on the presence of 
externality and heterogeneity of local preference. The model describes that how 
corrupt incumbents divert money from revenue central pool and reduce the welfare 
level of citizens. A snapshot of the model is presented here to understand the main 
intuition:                       
 
 
        .    is the decreasing step-
function of  , which is the discount factor.     is expected welfare benefit from 
centralisation.  
 
 
   is the expected discipline from the selective pooling, n is the 
total number of districts and m is minimum winning coalition districts. In such a 
scenario the good-intentioned incumbents make a coalition with the ill-intentioned 
incumbents for the projects‘ selection at the lowest cost. Thus, under 
decentralisation:                              , bad incumbent can 
separate only   instead of  
 
 
  . Thus, voters‘ welfare is higher in decentralisation. 
However, their model is based on ample of unrealistic and trivial assumptions that 
are hard to fulfill in reality.   
In similar fashion, Lockwood (2006) in another study presents a legislative model 
and assumes political representatives who tend to maximise their own pay-off 
instead of their voters. Supposing three regions in a federation, in which project in 
region three is most costly but gives more economic surplus: (             
                 ,
 
where,   is the willingness to pay for the project.  A welfare 
maximisation notion demands that project three should be selected. But the 
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representatives of region one and two respectively, impede project three to 
implement through the strategic delegation in legislative assembly, therefore, they 
prefer no project or status quo.   Thus, the end result of centralisation may be: 
if region (i) chooses a delegate to the legislature who places a high value on the 
public good, this delegate will be more ‗aggressive‘ in the legislature in demanding a 
higher   . This works to the benefits of citizens i because part if the cost of higher    
is borne the other region. But, of course, if both regions delegate to ‗aggressive‘ 
delegates, this will be self-defeating: the end results is that both    and    will be 
higher than their efficient levels (Ben Lockwood, 2006: 43). 
However, Oates (2008) argues that efficient outcomes in terms of local public 
service provision are possible even without assuming benevolence of the local 
authorities. It runs as: “in the widely used median voter model, for example electoral 
competition, resulting in median-voter equlibria may produce outcomes that do not 
deviate very much from efficient ones‖ (Oates, 2008:315).22  
Panizza (1999) finds that the level of fiscal centralisation has negative correlation 
with certain economic and political variables. His theoretical framework shows that 
country size, income per capita, the level of democracy and degree of 
fractionalisation are inversely correlated with centralisation. Panizza‘s empirical 
conclusions somewhat support the theoretical predictions of Oates (1972); 
Lockwood (2002); Besley and Coate (2003) whereby it is shown that the 
centralisation may not be suitable for a country with heterogeneous preference of 
public services and mature democracy. 
 Another line of argument comes in the favour of fiscal decentralisation is due to the 
ethnic fractionalisation. Alesina et al. (1999) are among the proponents who consider 
decentralised system best suited for an ethnically diversified society. Their analysis 
shows that how ethnic fractionalisation affects the amount of public goods, which is 
decided by political jurisdiction through median voter. The equilibrium amount of 
public good is shown as:           
          .     
  is the median distance from 
the one preferred by ‗median voter‘(median distance from the median shows the 
                                                 
22
 Bregstrom (1979) gives a detail account of how median-voters outcomes could be Pareto-efficient.  
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scale of ethnic fractionalisation.)
23
  Thus, it is depicted from the above equation that 
public good is decreasing in    
 . 
Authors like Stigler (1957); Musgrave (1959); Oates (1972) suggest that the role of 
subnational governments in redistributive policies is counterproductive. The reason 
why they stand against subnational governments‘ participation is mainly based on 
efficiency. Although inter-jurisdictional migration provides people the option to 
locate themselves to the places in order to increase their income with different 
bundle of public goods and tax burdens to the people. However, in case a poverty 
reduction scheme or redistributive policy is launched in a jurisdiction, it may lead to 
Pareto-inferior outcomes. That is because poor people from other jurisdictions find 
their way to and the rich come out of this jurisdiction.  In order to provide support to 
the poor, the subnational governments need to impose more taxes on rich to finance 
the poverty related schemes. However, without any expenditure benefits in return the 
rich eventually would migrate to the regions with lower taxes. This leads to an 
unbalanced budgetary situation for the subnational government where the cost of 
redistributive programmes would tend to enlarge while the revenue sources 
aggravate. As a result, the redistributive policies of subnational government would 
become unsustainable. Thus, the subnational government‘s role in redistributive 
policies is clearly criticised on the ground of mobility of the population and factors 
of production. That is because fiscally induced mobility is likely to create economic 
distortions and inefficiencies.  
On the other hand, there is a growing acceptance for the effective role of subnational 
governments for launching, implementing and monitoring policies related to poverty 
reduction (Teibout, 1956; Pauy, 1973; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Wildasin, 
1994; Wilson, 1999; Bird and Michael, 2002; 2003 among others). Bird and Michael 
(2002) argue that the decentralised governments cannot avoid policies that have 
direct bearing on poverty.  
Pauly (1973), assuming the imperfect population mobility, shows the efficacy of 
decentralisation in income redistribution and poverty reduction policies and presents 
that subnational governments are more efficient and effective in performing these 
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 Alesina et al. (1999:1249). Implications of the same model are tested using US data, and are 
reported later on in this chapter.  
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policies than the central government. However, Wildasin (1994) maintains that if 
factors of production and workers in a given jurisdiction are immobile, redistributive 
policies of subnational governments are inefficient and unsustainable.  
Similarly, interregional migration may also affect poverty because it can potentially 
change the expenditure and tax policy of local governments. Wilson (1999) and 
Wildasin (2003) argue that perfectly mobile factors migrate to jurisdictions with low 
tax rate unless ‗after tax rate of return‘ becomes equal countrywide. This, therefore, 
leads to a ‗race to bottom‘ competition among local governments which forcefully 
reduce their tax rates to avoid further outflow of mobile factors. Nevertheless, 
Tiebout (1956) demonstrates that taxpayer mobility allows the local governments to 
adopt an autonomous tax and expenditure policy to fulfill the highly heterogeneous 
demands of the constituents.      
Sumarto et al. (2004) present four reasons for fiscal decentralisation to alleviate 
poverty. Firstly, decentralisation makes the subnational government more transparent 
and accountable in designing and implementing its policies. Secondly, it allows 
resource endowed localities to shape and implement their own poverty reduction 
schemes. Thirdly, subnational government has authority to utilise the 
allocated/raised fund according to their own priorities. And finally, the autonomous 
local governments can create more conducive economic setting to bolster economic 
growth and create more job opportunities.   
Fiscal decentralisation may also alter the level of poverty by changing the 
composition of public sector expenditures. As part of the redistributive schemes 
public resources can directly be given to poor that cause their income to increase. 
And pro-poor public expenditures also affect poverty even without direct resource 
transfer to the poor. For example, with fiscal decentralisation the public expenditures 
on basic services such as health and education are to increase. Since these services 
are fundamental for human development, therefore, fiscal decentralisation is 
expected to increase the welfare of the poor (Martinez-Vazquez, 2001).  
2.5.2 FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND POVERTY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
The time-scale of empirical literature on the subject is much shorter than its 
theoretical counterpart. It has started its development in 1990s when Easterly and 
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Levine (1997) in a cross countries analysis discover a negative relationship between 
ethnic diversity and public goods and services parameters. Their findings reveal that 
the poor economic performance of African countries is positively correlated with 
their diverse ethnic structures. Supporting Easterly and Levine (1997) conclusions, 
Alesina et al. (1999) also confirm negative interaction between ethnic 
fractionalisation and public goods spending. They argue that ―ethnic conflict is an 
important determinant of local finance‖ (Alesina et al., 1999: 1243). They model and 
test its implication with three data sets of the US cities, metropolitans and urban 
centres, respectively. Their empirical outcomes reveal that spending shares on the 
core public goods and service (education, roads and sewerage) are lesser in more 
ethnically fragmented areas/localities. 
The study by Bird and Rodriguez (1999) in this regard gives the first trend of fiscal 
decentralisation impact on poverty alleviation. Examining the relationship between 
decentralisation and poverty alleviation, in an international setting with special focus 
on the Philippines, they exhibit that the effectiveness of fiscal decentralisation on 
poverty alleviation may not only be gauged through the level of expenditures on 
public expenditures. Instead the socio-economic, political, cultural and institutional 
setup of countries also plays a pivotal role in determining the efficacy of fiscal 
decentralisation in poverty reduction. Thus, overall interregional migration of 
population and factors of production appears to be a key distinctive determinant of 
the potential impact of fiscal decentralisation on poverty. In other words, if migration 
of population and factors of production are constraint, polices adopted by the local 
governments may be more effective in implementing poverty related programmes 
with no or minimum efficiency cost than the central government.  
Rao (2000), through a conceptual and theoretical framework, shows the relationship 
of fiscal decentralisation and poverty alleviation. His study reveals that fiscally 
decentralised local governments can give more tangible and efficient poverty 
alleviation schemes than what is possible in centralisation. He suggests a framework 
under which the central and local government finance works through the channel of 
intergovernmental transfers system for better poverty alleviation outcomes. 
Likewise, Bird et al. (1998) show a linkage between intergovernmental grants to 
poverty alleviation. They conclude in the favour of greater fiscal decentralisation and 
  
52 
 
better intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in order to increase the expenditure on 
pro-poor schemes that reflect the wishes, needs and preferences of each district and 
sub-national units.        
Presenting a case study on Sri Lanka, Gunatilaka (2000) examines the impact of 
decentralisation on poverty alleviation. The author regards a viable and functional 
infrastructure in rural areas as a pre-requisite for the success of fiscal decentralisation 
in arresting poverty. He postulates that in a weak and flawed rural development 
setting with shaky or no institutional support the effectiveness of fiscal 
decentralisation on rural poverty reduction is very unlikely. He concludes that fiscal 
decentralisation has to be designed to integrate the rural areas to urban 
agglomeration.  
Certain economic outcomes have been identified in the literature as potential 
determinants of poverty reduction that are affected by fiscal decentralisation. Oates 
(1972; 1993) supporting the argument by which subnational level decision making 
due to the tailoring of local people choices and preferences can increase the social 
service benefits, also points out its validity in a dynamic setting of economic and 
other macroeconomic developments. In his view there would be faster economic 
development if macro policies on regional infrastructural development and human 
capital are made considering the local and regional conditions and local 
requirements. He remarks that there will be more effective and greater ―… economic 
development than centrally determined policies that ignore these geographical 
differences'' (Oates, 1972).  
However, Martinez-Vazquez and MacNab‘s (2003) cross-country empirical work 
suggests that the relationship between fiscal decentralisation, economic growth and 
eventually the latter‘s impact on poverty is not linear. There might be limited linear 
trend after which more decentralisation leads to have an adverse impact on economic 
growth and development.
24
  
Regarding the impact of fiscal decentralisation on macroeconomic stabilisation, the 
empirical evidences are also divided. Authors like Musgrave (1959); Rodden (2002); 
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 Other studies show the relationship of fiscal decentralisation and poverty reduction through 
economic growth include, Davoodi and Zou (1998); Xie et al. (1999) Akai and Sakata (2002); 
Baskaran and Feld (2009); Rodrguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2011).  
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Rodden et al. (2003) argue that the decentralisation exacerbates the macroeconomic 
instability. Therefore, the macroeconomic policies should exclusively be given to the 
central government. Nevertheless, Wibbels (2002) and Shah (1999) show that 
decentralising some macroeconomic policies promotes macroeconomic stability, 
rather than hindering it. Regarding inflation Treisman (2000) and Wibbels (2002) 
illustrate that fiscal decentralisation does not affect the level of inflation. However, 
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2006) show that fiscal decentralisation aggravates 
the price stability.  
The size of the public sector is another key macroeconomic variable that potentially 
can affect the level of poverty: a bigger public sector enables the government to 
launch and implement more programmes with significant impact on poverty 
(Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez, 2011). Although the conventional public finance 
theory supports the argument that the size of government is likely to reduce under 
decentralisation because of subnational governments‘ tax competition, the ultimate 
public sector expenditure would not be under the optimal level. Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980) propose that while the bureaucrats in order to pursue their own 
vested interest tend to increase the public expenditure beyond the optimum level, the 
inter-jurisdictional tax competition arise from fiscal decentralisation would restrain 
the inefficient use of public expenditures. Supporting this argument, Fiva (2006), 
based on OECD data concludes that, whereas revenue decentralisation decreases the 
size of the government, the expenditure decentralisation tends to increase the size of 
the public sector. However, presumably if government officials are benevolent and 
would like to maximise the welfare of public, the low tax collection due to inter-
jurisdictional competition would exert a downward pressure on public finance that 
may force the government to cut some key public service provision. On the contrary 
Feld et al. (2003), while surveying the literature of fiscal decentralisation and size of 
the government, find no definite relationship.  
Another important determinant that can affect the level of poverty is the regional 
inequality. Considerable evidence supports the convergence of regional disparities in 
the long run, if not in the short run. For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) 
show a regional convergence in the US and seven European countries. Their results 
reveal a 2% per annum convergence rate for these countries, where the poor 
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states/regions grow faster than their rich counterparts. The empirical results of Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1991) support the theoretical prediction of de la Fuente, (2002) 
where it is demonstrated that the convergence tends to happen but at a slower rate. de 
la Fuente, (2002) illustrates that for regional convergence to take place, two 
conditions need to be fulfilled: first, diminishing returns to capital should exist; and 
second, the factors of production should be reallocated from the lower productive 
sectors to the higher ones, along with high rate of technological progress.  He doubts 
that under decentralisation such relocation of the factors of production may not take 
place. Rodrguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) show the relationship between 
decentralisation and level of regional disparity. They identify that fiscal 
decentralisation has the potential to reduce the regional disparity in developed 
countries; while in developing countries on the contrary fiscal decentralisation may 
aggravate regional disparity.  
Another channel through which fiscal decentralisation may potentially affect the 
level of poverty is corruption. Some of the studies of   fiscal decentralisation are of 
the view that corruption is preponderant in a fiscally decentralised system of 
governance, than at the central level. Prude‘homme (1994); Tanzi (1995); Treisman 
(2000); Persson et al (2001); Chen and Treisman (2009)  are in the view that local 
level bureaucrats and elected representatives are more likely to succumb to the 
wishes and vested interests of local pressure groups and elites compared to the 
centrally appointed officials, which eventually leads to corruption and 
embezzlements among local elites. Another remarkable reason quoted by these 
authors is the weak and full of loophole monitoring and evaluation system at the 
local level that provides a fertile ground to local politicians and bureaucrats to 
misappropriate public funds. Chen and Treisman (2009), for example, in a cross-
country analysis illustrate a positive correlation between political decentralisation 
and level of corruption: the scale and magnitude of bribery increases in both private 
and public sector firms with decentralisation.    
However, Huther and Shah (1998); Fisman and Gatti (2002); Arikan (2004) show 
that fiscal decentralisation enhances competition among localities/districts, and local 
competition forces the governments to limit their unnecessary expenditures and 
discipline the local public finance. In a competitive environment corruption and 
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misuse of local resources is least affordable, therefore, local officials put a stringent 
mechanism in place to curb the corruption. Katsiaouni (2003) and Chen and 
Treisman (2009) also show that accountability and responsiveness measures are 
more consolidated under the decentralised system of governance, which then limit 
the corruption and embezzlement. Supporting the same line of argument, Gurger and 
Shah (2000) in an empirical study of 30 economies show that weak political culture 
and strong bureaucracy in centralised regimes are the significant causes of 
corruption, rather than decentralisation.    
In theoretical literature of fiscal decentralisation, we come across the argument that 
fiscal decentralisation without political consideration may not be effective. Sensing 
the importance of political (de)centralisation, the impact of politics and political 
parties on the performance of fiscal decentralisation has been evaluated empirically. 
For instance, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) conduct a cross-country research 
to examine two concerns: firstly, whether or not the strengthening of national 
political parties helps improving the quality of governance, enhances the public 
goods provision and bolsters the economic growth; secondly, whether the 
appointment of administrative subordination by central government would be more 
effective in enhancing the results of fiscal decentralisation. Their findings reveal that 
fiscal decentralisation produces a positive outcome in terms of economic growth and 
poverty reduction in those countries where political parties are old and matured. 
However, these variables appear to have a negative correlation with the 
fractionalisation of the mainstream parties. On the contrary, administrative 
subordination is supportive to improve the results of fiscal decentralisation. Such 
empirical findings suggest that for fiscal decentralisation to be fully effective there 
should be a balanced and matured political culture at centre with countrywide 
political parties having elected representatives.   
Using a survey based dataset from 1985 to 1999 of rural China that covers 60 
villages, Zhang et al. (2004) compare two different government models. They show 
that elections at local level have a considerable effect on the composition of taxes as 
well as on poverty. That is, it shifts the distribution of taxation from citizens to 
enterprises. Such empirical evidence supports the theoretical argument
25
 that elected 
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 See for example, Arzaghi et al. (2005).  
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representatives of villages tend to moderate the burden of revenue on local people 
and instead diversify the tax base bringing the enterprises under the tax net. 
Additionally, their results confirm common believe of the role of the local level 
governance and power sharing in boosting up the allocation of public expenditure in 
the pro-poor sectors. Huther and Shah‘s (1999) study somewhat supports the above 
outcomes. They construct an index for the quality of governance around 80 
developed and developing countries and conclude that quality of governance 
positively affects the public service provisions.  
Hernandez and Jaillo-Rabling‘s (2008) empirical study of more ‗elite capture‘ under 
fiscal decentralisation supports the theoretical predictions of Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2005). The authors demonstrate how political opportunism or elite 
capture impedes the performance of subnational governments in poor areas. Using 
the data from 2429 Mexican municipalities they assess whether the Social 
infrastructure Fund (SIF) – a poverty targeting fund executed and administered by 
decentralised governments in Mexico – conducts its resource disbursement solely on 
the basis of poverty or there are other factors as well which drive the fund‘s 
disbursement. Their results show that besides poverty index, municipal fund per-
capita and revenue sharing per-capita are positively correlated with the SIF. Based 
on this evidence it is concluded that such programmes which are earmarked to 
provide pro-poor services (education, health, electricity and sanitation) through 
decentralised types of governments (states and municipalities in Mexican case), are 
not well-targeted. The fundamental reason for this failure is the presence of elite 
capture.  
Like many developing countries in Western Europe fiscal decentralisation has also 
been an effective tool to augment and sustain public investments. Kappeler and 
Valila‘s (2008) empirical findings help us understand how fiscal federalism turned 
up the public expending in Europe. They use a panel dataset from 1990 to 2005 of 
ten European countries and breakdown of public investment in four broad categories: 
infrastructure; hospital and schools; public goods and recreation facilities. The public 
investment variables of all categories, except recreational facilities, are positively 
correlated with share of tax revenue attributed to sub-national levels of government. 
The result of their research may be interpreted in terms of ‗fiscal competition‘ under 
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fiscal decentralisation. Moreover, cutting down the share of non-productive 
investment like recreation under decentralised system reveals the over-investment 
trend in such area under centralisation where lower tier of governments are 
competing for a common pool of resources. In a centralised system there may be 
many strategic reasons for local representatives to mis-present the local demand for 
public services. This being the case, decentralisation would reduce such strategic 
behaviour and bring the redistribution in line with the local needs.  
On the question of direct effect of fiscal decentralisation on poverty and 
redistributive polices the empirical literature is as divided as we observed the 
literature for indirect interaction of decentralisation and poverty. Right through the 
empirical work their direct relationship is not very broad and hence required more 
systematic research. Yet whatever little research has been done needs to be reviewed.  
For example Braun and Grote‘s (2000) work on India, China, Egypt and Ghana find 
a negative relationship between fiscal decentralisation and poor-oriented 
expenditures on social services.
26
 Nevertheless, unlike Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 
(2007) their study reveals that political decentralisation may augment the fiscal 
decentralisation‘s capacity to perform better for the poor.27 However, West and 
Wong (1995) note that fiscal decentralisation, due to its flawed design (more focus 
on federal-provincial fiscal relations and leaving local governments entirely at the 
mercy of provinces), is the prime cause of regional inequality and poverty in China. 
Fiscal decentralisation with specific characteristics could also potentially affect the 
poverty in many other direct ways. For instance, Alesina et al. (2001)  show that in 
Italy how public employment has been used as a redistributive policy in which the 
central government supports southern part of country by paying higher salaries 
where the average income is lower than northern part of the country. Likewise, 
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 In case of the Philippines the decentralisation programme has been relatively successful with 
certain impact on poverty. However, the widespread corruption and unequal distribution of 
intergovernmental transfers restricted subnational government capacity to fully realised pro-poor 
programmes (Angles and Mango, 2004; and Jutting et al., 2004).  
27
 Similarly, Jütting et al. (2004) carries out a cross-country study on fifty developing and developed 
countries and shows a positive correlation between fiscal decentralisation and poverty alleviation. 
They underlie the imperatives of political and administrative decentralisation as pre-requisites for 
substantial performance of fiscal decentralisation on poverty alleviation. Likewise, Kakwani and 
Perkia (2000) and, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2004) document a positive correlation between fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty reduction.  
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Martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) in a cross-country analysis, Rossello-Villallonga 
(2004) for Spain and Alesina et al. (2000) for the US show the positive impact of 
fiscal decentralisation on public sector employment. On the contrary, Azfar and 
Livingston (2002) do not see any improvement in pro-poor service provisions under 
decentralisation in Uganda.  
A broader trend in the literature evaluates the interaction of poverty alleviation and 
decentralisation as a whole and not only fiscal decentralisation. According to this 
literature, decentralisation is the devolving of political and financial powers to lower 
tier of governments and making them accountable to constituents as well as central 
government.  Though, the above description does not focus on fiscal decentralisation 
per se but it is fair to claim that this concept of decentralisation is incomplete 
without incorporating fiscal aspects. That is primarily because this type of fiscal 
decentralisation or simple decentralisation considers political decisions as prime 
factor for the outcomes of decentralisation. Thereby, it may be better to deal with 
political economy of fiscal decentralisation, which has attracted a great deal of 
attention in contemporary literature of fiscal federalism.  
For example, examining the impact of decentralisation on poverty reduction in Sub-
Saharan African countries Crook (2002) highlights that the impacts of 
decentralisation on poverty reduction and local government responsiveness to the 
poor widely depends on the political nature of federal-provincial or provincial-local 
relations. He also demonstrates that without a broader mechanism of accountability 
at the lower level of governing system, decentralisation is very unlikely to be 
effective in poverty alleviation. He goes on to say that poverty reduction 
programmes in Africa are mainly determined by political and ideological nature of 
the central government. However, Alderman (2002) shows that social assistance 
mechanism in Albania is more targeted to the poor compare to safety-net 
programmes in the same income level countries elsewhere.  
Krishna (2003), among others, thinks that local empowerment in the shape of 
participations of women of lower caste and other such groups, is the major factor for 
understanding the decentralisation‘s impact on the poor. He outlines that basic 
education plays a crucial role for more participation of common people and 
reduction of the influence of elites at local level. That is because basic education, 
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regardless of income level, paves the way for the access to information and 
influence. 
Evidences discussed so far indicate the presence of specific attributes of fiscal 
decentralisation in terms of improving service delivery due to many factors, 
including responsiveness, proximity and accountability of subnational governments 
to local people needs. Nevertheless, it is just a small step towards the understanding 
of fiscal decentralisation impact on pro-poor social and economic services. In order 
to explore the relationship of fiscal decentralisation and poverty, the channels 
through which they interact need to be examined further. Economists identify two 
pro-poor social services and one economic service. These are the provision of basic 
education, healthcare and agriculture. The relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty may be explained through these pro-poor services. In 
the following three subsections we subsequently discuss the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on these services.  
2.5.3 FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND HEALTHCARE  
On the one hand decentralisation of health sector invites criticism because of many 
complexities, such as diseconomies of scale, which tend to restraint the local 
governments in the provision of costly treatments and immunization (DeMello, 
2004). On the other, decentralisation of health sector is supported by many (Mills, 
1994), because a less unified health service provides by the subnational governments 
can better tailor the preferences of local people. Moreover, under the local 
accountability and greater community participation the subnational governments are 
more effective in implementing and monitoring health programmes. And 
decentralisation of health is also expected to increase the efficiency through better 
allocation of resources to the targeted groups, particularly to the poor income groups.  
Infant mortality rate is believed to be a barometer of health status of any society 
(Kaufmann et al. (2002). Robalino et al.‘s (2001) cross-country evaluation of the 
impact of fiscal decentralisation on infant mortality rate shows in countries where the 
subnational governments are responsible to manage higher share of total health 
expenditures tend to have better health indicators including infant mortality rate. 
Furthermore, they also assert that public expenditure on health is higher in those 
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subnational governments that command improved administrative capacity. This 
indicates that for fiscal decentralisation to be more effective it needs to be 
accompanied with administrative decentralisation. 
In addition to the cross-country analysis, country specific analysis has also been 
conducted for the assessment of fiscal decentralisation on health outcomes.  For 
example, Schwartz‘s (2002) study on the Philippines suggests a positive correlation 
between fiscal decentralisation and health outcomes. The study compares the level 
and composition of health expenditure during both pre and post devolution reforms 
in 1994. The results show a comparative increase in per capita health expenditures 
following the devolution. And the rise on expenditure is more prominent in 
provincial level compare to municipal ones, which may be because the former are 
responsible for major health projects and hospitals. Another interesting revelation of 
the study is that following the devolution, the subnational governments with more 
unconditional transfers from upper tier of governments tend to have higher allocation 
for health sector at the expense of other social services. Similarly, Arze et al. (2003) 
show a common trend in Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador and Nicaragua where higher 
health expenditure is followed by fiscal decentralisation.
28
  
No matter how much money the subnational governments are entitled to spend on 
healthcare sector, unless a stringent accountability system is in place the 
effectiveness of decentralisation on the performance of health services may be 
jeopardised. Khemani (2004) for example has conducted a research on Nigeria‘s 
intergovernmental design and its impact on local accountability. He found that after 
the decentralisation of health sector a widespread disruption and mismanagement in 
public health services ensued that ultimately led to further deterioration of the 
already low quality health service in the country. Interestingly, this situation is not 
entirely explained by not having sufficient resources at the subnational level. Lack of 
accountability is also a culprit in the equation of the devolved resources. Thus, under 
conditional intergovernmental transfers for health spending, the local governments 
are not held accountable to the public, which leads to the inefficient use of health 
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 Likewise, Lindaman and Thurmaier (2002) highlight a positive relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and provision of health and education. They demonstrate that increasing the level of 
fiscal decentralisation (in term of sub-national expenditure to total expenditure) by 2 to 4 %, increases 
the human development index by one point.  
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spending by local authorities. Kaufman et al. (2002) studies the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on public services delivery, particularly health and education in 
Bolivia. The results show that albeit both central and local governments are failed in 
providing adequate public services but comparatively local governments give better 
access to citizens, particularly to the poor and disadvantaged than central 
government. They note that since decentralisation is at its early stages in Bolivia 
positive outcomes of access to social services may be an indication for better health 
indicators such as infant mortality rate and crude death rate.  
However, it is also shown that fiscal decentralisation does not necessarily helps in 
improving the health outcomes even if it is in accordance with public demands 
(Pritchett, 1996; Inchauste, 2000). For example, in Mexico and Jordan despite 
differences in public spending on health services infant mortality rate was at a 
similar rate (WDR, 2004). Likewise, both Haiti and Cote d‘ Ivoire witnessed a 
reduction in per capita health expenditures during 1980s and 1990s but infant 
mortality rate improved in the former and worsened in the latter.  
2.5.4 FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 
Like health the debate for decentralisation of education has received much attention 
for over two decades. Educational decentralisation is rationalised on three broad 
categories: 1. Redistribution; 2. Effectiveness; and 3. finance (Hector, 2006; Winker, 
1994).The notion of redistributing power in educational decentralisation generates 
from the fact that community participation in schools‘ affair weakens the influence 
of strong lobbies such as teachers‘ union. Greater teachers‘ commitment, citizens‘ 
participation and surveillance lead to higher schools‘ performance. However, 
decentralisation of political power only works well in democratic society where local 
elites are not entirely in charge of decision making process (Winkler and Gershberg, 
2000). The educational finance‘s argument typically revolves on the idea that the 
central government because of financial constraints shifts a part of the basic and 
secondary education burden to subnational governments, to non-governmental 
organisations and local communities. Considering that local decision making 
because of its proximity better identify the local needs can provide education to local 
people with improved quality and reduced costs. Moreover, the decentralised 
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decision making regarding education provide greater voice to the local people makes 
the official and administrators accountable to the public for their performance.   
However, arguments in the favour of centralisation of education are equally strong. 
For instance, Weiler (1993) is clear when he supports the centralised education on 
the ground of standardisation, curriculum development and qualification. For 
standardisation of education and mutual recognition of qualification (diploma, 
certificate etc.) in nationwide the centralisation of education is required. Critics 
(Carnoy and Hannaway, 1993) are in the view that decentralisation reforms are very 
unlikely to resolve the problems concerning education. These are complex problems 
therefore the need of a widespread rethinking in policy arena is suggested and 
emphasised upon. Because the debate of the decentralisation of education is 
presented in terms of identifying what functions and responsibilities should be 
decentralised and what should remain with central government, rather than whether 
to centralise or decentralise the entire sector. Therefore, the ―partial decentralisation‖ 
has failed. It has not solved the problems of the poor people vis-à-vis the quality and 
quantity of education.       
In the 1990s several Latin American countries (Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela) embraced decentralisation in 
education sector. They aimed to enhance the overall quality of education by 
removing the administrative bottlenecks and inefficient use of resources. But also to 
increase the accessibility for those who hitherto are excluded from education. In 
Argentina for example all secondary and primary schools have been transferred to 
the provincial governments and now provincial education department is responsible 
for planning, financing and management of education (Winkler and Gershberg, 
2000). Chile and Colombia are other examples where educational decentralisation 
began in 1980s and 1990s respectively to devolve primary and secondary schools to 
regional governments and municipalities in order to produce improvements at school 
level.   
However, the evidence on this issue is also mixed. Educational decentralisation 
without proper technical and financial supports from the central government has not 
been successful in improving the quality of education, particularly for the poor. For 
instance, Brazil with strong decentralised education system also failed to increase the 
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per capita education expenditure i.e. reducing regional and income inequalities in 
accessing to education.  In Chile the condition of poor people not only has not 
improved after decentralisation but has deteriorated further. Therefore, the 
inequalities between the poor and the rich has widen further in post decentralisation 
period (Carnoy and De Moura, 2000).  
According to the 1973 constitution of Pakistan, education is a provincial subject. But 
in reality this has never happened. Planning, finance and administration of education 
is partially centralised. The federal education department sets the overall curriculum, 
policy, standard and budget for education. The central government is also 
responsible for policy planning and coordination of the education sector. The 
implementation and execution of these plans and policies come under the domain of 
the provincial governments. After the devolution reforms in 2001 (further discussed 
later in the thesis) the operational responsibility of primary and secondary education 
has been transferred to the local governments (districts and municipalities). 
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that no federal level function has transferred 
from the federal ministry of education to the local or provincial level after the 
devolution. Under the new scheme, the local governments are responsible for 
planning, monitoring and finance of basic education. However, curriculum 
development and standardisation still lie with federal government and post creation 
or abolition and salary setting under the purview of provincial governments (Khan 
and Mira, 2011).  
The core reason of giving basic education to subnational governments is to improve 
the provision and the quality of education. Therefore it is plausible to assume that 
with more fiscal decentralisation, the provision of education may increase. 
Nevertheless to the best of our knowledge, this relationship has not been empirically 
tested.    
2.5.5 FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND AGRICULTURE  
Agriculture is the economic backbone of many developing countries as it provides 
livelihoods and employments to a great part of the population. A widespread 
decentralisation has been noticed in agriculture sector - a reform package across 
many developing and transition economies such as India, China, Pakistan, Ghana, 
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Vietnam and many more (IFAD, 2001; Rivera and Alex, 2004). In order to increase 
the productivity and performance of the sector, it is suggested that fiscal 
decentralisation increases investment on agriculture, and latter being a pro-poor 
sector, in turns improves the living standard of the poor. International experience 
shows that output and yield of agricultural products have a significant impact on 
poverty (IFAD, 2001). World Bank (2005) presents that three-fourth of 1.2 billion 
rural dwellers live below the poverty line, 75% of them depend on agriculture. 
Naturally agriculture decentralisation as expected would improve the livelihood of 
majority of people. Consequently, it is a potential channel through which fiscal 
decentralisation would help reducing poverty in rural areas.   
Following the economic reforms in 1979 in which agriculture was decentralised, 
agricultural production increased rapidly in China that helped the country to achieve 
self-sufficiency in food production (Chuang et al. 2004). With the similar fashion, 
localisation of agriculture extension in Nicaragua seems to have helped poor people 
to escape from the extreme poverty (World Bank, 2000). Prior to the independence 
from Britain (1947) agriculture was a local government subject in India, and post 
1947 period the sector has jointly been handled by states and local governments. The 
impact of decentralisation on agriculture in India has a great variation from one state 
to another. For example, in Punjab and Haryana the agriculture productivity has 
doubled that of Bihar and Orissa (Johnson, 2003). In Pakistan since its inception 
(1947) agriculture policy has been designed by the federal ministry of agriculture but 
implementation and finance has jointly been conducted by provincial line 
departments with the collaboration of federal government. After the devolution 
reforms in 2001 implementation of agriculture has been transferred to local 
governments but financing and supervision still remain with provincial authorities.  
2.6 CONCLUSION  
The existing literature provides a good insight about many variables that affect fiscal 
decentralisation. The literature, however, overlooks the link between fiscal 
federalism and promotion of welfare in all constituents of the federating units. That 
is to say it does not sufficiently cover the correlation between alleviation of poverty 
and decentralisation of fiscal decision making. Thus, to bridge this theoretical gap 
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we develop a legislative bargaining model under fiscal federalism and assess its 
impact on welfare maximisation for the poor.  
Meanwhile, reviewing the empirical literature of the impact of fiscal decentralisation 
in general and fiscal decentralisation on poverty alleviation in particular raises 
couple of issues. Firstly, empirical studies offer contradictory results. Literature 
surveyed in this chapter shows that some studies present positive relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and poverty reduction while other studies reveal a 
negative relationship. Therefore, it is plausible to believe that the current literature is 
inconclusive regarding the impact of fiscal decentralisation and its impact on 
poverty.   
Furthermore, majority of the studies are sector or programme-specific and failed to 
assess the overall impact of decentralisation countrywide. Another potential 
limitation with existing empirical literature is of its emphasis on cross-country 
analysis that confronts with problems of coping with the external shocks, different 
institutions, political regimes, different socio-economic settings and other exogenous 
factors. These and many other concerned limitations within the empirical literature 
warrant a compressive empirical study to evaluate the direct and indirect – through 
pro-poor social and economic services – impact of fiscal decentralisation on poverty. 
The goal of the empirical part of this thesis is to conduct a countrywide research and 
the interaction of fiscal decentralisation and poverty in Pakistan.     
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CHAPTER 3 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Pakistan with an estimated population of 180 million is a federal country composed 
of four federating units or provinces: the Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pukhtunkhuwa (KP) 
and Balochistan; the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and the Capital 
Territory, Islamabad. Like the United States, federal units in Pakistan, differ largely 
in terms of population and geography. For instance, while the Punjab inhabits more 
than half of the country population (58%), Balochistan with 45% of total national 
territory homes only 5% of population. The ethnic diversity marks Pakistan as one of 
the most heterogeneous and multi-ethnic societies around the world. Each province 
is inhabited by a different nationality: the Punjab predominately homes Punjabis; 
Sindh is populated by Sindhis (Native dwellers) and Majjirs who migrated to 
Pakistan from India during and after the partition of the Sub-Continent in 1947; 
Pashtuns live in KP; and Balochistan is the province of Baloch people.   
Pakistan‘s economy is one of the great contrasts: it produces sophisticated nuclear 
weapons and missiles yet fails to manufacture a crankshaft. She has only one 
inefficient and antiquated steel plant, established with the help of the former Soviet 
Union in 1970s, and no plastics, chemical and automobile industry in her credit.  On 
average the economy has succeeded to grow at the rate of 6% since 1950 (Pakistan, 
various issues), yet more than 33% (Gazdar, 2005) of her population lives in abject 
poverty. The factors which contributed in the state of imbalance in the economy and 
the prevailing inequity and disparity in different regions and sections of the 
population include many. Among them the concentration of the economy in the hand 
of few families and regions in early decades, lingering efforts of nationalisation in 
1970s, piling up of domestic debt and gross negligence of social sector in 1980s, 
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widespread corruption and irresponsible spending in 1990s and the burgeoning 
defence expenditure and creation of a bubble economy in 2000s.   
The political process of Pakistan has been more volatile and tumultuous as her 
economy because of instability and dramatic events. The country has been ruled by 
military and intermitted by civilian dispensations throughout its political history. For 
the first time in recent world history a majority wing (East Pakistan, now 
Bangladesh) separated from minority west wing after a bloody war in 1971. A tiny 
group of emigrants acquired control over the key decision making posts at the apex 
of centralised state power with the help of Punjabi elite. And most importantly, 
Pakistan attacked and forcefully merged an independent state of Balochistan in 1948 
into her territory (Harrison, 1981) using palatial intrigue as well as the military force. 
There has been unabated struggle by the Baloch people to regain the independent 
state of Balochistan over the last 64 years. Despite the state repression to quell the 
resistance movement, yet the Baloch has refused to budge.   
This chapter is aimed to cover three separate but relevant themes with significant 
impact on the political economy of Pakistan and lays a particular background that 
helps to understand the theme of this thesis. First, the chapter contains summary 
examination of public finance and fiscal policy making in Pakistan. It briefly 
investigates the economic and political factors that affect the process of fiscal policy 
decision making in Pakistan. The chapter also discusses the problems facing the 
fiscal policy making, as well as the participants of the fiscal policy making in 
Pakistan. In addition, it illustrates the strengths and weakness of policies and their 
impact on other indicators of the economy. Second, the chapter describes the social 
sector, particularly health and education in Pakistan. Third section of the chapter 
deals with question of Pakistan-Balochistan relations and examines the political 
economy of Balochistan. 
The discussion of this chapter lays a ground and provides a motivation for the 
theoretical model and empirical analyses that we will illustrate in second part. As we 
will come across the chapter, in the bargaining game among various stakeholders in 
the process of fiscal policy the weaker stakeholder(s) has less probability to gain 
optimal resources. This leads to create a situation where the interests and preferences 
of a dominant province and certain groups are more reflected in public policies. The 
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inclination of public policy making towards powerful lobbies and influential 
province therefore would adversely affect the resource allocation to social sector, 
which inherently affects poor the most, and weaker and the poorest provinces. For 
empirical analysis the illustration of this chapter is important because the fiscal 
policy decisions not only determine allocations to social services it equally affect 
resource distribution between federal and provincial governments. Both have a 
potential impact on the poor.  
The analysis presented in this chapter is relevant to the greater public finance and 
political economy literature. The chapter makes an academic contribution by 
critically evaluating certain crucial but academically ignored political economy 
issues in Pakistan. 
3.2 PUBLIC SECTOR 
A large public sector and the involvement of the state made the fiscal policy a key 
determinant of the economy of Pakistan. Public sector may be divided into four 
groups: 1) federal government; 2) subnational governments; 3) deconcentrated 
public departments and agencies; and 4) state-owned economic enterprises. The 
federal government is mainly responsible for supplying public services like defense, 
while subnational governments (this organised in two tier administrations: provincial 
and local governments, respectively) have the duty to supply services like education, 
health and water. Decentralised and deconcentrated agencies like the State Bank of 
Pakistan, Pakistan Television, and Pakistan International Airlines have specific 
administrative and budgetary powers. In the last category of the public sector are the 
state-owned enterprises such as Steel Mill and Gadani Ship Breaking. These 
enterprises play a key role in different sectors of the economy.  
For a less-developed country like Pakistan, having a consistent resource mobilisation 
mechanism is crucial in order to maintain a decent socio-economic performance in 
the long run. Looking at Pakistan‘s fiscal history one can easily notice higher public 
expenditures, particularly the non-development expenditures, has forced the country 
to have a fiscal deficit. Pakistan is a typical example of Weingast et al. (1981) theory 
of ―distributive conflicts‖, where the geographical diversity and social and ethnic 
heterogeneity make the fiscal policy making and bringing the public sector to a 
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manageable level a formidable task. The revenue generation system of the country is 
almost centralised that is controlled by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). The 
FBR is a centrally controlled body that is responsible for the collection of around 
85% of all tax revenues. During the budget making each geographical region and 
vested interest groups in the realm of the federation try to maximise the projects‘ 
allocation in the favour of their respective regions, ethnic groups and classes.   
Structure of Pakistan‘s political economy partially resembles the Lockwood‘s (2002) 
model. In this model one province dominates others in terms of population. The 
dominant unit uses its disproportionate legislative and administrative representations 
in its advantage in terms of project selection and fund allocation. For instance, the 
Punjab with 58%
29
 of country‘s population enjoys a paramount dominance in public 
policy making. During democratic regimes the province remains the favourable 
destination for projects selection due to its majority seats in National Assembly.
30
  In 
the same way, during dictatorial regimes, the Punjab again has the lead to attract 
disproportionately a bigger part of economic projects since majority of military and 
civil bureaucracy personnel are from the same province. Thus in a ―non-cooperative‖ 
kind of a federation where one federating unit has more than half of the country‘s 
population excessive representation (even more than its population) in public 
institutions and geographical concentration is very likely. However, in order to avoid 
polarisation amongst the federating units of the federation, and for that reason to 
accommodate other provinces, the dominant province – the Punjab in case of 
Pakistan – allows some projects to the former. It is worth spelling out that it is very 
unlikely for the smaller provinces to receive projects at the cost of dominant 
province. On the contrary, the projects allocated to the latter are in addition to what 
would already be given to the dominate province. This, therefore, leads to increase 
the size of the national budget and worsens the budget deficit. 
In Pakistan the budget deficit remained higher during the decades of 1970s and 
1990s when the country was governed by democratic dispensations. This 
phenomenon somewhat adheres to the predictions of the Alesina and Tabellini‘s 
(1990) political economy model. The model describes that public expenditure – and 
                                                 
29
 See Economic Survey of Pakistan  (2009-10). 
30
 The annual national budget presents to and passes by simple majority by the National Assembly. 
  
71 
 
may subsequently be the budget deficit – is higher during democratic governments 
because politicians with different preferences affect its composition. The incumbent 
politicians in the fear of being voted out by their opponents with different fiscal 
preferences tend to finance the unproductive projects in order to garner new supports 
or maintain the old ones. If opposition party replaces the incumbent, it has to bear 
the fiscal burden of such public service projects. Thus, during democratic period the 
country witnessed a bigger budget deficit compare to the autocratic regimes. 
However unlike dictatorial regimes, the democratic dispensations, because of their 
reliance on public support to come to the power, are likely to spend more on social 
services, which notwithstanding run a huge budget deficit. 
3.3 PUBLIC REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
The fiscal functions and responsibilities of federal and provincial governments are 
specified in the constitution. Federal Legislative List, a list within the constitution, 
prescribes the functions of the federal government that includes foreign affairs, 
defense and strategic affairs, national highways and ports, and currency and stock 
exchanges. In addition the federal government also performs functions from the 
Concurrent Legislative List.
31
 Residual functions such as law and order, policing, 
primary, secondary and tertiary education, urban transport and sanitation, health, 
irrigation and agricultural extension come under provincial governments‘ domain.  
The local governments run under the ordinances, not prescribed in the constitution, 
which were promulgated in 1979 and later on in 2001 subsequently in the Punjab, 
Sindh, KP and Balochistan. The provinces delegate functions from the Residual List 
to the local governments. The delegated functions include compulsory as well as 
optional ones. The former are mandatory for the local governments to perform while 
the optional are performed under certain circumstances. 
 
 
                                                 
31
 The Concurrent List contains functions performed either by the provincial governments or the 
central government or by both simultaneously. However this List is to be abolished under the 18
th
 
amendment passed from both houses of the parliament in 2010, and all service functions are to be 
devolved to the provinces.  
  
72 
 
Table 3.1: Services and Functions of the each Tiers of the Government in Pakistan 
Legislative 
Responsibilities  
Services Actual allocation 
of functions 
Federal 
government 
Defense 
External affairs and foreign aids 
Post, telegraph, telephone, radio and TV 
Currency and foreign exchange  
Institutes for research  
Nuclear energy 
Parts and aerodromes 
Shipping, air service, railways, and national 
highways 
Stock exchanges 
Geographical and meteorological survey  
Censuses 
Mineral oil and national gas 
Industries  
Federal 
government 
Federal and 
provincial 
Governments 
Population planning 
Electricity (except KESC) 
Curriculum development, syllabus planning, and 
centers of excellence  
Tourism 
Social welfare and employment exchanges 
Vocational/Technical training 
Historical sites and monuments 
Federal/Provincial 
Governments 
Provincial 
Governments 
Law and order, justice 
Highways and urban transports 
Agriculture extension and distribution of inputs 
Irrigation and land reclamation 
Secondary and higher education 
Provincial 
Governments 
Local 
Governments 
Curative health 
Land development 
Primary education 
Preventive health 
Farm to market roads 
Water supply, drainage and sewerage 
Provincial/local 
governments 
   Source: Zaidi (1999) and Naveed (1996) 
As the table 3.1 presents, the federal government performs the macro role, whereas 
the responsibility of the provincial governments is to provide the social services, 
including logistic services and infrastructure. It is also shown that the provincial 
governments often encroach into the jurisdictional responsibility of the local 
governments and perform the functions that otherwise are legislative domain of the 
latter.  
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3.3.1 REVENUES  
In terms of revenue mobilisation, Pakistan being a centralist federation assigns 
majority of its revenue responsibilities to the federal government. The federal 
government collects more than 80% of total national revenues and shoulders 65% to 
70% of total public expenditure. The second tier or provincial governments are 
entitled to raise 17% to 18% of total revenues while the local governments 
(municipal, districts and sub-districts) are raised hardly the remaining 2 to 3% 
revenues (Provincial Budget documents, various years). The federal government 
transfers the collected resources to the provincial governments through the National 
Finance Commission (NFC) Award
32
, and these transfers include direct transfers, 
loans and credits, revenue shares of the provinces and special grants.
33
   
 The Federal Legislative List (FLL) of the 1973 constitution specifies taxes and 
duties that the federal government can collect. What is not included in the FLL is 
collected by either provincial or local governments.
34
 Table 3.2 shows a breakdown 
of direct and indirect taxes collected by various tiers of government in Pakistan.  
Table 3.2: Direct and Indirect Taxes: Federal, Provincial and Local Level 
Government(s) Direct taxes Indirect taxes 
Federal 
government 
Income tax 
Corporate tax 
Wealth Tax 
Property tax 
Sales tax  
Excise duty 
Imports duty 
Exports duty 
Gas and petroleum surcharges 
Foreign travel tax 
Provincial 
governments 
Land revenue 
Urban immovable property tax 
Agriculture income tax 
Capital gains tax 
Tax on professions, trades and 
callings 
Stamp duty 
Motor vehicle tax  
Entertainment tax 
Excise duty 
Cotton fee 
Electricity duty 
 Source: Zaidi (1999)  
                                                 
32
 The NFC is discussed in details in next chapter. 
33
 NFC Award is a formula based mechanism of resource distribution between federal and provincial 
governments and among the provincial governments. Readers are advised to wait till next chapter 
when we will discuss all dimensions of NFC Award. 
34
 The provincial governments have the power to make laws to delegate some of their legislative 
functions to the local governments, including tax collection.  
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Low tax-to-GDP ratio in Pakistan has been one of the weak characteristics of its 
economy, where on average the tax-to-GDP remained around 10%
35
 (see figure 3.1). 
With the low tax-to-GDP ratio, Pakistan is one of those countries that have the 
lowest records in terms of tax revenue generation. Concerning the low tax-to-GDP 
ratio in the country, the World Bank (1988) emphasises that unless the country 
strengthens the tax base, she cannot mobilise resources enough to meet her 
expenditure obligations. 
Figure 3.1: Trends of Revenue to GDP Ratio 
 
           Source: Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy, State Bank of Pakistan (2010) 
Figure 3.1 highlights that average tax revenue to the GDP has revolved around 11% 
over the last 35 years with lowest rate of less than 10% in 2010, notwithstanding 
introducing various tax reforms.  
It is worth pointing out that the fundamentals of tax system in the country are full of 
loopholes and with low bases. In addition to this, the tax administration  has also 
failed to bring the agriculture sector, a big part of service sector (capital gain is not 
taxed, for instance) and the influential class of Pakistani society –  tribal lords, 
businessmen, wealthy politicians – under the tax net (Aziz, 2009).  Certainly  the tax 
structure in Pakistan needs a drastic reform but looking at the political economy of 
                                                 
35
 During 1950s average tax to GDP ratio was around 4 %. This low level ratio is largely attributed to 
narrow or weak industrial sector and restrained foreign trade in Pakistan in early decades (see Pasha 
and Fatima (1999) for a vigor discussion).  
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taxation one may observe that vested interests have always thwarted any kind of 
reforms that may challenge their privilege. Many scholars including Pasha (1995) 
believe that in the past all intended reforms in the tax system have been frustrated by 
the influential vested interests. The role of this class is succinctly underlined in these 
words by Pasha (1995): 
 …behind each major tax exemption or concession there is a strong, entrenched vested 
group in Pakistan. Each group has organized itself as an effective lobbying entity. 
Which has not only blatantly demonstrated its power in political terms, but in more 
subtle terms also has played the game of patronage seeking through party donations, 
supporting influential politicians, etc., and developed credible arguments for the 
retention of these exemptions and fiscal incentives in the greater national interest 
(Pasha, 1995: 16). 
Another tax loophole is the tax holidays granted to various industrial zones 
apparently to encourage new investments in specific regions, which was strongly 
supported by the industrialists and other interest groups in those regions. However, 
these free tax zones were failed to expand new business and investments. Instead 
these zones provided a safe haven to many businesses for not paying any taxes.
36
 
Thus, stagnant or even declining tax-to-GDP ratio in addition to the increasing 
domestic and international debt has limited the size and magnitude of public 
expenditures that could provide fiscal space to the government to increase or 
maintain economic stimulus.  
Regarding the indirect taxes, more than 80% of total taxes are indirect, and a greater 
part of it comes from taxing the international trade, which not only discourages trade 
but promotes inefficiency and distortion. As table 3.3 presents, direct taxes constitute 
a small portion of total federal government taxes, in which income tax constitutes 
around 95% of it.  It is of some interest to note that during 1980s the tax-to-GDP 
ratio has come down slightly, which was due to the declining share of federal excise 
duties and sales tax.  Particularly the contribution of federal excise duties has come 
down from 4.6% of GDP in 1980
37
 to 2.72% by the turn of the decade, since the 
                                                 
36
 See Hafiz Pasha (1995) ―Political Economy of Tax Reforms: the Pakistan experience‖, Pakistan 
Journal of Applied Economics, vol. II, for a detail discussion on this issue.  
37
 In 1980s the customs and excise duties were the predominant source of the revenue. In 1990s and 
2000s the share of customs duties in particular and federal excise duties in general declined drastically 
to the total revenue of Pakistan. This decline, however, was largely compensated by income and sales 
taxes, respectively, and with the introduction of surcharges on gasoline commodities. Since the 
compensation was not fairly made, hence, the tax-to-GDP ratio has declined to 10.71 in fiscal year 
2010-11 (Table 3).  
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excisable goods (tobacco, for instance) were produced in large quantity. In the 
following decade the custom duties were the only tax that grew continuously due to 
the iqra surcharges and increasing the tariffs on imports. Nevertheless, because of 
trade liberalisation and tariff reforms the custom duties consistently declined in 
subsequent decades.  
Pasha and Fatima (2006) argue that the federal government enhanced the sales tax 
and incomes tax to compensate the customs duties declines. However, table 3.3 
shows that notwithstanding the rise of income tax and custom duties, the tax-to-GDP 
ratio has constantly declined over the last three decades. Thus, regardless of the 
readjustment of tax revenues the country failed to stop the declining trend of the tax-
to-GDP ratio. Table 1.A in appendix A supports this argument that provides the 
details of share of revenues from different sources. 
Income tax in Pakistan has traditionally been low and unsustainable. Traditionally 
income tax is more progressive and has lesser effect on those who are on the lowest 
ladder in society. Hence, in Pakistan income tax should have contained a higher 
portion to total tax where the income inequality is very high. Zaidi (1999) explains 
the reasons of low income tax in the following words:   
The income tax suffers from numerous deficiencies. There is a very poor coverage of 
taxpayers, a narrow tax base is riddled with exceptions and exemptions, and the 
income tax procedure is badly integrated with company law. The large number of 
exemptions has traditionally been justified as incentives for investment, saving, 
exports, regional development etc…..it is estimated that the evasion of income tax is 
almost five times the collected amount. Hence, the collection of income tax has 
remained restricted largely to the industrial and financial sectors, to public limited 
companies and multinationals, to corporate profits and salary income and to the 
metropolitan cities of Pakistan (Zaidi, 1999: 216). 
 
3.3.2 EXPENDITURES  
As indicated in table 3.4, the expenditure as percentage of GDP increased from 
16.21% in 1979-83 to 21.42% in 1984-1988. Two main heads of public expenditure 
- defense and debt serving – were the prime reason for this significant jump in 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio. Defense spending contains a hefty proportion of the 
national income largely at the expense of core social sector, as indicated in table A.2 
in appendix A. During 1980s and early 1990s the defense expenditures show a 
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considerable increase largely due to the direct military government regime in 
Pakistan and partly due to the Soviet forces invasion in neighboruing country of 
Afghanistan. Contrary to the popular belief, defense expenditure pattern did not 
change after the restoration of democratic dispensation in 1988. During 1989 to 1993 
the defense expenditure has remained as high (7.33% of GDP) as it had been in 
preceding decade.  
However, this trend decreased in second part of democratic period (1994-1999). 
Pasha and Fatima (2006) give the following reason for defense expenditure rises in 
first part of 1990s: 
….during the initial first or two years in office, democratic governments tend to 
reduce this ratio as they perhaps feel sufficiently secure. It starts increasing when they 
begin to experience intensifies political opposition that they tend to increase the 
defense expenditure-to-GDP ratio, as the first Benazir government did in 1989-90 and 
the Nawaz Sharif government did in 1992-93 (Pasha and Fatima, 2006: 215). 
The government expenditure on general administration accounts around 1% of the 
GDP, which has not been utilized efficiently due to the presence of large scale 
corruption and mismanagement.
38
 It is also important to note that the share of 
expenditure on social, economic and community services that is not only low but 
showed a declining trend over the decades. For instance, expenditures on community 
services declined from 0.32% of GDP in 1979-1983 to 0.21% of GDP in 1999-2003. 
Similarly, the social services expenditures were cut back to 0.29% of GDP in 1999-
2003 from 0.50% of GDP in 1979-1983. Economic services expenditure also 
experienced a decline from 0.54% of GDP in 1979-1983 to mere 0.21% of GDP in 
1999-2003 (table 3.4).  
Expenditures on economic and social services were the first victim when the country 
started downsizing her national budget size in 1980s that further accelerated in 
subsequent decades when international financial institutions pushed Pakistan hard to 
reduce the size of the government to narrow down the fiscal deficit. Expenditures on 
economic and social services were the first victim when the country started 
                                                 
38
 Ali (2011) ―Pakistan Development Challenges: federalism, security and governance‖, provides a 
comprehensive elaboration of this issue.  
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Table 3.3: Tax to GDP ratio (Overall and For Individual Taxes of The Federal Govt.) 
Year Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Total Tax-
to-GDP 
ratio 
Income 
Tax 
Corporation 
Tax 
Wealth 
Tax 
Gift Tax 
& Estate 
Duty 
Workers 
Welfare 
Tax 
Capital 
Value 
Tax 
Customs 
Duties 
Federal 
Excise 
Duties 
Sales Tax Surcharge Stamp-
non 
Judicial 
others 
1979-1983 1.972 0.570 0.039 0.006 0.011 0.000 5.646 4.131 1.115 0.595 0.002 0.000 14.086 
1984-1988 2.084 0.036 0.001 0.000 0.013 0.000 6.068 3.397 1.218 0.000 0.000 0.000 12.816 
1989-1988 2.291 0.010 0.035 0.000 0.050 0.000 5.887 2.888 1.992 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.152 
1994-1998 3.586 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.033 0.037 4.133 2.537 2.403 0.000 0.000 0.000 12.831 
1999-2003 3.216 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.107 0.022 1.693 1.441 3.641 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.178 
2004-2008 3.246 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.104 0.051 1.711 0.845 3.945 0.000 0.000 0.009 9.911 
2009-2010 3.854 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.108 0.043 1.299 0.949 3.905 0.000 0.000 0.378 10.536 
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy, State Bank of Pakistan (2010) 
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downsizing her national budget size in 1980s that further accelerated in subsequent 
decades when international financial institutions pushed Pakistan hard to reduce the 
size of the government to narrow down the fiscal deficit. The reduction of these 
expenditures in the interest of debt serving mainly has led to reduce the already 
marginalised social and economic services that adversely affected human 
development particularly the poor.  
Another noticeable point in table 3.4 is the low expenditure to GDP ratio, despite the 
fact that Pakistan is not only a developing country but a clientelist state. It seems 
astonishing given the high and burgeoning defence expenditure and soaring debt 
servicing. One of the reasons of this low ratio may be due to the ―disguised military 
expenditures‖ which are not recorded in the national budget, therefore, are not 
reflected in federal government‘s total expenditures to GDP ratio. Second, and 
perhaps the most convincing, reason is that since the federal government does not 
undertake the majority of social sector expenditures and development expenditures 
hence federal‘s government expenditure to GDP ratio obviously should not be high. 
It is important to note that federal government maintains three fourth of total national 
expenditures (This will be shown latter on this thesis). Considering these factors the 
low expenditure to GDP ratio, therefore, may not be surprising. 
Moreover, table 3.4 also indicates that the development expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
witnessed a perpetual decline from 1979 to 2003. Particularly, during the 1990s  and 
first three years of last decade not only the development expenditure to total GDP 
ratio declined, the share of development to total expenditure has also came down to 
0.63% of GDP during 1999-2003. The development expenditure has increased since 
2003 and reached to 2.13% of GDP in 2009-10. But it is still less than what it was 
during 1979-83. No matter how we look at it, it is extremely low for the country to 
develop her physical infrastructure of all the sectors of the economy.            
3.4 PUBLIC SECTOR CONSTRAINTS  
Elite monopoly and corruption pose serious challenges to the effectiveness of public 
sector in Pakistan because they cause the public expenditures to divert to more 
unproductive and regressive projects with adverse impact on overall budgetary 
position. For instance, despite looming budget deficit and poor resource generation 
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Table 3.4: Expenditure To GDP Ratio (overall and for Individual Exp. of the Fed. Govt.) 
Year Current Development 
Expenditure 
Total 
exp. 
To 
GDP 
ratio 
General 
Administrati
on 
Defense Law & 
Order 
Community 
Services 
Social 
Services 
Economic 
Services 
Subsidies .Debt Ser., 
Investible 
Funds and 
Grants 
Grants to 
Provinces 
Un-allocable Others 
1979-1983 0.75 6.35 0.40 0.32 0.50 0.54 0.90 4.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.28 16.21 
1984-1988 1.05 7.63 0.40 0.34 0.68 0.39 0.78 7.98 0.00 0.05 0.00 2.11 21.42 
1989-1993 0.93 7.33 0.41 0.30 0.66 0.33 0.91 7.87 0.59 0.21 0.00 1.95 21.49 
1994-1998 0.97 5.99 0.36 0.26 0.46 0.12 0.31 8.69 0.58 0.27 0.00 1.00 19.02 
1999-2003 1.01 4.00 0.25 0.21 0.29 0.20 0.60 8.25 1.01 0.41 0.00 0.63 16.86 
2004-2008 N/A 3.24 N/A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.11 0.00 0.00 10.18 1.92 17.45 
2009-2010 N/A 2.65 N/A 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A N/A 0.00 0.00 11.46 2.13 16.24 
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy, State Bank of Pakistan (2011)  and author own estimates 
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the military expenditure consumes on average one-third of the total national budget 
over the years (Pakistan, various issues). Given the budgetary constraints and high 
non-development public expenditures successive governments were forced to keep 
low target or reduce the  investments on social sector (health and education are the 
key example), physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, ports etc.) and poverty 
alleviation projects (such as Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Funds). It indicates ―an 
unproductive fiscal priority‖ is largely brought in place in order to accommodate the 
interests of specific vested groups rather than the public in general. 
Moreover, whatever development expenditure has been carried out, the selection 
criteria for the majority of public sector projects may not adhere to the needs and 
preferences of the targeted groups. Consequently these projects remain fail to 
provide adequate and effective social services. Thus, the over-centralised 
institutional structure and weak planning, implementing and monitoring mechanism 
has led to misappropriating the social services provisions that encouraged the 
supply-driven rather demand driven approach. Supply is channeled in accordance 
with the responsiveness to the recipients. The centralised planning system has 
perhaps failed to identify the projects consistent with the needs of targeted 
communities. Housing schemes and credits for agricultural machinery in 1990s are 
the prime examples of misplaced priorities. Massive leakages and misappropriations 
of public funds almost always end up in the pockets of the established elites (See 
Fatima and Ahmed, 2001; Bengali and Ahmed, 2001; Hasnain, 2008).  
Bengali (2002) believes that in order to run the wheal of social sector effectively the 
public sector functions need to be decentralised to the provincial and local 
government level. The main stream literature on fiscal federalism also supports the 
assertion for the demand of greater decentralisation of core public sector 
investments.  Oates (1972) for example shows that the sub-national governments 
with sufficient amount of funds and developed institutional capacity are far more 
effective in public service delivery. This argument is based on the strong assumption 
that such expenditure if undertaken by the decentralised governments with better 
local knowledge will be tailored to the needs and preferences of targeted people.  
Another important factor that potentially influences the effectiveness of public sector 
in key services delivery in Pakistan is the bureaucratic and political corruption. The 
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negative impact of such corruption on welfare is widely noted (Khan, 2001). The 
bureaucratic corruption, which refers to kind of corruption engaged by the public 
sector/state employees, considers being a serious impediment to social services 
delivery. Because bureaucrats are the executive arms of the state, and their 
involvement in corruption leave a serious negative impact on social services delivery 
and social and economic regulations. Similarly, political corruption refers to a kind 
of corruption that politicians/political representatives are engaged in. In Pakistan 
both political representatives and bureaucrats interlock and collide in corruption by 
facilitating one another. No matter who initiate the corrupt initiatives, whether 
political representatives direct government officials to indulge in corruption which 
benefits politicians and their clients or government officials take the initiatives and 
involve political representatives in  order to avoid state sanctions  - in both cases, this 
widespread interlocking adversely affects the social services delivery. The 
collaboration of bureaucrats and political representatives in engaging in corruption, 
suggests that unless both types of corruption (bureaucratic and political corruption) 
are addressed simultaneously, the sustained reduction of corruption overall is very 
much unlikely. Certain specific policies may be initiated or supported in order to 
bring political representatives and bureaucrats accountable to the people. These 
policy initiatives include democratisation and civil society participation, 
decentralisation and devolution among others.  
Several political economy models (like Bourguignon and Verdier, 1999) suggest that 
the reasons of poor social services delivery has lot to do with the political economy 
structure of that country. The political economy structure of Pakistan which is 
dominated by elite is a typical case of what has been shown in such type of political 
economy models. Specifically, the landlords who are the prominent part of this 
―oligarchy‖ have an influential and strong clout over political structure in rural 
Pakistan. The landlords are very likely to oppose wide spread social service delivery, 
particularly the provision of education. That is because educated masses inherently 
demand political power, which consequently weakens the stranglehold of strong 
landlords on political economy of Pakistan. Another important point to mention here 
is that large landlords would have least interest to tax themselves in order to pay for 
the social services delivery cost, which largely benefits the poor and less-
advantaged.  
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Another key political economy aspect that hampers social services delivery is the 
link between the latter and ethnic fractionalisation in Pakistan. Alesina et al (1999) 
find that in ethnically diverse societies less resource is devoted to public service 
delivery. Moreover, the ethnic fractionalisation also leads to have weak institutions. 
Manro et al (1995) also show that ethnic diversity causes poor quality of governance 
and encourages corruption. Pakistan‘s social structure with social backwardness and 
high fractionalisation predicts that the ethnic diversity impedes effective and better 
social services delivery. The political economy of the country is dominated by one 
ethnic group, which has least interest to provide social services to other ethnic 
groups within Pakistan. That is because in case of widespread social services 
delivery, all ethnic groups may benefit, if not equally, from public services, which 
may not suit the political and economy interests of the dominated ethnic group.   
3.5 PARTICIPANTS OF FISCAL DECISION MAKING 
The political and economic affairs of Pakistan are predominately controlled by the 
‗establishment‘. The latter ties up together high ranks military and civil bureaucracy 
personnel, key members of the judiciary, big landlords and other elites (Cohen, 
2005). Like other major issues of the economy, these agents also play the central role 
in shaping the fiscal policy. In addition to this, because of the heavy dependence on 
foreign lending for assistance on International financial institutions (IFIs) and donor 
countries, the fiscal policy also incorporates the directions and suggestions of these 
institutions. Additionally, Waheed (2001) believes that courts and media also have 
an influential role in fiscal decision making. Ahmed and Amjad (1984) include 
students and labour unions in the fiscal decision making. Although the latter groups 
historically influenced the fiscal policy making of the country, our research shows 
that over the time they have become marginalized. Currently they are unable to exert 
any meaningful pressure to change the course of the fiscal decision making in their 
favour. Thus, they may not be considered as effective players in fiscal policy 
making.  
The military that ruled country for most of the period of its existence left its 
influence on every aspect of her political economy. Waheed (2001)  argues that even 
during civilian rules, which intermitted the military regimes, the military behind the 
scene played not only a significant power broking role but had a paramount fiscal 
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decision making power. Supporting the same argument Khan (2003) suggests that 
military is the most important decision making body, be it the fiscal or political 
decisions, irrespective of its being in power or not. Looking at evidence of the 
military expenditure, on average, it increased at the rate of 10% in each fiscal year 
since 1950s (Pakistan, various issues),
39
 highlights the military‘s vital role in fiscal 
policy making. The military establishment has remained influential in directing the 
politicians and civilian bureaucrats in an authoritarian and uncoordinated manner to 
ensure funneling public finance to the military‘s big businesses like Askari Bank and 
National Logistic Cell (Siddiqa, 2007).  
Second important player in fiscal policy making is the political class. Due to the 
frequent military intervention in political and economic affairs of the country, the 
political culture has failed to take strong roots, and the political culture in turn 
encouraged the politicians to join direct military dictatorship or military-engineered 
democratic dispensations to gain and retain office in order to expedite or preserve 
their vested political and economic interests. Therefore, the politicians intend not to 
challenge the prime decision maker, the military, in fiscal policy decision making. 
While in office, the politicians are only ostensibly in charge of budget making, in 
fact they leave the core policy decisions to the military. Instead, they are more 
interested in safeguarding and promoting their personal privileges and ensuring to 
prolong their incumbency. Therefore, the politicians‘ role in fiscal policy making has 
not been growth and development oriented so far. Rather it has been confined to 
ensuring their maximum opportunity of public fund embezzlements and personal 
gains. 
Another important thing to note regarding politicians‘ role in fiscal decision making 
is owing to the fact that the latter are not accountable to their constituents. Khan 
(2003) believes this is because of the excessive role of the undemocratic institutions 
in country‘s political economy. Therefore, the politicians are less interested in such 
public policy making that leads to boosting economic growth, creating jobs and 
economic development.  
                                                 
39
 In terms of its share to GDP, the defense expenditure in Pakistan is the highest in the region. See 
Hasan (1998) and Siddiqa (2007) for more details.  
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Fiscal policy is largely reflected in annual budget, and the latter is constitutionally 
the responsibility of ministry of finance and planning commission. The role of 
ministry of finance and planning commission in fiscal policy is more professional 
and technocratic. The main function of the ministry of finance is to protect the state 
treasury, prepare federal government annual budget and pursue economic policies 
aiming to ensure the macroeconomic stability. However, professional role of the 
ministry of finance is often succumbed to the political and institutional needs of the 
ruling elite. Some policies suggested by the elites may have populist support but not 
necessarily be viable economically. Consequently the politically motivated decisions 
couple with frequent bureaucratic interventions have largely overshadowed 
professionalism of the ministry and impeded its role in providing a coherent, sound 
and sustainable fiscal policy. 
The planning commission compare to ministry of finance is a young body and has 
gone through major transitions since 1958, when it was first established. It is a 
highly technical body which composed of technical members whose expertise ranges 
from various specialised fields in social sciences with diverse approaches and 
capabilities. During the initial years of its establishment, particularly during 1960s, 
the commission played a central role in the economic development in the country in 
terms of setting the strategy for transforming economy into a rapid industrialisation.  
However, in following years it lost its scope for central planning and competency of 
its personnel (Root, 2010). The commission has been failed to provide guidance to 
the federal government regarding the country‘s wider planning issues related to 
sustainable macroeconomic and socio-economic development. To Ahmed and 
Amjad (1984), and Ansari (2001) the prime culprit for making the planning 
commission‘s role dysfunctional has been the ruling political and military class that 
has consistently intercepted into its working to gain personal or departmental favour 
often at the cost of greater economic development requirements.   
Another important participant in fiscal policy making is bureaucracy; bureaucracy is 
essential for smooth functioning of government machinery in any country (Shafqat, 
1999). The main function of bureaucracy is to ensure the implementation of 
decisions that are made by the incumbent government. Theoretically the role of 
bureaucracy in Pakistan is to carry out the policy enacted by the government, like in 
any other country, but in practice it is not only limited to the delivering policies, 
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instead it also has gained over the years a significant role in policy making for itself. 
As the bureaucracy not elected but recruited permanently as civil servants is not 
accountable to the public. Therefore, it is very unlikely that policy making decisions 
of the bureaucracy reflect the aspirations of general public (Kennedy, 1987; Shafqat, 
1999).  
IFIs also play a pivotal role in fiscal policy making by the virtue of their large 
amount of funding provided to Pakistan for budgetary support and other 
development projects. More than 80% of total multilateral aids to the country came 
from The World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) (Anwar, 2006). The World Bank‘s (2004) statistics show that Pakistan 
is among the top 10 aid recipients of the Bank, which makes the latter the largest 
external financial source of the country. The second largest source has been the 
ADB. The ADB (2002) places Pakistan the second largest borrower of the Bank after 
Indonesia.  
The majority of lending from these institutions fed programmes like Structural 
Adjustment Programmes and, Social Action Programmes, which are aimed to reform 
financial sector, widen the tax net, reduce unproductive public expenditures and 
narrow down the twin deficit – trade and budget deficits.40  The IMF that has a great 
deal of influence in fiscal policy making, entered into the picture in 1988, when the 
first agreement between the IMF and Pakistan was made.
41
 Ever since, the country 
signed numerous tranches with IMF, which mainly seek to cushion the balance of 
payments related problems.  
The IFIs not only play a major role in rescuing the country from balance of payments 
problems and supporting its structural adjustment matters, they also have a 
significant role in fiscal policy orientation of Pakistan. This argument is supported 
by the fact that most of the federal finance ministers, during civilian and military 
regimes alike, hailed either from the World Bank or the IMF. For example, Mehbul 
Haq, former Director of the World Bank, was the Finance Minister in 1988, Sahid 
Javed Burki, Vice-President of the World Bank, was the Finance Minister during 
                                                 
40
 See Anwar (2006) ―Structural Adjustment and Poverty: The Case of Pakistan‖, for positive and 
adverse role of IFIs in social and economic sector of Pakistan. 
41
 Though Pakistan signed an agreement for the time in 1958 with IMF, but due to reasons not known 
to author, the agreement was not materialized.  
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1990s, Moen Qureshi, Senior Vice-President of the World Bank was the caretaker 
Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1993 and Dr. Afeez Sheikh, country Director of the 
World Bank, is the incumbent Finance Minister. The appointment of these officials 
as the in-charge of finances in Pakistan has largely been seen as a part of the 
conditionality that the IFIs attach when they embark upon a financial agreement with 
Pakistan. Thus, it may arguably be asserted that these institutions have a good 
maneuvering power in fiscal policy making in Pakistan.  
The functionalities of businesses as an organised pressure group in the country are 
very much ineffective due to its inefficient and disarray organisational structure. 
However, major business organisations like professional Chambers and Bourses 
have a small role in fiscal policy making, and have the potential to thwart certain 
policies undermining their interests. For example, because of the fierce resistance 
from business organisations, the capital gain tax despite attempts by successive 
governments has not been implemented yet.  
3.6 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR DEVELOPMENT  
The social sector in Pakistan is weak and dysfunctional, which made the country a 
classic example of ‗economic growth without development‘ where a decent rate of 
economic growth has been achieved without adequate social sector development. 
Over the last 63 years, the country has not been able to progress in all dimensions of 
social sector development. The poor state of social sector has been largely due to the 
failure of the country to translate the fruits of economic growth for the improvement 
of the majority of the people. It is understandable that with such underdeveloped 
social sector – with low level literary rate and poor and inadequate healthcare 
services, for instances – the country would not sustain a decent economic growth. 
Pakistan seems to have failed to understand the fact that high and sustain economic 
growth depends on highly skilled, healthy and educated workforce, as suggested by 
new growth theories and exercised by many countries. For instance, the growth and 
development experience of countries, like Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, 
uncovers the striking fact that without social sector development economic growth is 
very unlikely to sustain itself. In comparison to these countries Pakistan lags far 
behind in almost all indicators of social and human development.  
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Table 3.5: Comparison of HDI‘s Trends of Selected Countries 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Pakistan 0.386 0.441 0.443 0.463 0 0.518 0.526 0.548 0.562 
India 0.428 0.456 0.494 0.517 0.561 0.576 0.585 0.6 0.609 
Morocco 0.471 0.497 0.516 0.56 0.582 0.626 0.631 0.638 0.646 
Indonesia 0.52 0.56 0.623 0.567 0.671 0.709 0.714 0.719 0.726 
Thailand 0.644 0.663 0.692 0.721 0.75 0.764 0.772 0.782 0.786 
Vietnam 0 0.559 0.595 0.645 0.688 0.703 0.709 0.714 0.718 
Egypt 0.843 0.539 0.572 0.628 0.665 0.704 0.709 0.712 0.716 
Source: Human Development Indices,  UNDP (2006) 
Table 3.5 Indicates that Pakistan‘s position in terms of the DHI is one of the lowest 
in comparison to countries with similar classification of per capita income by the 
World Bank.  For instance in 2006 the HDI in Pakistan was 0.562, which is the 
lowest in all seven included countries in the survey. 
Among the social indicators, education and healthcare are considered to be very 
important for the overall development of society. In the following sub-sections we 
describe the state of education and health in Pakistan.  
3.6.1 EDUCATION  
In modern world a nation without sound and decent education lags far behind in 
every aspect of socio-economic and human development irrespective of her 
possession of natural endowment. Those who have ignored the importance of 
education have been failed in reaping the economic opportunities. In a country like 
Pakistan where ethnic fractions and social diversity is starkly high, the pivotal role of 
education in order to scale down the social and ethnic strife is undeniable.   
Pakistan‘s performance in the field of education has been very poor throughout her 
history. Although Pakistan declared education-for-all as her prime goal in very first 
year of  inception (1947), but the budgetary allocations for all those proceeding years 
show that education has attracted the least attention. Average education expenditure 
as percentage of GDP has remained 0.8%, 2.3% and 2.1% during 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s, respectively (Pakistan, 2009-10), which is much lower than its regional 
neighbours:  during 2000s the average expenditure in India is 3.3%, Bangladesh 
2.6%, Indonesia 3.5%, Iran 5.2% and Nepal 3.2% of their respective GDPs (World 
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Bank and UNDP, 2010). According to official statistics, which though invite much 
skepticism, the current literacy rate in Pakistan is 57% (Pakistan, 2009-10), much is 
lower than those countries similar to Pakistan in 1947. For instance, countries like, 
Sri Lanka with very low per capita income ($818 in 2010), and Vietnam even further 
lower income ($392 in 2010) have 90.6% and 92.5% of literacy rate, respectively 
(World Bank, 2011). 
Literacy Rate: Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey, 2008-09 
reports the male literacy rate in Pakistan is 69% compare to it female counterpart, 
which is only 45%.  Another striking fact comes from these data is the revelation of 
rural-urban differentiation or in terms of literacy rate: in urban areas the literacy rate 
remains well above 74%, while in rural areas it is just 48%. In addition to this, the 
differentiation is not confined to the geographical areas but it also engulfs the 
genders, which is showed in table 3.6. 
As table 3.6 points out, there is a wide variation in literacy among the provinces. In 
the province of Punjab, the overall literacy rate stands at 59%, while in Balochistan it 
is only 45%. The same table shows that literacy rate is pace has been high in 
provinces of KP and Sindh over the last couple of years. In Sindh province, for 
example, the literacy has increased from 51% in 1989-99 to 59% in 2008-09. 
Similarly, in KP it increased from 37% in 1998-99 to 50% in 2008-09.  Female 
literacy rate particularly in two of the four provinces - KP and Balochistan - has 
remained dismally low with only 31% in the former and 23% in the latter, which 
probably would be one of the lowest rates in World over. 
Gross Enrollment Rate: The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) or school participation 
is the ratio of the children who attend the school to total number of children in entire 
country. The GER in Pakistan has increased by 20 percentage point within 10 years 
period from 71% in 1998-99 to 91% in 2008-9 (Table 3.6). Female enrolment, 
though increased from 61% to 83%, lagged far behind its male counterpart: the male 
enrollment was at 99% in 2008-09. The province of Balochistan portraits a very 
gloomy picture in terms of female GER where it has hardly reached to 54%, which is 
far behind compares to other provinces: in the Punjab, Sindh and KP respectively the 
female GER is 92 %, 75% and 70%. 
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Table 3.6:  Literacy rate 10 and above, GER and NER trends, GPI  
Region/Province Literacy rate (10 years and above) GER* primary (5-9) 
Pakistan 
Years 1998-
99 
2001-
02 
2004-
05 
2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
2008-
09 
1998-
99 
2001-
02 
2004-
05 
2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
2008-
09 
Male 59 58 65 65 67 69 69 80 83 94 94 99 97 99 
Female 31 32 40 42 42 45 45 61 61 77 80 81 83 83 
Both 45 45 53 54 55 56 57 71 72 86 87 91 91 91 
Rural      44 44 45 49 48     79 80 83 85 82 
Urban     71 71 72 71 74     104 104 106 106 106 
GPI         0.63 0.64 0.65         0.82 0.86 0.83 
Punjab 
Male 57 57 65 66 67 70 69 82 84 100 98 106 102 102 
Female 34 36 44 47 48 48 50 68 69 89 89 95 92 92 
Both 46 47 55 56 58 59 59 75 76 95 94 100 97 97 
GPI         0.72 0.69 0.61         0.9 0.9 0.9 
Sindh 
Male 65 60 68 67 67 69 71 75 76 84 88 88 87 93 
Female 35 31 41 42 42 42 45 54 51 65 71 68 72 75 
Both 51 46 56 55 55 56 59 64 63 75 80 79 80 84 
GPI         0.63 0.61 0.63         0.77 0.83 0.77 
KP 
Male 56 57 64 64 67 68 69 84 97 93 93 96 94 102 
Female 20 20 26 30 28 33 31 54 56 65 70 67 71 70 
Both 37 38 45 46 47 49 50 70 77 80 83 82 83 87 
GPI         0.42 0.49 0.45         0.45 0.7 0.75 
Balochistan  
Male 54 53 52 54 58 66 62 79 77 83 79 62 89 88 
Female 16 15 19 20 22 23 23 46 44 49 50 52 59 54 
Both 36 36 37 38 42 46 45 64 62 67 65 72 75 75 
GPI**         0.38 0.35 0.37         0.58 0.67 0.55 
Continued on next page  
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Region/Province NER** Primary (5-9) 
Pakistan 
Years 1998-99 2001-02 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 1008-09 
Male 47 46 56 56 60 59 61 
Female 37 38 48 48 51 52 54 
Both 42 42 52 53 56 55 57 
Rural    48 47 52 51 53 
Urban   64 65 66 66 68 
GPI     0.85 0.88 0.87 
Punjab 
Male 47 47 60 60 64 62 64 
Female 40 43 55 53 59 59 60 
Both 44 45 58 57 62 61 62 
GPI     0.92 0.95 0.94 
Sindh 
Male 47 46 53 54 56 55 57 
Female 35 34 42 47 43 46 49 
Both 41 40 48 50 50 51 54 
GPI     0.77 0.84 0.8 
KP 
Male 47 48 53 54 56 55 58 
Female 30 33 40 42 41 41 45 
Both 39 41 47 49 49 49 52 
GPI     0.73 0.75 0.64 
Balochistan 
Male 44 39 44 39 49 47 51 
Female 28 24 29 27 32 35 36 
Both 36 32 37 34 41 41 44 
GPI**     0.65 0.74 0.64 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan (2009-10), PSLAM (2008-09, 2006-07 and 2004-05) 
*GER is Gross Enrolment rate,  ** NER is Net Enrolment Rate and  *** GPI is Gender parity Index 
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Net Enrollment Rate: The Net Enrolment Rate (NER), which measures the overall 
school attendance
42
, does not show a good picture in Pakistan. Albeit, the NER has 
marked an increasing trend during the last 10 years (1998-99 to 2008-09), where in 
overall Pakistan it increased from 42% to 57%, but in  comparison to the other 
regional countries Pakistan is left far behind in terms of NER. Among the provinces 
Punjab showed a decent growth rate in NER of 22 percentage point during 1998-99 
to 2008-09 period, while, Balochistan could increase its NER by only 8 percentage 
point, from 36 to 44, during same period of time (see table 3.6). 
One of the prime reasons for low literacy rate in Pakistan is due to the lack of 
attention to its female education. The latter has not only remained dismally low, but 
it also left a negative consequence on overall education in the country. From the 
Gender Parity Index (GPI), which is the ratio of female to male enrolment rate, 
one can easily judge the gender parity in Pakistan. Among provinces, the GPI is 
highest in Balochistan with 0.64 (table 3.6). 
Education: Some Critical Issues: The deteriorated state of education in Pakistan 
created a wider debate and concern among the development economists, and national 
and international policy circles. Though education has not been the priority of any 
government in Pakistan, during Zia-ul-Haq era the sector suffered the most (Cohen, 
2006).  Zia-ul-Haq was convinced that scholarship and rationale thinking that may 
come from colleges and universities would make an insurmountable challenge to his 
dictatorial regime. Moreover, during his regime, the public sector schools were used 
for his islamisation process of the entire society. And the higher institutions (colleges 
and universities) were politicised, and consequently turned them into a hot bed of 
conflicts among the hostile rival student groups.   
A deeper look into the budgeting of education in Pakistan discloses that education 
has not only been underinvested and ignored during dictatorial regimes, but during 
interregnums of democratic dispensation negligence to education along with other 
social services continued. For instance, during the 1990s, education expenditure to 
GNP was 2.3% (Pakistan, 2009-10).  
                                                 
42
 NER is the ratio of students (between the ages of 5-9) who are enrolled in any primary school (both 
public and private) to total children of that age (Pakistan, 2009-10).  
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However, during Benazir Bhutto‘s second tenure (1993-1996), female education 
particularly in least developed province of Balochistan received a considerable 
attention. It is worth pointing out that according to some estimates Balochistan with 
weak or no female education infrastructure witnessed the lowest female literacy rate 
in the World in the early 1990s.
43
   
The country has a class-based education structure and runs at least four different 
types of systems in parallel. At the lowest rug comes the madaress (religious 
schools) which are networked with masques and run by various religious 
groups/parties. The madaress‟ graduates with weak or no modern skills are not 
absorbed in the job market (both public and private), therefore, majority of them 
would become ulema (religious teachers in the same madaress in itself). In addition 
to this, there are the public schools which accommodate around 72% of total enrolled 
students in Pakistan (Pakistan, 2008-09). Kizilbash (1998) argues that virtually 25% 
of teachers in public sector schools are totally un-trained, which couple with weak 
infrastructure, weakens the already deteriorated quality of education.  
Besides madaress and state run schools, Pakistan also has a tremendously increasing 
numbers of privately run English Medium schools in the cities, town and even in 
some villages. The country also has inherited a decent number of elite schools and 
colleges from the time of Colonial past, which were built during the British Raj by 
Christian Missionaries and the British India government. These institutions were 
purposely built to educate the aristocracy and to train personnel for civil and military 
establishment of Colonial government. After the end of the British rule in the Sub-
Continent, these institutions kept their standard intact, but only accessed by the 
members of the establishment and aristocracy (Kardar, 1998; Cohen, 2006). 
3.6.2 HEALTHCARE  
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) declares that everyone has a right 
to ―a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family‖ (The UN, Article 25). Pakistan being a member of the declaration spells out 
the importance of the health in her constitution in following words, ―the State shall 
                                                 
43
 Some independent researchers like (Jalil Nasir, 1998) suggest that in early 1990s the literacy rate in 
Balochistan was only 2%, which is the lowest in the World. However, official sources in Pakistan 
would deny this argument. 
 94 
 
secure the well-being of all people by raising their standard of living and shall 
provide basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, housing, education and 
medical relief for all such citizens as are unable to earn their livelihood by reason of 
disease, infirmity or unemployment‖ (Constitution, 1973).  
Looking at the health statistics of Pakistan, one may observe a considerable progress 
in health sector for last many decades. As table 3.7 indicates all indicators have 
continued to increase from 1960 to 2009. For instance, life expectancy at birth for 
female has increased from 46.8 years in 1960 to 65.8 year on 2009, a considerable 19 
years difference. The total life expectancy at birth has increased from 46.6 years in 
1960 to 65 years in 2009 that means currently an average Pakistani can live 18.4 year 
longer than in 1960. Another noticeable progress made in health sector is in terms of 
Crude Death Rates (CDR) and Infant Mortality Rates (IMR). The former has 
decreased by 42% - from 13 crude deaths per 1000 in 1960 to 7.6 in 2009 -, while 
the latter has fallen down by 48% - from 131 infant deaths per 1000 in 1960 to 68 
death per thousand in 2009. 
Similarly, apparently per capita health expenditure witnessed a substantial jump 
from 0.46 rupees in 1950 to 257.40 rupees in 2005(table 3.9). Nevertheless, 
considering the average inflation of 6.89% (SBP, 2010), during the same period this 
increment is not enough in meeting the health requirements of all citizens.  
Table 3.8 presents the infrastructure facilities or the curative side of the health 
facility provided in Pakistan. The number of hospital and dispensaries has made a 
tremendous growth - increase from 304 and 807 in 1950 to 968 and 4813 in 2009, 
respectively. Also, the population per bed availability has decreased by more than 
twofold: decreased from 2431 in 1950 to 1592 in 2009. Similarly, a noticeable 
progress has also been made in the availability of total dispensaries and maternity 
and child health centers, basic health units and regional health centres particularly 
for rural dwellers. However, table 3.9 indicates that health expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, which underlies the importance of health sector in public policy 
making, presents a gloomy picture. 
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Table 3.7: Trends of Key Health Indicators – 1960 to 2009 
Year 1960 1961 1964 1967 1968 1969 1971 1976 1979 1984 1986 1988 1990 1993 1995 1997 1998 2000 2001 2005 2008 2009 
Life expectancy 
at birth, female 46.8 47.5 49.5 51.4 52.1 52.7 53.9 56.6 57.9 59.7 60.3 60.9 61.5 62.3 62.8 63.3 63.5 64.0 64.2 64.9 65.6 65.8 
Life expectancy 
at birth, male 
46.5 47.1 49.2 51.2 51.8 52.5 53.7 56.2 57.2 58.6 59.1 59.6 60.1 60.8 61.3 61.8 62.0 62.4 62.6 63.3 63.9 64.1 
Life expectancy 
at birth, total 46.6 47.3 49.3 51.3 51.9 52.6 53.8 56.4 57.6 59.1 59.7 60.2 60.8 61.6 62.0 62.5 62.7 63.2 63.4 64.1 64.7 65.0 
Crude Birth 
Rate  
51.0 41.0 
 
36.0 36.0 37.0 42.8 41.6 43.3 43.3 40.5 40.6 39.9 37.2 33.8 32.7 30.2 28.7 26.1 28.7 28.4 
Crude Death 
Rate   
13.0 
 
12.0 12.0 11.0 11.5 9.6 11.8 10.1 10.8 10.6 9.9 9.4 9.0 9.1 8.3 8.2 8.2 7.7 7.6 
Infant 
Mortality (per 
thousands) 
 
131.0 136.0 121.0 124.0 111.0 106.0 87.0 95.0 127.0 106.0 108.0 105.0 100.0 93.0 84.0 81.5 79.8 77.1 77.0 70.2 68.2 
Source: World Bank, Pakistan; Research Department, SBP and Economic Survey (various issues) 
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Table 3.8: National medical and health Facilities    
       
(Progressive Numbers) 
Year Hospitals Dispensaries BHUs and 
sub health 
centers 
Maternity & 
child Health 
Centers 
Rural 
Health 
Centers 
TB 
centers 
Total 
Debs 
Population 
Per Bed 
1950 304 807 - 107 - - 14,524 2,431 
1955 333 984 - 198 - - 19,197 2,077 
1960 342 1,195 - 384 - - 22,100 2,038 
1965 379 1,695 - 554 - - 25,603 2,022 
1970 411 1,875 - 668 - - 28,976 2,061 
1975 518 2,908 373 696 134 89 37,776 1,852 
1980 602 3,466 736 812 217 98 47,412 1,716 
1985 652 3,415 2,647 778 334 100 55,886 1,699 
1990 735 3,714 4,213 1,057 459 220 72,997 1,444 
1995 827 4,253 4,986 859* 498 260 85,805 1,416 
2000 876 4635 5,171 856* 531 274 93,907 1,456 
2005 919 4,632 5,334 907 556 289 101,490 1,483 
2009 968 4,813 5,345 906 572 293 103,708 1,592 
*.  The decrease in MCH since 1993  onward as against previous years is due to  exclusion/separation of  
Family Welfare Centers from MCH structure in NWFP  
Source: FBS 50 Years of Pakistan in Statistics and Economic Survey of Pakistan 2009-10 
 
Although it increased from 0.08% of GDP to 0.54% of GDP between 1950 and 2009, 
with more allocation during the decades of 1970s and 1980s, it remains far below the 
international standard. The country with a growing ailing population cannot provide 
sufficient healthcare facility to her citizens by expending less than 1% of GDP.  
The country though made some progress in curative side of the health that has had a 
considerable impact on key health indicators, the health sector encountered with 
numerous structural issues that marred its broader effectiveness on common masses. 
Zaidi (1999) argues that Pakistan inherited her health system from British imperialism, 
which was brought to Indian subcontinent mainly to suit the medical requirement of 
their administrative and military set up. 
He further demonstrates that: 
 Along with  own people, the British also permitted the native Indian elite to consume this 
modern care, and this trend continued even after independence, when only the affluent 
and ruling classes had access to adequate medical facilities. At the same time, the British 
allowed a select few from the elite to become administrators, bureaucrats and doctors, and 
to work along with the colonists. Thus when they left India and Pakistan, the British 
retained considerable influence on entire health service system of the country by the top 
of the medical profession in India remained heavily dependent on them (349-350).  
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Thus it may be safe to describe Pakistan‘s health system as a very inequitable elitist 
curative model that facilitates a select few, particularly in urban area. 
Table 3.9: Expenditure on Health 
Period 
GDP (Current 
Factor) 
(Million 
Rupees) 
Total Expenditure  
on health (Million 
Rupees) 
Health 
Expenditure 
as % of GDP 
Nominal Health 
Expenditure-
Growth rate 
(%) 
Per Capita 
Health 
Expenditure 
(Rupees) 
1950-51 20,759 16.2 0.08 0.08 0.46 
1955-56 22,688 31.3 0.14 0.14 0.79 
1960-61 18,349 65.7 0.36 0.36 1.46 
1965-66 28,969 110.5 0.38 0.38 2.13 
1970-71 46,006 212.7 0.46 0.46 3.56 
1975-76 119,736 989.7 0.83 0.83 14.14 
1980-81 247,831 1,916.8 0.77 0.77 23.56 
1985-86 466,319 4,275.3 0.92 0.92 44.69 
1990-91 904,498 7,738.0 0.86 0.86 70.53 
1995-96 1,929,891 16,354.8 0.85 0.85 131.37 
2000-01 3,166,954 24,281.0 0.58 0.77 163.35 
2005-06 7,295,210 40,000.0 0.51 0.55 257.40 
2009-10   13,843,489  79000.0 0.54             0.57    
Source: Pakistan (Various Issues) 
 
The country‘s health system is highly biased against the rural areas. For example, in 
spite of  the fact that 60% of total population lives in rural areas, around 85% of 
practicing medical doctors work in urban centers and big cities (FBS, 2010). This 
―urban bias‖ may largely be due to the fact that since elite class resides in the urban 
centers, hence, the elite based medical system centers its medical facilities in cities. This 
geographical biasness is primarily because of the ‗class biasness‘ that predominately 
exists in Pakistani larger society. As a result, rural areas with great majority of the poor 
and lower middle class of the country lacks similar  kind of medical infrastructure that 
exists in  big towns and  cities.  
In the course of this study we notice that the biggest and the richest Balochistan 
province is the home of the poorest and backward people not only in Pakistan but the 
world. To understand Balochistan‘s social and economic backwardness and hapless 
human condition one has to know the historical and contemporary politico-economic 
and geostrategic relationship of the province with the state of Pakistan. The following 
section is an attempt to analytically demonstrate how Balochistan was inducted into 
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Pakistan and what is wrong with the political economy of the province that has caused 
its phenomenal deprivation.  
3.7 BALOCHISTAN VERSUS PAKISTAN 
Balochistan, now a federating unit of Pakistan, had remained a sovereign and 
independent country for centuries (Harrison, 1981; Bansal, 2006). Balochistan with 
immense geo-strategic importance and huge untapped natural resource reserves (oil, gas, 
gold, copper and others), retains 44% of total territory of Pakistan (Gazdar, 2007). In 
1948 when Balochistan was forced to annex with Pakistan (Ahmed, 1975), the conflict 
between the province and central government has been amongst the persistent state-
province contradictions in recent history of counties (Akhtar, 2007). The Baloch – the 
inhabitants of Balochistan – revolted five times against the unwilling seizure of 
Balochistan by Pakistan. To suppress and quell the voice of the Baloch who pledged to 
regain the independent status of Balochistan, Pakistan has used sheer force. 
Consequently, the latter indulged into gross human rights violation by killing and 
exterminating the Baloch in a massive scale (Harrison, 1981).Why the Balochistan-
Pakistan relation has been estranged and why the former has been failed to incorporate 
the latter into the federation? Furthermore, it is important to know that in spite of having 
huge resources and endowments Balochistan has remained the poorest and economically 
the least-developed region in Pakistan. In order to understand this conundrum, this 
section sheds a brief light on Balochistan-Pakistan relationship within a historical 
context and then analyses the causes of the underdevelopment of Balochistan by 
describing the political economy of the province.   
The Baloch is one of the oldest nations of Iranian plateau. For historians it has not been 
easy to locate Baloch history due mainly to the unavailable documentary evidences. The 
only solution left to the researchers to trace out the origin of the Baloch people is to 
study the cultural and linguistic affiliation of the Baloch people with other ethnic groups 
within the region. The first credible and somewhat comprehensive work on Baloch 
history and language was carried out by Dames (1904) who traced the origin of the 
Baloch to Kerman. 
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 In later part of the 20
th
 century, after the work of many researchers on Iranian 
languages, the Balochi language has now established as a member of north-western 
group of Iranian languages (Jahani, 2003). Along with Persian, Balochi, Zazaki Kurdish, 
Talyshi, Mazandarani and Gilaki are main languages of this group (Axenov, 2006). On 
cultural ground, Bosworth (1977) and Janmahmad (1982) consider that Baloch have 
much similarity and resemblance with Parthian and Medes. Moreover, many cultural, 
linguistic and traditional evidences indicate that Baloch are closely related to the Median 
group of tribes among which Kurds are the most prominent member. However, Dasthi 
(2012) maintains that the Baloch have remained a distinctive ethnic group possessed 
their own territorial independence and the language since late antiquity while living in 
alliance with other nationalities and ethnic groups and sharing cultural and linguistic 
features with them.  
 Baloch has always lived in tribal communities with frequent movement from one part 
of their inhabited territory to another without having a proper chain of command. A 
significant change took place in Baloch history in the 14
th
 century when Mir Chakar 
Khan Rind established the first tribal confederacy of the Baloch tribes to unite them 
under one loose administrative structure.  His tribal confederacy stretched from Kirman 
to the west, Afghanistan to northeast, Sindh and Punjab up to the southeast and Arabian 
Sea to the south (Fred, 2002). Chakar Khan‘s step towards the Baloch unification was 
the first cogent initiative. However, after his demise the tribes failed to maintain their 
political unity until 1666 when the first Kalat confederacy was established. The Kalat 
confederacy was larger and more coherent than Ckakar Khan‘s confederation. In early 
18
th
 century the Kalat confederacy encompassed an area from Kandahar (Afghanistan) 
to the north and Bandar Abbas (Iran) to the west. To the east it extended to Dera Ghazi 
Khan and Karachi to the southeast (Ali, 2005). Under the 6
th
 Khan of Kalat, Mir Naseer 
Khan, the Kalat confederacy emerged as a strong confederation with a regular army of 
some 25,000, a bureaucratic setup and two legislative councils (the house of lords and 
house of commons) (Harrison, 1981). During his rule significant improvements took 
place in terms of physical and economic infrastructure. He constructed roads, ports and 
encouraged education and learning. The territory under Kalat confederacy achieved the 
highest of development and attained the architectural, cultural and economic climax 
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(Fred, 2002). Thus with organised army and administrative structure Kalat remained a 
sovereign state until the arrival of British, who entered into Balochistan with high 
imperial designs. The Kalat confederacy lasted until the invasion of Balochistan by the 
British Army in 1839 when Mir Mehrab Khan, the ruler of the Balochistan was killed 
(Breseeg, 2004:159-166). On 13
th
 November 1839 the British forces attacked the Palace 
of Balochistan‘s Ruler and Mehrab Khan and several of his friends were killed.  
There are two distinctive views concerning relations between the British and Khanate 
Kalat. One is that the relations were based on amity, through agreements and treaties, 
but the other view is that there was a forced subjugation of the Kalat State by the British. 
The treaties with the State of Kalat and the revolts of Baloch tribes illustrate both these 
viewpoints. Zaidi (1993:288) argues in the Jinnah papers that ―the history of British 
relations with the Kalat State and its rulers has been one of friendly alliances and treaties 
of mutual friendship and amity throughout‖. After the occupation of the state of Kalat 
by the British they finally signed a treaty and recognised Nasir Khan II as the ruler of 
Kalat in 1841. This treaty mentions that the ―British troops could be stationed in Kalat 
territory‖ (Breseeg, 2005: 160). Various other treaties were signed at different times 
which provided an opportunity for the British to station their forces on British 
Balochistan territory en route to Afghanistan. In return for these concessions Kalat 
would receive handsome of subsidies and guarantees of tribal autonomy (Harrison, 
1981). Of all the treaties and agreements signed, the treaty of 1876 was the most 
important one.  
It had become expedient to sign treaty of 1876 in order to renew and reinforce the old 
treaty of 1854 and ―to supplement the same by certain additional provisions calculated 
to draw closer the bond of friendship and amity between the two governments‖ (Zaidi, 
1993:288). Article 3 of this treaty states that ―the British Government to respect the 
Independence of Kalat‖ (Zaidi, 1993:288).44 
                                                 
44
 Many of the Baloch believe that Kalat State enjoyed an independent status under the treaty of 1876 and 
the British became responsible for protecting Kalat State‘s independent status. In 1947, before the division 
of United India, the Kalat State National Party had presented their case to the British for a fully 
independent Balochistan. The territory included the Kalat State, British Balochistan and all other Baloch 
areas which were leased by the British Empire to Iran and Afghanistan. According to Baloch nationalists 
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In early 20
th
 century, Baloch middle class begun to mobilise a political struggle. They 
established the Anjuman-e Ithad-e-Balochistan (the Association for the Unity of 
Balochistan) which was a political party and a social organisation. Its principal aims, 
according to Bugti (1996) and Nasir (2010) and Baloch (1987) were; 1) ending the 
colonisation of Balochistan from the foreign powers; 2) unifying Balochistan; 3) the 
abolition of the Sardari system in Balochistan; and 4) establishing an independent united 
Balochistan. Later on in 1931 the Kalat State National Party was formed after the 
Persian occupation of Western Balochistan in 1928.
45
 The Anjuman-e-Ithad-e-
Balochistan and Kalat State National Party (KSNP) were secular and sought a unified 
democratic Balochistan (Redaelli, 1997). Both parties have provided a social and 
political platform for the Baloch youth to work for the Baloch people.  
The decade of 1930 was a crucial period for Balochistan, when the British were 
planning to leave and divide India. As the prospect of independence from British 
approached, the Khan and the other Baloch leaders had to decide whether to seek 
sovereignty, accession to Pakistan or sought to maintain some confederal relationship 
with Pakistan (Harrison, 1981). The Khan along with Baloch leadership made it clear 
that they sought independence. The argument for this claim was that the status of Kalat 
was different from other native states within British Indian government. Unlike other 
states, Kalat along with Nepal maintained its treaty relations directly with British crown 
in Whitehall. Moreover, under the 1876 agreement through which the British were 
allowed to operate in Balochistan pledged that the former would not violate the 
sovereignty of the latter (Ahmed, 1975). Thus, on the eve of British withdrawal from the 
Indian Sub-Continent, the Khan declared the previous status of Kalat State on 12
th
 
August 1947, two days before the creation of Pakistan (Dashti, 2012). Nawabzada 
Muhammad Aslam Khan was appointed as the first prime minister of the independent 
                                                                                                                                               
and historians the British agreed to support an independent Balochistan and the case was submitted in the 
form of an official memorandum in March 1946.   
45
 The Persian states weakened, and western Balochistan broke away once in the first decade of the 20
th
 
century. Bahram Khan (a Baloch ruler) extended his authority over most of the central and southern 
region of western Balochistan in 1915 (Bugti, 1996).  Iran annexed western Balochistan to Persia once 
again in 1928 and this region is currently known as Seistan-Balochistan (Breseeg 2004: 195-96). It has 
since 1928 been part of Iran. 
  
 102 
 
Balochistan. He along with foreign minister of Kalat was sent to Karachi to negotiate 
with Pakistani authorities on some outstanding matters including return of leased areas 
given to the British Indian government. 
The Government of Kalat State Act 1947 was promulgated as the new constitution of 
Balochistan. Under the constitution Balochistan would establish a representative system 
of governance with aiming to connect the people of Balochistan with administration and 
other state machinery of Kalat (Talbot, 1999). The legislature was composed of two 
houses: the Upper House and the Lower House. Under the Act, shortly after the 
independence elections were held for both the houses. KNSP won the majority seats in 
the House of Commons.  
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, after being appointed as the first governor general of Pakistan 
began to persuade the Khan to merge the newly independent country of Balochistan 
with Pakistan. The Khan took his proposal to the House of Common and the House of 
Lords for consideration. Both houses unanimously rejected the proposal and pledged to 
maintain the sovereignty and independence of Balochistan (Naseer, 1979). However, 
after failing to convince Balochistan and annex her peacefully, Pakistan used other 
tactics to cripple the Baloch state by manipulating the sub-ordinate states of Makuran, 
Kharan and Lasbela to join Pakistan bypassing the central authority of Balochistan. 
Consequently Pakistan has been successful in splitting the Baloch state. Eventually the 
Khan succumbed to the pressures and intimation of Pakistan, unwillingly affixed his 
signature on the Agreement of Accession on 27
th
 March 1948. Discounted from the 
forced annexation of their homeland to Pakistan, the Baloch have revolted five times 
against the state of Pakistan to regain the lost independence of their homeland.
46
 Thus, it 
is plausible to argue that the Baloch present association with Pakistan is not a voluntary 
union based on the principle of mutual interest and respect. 
 
                                                 
46
 The first Baloch insurgency took place in 1948, immediately after the occupation of Balochistan. It was 
followed by the second phase of conflict (1958-59), third phase of conflict (1962-68), and a guerrilla war 
in fourth time during the years of 1973-77. Since 2002 the fifth phase of Balochistan conflict, has been 
carried out through guerrilla warfare and strong political agitations in and out of Pakistan (Stanton, 2007; 
Barakzai, 2009).  
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3.7.1 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BALOCHISTAN 
Needless to say that the broader demand of the Baloch to regain the independence of 
Balochistan continued, but much of the reaction has emerged in response to the state of 
Pakistan‘s initiative to establish control over the territory of Balochistan with lots of 
resources. This conjecture of politico-economic interest of Pakistani establishment in 
Balochistan can be best understood through David Harvey (2003) theory, what he 
considers the capitalist imperialism by a state. He goes on to explain that a major shift 
took place in the middle of 20
th
 century when states initiated accumulating territory in 
which spatio-temporal fixes can be undertaken. Balochistan contains a vast land with 
highly strategic coastline and good endowment of natural resources is a viable target for 
Pakistan with spatio-temporal fixes interest. Looking at the military expansion in 
Balochistan it is not difficult to comprehend that Balochistan is not being treated as a 
unit of the federation by Pakistani state. Instead, the former is committed to treat the 
latter as her neoliberal colonialism. This territorial imperative can best be corroborated 
by the construction of military cantonments to the width and breadth of Balochistan, 
particularly at Gwadar, a highly strategic coastal town, Dera Bughti, district with the 
largest gas deposits in the country, and Kohlu, where it is believed that precious deposits 
of oil and gas reserves are untapped. In addition to this, the military‘s commercialisation 
and blatant resource grapping is evident from military‘s direct involvement in coal 
business, gold and copper enterprises and real estate projects (Siddiqa, 2007). The 
territorial establishment of Pakistan army is not without support of multinational 
corporations. Multinational capital, most importantly the Chinese companies, has 
expanded substantively in Balochistan (later in current section we show that how 
multinational companies are involved in exploiting Balochistan‘s natural resources). The 
deprivation along with discontent of the people of Balochistan against the state of 
Pakistan is increasing, as apparently they perceive the military as a colonial force 
manifested in blatant self-aggrandisement.                  
The fact is Balochistan province is one of the poorest regions in the world and its 
inhabitants are among of the most deprived on earth. An average resident of Balochistan 
lives on less than a dollar a day, over 90% of the settlements in Balochistan have no 
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access to clean potable drinking water or medical facilities and rural illiteracy exceeds 
90% (Balochistan, 2009). Within Pakistan Balochistan‘s per capita income is less than 
half of the country‘s average meaning that an average Baloch is likely to be twice as 
poor as his counterpart living in any of the other three provinces (Institute of Public 
Policy, 2011). It is unfortunate but true that even within the province of Balochistan; an 
average Baloch is twice as poor as an average Punjabi, Pashtun, or Hazara resident of 
the province. Even in the capital city of Balochistan, Quetta, less than one third of the 
households of the provincial metropolis are actually connected with the government 
water supply system and receive between 1-2 hours of water supply in 24 hours. The 
education system in the province is so inferior that those who can afford it would prefer 
to send their children to educational institutions outside the province; Karachi, 
Islamabad, Lahore. The same is true of medical facilities in the province; with a little 
affordability most people prefer to take their sick loved ones to Karachi or elsewhere for 
medical treatment. 
 In terms of political economy, Balochistan is markedly different from the rest of 
Pakistan. While the rest of Pakistan is labour-abundant with redundant labour force, 
Balochistan barely with 5% population with strong economic potentials can easily 
accommodate its indigenous labour force. While it is true that agriculture sector, like in 
the rest of Pakistan, continues to attract interest in Balochistan, its potential is 
circumscribed by the scarcity of water.
47
 That is because, unlike other provinces of 
Pakistan, the greater part of Balochistan is not connected to the Indus River system to 
irrigate its vast and fertile land. Moreover, Balochistan receives abundance rainfall 
water each year. If this water was managed properly through dams and constructed 
channels, the province would have sufficient water to irrigate its dry but fertile land.  
3.7.1.1 LACK OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND PHYSICAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL 
 A very basic ingredient of economic growth is the availability of physical and economic 
infrastructure. Such infrastructure in Balochistan is at worst non-existent and at best 
inadequate. As is the case with all extractive economies, roads and railways were built 
                                                 
47
 See the Balochistan Conservation Strategy and technical and background papers prepared for the 
Balochistan Resource Management Program. 
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for purposes of extraction and transportation of mineral and other resources (Bengali and 
Pasha, 2005). Grain and fruit farmers, animal raisers, and fishermen all remain poor 
partly because there is no farm to market roads and no local processing facilities are 
available within Balochistan (Kizilbash, 1998). The British originally built the road 
system for their own colonial strategic purposes, not for the purpose of the economic 
development of Balochistan. Recent road system along the coastal areas may serve 
strategic purposes but their contribution to economic development of the province is 
minimal (Akhtar, 2007). 
No improvement in living standards and alleviation of poverty are possible without 
improvement in educational levels and standards. High rates of illiteracy and low 
standards of educational progress in Balochistan are due to many factors. These factors 
include: 1. poverty; a typical poor person cannot afford to send his children to school, 
because that will mean loss of income that the child could make by helping parents in 
their subsistence activities; 2. due to poor educational standards parents realise that the 
children do not benefit from education and lose interest in family activities of farming, 
animal raising and fishing; 3. most people in Balochistan believe that the only reason 
that children should be sent to a school is for them to be able to get a government job. 
But they also realise that government jobs are for people who have connections with 
higher ups in the government or are rich to be able to pay bribes. So, why bother send 
your children to school (Pakistan, various issues; FBS, various issues).  
There is an established correlation between lower educational levels and higher rates of 
poverty. Studies performed in a number of Latin American, African and Asian countries 
have shown that a higher percentage of GDP spent on education, resulted in better 
educational levels and standards, which in turn resulted in higher economic growth rates 
and higher living standards (Winkler and Gershberg, 2000). The educational system in 
Balochistan is dysfunctional and a complete and absolute failure. Educational 
institutions are politicised, teacher appointments are made not on merit but on political 
grounds, and massive cheating takes place in all educational institutions and at all levels 
of education (Gazdar, 2005). 
 
 106 
 
3.7.1.2 LACK OF ECONOMIC AUTONOMY AND CONTROL OVER RESOURCES 
Besides agriculture and industry, the other potential of economic growth of Balochistan 
comes from mineral resources, transit routes and coastal development (ADB, 2005). The 
people of the province have no authority to run their own economic affairs and have no 
control over their natural resources. The Sui Gas case can be quoted as a classic 
illustration of economic exploitation of Balochistan. Natural gas was discovered on Sui 
site in the Dera Bughti District in Balochistan in the early 1950s and supplied to all 
provinces of Pakistan except Balochistan, where the same was supplied about 30 years 
later. The gas company that exploits and controls the gas fields is a federal government 
controlled company and Balochistan gets minimum share of the revenues generated. A 
similar case scenario can be witnessed with all other minerals and natural resources 
discovered in Balochistan (WB, 2007).  Another example of resource exploitation of 
Balochistan in the hand of Pakistani authorities with the collaboration of multinational 
firms is the Sandak Copper and Rek – e – Dik gold-copper projects respectively in Chagi 
District. In 2002 the federal government entered into an agreement with a Chinese 
company to handover the Sandak Project. Under the agreement the Chinese company 
would fetch 80% of total profits back home, pay 18% to the federal government of 
Pakistan and disburse only 2% to Balochistan government as royalty charges (Grae, 
2006).  Rek – e –Dik gold-copper is the second major project in Balochistan that was 
given to Antofagasta of Chile and Barrick Gold of Canada. This project was aim to 
exploit the estimated 20 million ounces of gold and two billion tons of copper from 
Balochistan.  
The economies of colonies have always been extractive in nature. The natural resources 
of the colony are extracted, taken in raw form to the mother country/region, where they 
are processed into finished products. This brings poverty and absolute deprivation for the 
colonised people as even unskilled jobs that arise during the processing of the raw 
materials are not available to them. No efforts have been made to establish such 
industries in Balochistan that will process locally produced raw material into finished 
products. There is no economic justification for transporting coal to other provinces of 
Pakistan to use it directly as a source of energy or convert it into other sources of energy 
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like electricity. This is particularly relevant because Balochistan faces acute shortages of 
energy and longest hours of blackouts. There is no economic justification for thousands 
of tons of raw marble stone, chromites, baryte, iron ore, shale, copper blister and other 
minerals to be taken in raw form to Karachi or to other places outside of the province for 
processing. Equally there is no economic justification for millions of tons of Balochistan 
fish to be taken to Karachi for processing and canning, because nowhere along the 750 
kilometer Balochistan coast any fish processing facility exists. Also there is no economic 
justification to waste tons of Balochistan fruit and vegetables due to the absence of fruit 
processing industries in Balochistan (Zaidi, 2005). 
Balochistan occupies an important geo-strategic position in southwest and northwest 
Asia. It is on the cultural, social, economic and geographical crossroad of the Middle 
East, Central Asia and the South Asia, and opposite to Straits of Hormuz. These 
potentials could make the province an industrial hub with a massive private industrial 
investment, had it been utilised by adopting vigorous industrial policy.  According to a 
rough estimation, around 17 million barrels of crude oil passes through the Straits of 
Hormuz daily (Hassan, 2005).  Sharing a 900 km border with Iran and 1200km with 
Afghanistan, the province ―opens access to these mineral-rich and strategically 
important areas. It also marks an entry point into the resource-rich landlocked provinces 
of the Punjab and KP. Its geographical proximity to the oil and gas deposits of Central 
Asian regions adds to its strategic importance‖ (Gazdar, 2007: p. 8). The important 
strategic location places Balochistan on the cross road of a potential intra-and inter-
regional trade. Nonetheless, the gross ignorance of Pakistan towards the industrial 
development, Balochistan remains one of the least developed regions in the world in 
terms of all the human development indicators despite the abundance of the natural 
resource. 
3.7.1.3 INSTABILITY, CAPITAL FORMATION, AND INDUSTRIALIZATION 
 Investment and economic growth cannot take place in an environment of political 
instability. Due to the reasons mentioned above Balochistan remained unstable for 
the larger part of its history with Pakistan. Therefore, a favourable environment for 
capital investment in Balochistan has never been as lacking as in recent years. No 
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domestic or foreign investors will be prepared to invest even in the provincial capital 
not to speak of the interior regions of Balochistan when there is no security and 
stability. In fact, in recent years, many investment opportunities have been lost and 
even running businesses have closed down such as Sariab Textile Mills and Harnai 
woolen Mills have already faded away that provided employment opportunities to 
hundreds of people in Balochistan. Probably government policies and lack of security 
played a role in their shutting down. Hub industrial estate has not benefitted 
Balochistan much as far as providing employment opportunities to the people of 
Balochistan are concerned.  Hub area industries are, for the most part, extension or 
subsidiaries of the Karachi based industries. The industrialists wanted to have tax 
relief by locating in Balochistan without providing employment opportunities to the 
people of Balochistan (Hussain, 2008).  
3.7.1.4 LOW PRODUCTIVITY  
In any society prosperity and improved standards of living are achieved through 
improved productivity. Productivity is the output per unit of input. Labour 
productivity is determined by first calculating the value of the goods and services 
produced in a year‘s time and then dividing it by either the total labour force or by 
the total number of hours of work spent in producing the goods and services. In 
United States during 2011, for instance, the total value of goods and services (GDP) 
produced was $15 trillion and per capita income was $ 47,000 (WDI, 2012). That 
year in USA, worker productivity, that is, the value of goods and services produced 
by an average worker in an hour‘s time was $59. The same year Pakistan‘s GDP per 
capita was $1050 (WDI, 2012). Average yearly income per person in Balochistan is 
about $350, and an average worker is, at the most, 1/59
th
 as productive as an 
American worker. This means that a worker in Balochistan (a shepherd, a fisherman, 
a farmer, daily wage labourer) produces goods and services equal to $1 or 95 rupees 
per hour (WB, 2009).  
The question is why productivity is so low in Balochistan. Three principal 
determinants of a nation‘s labour productivity growth rate are: 1. the rate at which the 
economy builds up its stock of capital (machinery, equipment, buildings); 2.  the rate 
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at which technology improves; and 3. the rate at which work force quality or human 
capital improves.  Worker productivity in Balochistan is low because a worker in 
Balochistan is typically illiterate and uses minimal capital and primitive technology 
in the production process.  
3.7.1.5 LACK OF DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
Democracy and accountability are important prerequisites for economic growth and 
prosperity. Although lack of democratic institutions and accountability are problems 
that exist throughout Pakistan, Balochistan is particularly afflicted with this scourge. 
People of Balochistan have never had the opportunity to fully participate in the 
process of decision making about how to run their own affairs. The interference of 
federal agencies in Balochistan‘s elections and manipulate the electoral outcomes in 
the favour of Pakistan, rather than reflecting the wishes of the people of Balochistan. 
Moreover, the governor is also appointed by the federal government usually from 
outside of the province who is more loyal to the federal government rather than 
representing the Baloch people. The provincial governments installed in Balochistan 
were not necessarily those that are elected by the people of Balochistan, not those 
that are honest and sincere to work for the improvement of living conditions of the 
people of Balochistan, but those who are considered by the central government to be 
able to best serve the interests of the establishment in Balochistan. The popularly 
elected governments in 1973 and 1997 were removed on suspicion that they were not 
loyal enough and or not obedient enough to the central government (Ahmed, 2004). 
The centre wholly or partially controlled elections so that only those favoured by the 
‗establishment‘ could form a government in Balochistan. If those in power in 
Balochistan are brought and maintained in power by sources other than the people of 
Balochistan, they will be accountable to those who brought them to power, not to the 
people of Balochistan. This situation also contributes to corruption by the provincial 
rulers and also contributes to further deprivation and poverty for the ordinary people 
of Balochistan (Ahmed, 1990; 2004; Adeney, 2007; Ahmed, 2010). 
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3.8 CONCLUSION  
Decisions on fiscal policy have always been under the influence of military and civil 
bureaucracy. The heavy reliance on bureaucracy for fiscal policy making may well be 
due to autocratic nature of Pakistani polity. The democratic forces were kept at distance 
from the key policy decisions. Thus, historically the fiscal policy making in Pakistan has 
been under the grip of military and their associated interest groups.  
It is to be mentioned that since 1990s the country under the pressures of the IFIs has 
liberalised a big part of the economy and lessened the role of controlling elements in 
fiscal policy making. Certain pressure groups, businesses, politicians particularly with 
their weak financial and political positions are not effective enough to influence the 
fiscal policy making. However, recently they gained some power to influence the 
process. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that these pressure groups with increasing 
power do not reflect the general tendency of the country. Therefore, under present 
political and military structure it is unimaginable to expect any public-centered fiscal 
policy in Pakistan.   
The country, notwithstanding having of a reasonable average economic growth rate,  
performed poorly in terms of human development, compare to other developing 
countries, and hence lagged far behind in all human development indicators. The above 
discussion reveals that the country has been failed to provide basic education to all 
citizens across the board. Although over the decades there has been a decent 
improvement in quantity of education, the quality of the education remained low. The 
adult literacy rate is one of the lowest in Pakistan compare to other regional countries, 
and even among literate, the majority of them is not properly skillful to be absorbed in 
the labour market.  
The vast majority of the population is poor and marginalised and, have no, or very 
limited access to the healthcare system of Pakistan. The country spends less than 1% of 
her GDP on healthcare, which is far from enough to support a huge and rapidly growing 
population. Moreover, whatever health infrastructure the country has is concentrated in 
urban centres, despite the fact that more than 60% of the population lives in rural areas. 
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Additionally, the country has a vibrant and growing private health sector that although 
very expensive and not in the reach of most of the population is too situated in urban 
centres. Thus, it may be concluded that Pakistan needs to strategise a far reaching policy 
in order to make the education, healthcare and other such basic necessities available to 
the width and breadth of the country.    
The Pakistan‘s political and economic relationship with one of her provinces, 
Balochistan, has been estranged because of certain historical facts as discussed with 
greater length in this chapter. And this rugged relationship of Pakistan and Balochistan 
indulged in the former into excessive use of state power against Balochistan that forced 
the latter into social and economic backwardness and human misery.       
To sum up, this chapter dealt with three broad political economy issues of Pakistan: 1. 
the fiscal policy making; 2. the social sector development; and 3. Pakistan‘s political 
and economic relationship with Balochistan. In the following chapter, the evolution, and 
constraints on the development of fiscal decentralisation in Pakistan is discussed.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERALISM AND FISCAL 
DECENTRALISATION IN PAKISTAN 
 
The federal system was created with the intention of combining the different advantages 
which result from the magnitude and the littleness of nations 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the development of federalism and fiscal decentralisation in 
Pakistan. Firstly we briefly illustrate how federalism has evolved in both pre 1973 
scenario and thereafter when the 1973 constitution was adopted. Secondly we 
thoroughly elaborate fiscal decentralisation and its various elements, particularly the 
NFC Awards. The elaboration of this chapter helps us in understating the various 
developments of fiscal decentralisation in Pakistan. It is important to understand the 
fiscal decentralisation process and certain obstructions that frustrate the true 
decentralisation from happening in the country. Such understating supports us in 
knowing how and why decentralisation takes place in Pakistan. In addition, the 
discussion of this chapter also motivates the empirical analyses of fiscal decentralisation 
and poverty reduction that are presented in second part of thesis. The findings of this 
chapter may be placed with high relevance in decentralisation literature. Critical 
evaluation of fiscal decentralisation process in Pakistan is appropriate to the related 
literature of decentralisation. Pakistan with a federal setup contains a diverse socio-
cultural, political and economic structure that makes decentralisation crucial for socio-
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economic development of sub-national governments. Nevertheless notwithstanding the 
importance, fiscal decentralisation issue has not received an academic analysis. This 
chapter is an attempt to fill this literary gap.   
Since independence Pakistan has been a federal state. Both wings required federal 
structure. Because the geographical division of east
48
 and west wing, and the ethnic and 
cultural linguistic diversity of west wing demanded a federal solution. However, the 
great failure of Pakistan to adhere to the federal principles led to a civil war between the 
two wings during the early decades of her formation, which resulted in the breakup of 
the country and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. This failure also left a colossal 
impact on remaining Pakistan with steadily increasing conflict and instability. All units 
except the Punjab are alienated and Balochistan is the worst affected among them 
(Ahmed, 1990). 
Waseem (2010) divides the evolution of federalism in Pakistan in three phases: 1. pre-
partition colonial heritage; 2. pre-federalisation (covers the period from 1947 to 71); and 
3. federalism, which starts with 1973 constitution and continues until date with several 
amendments. The federal spirit in sub-continent polity and governance formally sparked 
in 1935 when the British India government promulgated the 1935 India Act in order to 
pacify and accommodate the heterogeneous communities and ethnicities across the 
region by providing them with regional and provincial autonomy. The Act though 
considered as the first ‗quantum leap‘ toward federalism in the Indian Sub-Continent 
was not celebrated much among the Muslim majority parts of un-divided India.  
The Muslim League, which was the representative political party of the Muslims in 
India, passed a Resolution in 1940 at Lahore, demanding a separate state comprising 
Muslim majority provinces and regions in India. The spirit of federalism was embedded 
in this Resolution. The acceptance of distinct ethnic and linguistic background of Sindhi, 
Bengali, Punjabi and Pakhtoon nationalities, that would embody Pakistan, was the 
classic example of the 1940 Resolution recommending a federal structure for the 
                                                 
48
 Historically the country was comprised of geographically two separate wings; the eastern and western 
wing respectively. However, in 1971 after a bloody war, the eastern wing separated from western wing 
(current Pakistan) and became Bangladesh.  
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country (Adeney, 2007). Therefore, to make a unity from the diversity of various ethnic 
groups and nationalities, provincial or regional autonomy was envisaged in the Pakistan 
Resolution. Nevertheless, instead of incorporating the principles of 1940 Pakistan 
Resolution in 1947 Independence Act and consequently adopting true federal principles, 
the ruling elite of Pakistan chose to assume a centralist path. Therefore, enormous power 
was given to the centre at the expense of provincial governments under the section of 
9(5), 8(8), 102 and 92A of the Independence Act (Salamat, 1992). 
 The complex geographic and demographic characteristics of the country made it 
difficult to come up with a consensus-based constitution. The interests of monolingual 
east wing with one province comprised 54% of total population, against the western 
wing with diverse nationalities and ethnic groups of Punjabi, Pakhtoon, Sindhi, Baloch 
and Urdu speaking (Mahajir) with the population share of 28%, 6%, 8% 1% and 3% 
respectively demanded a constitution with loose federal structure with maximum 
internal autonomy to the provinces. But such arrangement was perhaps not acceptable to 
the Punjab-Mahajir elite who wanted to gain and possess disproportionate power share.   
The first constitution formally adopted and promulgated in 1956, after 9 years of intense 
deliberations and proposals, lacked the multinational model of federalism. It did not suit 
Pakistan political, ethnic and geographical needs. The multi-national federation is one in 
which the minority groups make local majority and enjoy local autonomy within their 
respective jurisdiction. Pakistan cannot qualify for ―multinational federation because, in 
contrast to India, the boundaries on the units of the federation were not revised to 
accommodate territorially concentrated linguistics communities‖ (Adeney, 2007: 106). 
The 1956 constitution provided a federal form of government with concentration of 
power to central government embedded ―geographical model of federation‖, recognising 
only the east-west parity.
49
   
This constitution happened to be short-lived. The second constitution was introduced on 
1
st
 March, 1962. The new constitution contained three legislative power lists: centre, 
provinces and concurrent – the latter would be exercised by federal and provincial 
                                                 
49
 However, the same parity formula was not applied to the West Pakistan, where provinces received 
representations and resources on population basis (Kundi and Jahangir, 2002).  
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governments (Kundi and Jahangir, 2002). The constitution adopted the presidential form 
of government with a strong role for the president who acted both as head of the state 
and the government, having no proper checks and balances which are the essence of 
presidential form of democracy exercised elsewhere (Ahmed, 2004). Another major 
feature of this constitution that markedly departed from the principles of federalism was 
the absence of specified definition of both provincial and the Concurrent List Articles. 
In practice, the governance system under this constitution was fully centralised with 
absolute power to military and civil bureaucracy with the strong collaboration of feudal 
aristocracy. The over-centralisation of the country eventually led to a great divide 
between the eastern wing (now Pakistan) and the western wing (now Bangladesh) in one 
hand and among provinces of the western wing on the other hand. Since the ruling elite 
of west wing, largely hailed from the province of Punjab, not only disregarded the 
people of East Pakistan in socio-economic and political realm but also ignored the other 
provinces of West Pakistan in power-sharing and economic development. 
The 1962 constitution ceased to exist with the removal of its author (Ayub) from power 
after a mobilised agitation in 1969. In the subsequent years, till 1973, the country 
witnessed some major political developments in the shape of first democratic elections, 
the breakup of the eastern wing and the passage, promulgation of a unanimous (except 
members from Balochistan
50
) constitution of 1973 and a large scale military operation in 
Balochistan killing at least fifteen thousand ethnic Balochs (Harrison, 1981).       
4.2  1973 CONSTITUTION: A MODEL OF MULTINATIONAL FEDERALISM  
The 1973 constitution, adopted parliamentary form of government, rebalanced the 
power-sharing structure between the centre and provincial governments by pledging to 
grant maximum provincial autonomy. Four significant features of the 1973 constitution 
are pivotal in defining the powers and functions between federal government and its 
federating units/provinces.  
                                                 
50
 Out of five elected National Assembly members from Balochistan, three of them did not sign the 
constitution.  
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First, an upper house of the parliament, the Senate (Article 59) was created which 
provides equal geographical representation to the federating units.
51
 With equal 
representation formula for provinces, each province elects 22 members, out of them 14 
are generally elected, and 4 seats each are reserved for women and technocrats. The 
federal capital, Islamabad, elects 4 members and 8 members are elected from the FATA 
that brings the total number of Senate seats to 100 (Constitution, 1973). 
Second, the Article (70 (4)) of the constitution discusses the Federal and Concurrent 
Legislative Lists. Under the Article, the parliament exclusively can enact and make 
legislation on 67 subjects of Federal Legislative List. On 47 subjects Concurrent List, 
both the parliament and the provincial assemblies can make legislation and enact laws. 
However, in case of any conflict on any legislative issue relating to the Concurrent List 
the decision of the federal government prevails over provincial government(s) 
(Constitution, 1973: Article 143). Matters not included in either legislature lists are the 
residuary power granted to the provinces, in which the latter are allowed to do 
legislation. Albeit the provinces have some residuary power of legislature but they are 
virtually powerless vis-à-vis on the subjects of Concurrent List. Conversely, article 143 
ensures the supremacy and dominant power of the federal government over provincial 
governments. The role of the Senate is also constraint with the provisions of article 73. 
The article limits any role of the Senate relating to the Money Bill. Instead, the National 
Assembly (the lower house) has absolute authority in the Money Bill including the 
federal budget. 
Third, in order to resolve disputes and enhance cooperation and harmony between centre 
and province(s) and among provinces the 1973 constitution under the Article 153 
established the Council of Common Interest (CCI). Strong in the declaration but weak in 
action, this quasi-executive body of CCI comprises the prime minister, chief ministers of 
all provinces and other representatives nominated by the president or the prime minister. 
                                                 
51
 The second, and the most powerful, chamber of parliament, (lower house or National Assembly) is 
elected on the basis of population where Punjab province alone possesses the majority seats. Out of total 
343 seats of national assembly, Punjab contains 183 (54 %) followed by Sindh with 75 (22 %) seats, KPK 
has 43 (13 %) seats and Balochistan possesses 17 or 5 % seats. The remaining 12 and 2 (4 % in total) goes 
to FATA and Capital territory, respectively (Constitution, 1973). The ―National Assembly members are 
directly elected in an adult in a first-past-the-post electoral system‖ (Bengali and Pasha, 2005: 246). And 
Senate, as noted earlier, represents the geographical location or the provinces with equal representations. 
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The prime minister serves as the chairperson of CCI meeting but in case of his/her 
absence he can nominate any federal minister to chair the meeting. The CCI is 
responsible to formulate and regulate policies relating to the Federal Legislative List II 
(like railway, water and power and natural gas) and other inter-provincial disputes 
including disputes on provincial territories and electricity.  
Fourth, the constitution under Article 160(1) created National Finance Commission 
(NFC)
52
 with the mandate to deal with collection and distribution (vertically and 
horizontally) of federally collected tax and non-tax revenues, and borrowing funds. The 
NFC membership contains federal minister of finance as its chairman, provincial finance 
ministers and 4 to 5 experts appointed by the president/ prime minister after the 
consultation with the provincial governors/chief ministers. 
The 1973 constitution although provides the federal system of governance with 
parliamentary democracy and significant autonomy to the provinces, has failed to break 
the power hold of the elites. Cohen (2006) remarks that in Pakistan, the establishment 
has a strong hold on key state institutions therefore exercises the actual power. Hence, 
the centre-province and inter-provincial relationship remained unfriendly and without 
coordination in the favour of centre and the biggest province (the Punjab). The critics 
such as Ali (1995); Adeney (2002; 2004; 2007); Ahmed (2010); Waseem (2010) believe 
that the reasons for the failure in maintaining a harmonious relationship between centre 
and provinces and among provinces itself is the centrist nature of the 1973 constitution 
in one hand and the preponderance of the Punjab over the other three provinces on the 
other. Another contentious matter rendered a great constitutional and political instability 
is the imbalance of the power between the president and the prime minister.
53
   
However, soon after the first Constituent Assembly completed its tenure (1977) the 
military took over through a coup d‘état. They scraped the constitution and imposed 
Martial Law. In subsequent years General Zia-ul-Haq, the military dictator and the 
                                                 
52
 A detailed and in-depth analysis is given later in the chapter. 
53
 Pakistan with a parliamentary system of federalism constitutionally supposed to confer more power to 
the prime minister who exercises his/her functions as head of the government. The president on the other 
hand without commanding any executive power serves only as the head of the state.  
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president, brought about numerous amendments and validated them by non-party based 
elected parliament in 1985 including the power of the president to nominate any 
member of the parliament as prime minister and dissolve parliament at any time.  
In order to undo and redress various amendments enacted and incorporated into the 
constitution during military dictatorships (1977-1988 and 1999-2008) and bring the 
constitution back to its original shape and grant more administrative and fiscal 
autonomy to provinces, the18
th
 amendment was made to the constitution by the 
incumbent civilian government.  
4.3 18TH AMENDMENT: A MOVE TOWARDS FISCAL FEDERALISM 
The 18
th
 amendment to the constitution passed in April 2010 is considered as a 
significant reform package towards the establishment of federalism and decentralisation 
in the country. The 18
th
 amendment brought after exhaustive consultations and 
deliberations. It was largely aimed to bring ‗participatory federalism‘ in Pakistan. The 
amendment with 100 small and major changes to the constitution is thought to be a way 
forward towards federalism and decentralisation of the country providing the provincial 
government with greater provincial autonomy. Some of the salient features concerning 
specifically to the fiscal federalism and provincial autonomy are enumerated as follows: 
1- The Concurrent List is eliminated and powers including the residuary ones are 
transferred to the provinces in principle. Laws concerning policing, law and 
order, education, healthcare among others are to be devolved completely to the 
provinces and the latter are responsible to make laws and execute them 
accordingly.  
2-  The NFC, the sole mechanism for both vertical and horizontal resource 
distribution, cannot reduce the provincial shares beyond the distributed share 
agreed in the seventh NFC Award under the Article 160. This may be taken as a 
major constitutional development towards fiscal decentralisation where, 
theoretically at least, the provinces are provided with more expenditure 
responsibilities with more funds made available through greater share in 
divisible pool (SPDC, 2012). 
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3- The CCI‘s, a joint federal-provincial forum, role relating to the subjects of 
common legislature interest between the centre and province(s) and among the 
provinces has been revitalised and its functional responsibilities have been 
enlarged as indicated above.  
The 18
th
 amendment although constituted a dramatic shift in political economy of fiscal 
federalism, ironically it has not been successful in rectifying some of the core dynamics 
that caused greater provincial inequality as well as controlling the strong role of military 
in country‘s polity. It is worthwhile to mention that the military is the strongest force 
championing for greater centralisation in Pakistan. Therefore, without diluting the 
military role in the political economy of the country the spirit of true federalism is hard 
to exercise. Another significant area where the 18
th
 amendment is failed, is to address 
the absence of constitutional guarantee to the local governments - the functions of latter 
as responsible and accountable bodies is believed to be vital for federalism (Oates, 1973; 
Birds, 1993; Litvack et al., 1998). Furthermore, the local governments suffer because of 
the overlapping of the power and functions between the provincial and local 
governments. The provincial governments because of their upper hierarchy often 
interfere in local governments‘ domains and use them to fulfill their political and 
economic needs, particularly for the purpose of electoral politics. In this regard, a 
constitutional mandate to the local governments not only makes the latter a substantive 
body but it helps also in ensuring the wider political and democratic participation by 
enhancing the grassroots potential.  
4.4  1973 CONSTITUTION AN ITS BICAMERAL STRUCTURE 
Bicameralism was adopted in the 1973‘s constitution in order to foster simultaneously 
―regional and majoritorian federalism‖ in Pakistan. According to Lijphart (1979) 
federalism is more desirable to take into account the differing interests under one 
governing structure than British style majoritorian rule with no geographical 
representation in the parliament. As discussed earlier, the Senate of Pakistan, though 
was created to balance the federalism, has been inactive in major policymaking 
including the fiscal policy in practice.  
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In the light of literature on bicameralism, we attempt to address the following question. 
How affective and useful is the bicameral structure in terms of major policy decisions in 
Pakistan when the upper house (the Senate) role is overshadowed by the lower house 
(the National Assembly), where one province (the Punjab) possesses the absolute 
majority? 
The federal structure of Pakistan may qualify for ‗uncoordinated‘ and ‗un-
accommodative‘ forms of federalism. The uncoordinated is defined as the system of 
governance where federalism coexists with authoritarian structure, while under 
accommodative federalism all federating units/provinces are better-off after joining or 
forming the federalism (Adeney, 2007). In parliamentary form of democratic federalism, 
the majoritorian rule prevails.  Pakistan with parliamentary from of democracy is not an 
exception when it is governed by elected civilian regime.  
Does majoritorian democracy guarantee the rights of smaller/minority provinces? 
Perkins (1992) believes that it may not do so because the smaller provinces lack the 
power to influence the decision-making processes within the federation. In Pakistan 
where nationalities are defined in terms of their ethnic background and provinces are 
largely demarcated on ethnic lines
54
 majoritorian rule seems problematic. The argument 
is in a federal structure where the preponderance population of one province, the Punjab 
in case of Pakistan, dominates the combined population of rest of the country, 
democracy under the majoritorian rule permanently keeps the smaller nationalities out 
of the realm of power. This view point is substantiated from the unfolded events in 
Pakistan demonstrating that, democracy has not been a panacea for the smaller 
communities. Instead it increases the probability of conflict between the communities 
within the federation. Looking at the political history of Pakistan one may conclude that 
the inclusion of smaller provinces in policy makings has been barred during both 
authoritarian and democratic rules. Therefore it suggests that democracy may not always 
make the federalism accommodative for minority groups. 
                                                 
54
 Unlike India where new provinces (states) have been carved out based on linguistic and ethnic 
affiliations of the communities, provinces in Pakistan are not legally recognized as ethnic units. However, 
since each province is predominately populated by a distinct ethnic group, Punjab by the Punjabis and 
Balochistan by the Balochs, for instance. They (provinces) are understood as de facto ethnic units in 
Pakistan.  
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A simple illustration may help understanding how the rules of business work in the 
Legislative Assembly. Any legislative move in the National Assembly that is in the 
favour of other three provinces except the Punjab can be simply turned down. That is 
because the Punjab has the ―veto power‖ in the National Assembly by the virtue of its 
single majority in the house. It approves any policy that serves the Punjab interests as 
they have the domination over majority votes, even though it may come to the direct 
disinterest of other federating units.  
The Senate role is limited to mere a debating forum without commanding any 
substantive power in policymaking. For instance, under the Article 73 Money Bills 
including federal annual budget are not presented and discussed in the Senate. The latter 
can only comment on the budget once it is originated from the National Assembly. The 
National Assembly finally passes the federal budget or any other finance related bill 
with or without considering the proposals of the Senate. Therefore, any policy including 
fiscal policy of federal government that the federal budget reflects inherently cannot be 
framed and passed unless it safeguards the Punjab‘s fiscal and political interests.  
Even if the 1973 constitution provided with the provision that the federal budget or any 
other fiscal policy matter would need to be approved in the joint secession of the 
parliament, the Punjab‘s absolute majority in the National Assembly would override the 
other three provinces majority in the Senate. Punjab with 183 National Assembly Seats 
and 14 members in the Senate commands 297 of total 443 votes of the Parliament. Yet 
in joint secession, Punjab can approve and disapprove any matter that confirms its 
interests. Thus, overrepresentation of one province with majoritorian democracy has 
made Pakistan an ‗uncoordinated federalism‘ and jeopardised the ―balanced 
functioning‖ of the federation in order to safeguard the rights of the smaller provinces.  
4.5 FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN PAKISTAN 
Fiscal decentralisation in Pakistan is uneven where the provincial governments have 
high expenditure obligations with very limited and narrowed tax collecting authority: 
the federal government collects 90% revenues and undertakes 70% of total public 
expenditures (Pakistan, various issues). Given the mismatch between provincial 
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governments‘ expenditures and revenues the intergovernmental transfer has become an 
issue between the centre and federating units.  
Table 4.1 presents the revenue raising responsibilities of federal and provincial 
governments that are delineated in the constitution under the Article 70 (40).  Taxes and 
duties such as sales tax, capital gains tax and income tax are shared between federal and 
provincial governments, though the former alone sets the bases and rates of these taxes 
(Ara and Sabir, 2011). General Sales Tax (GST) on sales and purchases on goods falls 
under the domain of federal government, whereas, the provincial governments levy and 
collect GST on services. However, notwithstanding all of this, constitutional provision 
gives authority to the federal government, under the pretext of Central Excise Duty, to 
collect GST on services on telecommunication, which accounts for a major share of 
service taxes. Nevertheless, this intermingling is rectified in the 18
th
 amendment in 
which all kinds of relevant sales tax are transferred to the provinces.   
Article 161 and fourth schedule of the constitution elucidate respectively the allocation 
of royalties/surcharges and taxes/duties/fees to various levels of government, which are 
indicated in table 4.2. It specifies that the federal government collects excise duty for 
natural gas on a wellhead basis and hydroelectric power generation and transfers the 
same to the appropriate province(s) in which the gas well is situated and electricity 
generation plant is stationed. Similarly, the constitution also spells out the borrowing 
power of the federal and provincial governments.  
One of the main building blocks of fiscal decentralisation is intergovernmental resource 
transfer. As is noted earlier, Pakistan with a serious mismatch between spending and 
resource mobilisation among different tiers of government needs a vibrant 
intergovernmental resource transfer mechanism. The resource flow takes place at 4 
levels, as illustrated in figure 4.1. 
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Table4.1: Constitutional Provisions of Fed. and Prov. Govt. Revenue Assignments 
Federal Government Provincial Governments 
Direct Taxes/Duties Indirect Taxes/Duties Direct Taxes/Duties  Indirect Taxes/Duties 
Personal Income 
Tax (excluding Agri. 
Income Tax) 
Custom Duties Property tax Excise duties (levied 
on alcohol and 
narcotics) 
Corporate Income 
Tax 
Excise Duty 
(excluding on Alcohol 
and narcotics) 
Capital Gains tax Sales Tax on Services 
Capital Value tax 
(Excluding 
immovable 
property) 
sales tax on goods Agriculture Income 
Tax 
Stamp Duties 
  
Production capacity 
tax   
Duty on electricity 
  
Taxes on goods and 
passengers (levied on 
terminal)    
Hydro profit tax 
      Duty on Natural duty 
      Registration fee 
      Mutation 
      Motor Vehicle tax 
      Professions Tax 
   Source: Constitution of Pakistan (1973) 
Firstly, resources flow from the federal to provincial governments through the 
mechanism of NFC Award. While, the second stream of flow occurs from the provincial 
governments to the local governments through Provincial Finance Commission (PFC) 
Award, and at third stage of resource flow, the federal government directly transfers 
funds to the local governments. In the last stage local governments 
(districts/municipalities) transfer funds to lower level (tehsil and union councils). The 
systematic resource transfers to the provinces from the federal government include 
revenue shares, development grants, grants-in-aid and loans. In addition to this, the 
federal government also collects and transfers ‗straight transfers‘ like royalties on gas 
and petroleum surcharges to the provinces. Major tax revenues of the federal 
government that also make up the divisible pool are income taxes, sales tax, and excise 
and custom duties. Though the role of the provincial governments in revenue generation 
is considerably limited, they are however responsible for the collection and retention of 
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motor vehicle tax, stamp duties, income tax on services, and agriculture tax among other 
small taxes and duties (Bengali, 2002). 
As table 4.2 illustrates the provincial governments are not only constraint in having 
exclusive domain on few taxes and duties (property tax, stamp duties among others), but 
are largely pre-empted by national government in sharing them. 
Taxes that exclusively fall under the federal government‘s domain are custom duties, 
sales tax on goods, and income tax on goods, corporate tax and natural resource 
taxation. The provincial governments, on the other hand, have exclusive authority to 
collect property tax, stamp duties and income tax on services. Many of the tax bases are 
shared and overlapped between the federal and provincial governments. Because of the 
ambiguous nature of overlapping, the problem of excessive taxation on certain tax bases 
and increasing compliance costs invariably occur. Another ambiguity exists with the 
capital gain tax. For example, whilst for capita tax, the provincial base includes tax on 
capital gain on physical assets; the federal government collects capital gain taxation on 
financial assets.  
Regarding sales tax, both federal and provincial governments have their own domain. 
The federal government has the authority to levy and collect sales tax on goods, while, 
the sales tax on services falls under the purview of the provincial governments. Since 
the sales tax on goods can be exported to neighbouring province(s) - lest a provincial 
government levies it – therefore the federal government collects it to discourage such 
exporting.
55
 Nevertheless, Bahl (1999) and Ahmed and Wasti (2002)  argue that this 
division and bifurcation of sales tax has the potential to impede the introduction of 
neutral value-added tax with tax invoice features in the different sectors of the economy 
 
 
 
                                                 
55
 For example, the province of Sindh homes the majority of industries, because of the port city of 
Karachi, and contributes 40 % of value added in industrial commodities. The province with the population 
of only 23 % to total population is very likely to export a big volume of tax to other provinces. 
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Figure 4.1: Resource Transfer Mechanism under Various tiers of Government  
 
   
 
 
  
       
 
 
 
 
 
       
Source: the author 
The federal and provincial governments‘ tax revenues are presented in table 4.2, 
wherein it is shown that indirect taxes contribute to the majority of federal tax revenues. 
Although the share of indirect tax to total federal tax revenues has decreased from 83% 
in 1980 to 64% in 2010, yet it still dominates the federal government tax composition. 
Federal Government 
Stage 1 
(NFC) 
Provincial 
Governments 
Stage 2 
(PFC) 
 
Stage 3 
 
Local Governments 
(District/Municipal) 
Stage 4 
 
Local Governments 
(Tehsil and Union 
Councils) 
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Table 4.2: Assignment of Taxes Federal and Provincial Governments 
Taxes/Duties  Government(s) 
Customs duties Federal  
Income tax on goods Federal  
Income tax on services Provincial  
Corporate tax Federal  
Natural resource  Federal  
Excise duties Federal/provincial  
Property tax Provincial  
Stamp duties Provincial 
Motor vehicle duties  Provincial 
Fees  Federal/Provincial 
Other taxes/duties Federal/Provincial 
Source: Constitution (1973) 
Table 4.3: Composition of Tax Revenues of National and Provincial Governments  
 (Values in percentage)  
 
1980-01 1985-06 1990-01 1995-06 1999-00 2005-06 2010-11 
National Government        
Direct Taxes 17.4 17.0 16.6 28.7 31.2 31.0 36.4 
I. Income Tax 17.0 16.7 16.9 27.8 29.1 29.7 35.0 
II. Wealth Tax 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.0 0.0 
III. Others 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.2 1.3 
Indirect taxes/duties 82.6 83.0 83.4 71.3 68.8 69.0 63.6 
I. Custom Duties 41.0 47.1 44.8 33.1 18.2 19.3 11.1 
II. Sales Tax 8.4 8.7 16.6 19.0 34.2 40.5 36.4 
III. Federal Excise Duty 31.5 27.0 22.0 19.1 16.1 9.2 9.0 
IV. Others 1.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 7.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 101.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Provincial Governments        
Stamp Duties 26.7 27.9 37.3 37.2 31.0 35.0 36.1 
Motor Vehicle Tax 19.5 21.5 17.2 16.2 13.7 11.7 10.6 
Property transfer and reg. 
Tax 
5.0 5.3 3.8 3.2 2.2 2.0 3.1 
Land Revenue  6.8 7.0 8.8 11.5 11.3 11.5 10.4 
Electricity Tax 10.1 7.9 15.7 10.3 7.8 8.5 8.5 
Callings Tax 2.2 2.0 1.5 2.2 2.1 2.7 1.6 
Provincial Excise Duties 3.4 3.6 4.3 7.3 5.7 5.1 6.2 
Agriculture Income Tax 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.3 12.5 13.5 
Immovable Property Tax 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.2 1.2 
Entertainment Tax 9.2 8.8 3.4 1.8 1.8 1.0 3.1 
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Capital gain Tax 6.5 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Others 7.1 6.3 5.4 7.7 9.7 7.8 5.7 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Federal and Provincial governments annual budget documents 
Within the category of indirect taxes, custom duties had dominated until 1995 followed 
by federal excise duties and sales tax. However, a major shift took place thereafter in 
which sales tax‘s contribution to this head has increased tremendously. Under the direct 
taxes at the federal level, income tax generates most of the revenues. As table 4.3 
indicates provincial tax revenues stamp duties and motor vehicle tax respectively are the 
major contributors to provincial governments‘ revenues. Agricultural income tax 
adopted after the financial year of 1999-2000 has overtaken the motor vehicle tax and 
has consequently become the second largest contributor to the provincial tax revenues. 
Among other taxes and duties the share of provincial duties on land has also increased 
over the time. Nonetheless, remaining sources of provincial tax revenues are still very 
small, narrowed and inconsistent.   
Expenditure functions of federal and provincial governments are more balanced than the 
revenue authorities. But also, as presented in table 4.4, the allocation of expenditure 
responsibilities in Pakistan does not adhere to the general trends followed by other 
federal countries. For example, education, health, agriculture are largely the functional 
responsibilities of the subnational governments in the majority of federal states (Adeney, 
2007. However, in Pakistan these functions are jointly undertaken by federal and 
provincial governments, where the functional role of each tier is significantly blurred. 
Nevertheless, in certain sectors like defense, foreign affairs, air services, railway, and 
currency and banking the federal government exercises exclusive functions. The 
function of the federal government on these services is strictly in accordance with the 
standard principles of federations around the world. With few exceptions the provincial 
governments would not exercise exclusive authority in any functional responsibility.  
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Table 4.4: Assignment of Functions/Exp. to Federal and Provincial Governments 
Functions   Government(s) 
Defense expenditure Federal 
Currency Federal 
Banking  Federal 
Foreign Affair Federal 
International Trade Federal 
Industrial Development Federal 
Transportation and Communication Federal 
Environment  Federal/Provincial 
Manpower management  Federal 
Interprovincial trade Federal 
Immigration Federal 
Air service and Railway Federal 
Food and Agriculture Federal/Provincial 
Population Planning Federal/Provincial 
Health Federal/Provincial 
Education Federal/Provincial 
Social Services  Federal/Provincial 
Highways constructions and maintenance Federal/Provincial 
Tourism  Federal/Provincial 
Power generation Federal  
Rural Development Provincial  
Policing  Provincial  
Source: Constitution (1973) 
Albeit, the exclusive role of each tier of government is largely limited in federal form of 
government, yet in Pakistan certain functions that should be purely under provincial 
domain are either shared by both level of governments or come in the purview of federal 
government – agriculture, education, health and social functions are the classic 
examples. Thus, notwithstanding the extent and nature of decentralisation underlined in 
1973 constitution, the real assumption and execution of power is still fundamentally 
centralised.  
The expenditure composition of federal and provincial governments is given in the table 
4.5, which clearly indicates that the share of the federal government is much higher than 
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the provincial governments. The federal government spends 74% to 70% of total 
national public expenditures, and dominates in sectors like defense and debt servicing, 
with 100% share in the former and 82 to 93% in the latter. In some sectors, particularly 
in general administration and other social services, the share of federal government has 
been declining over the years. However, in certain sectors which are believed to be sub-
national in character the share of federal government has had an upward trend. For 
instance, the share of federal government in health sector increased from 13% during 
1980s to 24.13% by the turn of the century; although afterward it has started declining.  
4.6 VERTICAL IMBALANCE: REVENUE MOBILISATION AND EXPENDITURES  
Vertical imbalance in tax and non-tax resource mobilisation is starkly higher in 
comparison to expenditure. These imbalances are such that the federal government has a 
budget surplus of 17% to 23%, whereas the budget deficit of provincial governments is 
with the same magnitude. Table 5.6 illustrates that the provincial governments‘ – this 
includes the local governments – resource mobilisation ranges from about 5% to about 
9% of total national revenue. As shown in figure 4.2, 90% to 91% of total provincial 
receipts come from federal governments. Therefore, it implies that revenue 
decentralisation in Pakistan is not only far lower than other federations, it also shown a 
very slight movement over the course of 25 years. It further suggests that high 
centralisation of revenue collection with relative decentralisation of expenditure 
responsibilities encourage the provincial governments to indulge in unnecessary 
expenditures, knowing that the federal government finances their budget gaps through 
intergovernmental resource transfers, which eventually makes the provincial 
governments less accountable to the taxpayers.     
 
 
 
 
 
 130 
 
Table 4.5: Expenditure components of Federal and Provincial Governments    
(Share in percentage) 
 1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995-96 1999-00 2005-06 2010-11 
Federal 
government 
       
Defense 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
General 
government 
61.11 64.41 57.78 48.4 48.12 46.71 45.3 
Debt Servicing 86.12 88.5 87.16 89.09 91.7 92.01 93.41 
Law and Order 34.1 36.41 33.15 34.48 32.26 31.22 30.12 
Other Social 
Services 
74.42 79.3 80.64 65.54 55.95 52.17 50.2 
Economic 
Services 
41.73 38.08 44.75 32.36 24.37 23.55 20.37 
Community 
Services 
36.23 34.76 22.97 36.41 33.21 32.11 28.1 
Health 13.13 15.14 12.89 26.08 22.96 19.1 17.52 
Education 11.51 12.66 11.92 12.96 10.71 11.34 9.11 
Others 81.7 82.49 81.21 85.24 66.48 63.11 59.11 
Total exp. of 
Fed. Govt. 
73.24 74.02 73.13 71.79 74.15 73.1 71.52 
Provincial Governments 
General 
government 
38.89 35.59 42.22 51.6 51.88 53.29 54.7 
Law and Order 65.9 63.59 66.85 65.52 67.74 68.78 69.88 
Community 
Services 
63.77 65.24 77.03 63.59 66.79 67.89 71.9 
Health 86.87 84.86 87.11 73.92 77.04 80.9 82.48 
Education 88.49 87.34 88.08 87.04 89.29 88.66 90.89 
Other Social 
Services 
25.58 20.7 19.36 34.46 44.05 47.83 49.8 
Economic 
Services 
58.27 61.92 55.25 67.64 75.63 76.45 79.63 
Debt Servicing 13.88 11.5 12.84 10.91 8.3 7.99 6.59 
Others 18.3 17.51 18.79 14.76 33.52 36.89 40.89 
Total exp. of 
Provinces 
26.76 25.98 26.87 28.21 25.85 26.9 28.48 
Source: Ahmed and Wasti (2002), Annual Budget Documents of Federal and Provincial 
governments. 
4.7 INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESOURCE TRANSFERS 
Lower tiers of government receive several types of transfers from the higher level of 
government(s) that include unconditional and conditional transfers. Unconditional 
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transfers are revenue sharing from the divisible pool taxes and straight transfers such as 
royalty on oil and electricity and development surcharges on gas. 
The conditional transfers, on the other hand, constitute a relatively low magnitude and 
largely include development grants, closed-ended matching grants as incentives to 
provinces for provincial resource mobilisation, federal transfer to the universities, 
among others.    
Table  4.6: Current expenditure and Revenue Mobilization 
(Share in Percentage) 
Year 
Expenditure Share Revenue Mobilization 
Share 
Deficit/Surplus 
Federal 
Govt. 
Provincial 
Govt. 
Federal Govt. Provincial 
Govt. 
Federal 
Govt. 
Provincial 
Govt. 
1980-81 75.3 24.7 93.4 6.6 18.1 -18.1 
1985-86 74.1 25.9 92 8 17.9 -17.9 
1990-91 73 27 93 7 20 -20 
1995-96 72 28 95 5 23 -23 
2000-01 74.2 25.8 92.9 7.1 18.7 -18.7 
2005-06 76.3 23.7 92.7 7.8 16.4 -15.9 
2010-11 73.9 26.1 91.2 8.8 17.3 -17.3 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan (various years) and federal and provincial governments 
Documents (various year) 
 
The four types of resources: 1. revenue-sharing transfers; 2. recurring grants and loans; 
3. development grants; 4. debt servicing and surcharges, transferred from the federal 
government to the provincial governments are discussed below very briefly.  
In revenue-sharing transfers taxes collected by the federal government are shared with 
provincial governments under the coverage of divisible pool revenue sharing mechanism 
that includes number of taxes and duties. 
This arrangement also decides the share of revenue from each tax that may be 
transferred to sub-national governments 
 
. 
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Figure 4.2: Provincial Governments‘ Total Receipts 
 
 
  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
       
Source: the author (based on Pakistan (various years) data)        
Income from property 
and enterprises  
Miscellaneous User charges 
and fees 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Direct 
Taxes 
Straight 
Transfers 
Grants and 
Subventions 
Share in Federal 
Divisible Pool 
Provincial Own Receipts 
Federal Transfers 
 9 to 10 percent share to 
total Provincial Receipts 
 
90 to 91 percent share to 
total Provincial Receipts 
 
Provincial 
Capital Receipts  
Provincial Total Receipts 
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In addition to this, the divisible pool determines specified revenues given to the 
provincial governments, which include royalty on the exploration of oil and gas and 
surcharges on electricity.  
Under the recurring grants and loans the federal government transfers funds to 
provincial governments in order to subsidise a particular social or economic service 
through grants-in-aids or other kind of grants. Additionally, in case of a massive budget 
deficit problem with provincial governments the federal government may take the 
responsibility of financing it through grants, since the provincial governments are 
constraint from borrowing to cover it. In the case of the federal government reluctance, 
the provincial governments are encouraged to take soft loans from the federation. 
Similarly, the provinces are also given loans to cushion their budget for financing the 
development expenditures. 
Under development grants the federal government transfers block or specific grants to 
provincial governments to finance the overall development expenditure of the latter or 
finance specific social services such as education and healthcare. Development grants 
from the federal government usually finances provincial governments through its 
Annual Development Programme (ADP). 
Debt servicing of provincial governments to federal government is the manifestation of 
reverse flow of funds from lower to higher level of governments, where the former pay 
back the debts to the federal government. The debt servicing consists of interests and the 
principal amounts of loans that have been taken by the provincial governments on 
various occasions for budgetary purpose. In addition to this, provinces pay revenues that 
occur to the federal government, specifically the surcharges levied on taxes of the sub-
national governments. 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers may be justified on following grounds: 
Firstly, given the better infrastructure of tax machinery and resources available for 
collecting larger tax revenues, the centre is more efficient than provinces. Given the 
proximity to taxpaying agents, individuals and corporations, and nature of smaller taxes, 
such as stamp duties and motor vehicle tax, the provinces are economically efficient to 
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collect taxes with narrow bases. Therefore, revenue obligations to various tiers of 
government may be placed based on the criteria of economic efficiency as well as social 
desirability, though the latter with lesser magnitude.  
Secondly, in Pakistan the expenditure and revenue generation obligations, respectively, 
are unequally distributed where subnational governments undertake more expenditures 
than revenues. Therefore, intergovernmental fiscal transfer is essential to bridge this 
mismatch of revenues and expenditures of provincial governments.   
Finally, in the majority of countries with federal system of governance, the income tax 
and sales tax are sub-national government‘s subjects in character, that is, they are 
mainly levied and collected by the provincial/state governments. However, in Pakistan 
both income tax and sales taxes are levied and collected by federal government - though 
the income tax in services has recently been assigned to the provincial governments 
after the 18
th
 amendment to the constitution and 7
th
 NFC Award.  These two forms of 
taxes constitute a sizable proportion (more than 50%)
56
 of total tax revenue. Therefore, 
sharing them between federal and provincial governments through the NFC Award 
framework makes intergovernmental transfers crucial for the public finance of the 
provincial governments.  
  In following section the NFC Award and its development is discussed in detail.  
4.8 NATIONAL FINANCE COMMISSION AWARDS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The NFC gives the legislative provisions of resource distribution between the central 
and provincial governments and among the provincial governments. It is established 
under the Article 160 (1) of the constitution of 1973 and ensures the distribution of 
resources mobilised by the federal government and shares with the provincial 
governments. The provincial governments, with a limited resource mobilisation 
authority, as presented in diagram 4, rely on federal transfers to finance most of their 
budgetary requirements. Therefore, prudent, efficient and judicious NFC Award is 
necessary for the smooth running of provincial finances.  
                                                 
56
 Pakistan (2011-12) 
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The salient features and characteristics of the NFC Award are described below 
(Pakistan, 2006): 
1. Mobilisation of taxes, duties, fees and other specified tax revenues by the federal 
government and their distribution vertically and horizontally. 
2. The allocation of various kinds of grants to the provinces from the federal 
government. 
3. The discretion of borrowing powers to the federal government as well as to the 
provincial governments.  
4. Any kind of contentious financial issue relating to the resource distribution is 
referred to the NFC body. 
Financial resource distribution in Pakistan traces its history back to the 1935 
Government of India Act, where the fiscal relation between federal (centre) and 
provincial governments is delineated and prescribed. The 1935 Act governs the 
distribution of revenues alongside the legislative responsibilities of central government 
and its constituent units (Jaffery and Sadaqat, 2006).  
Table 4.7 portraits the share of provincial governments in various resource sharing 
awards. Though, there have been 12 awards in total since the independence of Pakistan, 
only 7 could successfully conclude their final recommendations amicably. The resource 
transfers‘ trend has been increasing since the first award – Raisman award -, from 12.8% 
in 1951 to 56-57.5% in recent award (concluded in 2009). With the exception of 1974 
award, and the following two inconclusive awards (1979 and 1985) which replicated 
1974 award, the share of provincial government in divisible pool has consistently been 
increasing. This shows that the country has gradually, albeit very slowly, moved 
towards fiscal decentralisation.   
In undivided India, when Pakistan was a part of it, the Niemeyer Award under the 1935 
Government of India Act formulated the resource distribution framework between the 
central government and its federating units. It is interesting to note that under this award 
the provincial governments levied and collected the sales tax, while in case of income 
tax the 50% to total collection. After the independence of the country in 1947, the same 
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financial distribution arrangement was continued, though with some readjustment with 
the sharing of sales and income taxes and railway budget (Pakistan, 1991). Moreover, 
the provinces of Sindh and KP, respectively, received Rs.10 million and Rs. 10.5 
million  annual grants, however, after the stabilisation of budget position of the former 
province (KP), its grant was withdrawn and was directed to repay its federal debt, that it  
had owed to the federal government (Pakistan, 1973). 
Raisman Award was presented in December 1947 by Sir Jeremy Raisman that 
formulated a revenue sharing arrangement between the federal and provincial 
governments that was adopted after a long delay on 1
st
 April of 1952. After partition, 
considering enormous financial difficulties the federal government was given 50% ad 
hoc share of sales tax (Pakistan, 1991). Out of the remaining 50% the then East Pakistan 
received 45%, while the rest 55% of half of total sales tax was distributed among the 
federating units of West Pakistan
57
  base on population.  
Table  4.7: Share of Provinces Divisible Pool under Raisman Award     
(In Percentage) 
Province Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan Total 
Population 
Share  
63.58 18.71 14.10 3.61 100 
Share in 
Divisible Pool 
59.39 24.14 15.32 1.15 100 
 Source: Pakistan (1990) 
In addition to this, the province of KP received Rs.14.5 million as subvention. As 
indicated in table 4.8, under this award both Balochistan and the Punjab received a 
lower share than their population share whereas KP and Sindh on the other hand 
received more than their respective population share. 
 
                                                 
57
 Former West Pakistan included the States of Bahawalpur and Khairpur, which later was merged into 
the province of Punjab and Sindh, respectively. 
 137 
 
   
Table  4.8:  Revenue Sharing Arrangement under Various Awards                        
                                                                                                                                                                               (Provincial Share In %Age) 
Divisible Pool 
Raisman 
Award 
1952 
NFC 
Awar
d 1961 
NFC 
Award 
1964 
NFC 
Award 
1970 
NFC 
Award 
1974 
NFC 
Award 
1979 
NFC 
Award 
1985 
NFC 
Award 
1991 
NFC 
Award 
1997 
NFC 
Award 
2002 
NFC 
Award 
2006 
NFC 
Award 
2009 
Income Tax and 
Corporation Tax 
50 50 65 80 80 80 80 80 37.5 37.5 41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Other Direct Taxes         37.5 37.5 41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Sales Tax 50 60 65 80 80 80 80 80 37.5 37.5 41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Excise Duty    80         
Tea 50 60 65        41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Tobacco 50 60 65 80    80   41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Sugar           41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Betelent 50 60 65 80       41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Export Duties         37.5 37.5   
Cotton  100 65 80 80 80 80 80     
Jute 50 100 65 80       41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Import Duties         37.5 37.5 41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Succession Duties  100  100     37.7 37.7 41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Capital Value Tax on 
Immovable Properties 
 100  100     37.5 37.5 41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Petroleum Surcharges         100 100 41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Gas Development 
Surcharge 
        100 100 41.5 - 46.25 65 - 57.5 
Divisible Pool 
Transfers as % of 
Federal Tax Revenue 
12.8 23.1 35 53.4 29.8 29.8 29.8 35.3 37.3 37.3 41.50 - 46.25 56 - 57.5 
Source: NFC Reports (various years) 
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The federal government continued to administer the sales tax, with the provinces 
allowed to get 50% of net collections in their respective areas. Net proceeds on excise 
duty on Tea, Tobacco and Betelnut were divided among the provinces according to the 
formula adopted in the case of income tax receipts (Pakistan, 1974). 
Raisman Award continued till 1961 even after three years (in 1955) of the award the all 
provinces of West Pakistan were amalgamated into One Unit, eliminating their status as 
separate entities which they enjoyed hitherto. Thus, in 1961 a Finance Commission 
appointed by the then president tabled its proposals for resource distribution in 
December, 1961. Considering the weak economic condition of the provinces, the 
Commission also proposed that grants-in-aids and other transfers to be made to the 
provinces.   
Under this award, 60% and 50% share of income tax, sales tax and excise duty on tea, 
tobacco and sugar were given to the provinces with the share of 54% of West Pakistan 
and 46% to East Pakistan. Likewise, provinces were given 100% share in export duties 
on cotton and jute and succession duties and tax on capital value on immovable 
properties (table 4.7), with share of 54 and 46% respectively to West and East Pakistan. 
In addition, the units received 30% of sales tax and 100% of agriculture tax based on 
collection in their respective areas (Pakistan, 1991). In order to give more cushions to 
the provinces, the latter were given relief in loan repayment, owed to the federal 
government. All loans, except foreign loans, made to the units by federal government 
were reduced by half which were repayable within 25 years time with 3.5% rate of 
interest (Pakistan, 1974).      
However in 1964 National Finance Commission, established under the 1962 
constitution‘s Article 144, the scope of the divisible pool was narrowed down to tax on 
income, export and excise duties, respectively along with other changes in distribution. 
The Commission recommended 65% share for federal government and 35% for 
provinces from the divisible pool.  
The taxes included in the divisible pool under this Commission were as follows: 
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1. Income tax: included corporate tax but excluded the remuneration paid out of the 
federal consolidated funds. 
2. Excise duties on Tea, Tobacco and Betelnut. 
3. Export duties on Jute and Cotton. 
4. Sales tax. 
Moreover, the 1964 Commission also proposed that the allocated funds to the provinces 
would be used for development purposes and for recurring expenses the latter may 
endeavour to get additional revenues from own sources mainly through agricultural 
taxation.       
National Finance Committee of 1970: Under the federal finance minister a committee 
was formed in April 1970 to work out and recommend an intergovernmental resource 
transfer mechanism. The committee recommended changing the revenue sharing 
arrangement between the federal government and the units. However, the horizontal 
distribution among the provinces in West Pakistan was not unchanged – it took place on 
the basis of population. The vertical distribution was 20: 80% respectively for the 
federal and provincial governments. Out of 20% of provincial share the East Pakistan 
received 54% – a remarkable departure from the previous awards in which the East 
Wing‘s share had invariably remained lesser than its western counterpart. The remaining 
46% was given to the West Pakistan and distributed among the provinces based on 
population. As indicated in table 4.9 the provinces of KP and Balochistan received more 
than their population share. Moreover, similar to the previous award the provincial 
governments received 30% of the sales tax because of collection from the respective 
areas.  
Table 4.9 : Share Of Provinces in Divisible Pool 1n 1970 Award     
                 (In Percentage) 
Province Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan Total 
Population 
Share  
60 22.50 13.5 4 100 
Share in 
Divisible Pool 
56.50 23.50 15.50 4.50 100 
Source: Pakistan (1991) 
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Even after 1971 when East Pakistan was separated, and eventually the One Unit was 
collapsed, the respective provinces continued to get transfers with the same proportion. 
Yet the size of the revenue was bigger (Ahmed et al., 2007).  
4.9  FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT IN 1973 CONSTITUTION: THE NFC AWARD 
Article 160(1) of the 1973 constitution makes it mandatory for the government to 
constitute a NFC Award at the interval of every 5 years. The distributional mechanism 
under the NFC may be in accordance with need and goals for the equal development of 
all provinces. Hence, the NFC recommends procedures of width and breadth of resource 
mobilisation and its distribution under a prescribed systematic formula. 
Thus, executing constitutional requirement the Prime Minister of Pakistan constituted 
the first NFC after the implementation of 1973 constitution in 1974. This put forward 
recommendations on the following areas: 
1. Distribution of net proceeds between the federation and the provinces; 
I. Income tax, which included corporate tax but excluded income tax paid 
remuneration out of the Federal Consolidated Fund. 
II. Sales tax on goods‘ productions and purchases. 
III. Export duties on Cotton. 
2. Disbursement of grants-in-aids and other such grants to the provincial 
governments by the federal government. 
3. Conferring of external and internal borrowing power to federal and provincial 
governments.   
The NFC Award in 1974: This award was the first one concluded after the 1973 
constitution whereby the scope of divisible pool remained limited to income taxes, sales 
tax and export duty. It proposed that the distribution of net proceeds of allocable federal 
taxes between the central government and the governments of federating units would be 
based on 20:80%. For vertical distribution population being the sole criteria placed the 
Punjab province as major beneficiary, as suggested in table 4.10.   
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Table 4.10: Share of Provinces in Divisible Pool in 1974 Award              
      (In Percentage) 
Province Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan Total 
Population Share  60 22.50 13.5 4 100 
Share in Divisible 
Pool 
60.50 22.50 13.50 3.86 100 
Source: Pakistan (1974) 
The commission also recommended fixed per annual subvention grants of Rs 50 million 
and Rs 100 million respectively to KP and Balochistan in order to support their 
deteriorated financial positions. The grants-in-aid would be granted to the provincial 
governments for the maintenance of roads and national highways, whereas, grant-in-aid 
for the sharing of the cost of maintaining the strategic road(s) would be decided though 
consensus by the federal and provincial governments (Pakistan, 1974).  
National Finance Commission Award of 1979: As the constitutional requirement, in 
1979 NFC was constituted under the chairmanship of the then federal minister, Mr. 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan to formulate a new resource distribution setup. However, due to 
extreme social unrest and political upheaval in the country the Commission was unable 
to conduct any meeting and therefore could not advance a new award. In order to 
distribute resources between the federal and the provincial governments the 1974 NFC 
Award was followed with same vertical and horizontal distributional formulation. 
Nevertheless, after the 1981 census, when the demographic structure of respective 
provinces changed, the award readjusted itself and accommodated the percentage share 
of population of the provinces. 
Table 4.11: Share of Provinces in Divisible Pool in 1979 Award           
            (In Percentage) 
Province Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan Total 
Population 
Share  
60 22.50 13.5 4 100 
Share in 
Divisible Pool 
57.97 23.34 13.39 5.30 100 
Source: Pakistan (2006) 
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Since the population share of Balochistan had increased marginally so did its share 
horizontal distribution. The share of KP remained unchanged, while, Punjab‘s share has 
declined and Sindh experienced a slight improvement in its situation (see table 4.11).  
The NFC Award in 1985 was constituted under the chairmanship of Dr. Mahbubul Haq, 
then federal finance minister. The Commission held 9 meetings to discuss and deliberate 
thoroughly on various angles of resource distribution. However, amid wide 
disagreements on the issues of vertical and horizontal resource sharing, the Commission 
was unable to develop a consensus on finalising its recommendation for a new award. 
As a result, like previous award, this one also could not produce any tangible outcomes 
in terms of resource distribution. Consequently, the recommendations of 1974 award 
were carried out for resource distribution considering the new demographic structure of 
the provinces for horizontal distribution.  
The Fourth NFC Award was formed in 1990, after a gap of almost 16 years presented its 
final recommendations in April 1991. The award was considered a historic achievement. 
In the sense that it came after a long delay during which the provinces had experienced 
large and chronic budget deficits positions mainly due to the unbalanced 
intergovernmental resource transfer pattern. The remarkable accomplishment of this 
award was that for the first time in Pakistan‘s history the size and scope of the divisible 
pool was expanded with the inclusion of taxes and duties, such as duties on Sugar and 
Tobacco that hitherto had remained out of divisible pool. Another significant 
development in 1991 award was the tremendous growth of horizontal share of the 
provinces: the latter registered a noticeable 60% growth; from 28% (Rs 39 billion) in 
previous award to 45% (Rs 64 billion) in 1991 award (Ghaus and Pasha, 1994).   
However, the Commission was not successful in including custom duties in divisible 
pool despite strong demand from the provinces in its favour. Another major failure of 
1991 Award was not to achieve an agreement on horizontal resource distribution. 
Therefore, the existing formula of population was carried out as a sole criterion despite 
serious doubts and reservations from the less populated provinces, particularly from 
Balochistan, which was worst affected from population being the single criterion.  
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Under the recommendations of this award 80% of income tax, sales tax, excise duties on 
Tobacco and Sugar, export duty on Cotton, which formed the divisible pool were 
transferred to the provinces from the federation. That was further distributed among the 
former on the basis of population as presented in table 4.12. 
Table 4.12: Share of Provinces in Divisible Pool in 1991 Award    
             (In Percentage) 
Province   Punjab   Sindh KP Balochistan Total 
Population Share  60 22.50 13.5 4 100 
Share in Divisible 
Pool 
57.88 23.28 13.54 5.30 100 
Source: Pakistan, 1991 
However, notwithstanding such failure the 1991 Award is considered a way-forward 
towards fiscal decentralisation. That was because of the fact that the provincial share in 
total revenues collected by the federal government registered a quantum leap to 18% 
compare to the previous awards. This increment happened largely due to the inclusion of 
excise duties on Sugar and Tobacco into the divisible pool that erstwhile were not 
divisible (Ahmed et al., 2007). Additionally, in pursuance of Article 161 of the 
constitution this Award for the first time recognised the rights of the provinces on 
surcharges and royalty on natural gas and net hydel profit respectively. The provinces 
were also given excise duty on crude oil in the shape of straight transfers.  
Though, the horizontal transfer did not change as the population being the only 
distributional criterion, the size of the transfer increased because of the bigger volume of 
the divisible pool. Other major steps taken in this Award that increased the fiscal 
autonomy of the provinces included: first, the provision of special grants and straight 
transfers to finance the development needs of provinces. Under the special grants to the 
provinces‘ financial heads, the Punjab, Sindh, KP and Balochistan were granted Rs 1000 
million, Rs 700 million, Rs 200 million and Rs 100 million respectively in 3
rd
, 5
th
, 3
rd
 
and 3
rd
 years (Pakistan, 1991). And second, alongside the inclusion of federal excise 
duty and sugar and tobacco in divisible pool, the share of provinces in two pivotal 
federally collected taxes – sales tax and corporate income tax – has also increased to 
80% (Sabir, 2001). It is maintained that the intergovernmental transaction from federal 
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to provincial governments increased many folds. Yet a serious issue remained 
unresolved: the provinces were not motivated to build their own infrastructure to 
generate revenues, which could guarantee the latter‘s fiscal autonomy (Jaffery and 
Sadaqat, 2006; Ahmed et al., 2007).  
The Fifth NFC Award was formed under the federal caretaker finance minister Mr. 
Shahid Javed Burki in December 1996. He presented his recommendations in February 
1997. This Award was a departure from its predecessors in many respects. Most notably 
it not only expanded the size of the divisible pool with the inclusion of all tax revenues 
but also extended the royalties and development surcharges on crude oil and natural gas 
respectively to the provinces in the form of straight transfers. In other words, the 
Commission recommended that in every fiscal year each province would be given ―a 
share in the net proceeds of the total royalties on crude oil, an amount which bears to the 
total net proceeds the same proportion as the production of crude oil in the province in 
that year bears to the total production of crude oil‖ (Jaffery and Sadaqat, 2006: 217). 
Likewise, each province would get net proceeds of development surcharges on natural 
gas equivalent to the well-head production of gas situated in that province.  
However, the horizontal resource formula stuck to the population as the singular 
criterion. This formula resultantly provided the most populace province of Punjab with 
the greatest advantage at the expense of the least populated but the biggest in term of 
territory and poorest province of Balochistan. To Punjab 57.88% of total proceeds was 
allocated and Balochistan while is the richest in terms of resources only received 5.30%.  
These data are presented in table 4.13.  
Table 4.13: Share Of Provinces in Divisible Pool 1n 1997 Award   
             (In Percentage) 
Province Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan Total 
Population 
Share  
60 22.50 13.5 4 100 
Share in 
Divisible Pool 
57.88 23.28 13.54 5.30 100 
Source: Pakistan (1997) 
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In addition, the Award also recommended grants-in-aids for the two least developed 
provinces: KP and Balochistan received Rs. 3310 million and Rs. 4080 million 
respectively each year for five years subject to the 11% annual increment in order to 
adjust for inflation. Moreover, the same also included matching grants for those 
provinces that would maintain minimum 14.2% growth rate in provincial receipts, 
impose new local taxes and withdraw unnecessary exemptions. In doing so, they would 
receive the maximum amounts in the subsequent year. Maximum grants for each 
province was as follows (Jaffery and Sadaqat, 2006): 
Punjab and Sindh:  Rs 500 million each, and 
Balochistan and KP:  Rs 100 million each 
The economic downturn during this period constrained the federal government financial 
positions. Consequently, the federal government redesigned and curtailed the federal 
transfers to the provinces. Table 4.14 highlights a short fall in all transfers during 1997-
98 to 2000-01 financial years. The short fall in divisible pool was more acute than 
straight transfers and subventions. For instance, the actual transfers to the provinces 
during 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-00 and 2000-01 have been Rs.25.532 billion, Rs. 
24.9922 billion, Rs. 27.494 billion and Rs.30.111 billion against the projected transfers 
of Rs. 38.941 billion, Rs.43.304 billion, Rs.49.498 billion and Rs. 58.92 billion, 
respectively.  Looking at subventions and straight transfers, one may realise that the 
provincial actual receipts were slightly different amount compare to the projected one.  
One of the fundamental developments in 1997 Award was the bifurcation of public 
expenditure into priority and non-priority categories. While the former contained 
expenditures on defense, social services, development of key infrastructure and debt 
serving. The latter described as general administration, community services, economic 
services among others (Sabir, 2001). The basic rationale of this division of expenditure 
was to ensure the first line of expenditure (priority expenditure) in case of any shortfall 
in the targeted revenues. At the same time it meant to even out the development path of 
priority sector of the economy. 
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Unlike the previous Awards, this Award included all taxes which were collected by 
federal government in divisible pool. This was perceived as a positive development 
toward fiscal decentralisation. It was optimistically believed that as a result of the 
thriving macroeconomic profile - high economic growth rate, low inflation, and higher 
resource mobilization thanks to tax and tariff reform - the expanded divisible pool 
would meet the resource requirements of the provincial governments. Yet, because the 
high economic volatility and slowdown in world economy and consequently drastic 
decline of imports prices that affected the import tax collections the size of the divisible 
pool suffered a lot as a result. Besides, the domestic economic recession accompanied 
by tax concession extended by the then government to boost supply side economy 
resulted into a drastic fall of income taxes and sales tax. This left a major impact on 
divisible pool and reduced transfers from federal to provincial governments. Leaving a 
short fall that was not only on divisible pool but also on straight transfers and 
subventions with lesser degree in the latter. 
Table 4.14: Federal Transfers to Provinces (From 1997-98 To 2000-01) 
 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 
Divisible Pool      
Actual 25.532 24.9922 27.494 30.111 
1997 NFC Award Projections 33.28 36.481 40.822 46.691 
As per 1991 NFC Projections 38.941 43.304 49.498 58.92 
Straight Transfers     
Actual 4.986 4.602 5.733 6.369 
1997 NFC Award Projections 5.816 5.992 6.294 6.742 
As per 1991 NFC Projections 5.816 5.992 6.294 6.742 
Subvention     
Actual 1.812 1.904 1.943 1836 
1997 NFC Award Projections 1.814 1.904 2.04 2171 
As per 1991 NFC Projections 0 0 0 0 
Total Transfers     
Actual 32.329 31.498 35.169 38.315 
1997 NFC Award Projections 40.91 44.376 49.156 55.605 
As per 1991 NFC Projections 44.757 49.296 55.792 65.662 
Source: Sabir (2001) and NFC Report (1997) 
 
Despite having 11 meetings and intense deliberations, The 6
th 
NFC Award, constituted in 
July 2000, failed in formulating a new resource distribution. The key reason for the 
 147 
 
failure was lack of consensus among stakeholders on vertical and horizontal distribution. 
The federal government strongly resisted the provincial governments‘ demand for at 
least 50% share. The claim of Balochistan and KP to diversify the horizontal distribution 
criteria by including other indicators such as poverty, backwardness and inverse 
population along with population was turned down by the Punjab. The latter wanted the 
population to remain the sole criterion for horizontal distribution. Therefore, this Award 
completed its 5 years period without any achievement (Khatak et al., 2010).  
The NFC Award in 2006 also failed to develop a consensus among the stakeholders 
about resource distribution between the centre and provinces. This stalemate led the 
Commission to the final option in which the provincial chief ministers entrusted the 
authority to the president to declare a ‗just and agreeable-to-all‘ Award. The president 
under the Article 160(6) of the 1973 constitution amended the ―Distribution of 
Resources and Grants-in-aids Order, 1997‖, and announced a new award on July, 2006. 
The provincial share was proposed to increase from 41.50% to 46.25% in both divisible 
pool and grants. The divisible pool included taxes on income and wealth, sales tax, 
capital gain tax, and duties on custom and excise; besides other tax revenues mobilised 
by the federal government (Pakistan, 2006).   
Three broad categories markedly differentiate this Award from the previous ones. 
Firstly, instead of a static share of provinces in divisible pool, for the first time it set up 
varied share of the provincial governments – that started from 41.50% in first year and 
ended up with 46.25% in last year of this Award. Secondly, it included the Punjab and 
Sindh as recipients of subventions grants, which did not receive before. Thirdly, it also 
incorporated 1/6
th
 of the net proceeds that would be transferred further down to the 
district governments through provincial governments. The latter‘s demand for at least 
50% share from the divisible pool was not met. But it nonetheless increased their share 
from the 37.25% of last two awards.    
The criterion for horizontal distribution still remained solely on population. 
Balochistan‘s demand to include poverty, inverse population and geography as criteria 
was rejected because of the Punjab monopoly on Pakistan entire establishmen 
 148 
 
 
Table 4.15: Share of Provinces in Divisible Pool in 2000 Award  
                    (In Percentage) 
Province Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan Total 
Population 
Share  
60 22.50 13.5 4 100 
Share in 
Divisible Pool 
57.36 23.71 13.82 5.11 100 
Source: Pakistan (2006) 
As indicated in table 4.15, Balochistan despite having 43% of total territory of the 
country and with highest per capita cost in economic and social services provision (Nabi 
and Sheikh, 2011), and highest poverty rate
58
 received the lowest transfers from the 
divisible pool. In contrast, Punjab still has remained the prime beneficiary – with 
57.36% share. 
Table 4.16: Transfer to Provinces from Federation                                   
(Rupees in billions) 
 
2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
divisible Pool 204.8 244.6 320.6 391.3 477.4 569.8 
Straight Transfer 40.5 56.8 70.3 65.9 82.4 85.4 
Special 
Grants/Subventions 35.3 63.5 29.3 33.3 40.6 52.9 
Project Aid 15.5 17.5 16.3 19.1 26.3 26.9 
Agriculture Sector 
Loan 1.4 2.8 2.6 1.1 0 0 
Japanese Grants 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.04 0.02 0.09 
Total  Transfer 
(gross) 297.6 385.2 385.2 510.8 626.8 735.1 
Interest Payment 24.3 21.6 21.6 19.9 18.5 16.8 
Loan Repayment 28.7 14.7 14.7 25.4 21 20.4 
Total Transfers (Net) 244.6 348.9 348.9 465.6 587.3 697.9 
Source: Pakistan (2009-10) and Budget in Brief (2008-09) 
 
 Table 4.16 presents the federal government‘s total transfers under various heads since 
fiscal year 2004-05. We noticed that total transfers has increased from Rs. 244.5 billion 
in 2004-05 to Rs. 697.9 billion, showing a significant development towards fiscal 
                                                 
58
 According to recent estimates by Social Policy Development Institute (2012), In Balochistan more than 
52 percent of population lives below the poverty line whereas in Punjab, Sindh and KP the poverty rate is 
19 percent, 32 percent and 33 percent respectively. 
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decentralisation. It is worthwhile to note that the transfers from divisible pool rose by 
around 178% within six years.  
The 7
th
 NFC Award‘s final recommendations were not less stringent. Balochistan and 
KP insisted on the inclusion of indicators like poverty, backwardness and inverse 
population density. Sindh
59
 demanded to include sales tax on services and revenue 
generation as criteria for horizontal distribution along with population. Punjab insisted 
on uni-variable criterion-based formula. On December 2009 the Award was succeeded 
unanimously and made number of tangible recommendations for both horizontal and 
vertical distributions. The Commission under the chairmanship of federal finance 
minister, Mr. Shoukat Tareen, developed a consensus among all members and 
resultantly recommended a plausible award to the Prime Minister (Mustafa, 2011). The 
Award introduced some fundamental changes. Such as: 
1. A drastic step towards fiscal decentralisation by increasing the provinces‘ share 
in divisible pool to 56% in first year, effective from first July, 2010 and 57.5% in 
remaining 4 years of  the Award. The collection charges, which hitherto had 
been 5% by the federal government has been reduced to 1%. The federal 
government also relinquished the sales tax on services under federal excise 
duties to the provinces (Nabi and Sheikh, 2011). 
2. Alongside vertical distribution the horizontal distribution has also undergone 
into a major shift. Population as a sole resource distribution criterion among 
provinces very often caused impasse in previous Awards. It resulted in 
inconclusive outcome. This Award is a positive step to mitigate the horizontal 
imbalance by diversifying the distribution criteria. It has included in the 
assessment of the award besides population factors such poverty, backwardness, 
resource mobilisation and inverse population density. As table 4.17 shows the 
inclusion of indicators like poverty/backwardness and inverse population density 
benefits Balochistan and KP. It is true that the population (with 82% weight) still 
                                                 
59
It is important to mention that Sindh province contributes more than 60 percent of total tax revenues. It 
not only hosts majority of industries but virtually all custom duties. Sindh has only functional port of the 
country. Another port at Balochistani town of Gwader was constructed in 2008 with the help of China 
(Ferguson, 2011) but it is yet fully operational.    
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remained the major indicator compare to other indicators, therefore, the Punjab 
maintained to be the prime beneficiary. However, due to the enlargement of the 
provincial share in vertical distribution and inclusion of other indicators, the 
provinces received a financial relief to consolidate their deteriorating budgetary 
positions.    
3. In order to compensate the provinces that faced extraordinary financial 
difficulties special considerations have been made. For example, it was pledged 
that the province of Balochistan would get not less Rs 83 billion under the 
divisible pool transfers. Therefore, its share in divisible pool has increased to 
9.09%, as indicated in table 4.17, from the actual 7.17% based on 4 indicators 
criteria for horizontal distribution. KP receives one% extra fund out of the 
divisible pool for being at the frontline of war against terror.   
4. In every fiscal year, it was agreed that each province would receive 50% of net 
proceeds on total royalty on crude oil. Additionally, Balochistan was to receive 
Rs 120 billion under the head of Gas Development Surcharges. The federal 
government owed this amount to Balochistan. An agreement was made between 
the federal government and Balochistan that the former would pay the amount 
within a period of 12 years. Likewise, it was agreed that KP would get Rs 110 
billion on the head of hydel profit in the course of 5 year time (Pakistan, 2010). 
The bottom line of the 7
th
 NFC Award is that the federal government conceded to the 
fact that without greater fiscal decentralisation provinces would fail in providing social 
and economic services like education, healthcare basic infrastructure, drinking water and 
sanitation. Considering the provinces high fiscal need, the current award took a big step 
in providing bigger slice of the fiscal revenue to the provincial governments in order to 
enable them to provide better social services to their people.  
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Table 4.17: Distribution Criteria for 7
th
 NFC Award                                                              
        (Share In Percentage)          
 
 
 
 
 
Indicators Population Poverty/ 
Backwardness 
Revenue 
Generation 
Inverse 
Population 
Density 
Grants for 
Compensation 
on account of 
OZ&T* 
 
Grant for 
War on 
Grants for 
War on 
Terror** 
Share on 
the basis 
of 
previous 
award 
7
th
  
NFC 
Award 
Weight 82 10.3 5 2.7 
  
100 100 
Punjab 57.37 23.16 44 4.34 
  
53.01 51.74 
Sindh 23.71 23.41 50 7.21 
 
0.66 24.94 24.55 
KP  13.82 27.82 5 6.54 1.8 
 
14.88 14.62 
Balochistan 5.11 25.61 1 81.92 
  
7.17 9.09 
Source:  NFC document ( 2010) and Nabi and Sheikh (2011) 
*Grant-in-Aid to Sindh province is  equivalent to 0.66% of the net Provincial Divisible Pool, is  given as compensation for losses on account of     
   abolition of OZ&T 
**The grant for war on terror is 1% of the total divisible pool, which is equivalent to 1.8% of the provincial share in the net      
   proceeds of Provincial divisible pool 
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4.10 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION  
Fiscal decentralisation was always resisted by strong military and civil bureaucracy and 
other centralist forces. These forces thwarted every attempt that was made towards 
decentralisation including the formation of consensus-based NFC Award that could 
reflect fiscal needs and development goals of all provinces.    
The NFC Award is a political economy issue. In game theory the stakeholders bargain 
over the resource distribution. In case of failure to reach into a consensus they retreat 
willingly or otherwise to previous Award which is not optimal. Similarly, a consensus-
based and multi-factors NFC Award to certain degree promotes provincial autonomy 
and fiscal decentralisation. Political economy discourse in Pakistan shows that forces 
hostile to decentralisation missed no opportunity in sabotaging any attempt made 
towards fiscal decentralisation and provincial fiscal and political self-rules. Out of 7 
NFC Awards in total constituted after the promulgation of the 1973 constitution, only 4 
commissions effectively concluded with their recommendations with consensus. 
Failing to hammer out a new consensus-based Award would by design compel the 
stakeholders to adopt the recommendations of the existing Award. As we noticed 
throughout this chapter, the continuation of current Award would benefit the Punjab 
most. Because the biggest objection of other provinces has been that the population 
should not be the sole criterion for horizontal resource distribution. And retreating to the 
current Award inherently implies the perpetuation of population-based distribution that 
obviously advantages the Punjab. Thus, in a game theoretic framework the Punjab being 
an influential stakeholder frustrates any move driving to diversify the distributional 
criteria.    
The critical nature of resource distribution lies on the mere fact that it will empower 
smaller provinces. It will entitle them to a just and equitable share of resources from 
divisible pool, which makes them fiscally capable to finance their development. Hence, 
NFC Award is the only mechanism through which the provinces can fetch a due share of 
resources to ensure their fiscal autonomy. The approach adopted in various NFC 
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Awards and reliance on population is completely biased towards the dominant province 
and central political establishment. 
This policy has not only hampered the provincial autonomy and fiscal decentralisation 
but also created serious fraction and rift between central-provincial relations. The 
country which had already lost her eastern wing due to the ―biased resource 
distribution‖, including of course other reasons, in the favour of the west wing is 
encountering similar danger from Balochistan. So it is felt that the country needed such 
a resource distribution mechanism that not only revamped the vertical distribution to 
enhance provincial fiscal autonomy but to incorporate other criteria for the horizontal 
distribution alongside population. The matter of resource distribution has never been an 
easy business in any federation. It is said that serious and collaborative deliberation and 
honest approach to the issue across the board may help to harmonise the coexistence of 
different nations under one political framework.   
The pure public finance of fiscal decentralisation suggests that political competition, 
within many circumstances, moderates the political distortions. However, the success of 
fiscal decentralisation depends largely on certain institutional parameters, such as 
democracy, rule of law and equity. Analysts of political economy of Pakistan consider a 
significant role of rural elite or landlord in policy making. In Pakistan the majority of 
population lives in rural areas, and rural gentry capture the local politics; one would 
expect fiscal decentralisation to worsen the outcomes, at least in rural areas. 
Nonetheless, the mere fact that the rural gentry are not a monolithic class, rather they 
vigorously fight for political power, and the stranglehold of local elite has loosing over 
the time. Furthermore, the strength of landlords traditionally comes from the land 
concentration. But evidence (For example, Zaidi, 1999) shows land distribution through 
inheritance seems not be a big source of policy outcomes in rural areas. Therefore, the 
argument that, fiscal decentralisation leads to have distorted policy outcomes due to the 
dominance of the landed gentry in political economy of Pakistan, does not seem to be 
grounded on sound evidence. 
The model of elite capture or for that the influence of other influential groups, be they 
civil bureaucracy, the military top brass or the business class, may not capture several 
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other political and economic dimensions that potentially affect the outcomes of fiscal 
decentralisation. One of the crucial dimensions of electoral politics is the credibility of 
pre-electoral promises of political parties. In Pakistan the mainstream political parties 
albeit make pre-electoral promises of better social services, however, when it comes to 
action they fail to ensure the provision of essential social services such as health and 
education, which is evident from the dwindling social sector of the country. Therefore, it 
is fair to argue that mainstream politics of Pakistan is least credible, and such lack of 
credibility leaves a negative impact on policy outcomes. On the contrary, if electoral 
politics presents local people with regional competitors with more credible promises to 
them on broader range of policy issue, including better social service delivery, fiscal 
decentralisation has the potential to improve the policy outcomes.  Moreover, if the non-
peculiarity of rent seeking is higher for local representatives than the national level 
representatives, then inherently decentralisation would improve the policy outcomes by 
making the politicians less inclined towards rent seeking. On the other hand, however, if 
the non-peculiarity rents from being national representatives are higher compare to local 
office, then policy outcomes would be worse off under fiscal decentralisation.  
Another important factor worth considering regarding the political economy of fiscal 
decentralisation in Pakistan is the effects of the latter on corruption. It is useful to 
consider rent-seeking because public resources that serve no any purpose except 
enriching politicians is a major source of distortion in policy making outcomes, and the 
interest of fiscal decentralisation is also triggered among politicians and policy  makers 
to ensure more rent-seeking. Political economy models (for example, Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 1999; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Keefer, 2002) show that in a situation 
when electorates are unable to force politicians to compete for better service delivery, 
rent-seeking bahaviour remains high among politicians. Thus, in the absence of 
competitive electoral political environment that exerts pressures on politicians; rent-
seeking is an eminent threat. Factor such as absence of credibility and electoral 
uncertainty encourage politicians to divert maximum possible public resources for self-
benefit and pursue rents. Whether or not fiscal decentralisation encourages rent-seeking 
depends largely upon the consistency and certainty of elections and credibility of 
political parties. In Pakistan although the crisis of credibility is much stark for national 
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level political parties than regional ones, the electoral uncertainty is likely to be equal at 
both central and sub-national level. Therefore, under decentralisation politicians are 
equally likely to seek rents, as otherwise the case under centralisation. However, it is 
pertinent to argue that fiscal decentralisation in Pakistan would be expected to enhance 
the outcomes of public policy, as local politicians perceive a longer political horizon or 
may believe that malpractice of public office would have a negative consequence of 
their post-office life in locality.  
4.11  CONCLUSION 
The federation of Pakistan has gone through various challenges mostly financial, 
political and geographical since her creation. Among them financial distribution has 
been pivotal in shaping the strength and direction of the federation. The federal structure 
of Pakistan demands cooperative and accommodative federalism wherein the provinces 
can enjoy maximum political, administrative and fiscal autonomy. Despite centralist 
grip over political and military power the overall mood of the country has always been 
in the favour of greater decentralisation. One of the central issues of federalism in 
Pakistan is the vertical and horizontal resource distribution between federal and 
provincial governments. This remains a central issue of hostility until a solution is found 
that takes into count the legitimate rights of each province.   
The history of resource distribution discussed in this chapter reveals that the failure of 
the stakeholders in reaching to a consensus-based distribution formula under various 
NFC Awards is a political issue. A broad-based distribution mechanism has always been 
resisted by the centre and the Punjab province. As a result the process of fiscal 
decentralisation has not been evolved amicably. It has created a sense of deprivation and 
alienation among smaller provinces. Prior to the 7
th
 NFC Award, population had 
remained the sole criterion for vertical resource distribution. This policy stands in stark 
contrast to the world best practices of resource distribution among federating entities.   
The vertical resource distribution has always been unbalanced. But since 1990 Award 
the share of provinces and scope of the divisible pool has been increasing by including 
more taxes and duties.  Overall, the trend has been towards the fiscal decentralisation.  
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For a successful and effective decentralisation system the provincial governments need 
to enhance their administrative capacity to ensure efficient implementation of service 
delivery and revenue generation. These obligations are mandated in the 7
th
 NFC Award.  
In the following chapter we provide an overview of the issues and debates related to 
poverty in Pakistan.   
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CHAPTER 5 
POVERTY IN PAKISTAN: APPROACHES, MEASUREMENT, 
TREND AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
5.1   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins with a brief definitions and measurements of poverty. This follows 
by a thorough discussion of the nature, scope, causes and trends of poverty in Pakistan. 
While presenting the poverty profile, an attempt is made to highlight the institutional 
factors related to either the causes of poverty or the impediments that obstruct 
ameliorating poverty. The analysis of poverty includes a broad-range of issues such as 
conceptualisation and measurement of poverty, institutional impediments and variation 
of poverty trends over the decades. To study a wide subject such as poverty in a diverse 
country like Pakistan, that too for a long time period, is a daunting task. But in the run of 
this chapter some attempts are also made in presenting a critical examination of the 
institutional and political economy issues that are viewed to be the potential hurdles in 
reducing poverty.  
The first ever data on poverty were collected in 1960s. We commence our analysis from 
this date and then present a comprehensive periodisation of various developments and 
their corresponding consequences on poverty. Finally we look at the measurement of 
poverty with various methodologies applied and their implications on Pakistan.  
A detailed discussion of issues related to poverty in Pakistan is important because it 
shows how the trend of poverty changes over time. It also reveals how certain public 
sector bottlenecks cause poverty in the country. Fiscal decentralisation as a major 
economic and political reform has a potential impact on poverty directly as well as 
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indirectly through certain channels. Therefore, the argument of this chapter provides a 
background for theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty, which we discuss in chapters 4 through 11. As we observe 
through the course of the chapter, although poverty is relatively a well-researched 
subject in Pakistan, but a substantive part of the poverty related work is focused on 
measurement issues, ignoring institutional constraints that happen to be either a great 
cause of poverty or impede policies aiming to arrest poverty.  Analysing poverty trends 
and other related issues with an institutional framework, which is the theme of this 
chapter, may be considered as a contribution to the wider poverty related literature.  
5.1   MULTIPLE APPROACHES APPLIED TO POVERTY IN PAKISTAN  
In analysing poverty two approaches are worth discussing. The first one is the 
conventional and is largely accepted approach. In this approach poverty is statistically 
and econometrically measured. This approach has broadly been used for the 
measurement of poverty in Pakistan. The second approach is a more ‗inclusive‘ and 
process-based approach. Alongside income or consumption, other dimensions such as 
education and health are also included in the model. The review of existing literature on 
poverty shows that the latter approach despite gaining an overwhelming popularity has 
remained limited in its application and scope in the case study of Pakistan (Gazdar and 
Zaidi, 1994).  
Most literature on poverty, specifically those dealing with developing countries, 
employs absolute ‗poverty line‘60 for poverty measurement. Following the general trend, 
almost the entire literature on poverty in Pakistan uses absolute poverty line in 
measuring poverty.  Certainly the central focus of the conventional literature of poverty 
has been to define and measure poverty adopting a monetary approach of poverty: to 
classify and identify the poor; and to decide the poverty reduction strategies.  However, 
a recent trend has emerged within the literature that expanded the analysis to include the 
                                                 
60 The conventional approach of poverty simply constitutes the failure to obtain a minimum acceptable 
level of income necessary to meet a given level of consumptions – which is established through a 
―poverty line‖. This indicates that those individuals or households are considered poor who grossly failed 
to attain the given level of income and therefore fall below the poverty line (Ravallion, 1992). 
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ethical, social considerations (Dasgupta, 1993; Sen, 1999; 1993) and democratic and 
community elements (Chambers, 1994, 1995; 1998; Duraiappah et al., 2005). Since the 
1990s these approaches have been used by many organisations
61
 and researchers in 
poverty assessment in Pakistan.  According to this approach poverty is chiefly caused by 
socio-economic and political constraints. The poor and marginalised social and ethnic 
groups are barred from taking an active and productive part in social, political and 
economic endeavours. Such restrictions not only dent the social and ethical well-being 
of the poor, it also reduces or completely prevents the poor from having access to 
opportunity and economic progress (Novak, 1996).  
As we noted from the chapter 2 the participatory approach is linked with the income or 
consumption approach: it incorporates the ‗power of consumption‘ or ‗having a decent 
income‘ in its broader definition. Gazdar (1999) in explaining the rationale in using 
income or consumption based poverty and connecting it to the participation approach 
argues: ―the original arguments behind income – or consumption – based approaches 
was that they are proxies for capturing precisely this ability of individuals to participate 
freely and with dignity in the affairs of the community, and to achieve objectives might 
have reason to value‖ (Gazdar, 1999: 244). This approach of poverty, therefore, allows 
institutions or government agencies to address the areas that potentially restraint the 
poor from participating in social processes and economic mobility.   
Sen (1992) argues that the participation-based approach of poverty enables us to identify 
the causes which create poverty and consequently help in suggesting possible remedies 
for it. This approach of course is very popular among the development economists and 
public policy designers in many developing countries including Pakistan. In Pakistan, 
for example, both private and public sectors‘ financial institutions are encouraged to 
extend micro-credits to the poor to enable them to have access to formal credit market 
and hence participate freely in economic activity (Stevens et at., 1976; WB, 1995; Zaidi 
1999b).  
                                                 
61 The World Bank (1995; 2003; 2005) and the UNDP (2003) in their respective poverty assessment 
report on Pakistan include social (non-income) indicators such as education and healthcare alongside per 
capita income. 
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Another challenge to the poor in Pakistan (as in many developing countries) that is not 
taken into account in income or consumption assessment is the ‗inability of the poor to 
read and write‘. In other words, Pakistan has been facing an acute form of poverty 
which is ―illiteracy.‖ Moreover, poor health and prevalence of various diseases are 
widely considered as another form of poverty that Pakistan has seriously been suffering 
endlessly. Illiteracy and poor health are regarded as the underlying causes in hindering 
the poor from participating freely and actively in social and economic affairs.  
These drawbacks are partially due to certain social, political and religious taboos that are 
ingrained in Pakistan‘s entire fabric. For example women, by and large, are excluded 
from socio-economic participation. The participatory approach takes into account these 
socio-cultural and political issues while defining poverty (Dreze and Sen, 1989; Haq, 
1997). 
In Pakistan the majority of the poor live in rural areas and around 70% (FBS, 2009) 
rural labour force are associated with agricultural sector. Moreover, a greater part of this 
labour is ―bonded labour‖ (Zaidi, 2001). The emancipation of bonded labour from the 
stranglehold of feudal lords certainly allows the poor to engage in labour markets freely 
as active and autonomous participants. And free participation of the labour force, 
therefore, is a necessary if not sufficient condition to allow the poor to escape from the 
poverty. Both participatory and Sen‘s capability approaches incorporate the availability 
of free labour market to the poor in their poverty analysis.  
As shown in chapter 2 a crucial yardstick of participation or capability and functioning 
approach to poverty is the active participation of the poor in political matters. It is worth 
spelling out that Pakistan, notwithstanding having all the socio-economic and political 
aspects of poverty, the poverty specialists and the economists have restricted their focus 
to the monetary approach only. In doing so, they have failed to offer a comprehensive 
and workable explanation of poverty in Pakistan. 
It is suggested that research on poverty and poverty related issues should not be 
confined only to the conventional income or consumption analysis. Instead, it needs to 
be expanded to incorporate social, economic and political aspects of poverty to facilitate 
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the engagement of the institutions that are crucial for poverty eradication. Literature on 
poverty in Pakistan, as we shall endeavour to demonstrate in the remainder of this 
chapter, leaves out of the analysis some basic issues. These include such issues as 
education, health and local infrastructure couple with the corresponding public 
expenditure on these sectors. Albeit, the calculation and measurement of poverty using 
primary or secondary data based on any approach is out of the scope of this 
dissertation
62
, however, we consider and analyse health and education as key poverty 
dimensions. We also study the impact of public sector expenditure on social sector 
(particularly health and education) and its consequences on poverty.  
Pakistan unlike India and other such developing countries neither publishes poverty data 
regularly nor endorses an official Poverty Line - except for the Planning Commission‘s 
provided headcount poverty data for some years - that may be used by academicians and 
researchers as reference point. This underlines the fact that poverty has not been a 
priority of both central and provincial governments. Another fundamental reason for not 
publishing and regularly updating poverty data may be to escape from the expected 
criticism and wider debate on the status of the poor and performance and criticality of 
certain poverty alleviation programmes launched by government(s). In other words, 
successive governments placed less or no priority on poverty alleviation. Hence, having 
officially endorsed poverty data may invite much criticism from anti-poverty agencies 
and organisations that have an influence on public debate.   
5.2   INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND GOVERNANCE IMPACT ON POVERTY  
For rapid reduction in poverty, high and sustained economic growth is obviously 
essential but that alone is not a sufficient condition. To make the economic growth pro-
poor certain institutional constraints need to be removed. For example investing in the 
health sector has direct ramifications on poverty reduction. Pakistan‘s performance on 
health has not been remarkable. Widespread illness and prevalence of diseases are still 
very common, particularly amongst the low-income strata and the poor. PIDE‘s (2001) 
estimates demonstrate that around 65% of extremely poor are suffering from 
                                                 
62
 This study, instead, uses poverty line calculated by numerous authors and institutions (all of them are 
discussed later in this chapter).  
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deteriorating health and illness. Hussain (2008) believes that the high prevalence of 
diseases is a core reason for pushing those into below the poverty line who would hardly 
manage to survive at the threshold of poverty line as well as puts the already poor and 
marginalised into a deeper poverty trap. That is because the soaring medical cost not 
only exhausts the already meager resources of the poor but forces them to borrow from 
informal lenders and consequently remains indebted for a good part of their lives. Poor 
health condition and incidence of preventable diseases is potentially due to the 
negligence of both the federal and provincial governments to this sector. It is best 
reflected in the share of health to GDP and per capita heath expenditure data that we 
showed in table 3.9, chapter 3.  
Another key sector that has a strong impact on poverty is the education. Sen (1999) 
considers education is an essential part of human freedom and capability. These are 
crucial elements for emancipating the poor from the vicious circle of poverty. Therefore, 
investment on education would have significant impact on poverty reduction. But 
paradoxically, like healthcare the public spending on education has been very low in 
Pakistan, in comparison to many developing countries (for example, Iran, India, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Bangladesh and Malaysia
63
). Pakistan‘s expenditure on education 
(as% of GDP) is the lowest. Since education is the key driver of human resource and 
other socio-economic development, the weak state of education is generally perceived as 
the main cause of poverty in Pakistan.   
Mughal (2007) shows that, in Pakistan an additional year of schooling augments the 
average earning of workers by 7.3%. Similarly, individuals with 10 years of schooling 
have 37% more earnings than those without schooling. Furthermore, an additional year 
of education attainment in primary, secondary and higher level respectively increases 
the earnings of individuals by 3%, 5% and 7.1% to 8.2%. These evidences highlight the 
vitality of education in increasing the productivity of the poor and the poverty 
reductions. Despite the importance of education to empower the poor socially and 
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 These countries respectively spend 5.2%, 3.3 %, 4.5%, 5.2%, 2.6% and 4.7% of their GDP on 
education. While, Pakistan Spends 2.1% of her GDP on education (World Bank, 2011, and Pakistan 
(2009-10) 
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economically, Pakistan failed to provide education to a very large part of population and 
the majority of them are poor. For instance, Pakistan‘s interim PRSP (2001) estimates 
show that in poor households only 27% of head of families are literate against 52% in 
non-poor households. Compared to other South Asian countries, the poor quality and 
low quantity (in terms of gross and net enrolments) of education - in both lower and 
higher education - suggest a low priority given to education. And the low priority and 
lack of interest in allocating public resources to the healthcare and education sectors are 
the significant structural constraints that prevent the poor from increasing their 
productive capacity, and impede them from social and political empowerment.  
The allocation of public service expenditure is determined by a specific class (military, 
civil bureaucracy, feudal lords and high businessmen), which does not display any 
appetite or has least priority on mass education. That is because the structure of power 
politics in Pakistan is such that the public expenditure is dominated by military 
expending and other such expenditures that patronise the elites and their associates at 
the expense of public sector. Authoritarian power structure in the country always fears 
mass education as a potential threat to their hold onto the reins of power.     
Corruption is thought to be another determinant that adversely impacts on poverty in 
many ways. Susan (1999) suggests that high levels of corruption distorts investment 
confidence and weakens economic growth. Krueger (1974) asserts that corruption 
intensifies income inequality through economic and social distortion from which the 
powerful groups will benefit at the expense of marginalised ones. Similarly, Johnston 
(2000) shows that corruption adversely affects the governance by eroding the political 
institutions‘ capability and discourages people‘s participation in democratic processes. 
Ahmed (2001) states that in South Asian countries including Pakistan poor governance 
appears to be a stumbling block that hinders the efforts in reducing poverty.  
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Table 5.1: Selected Governance Indicators    
                 (In Percent) 
Year Rule of 
Law 
Control of 
Corruption 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Voice of 
Accountability 
Political 
Stability 
1996 40.2 29.2 42.2 28.8 21.8 
1998 34.2 33.6 35.2 36.4 25.8 
2000 35 31.2 39.4 18.6 32.4 
2002 35 33 38.6 27.6 19.8 
2003 36.2 34 39 26.4 18.4 
2004 33.4 28.4 39.6 23.8 16.6 
2005 33.8 29.8 39.4 25.4 16.4 
Source: Kaufmann, et al. (2005 &2006), and Haq and Zia (2009) 
Table 5.1 summarises the governance related indictors where we observe that score of 
corruption has deteriorated overtime. In its 2007 survey report, Transparency 
International (TI) places Pakistan among the top most corrupt countries in the world. 
According to the report corruption and bribery have increased sharply in Pakistan over 
the years. For instance, in order to get a public service done one has to pay 30% more 
bribe in 2007 compare to 2006 for the same level of service (TI, 2007). Hussain (2008) 
believes that poor are forced to pay more bribes to achieve any public service. For the 
influential and affluent people this does not apply with the same magnitude: they would 
obtain the same or better social service without paying any bribe. Such phenomenon, 
consequently, worsens the income distribution between the rich and the poor and will 
result in more poverty.  
Similarly, as elsewhere poverty in Pakistan cannot be judged by looking only at the lack 
of resources. It also occurs when the people are denied the opportunity to employ their 
potential abilities and skills. This phenomenon traps the marginal community into a 
power structure, which is dominated and controlled by ‗powerful elite‘. This leads to 
weaken the public institutions, distorts the law and justice and social services delivery 
mechanism. If such a situation persists it is hard for the poor and marginalised 
communities to get rid of poverty trap. That is because exclusion and absence of 
democratic participation are the main characteristics of poverty in general.  
In a non-democratic society the poor are normally voiceless. It is highly likely that 
whatever decisions are made pertaining to public affairs do not reflect the concerns and 
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predicaments of the poor. On the contrary, it may be argued that in a democracy such 
hurdles to poverty reduction may be removed by empowering the poor through a 
participatory process. Ismail (1998) and Ismail and Rizvi (2000) compare the 
performance of both democratic and autocratic regimes in Pakistan since its 
independence. They conclude that although economic growth rate has remained higher 
during dictatorial rules, yet, they have bad record of developing and improving the 
human capital. On the contrary, during democratic dispensations human and social 
services sectors received better attention in terms of public investment as the latter 
governments are more accountable to the people. 
5.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS ON POVERTY FROM 1947 TO 2009  
This section briefly but concisely presents and analyses the impact of various policies 
launched and implemented by different governments – both dictatorial and apparently 
democratic or quasi-democratic – on the poor and their (in)effectiveness in reducing 
poverty in a chronological order starting from 1947 when the country came into being.   
The first eleven years (1947-1958) is thought to have been the formative period of 
Pakistan. The political and economic developments during this period were very 
instrumental in defining poverty trends for the later decades to come. The major failure 
of this period was to ignore the evolution of democratic institutions, provision of social 
services, particularly education and healthcare, decentralising the governance and 
changing the nature of agricultural land ownership. The negligence of the education 
sector and other social services led to human resource and development deterioration 
that caused more poverty. Moreover, highly symmetric land ownership predominately in 
rural areas put the majority of rural poor in the vicious circle of poverty, as the majority 
of rural poor were directly or indirectly associated with the agricultural sector in 
Pakistan. Thus, it may be argued that political, economic and social developments of 
early years laid down the foundation of the nature and trends of poverty in the country 
for the later years to follow.  
After 1958 the country witnessed a profound performance of both industrial and 
agricultural growth that enhanced per capita income. In first five years of 1960s the 
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large scale manufacturing sector witnessed an impressive growth, whereas, the 
agriculture after medium growth rate during the same period, gathered its growth 
momentum and showed a high growth in second leg of the decade (1965-70) (see table 
5.2). 
Table 5.2: Average Annual Growth Rates of Key Sectors between 1960 1970     
                  (In Percent) 
Growth rates 1960 to 1965 1965 to 1970 
Manufacturing sector  16.9 9.9 
Agricultural sector  3.7 6.3 
Per Capita Income 3.5 3.7 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey (various issues) 
 
Notwithstanding, while the regime had a clear approach and professional competence to 
the economic management, and somehow commanded the required efficiency to its 
economic plans, it was extremely indifferent to income distributional issues and paid 
insufficient attention to social sector development. As a result, with fairly steady and 
rapid economic growth income inequality and poverty rose to a record high. Highly 
skewed economic policies brew a social and political discontent related to the issues of 
poverty and income disparities played a central role in downfall of the government and 
nullified its economic model. Khan (1972) using the nominal wages and prices data 
suggests that real wages in industrial sector also declined in the same period. Supporting 
the same argument Naseem (1977) indicates that the real wage in agriculture in this 
period has declined despite the rise of per capita income. Similarly, Griffin and Khan 
(1978; 2000) suggest that the wages of the industrial workers fell by 12% between 1954 
and 1967. According to the World Bank (1973) Pakistan is the worst country in Asia in 
terms of percentage of national expenditures on education, health and local 
infrastructure that resulted into high population growth, rising poverty and inequality 
across region and class.  
The decade of 1970s started with a new democratically elected dispensation that 
launched nationalisation of capital and intermediate goods producing industrial units, 
rice husking and cooking oil (Burki, 1980; Aziz, 2009).  The economic reforms of 1970s 
left a significant impact on redistribution of national income and poverty. Another major 
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development of this period was the emergence of trade unions in large public sector 
organisations that provided the workers a platform to strength their financial and 
political power. Moreover, in 1970s a large land reform was launched to redistribute 
land to the landless peasants and farmers. That land reform albeit failed to bring a 
change to the political economy of agrarian relations that could herald the economic 
empowerment of peasants and rural poor, it improved the living conditions of the poor 
in rural areas of Sindh and Punjab by giving them land ownership. In addition to the 
domestic reforms and their subsequent impact of poverty and inequality, the Z.A. 
Bhutto
64
 regime opened up a window of opportunity for Pakistani workers to the oil rich 
Middle East countries. This economic openness fundamentally brought a positive 
change to the livelihoods of thousands of the poor and low income households, who 
started receiving remittances from the Middle East (Burki, 1988; Gazdar, 1999).  
The economic reform of 1970s received strong criticisms from some quarters (Burki, 
2006; Aziz, 2009 among others) for its economic inefficiency and mismanagement.  
However, it should be mentioned that during the same decade the country has succeeded 
in reducing poverty and income inequality, despite experiencing sluggish economic 
growth.  
The key development in political economy of Pakistan in 1980s was the shift from the 
state intervention in economic affairs to economic liberalism. This period is regarded by 
many including Burki (1993; 2006); World Bank (1995); Naseem (2008); Aziz (2009) 
as a fundamental step towards economic growth and poverty reduction. The average 
GDP growth remained at 6.5% compare to 4.8% in preceding decade and relative 
reliance of the economy moved away from the agriculture sector to the industrial sector 
(Pakistan, various issue).  
As was stated a moment ago Pakistan‘s economy witnessed a relatively high growth 
rate, declining poverty trend and a rising living standard in the 1980s. But it is worth 
bearing in mind that many exogenous events at domestic and international front played a 
key role for the economic and social development of 1980s. For instance, the impacts of 
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 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was the prime minister and the chairman of the ruling party, Pakistan People‘s 
Party, when these reforms were launched in 1970s.  
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the heavy economic projects undertaken in 1970s, workers‘ remittances65 and the 
positive economic shocks at external front are important to note. In particular, the 
Afghanistan war played a significant role in explaining economic growth and poverty 
reduction in 1980s. However, in subsequent decades, Afghan war‘s fallout equally 
played a major role in social and economic destruction that caused more poverty.   
In 1990s the country faced several social and economic problems that not only adversely 
affected economic growth and created macroeconomic imbalances but also caused 
increasing poverty (Gazdar, 1999). The 1990s also witnessed a rising involvement of the 
IMF and the World Bank. Syeed and Ghaus (1996) and Bangali and Ahmed (2002) 
believe that the structural adjustment programmes launched with the help of the IMF 
caused an adverse impact on poverty, income inequality and human development. 
However, the involvement of the World Bank and the IMF brought a new debate on 
poverty by emphasizing on ‗participation-based‘ and ‗women empowerment 
approaches‘ to poverty.  
During 1999-2008 the country witnessed a significant decline in poverty, a high 
economic growth and increase in non-interest and non-defense spending (FBS 2005; 
2008; Pakistan, various issues). According to the official statistics the incidence of 
poverty reduced from 31.6% in 2001 to 25.4% in 2005, and in 2008 it further came 
down to 17.5%  (FBS, 2008; Pakistan, 2007-08). During the same period (2001-2008) 
the average economic growth rate remained above 6%. Non-defence public expenditure 
- particularly on education, health, rural electrification, irrigation and roads - has 
increased by 50% in real term compare to the previous decade (Burki, 2006; Hasan, 
2006; and Pakistan, 2009-10). The pro-poor expenditure has risen considerably over 
these years from 3.1% of GDP in 1999-00 to 7.46% of GDP in financial year 2008-09 
(see table 5.3). Looking at the aforementioned statistics on can easily notice that the 
social and development expenditures undertaken by both federal and provincial 
governments seemed to be effective in reducing poverty.  
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 In 1983, the peak year of worker remittances, it contributed one tenth of GDP of Pakistan and was one 
of the highest foreign exchange sources (Pakistan, various issues).  
 169 
 
Table 5.3: Social Sector and Poverty Related Expenditure         
                         (Rupees in Billion)                                                                                                                                           
Sectors 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 
community Services 9.06 10.55 11 16.57 28.53 41.71 63.59 76.6 104.5 121.8 
I. Road,  & buildings 4.5 5.45 6.3 13.15 22.75 35.18 35.25 60 85 99.6 
II. Water supply and san 4.56 5.1 4.6 3.42 5.78 6.53 10.34 16.6 19.5 22.2 
Human Development 67.51 67.977 86.8 103.9 130 152.9 191.1 222.2 257 330 
1.    Education  50.98 52.1 66.3 78.61 97.69 116.87 141.7 162.8 187.7 240.4 
II. Health  15.98 15.21 19.21 22.37 27 31.42 39.2 53.2 62.4 83.7 
III. Population Planning 0.55 0.667 1.33 3.12 4.68 4.57 10.23 7 6.7 5.3 
Rural Development 9.94 14.364 24.3 34.18 44.6 59.69 78.52 101.8 152 136 
I. Agriculture 3.58 4.2 10.13 15.54 22.5 37.87 59.82 74.8 122.9 88.9 
II. land Reclamation 0.56 0.954 1.9 1.8 2 2.11 2.67 2.3 3.1 2.7 
III. Rural Development 5.8 9.21 12.33 16.88 18.6 15.35 15.04 22.2 22.8 16.3 
IV. Rural electrification         1.42 4.35 1 2.5 2.7 28 
Safety Nets 3.339 4.376 11 27.11 16.9 11.34 36.12 18.72 436 276 
I. Subsidies 2.65 3.21 4.3 10.9 8.51 5.35 6.02 5.5 398.5 220.6 
II. Social Security & 
Welfare   
3.7 13 4.1 2 7.6 4.4 22.5 29.1 
III. Food Supply 
Programme 
0.689 1.166 2 2 2.8 2.7 3.1 3.5 4.3 12.4 
IV. Peoples Works 
Programme 
    0.8 0.8 0.6 0.08 0 0.02 1.9 3.3 
V. Natural Calamities     0.2 0.4 0.5 0.9 19.1 5 7.4 10 
VI. Low Cost Housing     0 0.01 0.42 0.31 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 
Governance  28.43 26.68 33 38.9 41.84 50.52 65.21 78.1 94 113.9 
I. Law and Order 27.23 25.65 31 36.7 39.4 47.41 59.57 73 88 104.7 
II. Administration of 
Justice 
1.2 1.03 2 2.2 2.44 3.11 5.64 5.1 6 9.2 
Total 118.27 
123.94
7 
166.1 220.7 261.3 316.16 4346 
497.4
2 
1042 977 
AS % of GDP 3.1 2.9 3.8 4.33 4.6 4.8 5.6 6.7 9.7 7.46 
 Pakistan (2009-10) and Federal Budget Documents (various years) 
  
 
Though the incidence of poverty has reduced as claimed by officially provided data but 
the real challenge, the political structure of the country towards the poor, remained 
unaddressed. Another major concern was the increasing income inequality during the 
same period. Table 5.4 shows both Gini-Coefficient and higher to lower consumption 
quintiles ratio. These ratios were used to measure the income inequality. Data suggest 
that the income equality situation has worsened during this period.   
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Table 5.4: Gini Coefficient and Consumption Share by Quintiles 
Thus, the serious problem encountering the poor in Pakistan is the increasing economic, 
social and political inequality, which provides little or no opportunity to the poor to 
come out of the ―poverty trap.‖ It is plausible to argue that the current political power 
and asset ownership structure and weak and inefficient tax infrastructure unable to 
mobilise enough resources to fund the poverty related projects are the fundamental 
causes of poverty and inequality in Pakistan. 
5.4 MEASUREMENTS AND TREND OF POVERTY IN PAKISTAN: A CRITICAL 
REVIEW 
 
Poverty alleviation has remained a critical challenge for Pakistan. Various factors, such 
as income inequality, lack of resource ownership, unemployment and underemployment, 
inadequate social service provision and poor governance have contributed to the 
persistent poverty, as we presented in preceding section. This section critically evaluates 
the trend of poverty that has prevailed since 1960s and examines various measurement 
techniques and approaches used by various studies to determine poverty.  
Our analysis of measurement of poverty of both monetary and non-monetary 
approaches, geographical location of the poor (rural or urban) and poverty trend 
overtimes is begun from 1960s when the first National Sample Survey (NSS) dataset 
was made available in 1960-61. The second NSS was conducted in 1961-62. In 1963-64 
the NSS was replaced by Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES). And till 
 PIHS 2001-02 HIES 2004-05 PSLM 2005-06 PSLM 2007-08 
 Urban Rural Pak Urban Rural Pak Urban Rural Pakistan Urban Rural Pak. 
GINI  0.32 0.23 0.27 0.33 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.24 0.3 0.32 0.25 0.29 
Consumption share by Quintiles (%)         
Quintile 1 5.3 12.8 10.1 4.8 12.6 9.5 4.5 13.5 9.6 5 13.1 2.2 
Quintile 2 8.1 16.9 13.7 7.6 17.1 13.2 8.2 16.8 13.1 9.1 16.1 13.3 
Quintile 3 12.1 1 16.8 11.6 19.7 16.4 11.1 20.1 16.2 11.7 19.6 16.4 
Quintile 4 19.4 22.4 21.3 18.3 23 21.4 17.8 23 20.8 19.6 22.1 21.1 
Quintile 5 55.1 28.4 38 57.7 27.6 39.4 58.4 26.6 40.3 54.6 29.1 39.3 
Ratio of 
Higher to 
Lower 
quintiles 
10.4 2.22 3.76 12 2.19 4.15 13 1.97 4.2 10.9 2.2 4 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan (2010-11) 
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1971-72 the Household Budget Survey (HBS) had been conducted on a regular basis. 
However, the 1970s witnessed an eight years gap, and therefore the next HIES was 
conducted in 1979 (Gazdar et al, 1994a; 1994b). In subsequent decade only two HIES 
were conducted in 1984-85 and 87-88 respectively. In the following decade, 
nevertheless, the HIES, after getting renamed to Household Integrated Economic Survey 
(HIES in 1990-91) was conducted more frequently: four HIES were carried out in 1990-
91, 1992-93, 1995-96 and in 1996-97. During last decade the household budget survey 
has been conducted in 2000-01, 2004-05, 2006-07 and as recently as in 2008-09.  
The government of Pakistan does not provide an updated official poverty line regularly; 
almost all studies on poverty applied their own method to construct the poverty line 
given the officially provided micro level dataset. Therefore, each study‘s suggested 
poverty statistics may not only vary from other related studies in magnitude, geography 
and region but also differs in terms of trend. Given the disagreement exists among the 
various poverty studies, the poverty trend analysis is a very difficult task in Pakistan.   
Initially majority of the research on poverty in the country was conducted with the 
reference to constructing a poverty line based on income or expenditure needed to meet 
the basic nutritional requirement normally 2550 calories intake per adult daily (Amjad 
and Kemal, 1997). Albeit, later on some studies have attempted to measure poverty 
applying basic need approach (these studies are discussed below). Gazdar et al (1994a) 
demonstrate that using a unique poverty line does not help in analysing poverty 
situation. However, Atkinson (1993) maintains that using a fixed poverty line has its 
merit when it is being used for political economy of public policy.  
In order to make it easier to understand the trend we segregate poverty trend over the 
decade and present it in a sequential order. The analysis is started with the review of 
studies which used various HIES datasets collected in 1960s (1993-64, 19966-67, 1968-
69 and 19969-70). Studies measure poverty on the bases of these data may be divided 
into two broader categories. First, Naseem (1973); Alauddin (1975); Mujahid (1978) use 
the fixed poverty line with the reference to the given level of income or expenditure. 
Both Naseem (1973) and Alauddin (1975) conclude that rural and urban poverty 
between 1963 and 1970 declined. Mujahid (1978), on the contrary, shows that poverty 
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during the same period has increased. He criticises the methodology used by the 
previous two authors.
66
 The second category includes Naseem (1977); Malik (1988); 
Irfan and Amjad (1984) who use the same datasets and construct the poverty line based 
on minimum nutrition requirements of 2550
67
 calories per adult person daily. Irfan and 
Amjad (1984) and Malik (1988) use basket of consumption equivalent to 2550 calories 
per adult per day and identify that poverty has increased in rural areas in Pakistan. 
Likewise, Naseem (1977) uses a consumption basket equivalent to 2100 calories reaches 
to a similar conclusion. However, Malik (1988) on the other hand suggests that poverty 
in urban areas has declined in Pakistan, though he agrees with preceding studies – 
wherein both the overall and rural poverty has increased - as indicated in table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Trends in Poverty in Pakistan 
Year Rural Areas Urban  Areas Overall 
percent of 
very poor 
household 
percent of  
poor 
household 
percent of 
very poor 
household 
percent of  
poor 
household 
percent of 
very poor 
household 
percent of  
poor 
household 
1963-64 36.79 24.69 40.88 48.89 37.69 44.05 
1966-67 43.05 49.68 37.41 45.99 41.7 48.79 
1969-70 44.24 50.76 34.09 42.55 41.78 48.77 
1979 29.23 35.19 23.64 30.95 27.75 34.07 
1985-85 24.1 29.21 19.4 25.61 22.79 28.21 
Source: Malik (1988)68 
Some disagreement exists on urban poverty trends during the Ayub 1960s government.  
There is a consensus that both rural as well as overall poverty increased in this period. 
Zaidi (1999) attributes the rising of rural poverty to the ―green revolution‖ and land 
mechanisation: it might have a positive impact on rural economy in the long run but it 
evicted a large numbers of tenants for the short period of time.  
Gazdar et al. (1994a and 1994b); Amjad and Kemal (1997); Gazdar (1999); Zaidi (1999, 
2001); Pakistan (various issues); Bengali and Ahmed (2002) among others widely 
quoted Malik‘s (1988) calculated poverty statistics in their respective poverty analyses. 
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 They did not incorporate the differences in the size of household who were from identical income 
group; thus, considered such household as poor.  
67
 The planning commission of Pakistan has endorsed 2550 calories per adult per day. Studies such as 
Malik (1988) used adult equivalence scales to balance the gender consideration.   
68
 The author used 1963-64, 1966-67, 1969-70, 1979 and 1984-85 HIES respectively to calculate the 
poverty data. 
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As suggested in table 5.5, urban poverty witnessed a decline during 1960s, whereas rural 
poverty registered an upward trend in the same period, which therefore caused the 
overall poverty to rise. 
Between 1971 and 1979 no micro-level household survey was conducted. Therefore, it 
is difficult to understand the poverty trend during this period but studies that cover 
1970s poverty profile almost all of them confirmed a declining trend. For example, 
Kruijk and Leeuwen (1985), use monthly expenditure of seven hundred rupees at 1997 
prices, conclude that poverty in both urban and rural areas has declined during 1970s, as 
indicated in figure 5.1. Likewise Malik (1988), covering urban and rural areas, observes 
a declining trend of poverty during the same period. However, unlike Kruijk and 
Leeuwen (1985), he applies per capita expenditure requires to meet 2500 calories intake 
plus non-food expenditure of total population. Irfan and Amjad (1984) use 2550 calories 
per adult for basic analysis and also use adult equivalence scales to balance the gender 
consideration. They show a similar trend result as of Kruijk and Leeuwen (1985). Their 
study, however, is limited only to rural areas of Pakistan. Nonetheless, Ali (1995), using 
utility function based concept of poverty, uncovers that poverty has increased in 1970s, 
albeit his study is restricted only in showing the overall trend ignoring the geographical 
(rural and urban) poverty trends. Similarly, authors like Zaidi (1992); Ali and Tahir 
(1999); Zaidi (1999); Bengali and Ahmed (2002); Jamal (2005; 2006); Zaman et al. 
(2010) either use calories norm or monthly expenditure method demonstrate a dramatic 
decrease in poverty in overall as well as in rural and urban areas respectively.  
Akhtar (1988) uses 1979 HIES dataset and measures the poverty and inequality based 
on poverty definition to bottom 10% compare to the top 10% of the population in terms 
of per capita expenditure. Her analysis shows that poverty in fact is a rural phenomenon 
and particularly is found in rural areas of Sindh and Punjab.   
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Figure 5.1: Trend of Headcount Ratio in Pakistan 
 
The most prominent feature regarding poverty in 1970s is that poverty reduced 
alongside income inequality. As suggested in table 5.6, income inequality, represented 
both by Gini Coefficient and income share of below 20% of population recorded a 
noticeable reduction. For instance, the income share of the lowest 20% increased from 
33.01% of total national income in 1970 to 37.16% in 1980: more than a 4 percentage 
point increment over the decade. 
For 1980s‘ poverty estimates, studies have used HIES datasets of 1984-85, 1987-88 and 
finally in 1990-91. Major studies that analysed the poverty trend during this period are 
Ahmed and Ludlow (1989); Ercelawn (1990); Malik (1992); Zaidi (1992); Devos 
(1993); Malik (1994); Gazdar et al. (1994a; 1994b); Ali (1995); Shirazi (1995); Jaffri 
(1999); Zaidi and Gazdar (1999). 
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Table 5.6: Trends of Income Inequality and Poor In 1970s 
Year 
Income share of below 20 
percent of population (%) 
Gini 
Coefficient  
Head count Poverty 
Ratio (%) 
1970 33.01 8.04 49.13 
1971 34.5 7.79 49.85 
1972 34.9 7.7 47.11 
1973 35.31 7.61 44.37 
1974 35.7 7.53 41.63 
1975 36.1 7.44 38.89 
1976 36.51 7.36 36.15 
1977 36.91 7.27 33.41 
1978 37.3 7.19 30.68 
1979 37.23 7.15 29.66 
1980 37.16 7.16 28.64 
Source:  Zaman et al. (2010) 
  
A unanimity exits almost among all studies on the declining poverty trend in 1980s. 
Ahmed and Ludlow (1989), for example, using three household budget data points 
(1976, 1979 and 1984-85) apply a consistent method in measuring poverty trend. Their 
analysis indicates that poverty has declined both in rural and urban area during early 
years of 1980s. The study shows that both rural and urban poverty declined from 41% 
and 38% in 1979 to 31% and 25% in 1984-85 respectively. Following their method, 
Gazdar (1999) uses 1987-88 HIES and 1990-91 PIES datasets discovers that rural 
headcount ratio increased to 32% in 1991from 31% in 1984-85. However, the urban 
poverty witnessed a marginal decline to 20%. Similarly, Gazdar et al. (1994a; 1994b) 
conduct a comprehensive study to examine the trend of poverty from 1984 to 1991 by 
applying mean consumption approach and adjust for prices with GDP deflator. They 
find that overall headcount poverty declined, particularly between 1984-85 and 1987-
888, as shown in table 5.7, which is somewhat surprising considering other 
macroeconomic indicators in same period.  
Moreover, extending their analysis to the provincial level, albeit covering only the rural 
areas of the provinces, Gazdar et al. (1994a; 1994b) also reveal a poverty reduction in 
all provinces. Nevertheless, the unprecedented poverty reduction in Balochistan 
province (from 55.4% in 1984-85 to 20.9% in 1990-91, a 24.4 percentage point 
reduction) raises much doubt from various quarters particularly from poverty analysts 
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(Rashid Amjad, 1994; Kemal, 2003 and 1994; Iftikhar Cheema, 2005; Cheema et al. 
2008 among many). Amjad and Kemal (1997) believe that the drastic poverty reduction 
shown for Balochistan during this period is mainly because of the data selection 
biasness in both 1984-85 and 1990-91 survey years.  
Table5.7: Percent of Population Living Below the Poverty Line Province 
 
1984-85 1987-88 1990-91 
Punjab 50.4 42.1 38.5 
Sindh 45.3 34 30.8 
KPK 46.2 38.3 40.4 
Balochistan 55.4 44.6 20.9 
Source: Gazdar et al (1994) 
 
Malik (1988) uses 2550 calories per adult per day by regressing total required calories 
on total expenditure. He shows that both overall as well as rural and urban incidence of 
poverty declined between 1984-85 and 1987-88. However, his study illustrates that in 
second part of the decade (between 1987-88 and 1990-91) both rural and urban poverty 
increased marginally. Similarly, Amjad and Kemal (1997) use the same method that of 
Malik (1988) report a reduction in the incidence of poverty in both overall and rural and 
urban poverty respectively till 1987-88. Having an agreement with Malik (1988), Amjad 
and Kemal (1997) also conclude that poverty started increasing in last years of 1980s. 
For example, overall poverty, increased from 17.32% in 1987-88 to 22.11% in 1990-91 
(table 5.8).  
Table 5.8: Poverty Trend in Pakistan during 1980s and early 1990s 
                                                                (Percent of population living below the poverty line) 
 
1979 1984-85 1987-88 1990-91 1991-92 
Overall  30.68 24.47 17.32 22.11 22.4 
Rural areas 32.51 25.87 18.32 23.59 23.35 
Urban areas 25.94 21.17 14.99 18.64 15.5 
Source: Amjad and Kemal (1997) 
 
Likewise, Shirazi (1995) applies both 2550 calories norm and basic needs approaches 
presents that poverty between 1987-88 and 1990-91 increased in overall as well as in 
urban and rural areas. Zaidi (1992), on the other hand, uses 1984-85 data point analyses 
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the relative poverty estimation in Pakistan with income and expenditure approaches. He 
demonstrates that when resource of households are measured by expenditure the 
headcount poverty of 39% is  recorded in Pakistan - whereas the poverty figure is 43% if 
income based measurement approach is applied. To him the reason for this difference in 
poverty figure is the under-reporting of low income households in latter approach. His 
study also shows that the households headed by uneducated or semi-educated have a 
major share of poverty than the households comparatively having better education. 
Similarly, households extract their income from sectors such as agriculture mining and 
construction constitute more poverty than their counterparts in other sectors. Finally, he 
illustrates that among relative poverty the Punjab being the most populated, and 
Balochistan being the largest but least populated province among all provinces, are the 
richest and the poorest province respectively.  
Ercelawn (1990) applies 1984-85 HIES micro dataset, measures a poverty line based on 
monthly expenditure that is sufficient to meet 2550 calories per adult daily. He measures 
and analyses the incidence of poverty at both national and provincial levels. He finds out 
that the overall headcount poverty in the mid of 1980s remains 20% of total households, 
while in rural Sindh and Punjab the poverty rate is 21% and for Balochistan and KP he 
reports 30% and 31% respectively.  (10% poverty in KP is astonishing for many poverty 
specialists given the socio-economic structure of the province). However, Cheema‘s 
(1995) study uses 1984-85, 1987-88 and 1990-91 data points with the application of 
utility function based concept of poverty concludes an increasing trend of overall 
poverty during this period. Anwar (1996) on the contrary finds an increase of poverty 
during the same period. However, according to Jafri (1999) poverty decreased between 
1987-88 and 1990-91.   
Thus, overall the incidence of poverty during the 1980s consistently declined, as 
indicated in the figure 5.2, following the same trend of headcount poverty in preceding 
decade (1970s). 
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Figure 5.2: Incidence of Poverty Trends (1973-2001) 
(Interpolated) 
 
Most of the researches undertaken during 1990s in order to assess the nature and extent 
of poverty used multiple approaches: a departure from the decades old practice of 
income or consumption approaches of poverty line based on required calories intake. 
Three broad approaches were applied by the poverty literature to calculate the poverty in 
1990s. First approach follows the conventional way of calculating poverty and measures 
income or consumption level which is required to meet the calorific requirements of 
basic food and non-food items. While, the second approach estimates of poverty in 
1990s using basic needs approach. The third, perhaps the broader approach, is the set of 
those studies which draws the poverty line of 1990s on the basis of income level as well 
as other socio-economic and political dimensions. 
Most of the studies
69
are somewhat unanimously agreed that over the course of the 1990s 
both overall, and urban and rural poverty have increased in Pakistan. However, some 
                                                 
69
 For example, (Gazdar et al., 1994; Malik, 1994; Anwar 1996, 2005 and 2006; Sayeed and Ghaus, 1996; 
Amjad and Kemal, 1997; Ali and Tahir, 1999; Arif, 2000; FBS, 2001; Ghaus-Pasha and Jamal, 2001; Haq 
and Bhatti, 2001; World Bank 2002; Anwar and Qureshi, 2003). 
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studies like Gazdar et al. (1994a); FBS (2001); World Bank (2002) report contrasting 
outcomes. For instance, World Bank (2002) documents that till 1996-97 poverty 
decreased both in rural and urban areas. However, between 1996 and 1999 the incidence 
of poverty witnessed an increasing trend. Hence, the World Bank report (2002) 
concludes that poverty remained marginally lower by the end of 1990s compare to the 
early years (34% in 1990-91 and 32.6% in 1998-99, as shown in table 5.9). The level of 
overall poverty suggested in the World Bank Report (2002) is largely consistent with 
other studies. However, large number of studies draws an opposite result of poverty 
during 1990s.  For instance, in Anwar‘s (1996) and Anwar and Quereshi‘s (2003) works 
it is shown that poverty has increased by about 70% (from 17.26% to 30.9% in 200-0). 
Skeptics (Anwar and Qureshi, 2003; Kemal, 2003 among many) raise a serious concern 
over the methodology used by the World Bank. They are in the view that because of the 
methodological error, World Bank overestimated the poverty incidence in Pakistan in 
early years of 1990s that resultantly derived to report a decline in poverty in later part of 
the 1990s.   
Gazdar et al. (1994b) estimate poverty for five years (1987-88 to 1992-93) by using 
Ahmed‘s (1993) method of basic needs poverty line approach. They conclude that rural 
poverty has declined during this period. Extending the same analysis by including 1993-
94 HIES dataset, Jafri (1999) shows that from 1987-88 to 1990-91 headcount poverty 
witnessed a decline. During 1991-92 and 1993-94 it started increasing again. Arif et al. 
(2001) estimate overall poverty trend during 1993-94, 1996-97 and 1998-99 reveal that 
the overall poverty has gone up from 27% in 1993-94 to 35% in 1998-99, which in other 
words suggests that in the end of 1990s more than one third of Pakistani households 
were living below the poverty line. In rural areas where the incidence of poverty was 
more prevalent: virtually 40% of population was forced to live under the poverty line 
(table 5.9). 
FBS (2001) suggests two poverty lines from 1992-93 to 1998-99 and presents an 
increasing poverty trend in both cases during this period. The first poverty line is 
constructed on 2550 calories norm shows of 29.9% and 36.3% of poverty respectively in 
1992-93 and 1998-99. Whereas, the second poverty line of FBS (2001) with 2150 
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calories requirements demonstrates the incidence of poverty 23.9% in 1992-93 but 
increased to 32% in 1998-99. Although both the estimations of FBS suggest two 
different poverty estimates in terms of the incidence but both present an increasing 
poverty trend. 
Likewise, Ali and Tahir (1999) estimation shows an increase in overall poverty from 
19.18% to 27.93, rural poverty from 20.36% to 31.24%, and urban poverty from 16.65 
to 20.89% between 1987-88 and 1992-93 (table 5.9). 
 Figure 5.3: Consistent Estimates of Poverty Trends In 1990s 
 
Thus, after witnessing a decline during the 1970s and 1980s, as illustrated above, the 
poverty has returned and consistently increased in1990s as shown in figure 5.3. 
However, the World Bank‘s (2002) shows almost a consistent decline of poverty during 
1990s, which is not supported by other studies reported above. In 1990s the 
macroeconomic indicators that have potential impact on poverty have suffered, as 
shown in table 5.10. For instance, economic growth with a significant implication on 
poverty reduction remained  
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Table 5.9: Trends of Poverty in Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s 
Year Malik 
(1992) 
Gazda
r et al 
(1994) 
Anwar 
(1996) 
Amjad 
and 
Kemal 
(1997) 
Ali and 
Tahir 
(1999) 
Jafri 
(1999) 
Jamal and 
Gaus-Pasha 
(2000) 
Arif et 
al 
(2001) 
Qureshi 
and Arif 
(2001) 
FBS 
[(2001)(2550calor
ies)] 
FBS 
[(2001)(2125
calories)] 
World 
Bank 
(2002) 
Anwer 
and 
Qureshi 
(2003) 
Offical 
poverty 
Line  
Overall 
              
1987-88 13.0 
 
13.81 17.32 19.18 29.2 
     
30.7 
  
1990-91 
  
17.26 22.1 23 26.1 
     
34 
  
1992-93 
   
22.4 28.11 26.8 
   
26.6 22.2 26.7 
 
24.9 
1993-94 
    
27.93 28.7 
 
27.4 
 
29.3 25 28.6 
 
27.7 
1996-97 
      
31 29.6 
 
26.3 21.8 24 
 
24.5 
1998-99 
       
35.2 35.2 32.2 28.2 32.6 27.7 30.6 
2000-01 
            
30.9 
 
Rural 
              
1987-88 
   
18.32 20.36 29.3 
     
40.2 
  
1990-91 
   
23.59 24.49 25.2 
     
36.9 
  
1992-93 
   
23.35 30.53 24.6 
   
29.9 23.9 27.7 
 
27 
1993-94 
    
31.24 25.4 32 29.9 
 
34.7 29.7 33.4 
 
33 
1996-97 
       
31.6 
 
30.7 26 27.1 
 
28.8 
1998-99 
       
39.8 39.8 36.3 32 35.9 28.8 34.7 
2000-01 
            
34.3 
 
Urban 
              
1987-88 
   
14.99 16.65 30.3 
        
1990-91 
   
18.64 19.82 26.6 
     
30.7 
  
1992-93 
   
15.5 22.91 28.3 
   
20.7 17.7 20.8 
 
19.8 
1993-94 
    
20.89 26.9 
 
23.1 
 
16.3 13.6 17.2 
 
15.2 
1996-97 
      
27 27.4 
 
16.1 12.4 16.9 
 
14.8 
1998-99 
       
31.7 31.7 22.4 19.1 24.2 
 
20.9 
Source: Studies cited above 
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sluggish throughout the 1990s. Commodity sectors (agriculture and industry) were badly 
affected. Even agriculture sector witnessed a negative growth rate for some years. 
Inflation has increased. Workers‘ remittances decreased and public expenditures on 
social sector fallen. The bad performance of all these factors largely explains the 
increasing trend of poverty in 1990s. 
Table5.10:  Selected Indicators (Real Growth Rate and Percentage Share to GDP) 
Year 90-91  91-92 92-93  93-94 94-95  95-96  96-97 97-98 98-99 99-0  00-1 
CPI 
6 12.7 10.6 9.8 11.3 13 10.8 11.8 7.8 5.7 3.6 
GDP Growth 
4.6 5.6 7.7 2.3 4.5 4.1 6.6 1.7 3.5 4.2 3.9 
GDP (Per 
Capita) 
1.8 3.7 -0.85 1.26 3.02 2.91 -1.2 0.88 1.9 1.22 0.23 
Industry 
6.25 8.1 4.4 4.5 2.5 3.7 -0.1 6.9 4.1 1.5 7.6 
Agriculture 
4.96 9.5 -5.3 5.2 6.6 11.7 0.1 4.5 2 6.1 -2.6 
Health Exp (  
% of GDP) 
0.86 0.80 0.81 0.75 0.72 0.85 0.82 0.77 0.73 0.58 0.58 
Edu. Exp     ( 
% of GNP) 
2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 3.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.6 
Unemployme
nt rate (%) 
0.7 16.3 14 9.9 9.1 14 15.2 17.1 15 15.3 15.8 
Subsidies and 
other transfer 
(% of GDP) 
7 6 5 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 
Source: Pakistan (various issues) and SBP (2011) and WDI (2012) 
 
Pakistan (2007-08) and FBS (2007-08) suggest a substantial reduction of poverty from 
2000-01 to 2008-09. Figure 5.4 illustrates that poverty declined from 30.9% in 2000-01 
to 17.5% in 2007-08, suggesting a 13.4 percentage reduction within seven years. The 
urban poverty declined from 22% to 11.1% and rural poverty reduced from 33.3% to 
21.5%. The rural poverty fell significantly over the same period but the gap between 
rural and urban poverty remained wide. In 2007-08 rural area had almost two times 
more poor people than in urban area.  
Nevertheless, FBS‘s current households‘ budget data suggests an upswing in the 
incidence of poverty since 2007-08. This recent upsurge of poverty has largely been due 
to the steep rise of prices of petroleum products, natural gas and electricity and edible 
commodities, such as flour, sugar, oil, onions, pulses, meat and rice. The overall 
headcount poverty increased from 17.7% to 21.5% between 2007 and 2009.  
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Figure 5.4: Poverty Trends In 2000s 
 
However, the significant decline of the incidence of poverty in last decade, particularly 
during first five years of 2000s has been a major subject of debate in many circles. 
Almost 11 percentage point poverty reduction between 2000-01 and 2004-05, as 
claimed by Government of Pakistan, if true could resolve around one third of poverty 
problem in Pakistan with a very short span of time. Even fast growing countries like 
China and India with more than 8% average growth rate annually could hardly reduce 
poverty with such an unprecedented rate.    
A close look at the factors largely responsible for poverty reduction shows that such 
claims of significant poverty reduction may be exaggerated. For instance, the 
composition of economic growth between 2000-01 and 2004-05 was dominated by 
services sector, which was not pro-poor – the services sector contributes more than 60% 
of the GDP (table 5.11). Similarly, the manufacturing growth largely comes from 
automobiles, textiles and electronics subsectors that are not pro-poor. As the table 5.11 
makes it clear, the unemployment rate during the same period rose sharply from 6% in 
2000-01 to 7.69% in 2005-06, which adversely affects the poor.  
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It is important to know that in estimating the incidence of poverty government uses two 
years to compare the scale of change takes place in poverty. Firstly, a base year is 
chosen to compare another point in time and secondly the inflation is used to deflate the 
prices changes so as to make the consumption pattern constant overtime. 2000-01 is 
used as based year. Since 2000-01 was the worst year in terms of harvest that recorded a 
negative agricultural growth rate compares to 2004-05 or 2007-08 with better harvest. 
Therefore, using 2000-01 as base year would overestimate the poverty reduction (Burki, 
2006; Hasan, 2006; Hussain, 2008). 
Similarly, World Bank‘s (2007) estimates show that the overall incidence of poverty  
between 2000-01 and 2005-06 has declined from 34.4% to 29.2%: a 5.2 percentage  
reduction, against the official claim of 12 percentage point reduction. The World Bank 
(2007) criticises the use of Consumer Price Index (CPI) in official poverty estimates. 
The CPI ignores the inflation in rural areas where the majority of the poor live. Thus, 
using CPI in estimating poverty understates the actual incidence
70
 and fails to reflect the 
actual rate of increase or decrease in poverty. Similarly, Anwar (2006) applies the same 
methodology of the World Bank, proposes that from 2001-02 to 2004-05 poverty 
reduced by 5.1 percentage points. He, however, argues that despite this decline the 
absolute number of the poor in Pakistan has risen by 2.6 million during the same period. 
reduction, against the official claim of 12 percentage point reduction. The World Bank 
(2007) criticises the use of Consumer Price Index (CPI) in official poverty estimates. 
The CPI ignores the inflation in rural areas where the majority of the poor live. Thus, 
using CPI in estimating poverty understates the actual incidence
71
 and fails to reflect the 
                                                 
70
 Price changes have a significant impact in determining poverty trend. The consumption pattern of low 
income people differ largely from their high income counterpart: they spend more of their disposable 
income on necessity items compare to luxuries, whereas, the rich spend a larger proportion of their 
income on luxuries. This therefore suggests that if the prices of necessity items increase compare to 
luxury ones, the poor would be more affected than the rich (Arrow, 1958). Kakwani and Son (2006) 
construct a pro-poor index to understand that how price changes in necessary consumption items affect 
the income and distribution of income. Their estimates conclude that items like food, clothing and housing 
have price indices greater than unity, which suggests that, keeping other things constant; increase in price 
level affects the poor more than non-poor. 
71
 Price changes have a significant impact in determining poverty trend. The consumption pattern of low 
income people differ largely from their high income counterpart: they spend more of their disposable 
income on necessity items compare to luxuries, whereas, the rich spend a larger proportion of their 
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actual rate of increase or decrease in poverty. Similarly, Anwar (2006) applies the same 
methodology of the World Bank, proposes that from 2001-02 to 2004-05 poverty 
reduced by 5.1 percentage points. He, however, argues that despite this decline the  
absolute number of the poor in Pakistan has risen by 2.6 million during the same period. 
                                                                                                                                               
income on luxuries. This therefore suggests that if the prices of necessity items increase compare to 
luxury ones, the poor would be more affected than the rich (Arrow, 1958). Kakwani and Son (2006) 
construct a pro-poor index to understand that how price changes in necessary consumption items affect 
the income and distribution of income. Their estimates conclude that items like food, clothing and housing 
have price indices greater than unity, which suggests that, keeping other things constant; increase in price 
level affects the poor more than non-poor. 
Table 5.10:  Selected Macroeconomic Indicators    
                                                                                  (Values expressed in percentage)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Year 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 
GDP Growth 2 3.1 4.7 7.5 9 5.8 6.8 3.7 1.2 4.1 
Agricultural 
growth 
-2.2 0.1 4.1 2.4 6.5 6.3 4.1 1 4 2 
Manufacturing 
Growth rate 
9.3 4.5 6.9 14 15.5 8.7 8.3 4.8 -3.7 5.2 
Services Sector 
Growth rate 
3.1 4.8 5.2 5.9 8.5 6.5 7 6 1.6 4.6 
Services sector 
share to GDP 
51.3 52.1 52.4 51.6 51.3 51.7 51.8 52.9 53.1 53.3 
Share of 
Industry to 
GDP 
23.8 23.7 23.6 25.5 26.3 25.9 26.3 25.8 25 25.2 
Share of 
Agriculture to 
GDP 
24.9 24.1 24 22.9 22.4 22.5 21.9 21.3 21.9 21.5 
Unemployment 
rate 
6 7.82 8.27 8.27 7.69 7.69 6.2 5.2 5.46 5.5 
Labour force 
participation 
rate 
29 28.97 29.61 29.61 30.41 30.41 32.22 32.17 32.81 32.81 
Agriculture 
share to total 
employed 
persons 
48.42 48.42 42.09 42.09 43.05 43.05 43.37 43.61 44.65 44.65 
Education 
Expenditure as 
% of GNP 
1.6 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.1 2 
Health 
Expenditure as 
% of GNP 
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 
Development 
Expenditure as 
% of GDP 
2.1 2.8 2.2 3.1 3.9 4.8 4.9 4.4 3.8 4.1 
Source: Pakistan (various issues) 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented the multiple approaches to poverty. These approaches 
include governance and institutional constraints. The chapter also described the trend 
with reference to the existing literature.   
The measurement and analysis of poverty in Pakistan has changed in recent years. 
The conventional definition and measurement of poverty is no more the focus of 
poverty analysis. Instead, more broad-based approaches like participatory approach 
are being used in studying poverty. These approaches put more emphasis on the 
institutionalisation and socio-political conceptutlisation of poverty. Although the 
poverty and inequality remained an important political issue, poverty 
reduction/alleviation per se has not been the implicit objective of various 
governments‘ macroeconomic policies. During both autocratic and democratic 
regimes poverty alleviation has not been the centre policy goals. For instance, in 
1960s despite the high economic growth rate the poverty and inequality have 
increased. The 1970s was a good decade in terms of poverty reduction but it was a 
decade that experienced relatively slow growth rate. The poverty in 1980s has 
reduced. This comparative reduction in poverty was attributed primarily to the 
structural readjustment and deregulation of markets. However, a closer look at the 
political economy unfolded during the 1980s reveals that the favourable external 
shocks have more to do with declining trend of poverty than domestic policies. 
Poverty has returned in 1990s which would substantially be the results of wrong and 
short-sighted policies pursued during 1990s. During 2000s the poverty trend had 
mixed results: decreased between 2001 and 2008, and started climbing up thereafter. 
In the following part, that contains four chapters, we develop a theoretical model and 
illustrate a framework and methodology to evaluate the empirical relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and poverty as well as fiscal decentralisation with 
healthcare, education and agriculture. 
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PART III 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF POVERTY REDUCTION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
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CHAPTER 6 
A LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING MODEL OF FISCAL 
FEDERALISM 
6.1    INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter we construct a legislative bargaining model and examine comparative 
efficiency of upper tier and lower tier systems of government for the supply of public 
goods under a game theory frame work. The model specifically looks at the role of 
federal transfers in poverty reduction under fiscal federalism. We postulate that in 
fiscal federalism environment where the legislative assemblies (either federal/central 
or provincial/state) are represented by members, representing their respective sub-
national jurisdictions (provincial or local). The model shows that in bargaining game 
framework a legislative body would involve in such a game where the end result is 
the efficient allocation of public resources among the federal decision making at the 
bargaining equilibrium, the ratio of local/subnational expenditure to total expenditure 
is increasing in the federal transfer ratio. The model predicts that federal transfers 
help in reducing poverty. Since the federal transfers increase the fiscal 
decentralisation hence the model demonstrates that fiscal decentralisation and 
poverty are negatively correlated.  
To make the argument as clear as possible, we assume that the conventional 
argument (see for example: Cremer and Palfrey, 1996; Alesina and Spolare, 1997; 
Bolton and Roland, 1997; Ellingsen, 1998; Lockwood, 2002; Oberholzer-Gee and 
Strumpf, 2002; Besley and Coate, 2003), fiscal federalism of spill over across the 
provinces/districts does not work. Moreover, the voter difference in electing the 
representatives from the districts or provinces for provincial and federal legislative 
assemblies is homogeneous; i.e. there are no voter preferences across the provinces 
or districts. Thus, the outcome between national and subnational government is 
entirely due to the bargaining game that would take place in legislative assembly.  
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This issue is important for several reasons. Most importantly, there is a common 
believe that fiscal and political federalism is a key reform for the better social service 
delivery, because it not increases the accountability of local representatives to their 
voters, but equally the local politicians due to their proximity to locality can better 
identify and locate the economic projects that can suffice to the public needs and 
interest (Bahl and Martinez-Vasquez, 2006; Hindrisk and Lockwood, 2009). 
Moreover, the model aims to fill a gap in the theoretical literature that we believe is 
quite sizeable. We understand that there is no existing work that assess the economic 
outcome and enhances the public spending, particularly on those sectors which 
potentially have a sizeable affect on the poor, in a political economy setting. So the 
key objective of this model is to contribute to the existing theoretical literature of 
fiscal and political federalism by achieving this overarching goal. Our model is a 
static model with one period, tow provinces of a federation and each province 
contains two districts. The districts are asymmetric; that is they not equal in size and 
population. 
The scheme of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 sets the framework of the model 
with representative individuals who consume private and public goods and supply 
labour to the labour market. The private consumption emanates from net income 
(after paying federal taxes) and federal transfers that is distributed by the 
provincial/district governments to their respective residents. Only the federal 
government collects taxes and passes on a part of that to the provincial governments. 
Section 6.3. describes the economic equilibrium of the representative individuals 
given the public and private goods, federal transfers and tax rates. Section 6.4 
illustrates the government budgets equilibrium, where it is shown that the federal 
government gathers taxes from individual wage incomes and distributes it to the 
provincial governments along with federal transfers. Subsequently, the provincial 
governments distribute these resources among districts, which are used for both 
development expenditures and public goods provision. Section 6.5 of this chapter 
provides the bargaining game framework in the provincial legislation, where it is 
assumed that the districts are not homogenous in size hence the larger district would 
initiate the project move. This shows equilibrium where the districts reach to a 
strategic position to get an efficient equilibrium. The last section gives a framework 
for decision making at federal legislature in which it is illustrated that in the 
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bargaining game among the legislatures reach to equilibrium the federal transfer is 
increasing. Since the ratio of subnational expenditures to total expenditures (fiscal 
decentralisation) is increasing in the federal transfers, so the poverty decreases under 
bargaining equilibrium.  
6.2  THE FRAMEWORK  
Consider an economy where there are two provinces, A and B, and two districts, 
i={1,2}, within each province. Individuals differ in their inherent labour 
productivity, denoted si, and distributed according to the density function γi(s). An 
individual‘s wage rate, wisi, is linear in the productivity parameter. An individual of 
type si, residing in district i of province A gets utility from private consumption, 
ci(si) and a district specific public good, Gi, and disutility from labour supply ℓi(si). 
For simplicity we assume Cobb-Douglas preferences: 
     iiiiiii Gsscsu ln)(1ln)(ln)(ln                   (6.1) 
We denote the B district with ~, i.e. the utility of a type-s individual in district i of 
province B is: 
     iiiiiii Gsscsu
~
ln)~(
~
1ln)~(~ln)~(~ln        (6.1‘) 
An individual of type si, in district i of province A receives after-tax wage income, a 
federal  resource transfer, b, which is used for private consumption: 
bsswsc iiiiii  )()1()(                      (6.2) 
Where τ is the federal income-tax rate. Consequently, in province B: 
bsswsc iiiiii  )
~(~~)1()~(~             (6.2‘) 
We will suppress the ~ when there is no ambiguity, i.e. we do the derivations for 
province A, and can always obtain the corresponding quantities for province B by 
adding ~. 
We assume the district specific wage rate is linear in that district‘s development 
expenditure, Di, and that the ‗base wage‘, w, is the same across districts, i.e. 
ii wDw          (6.3) 
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ii Dww
~~          (6.3‘) 
6.3   ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM 
Maximising (6.1) s. t. (6.2) gives the labour supply function and the corresponding 
indirect utility: 
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where 

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
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1
b
        (6.6) 
6.4   GOVERNMENT BUDGETS 
Each province is given a budget, R and R
~
, by the federal government to use on 
development expenditure and the public good in each of the two districts: 
 
2121 GGDDR        (6.7) 
2121
~~~~~
GGDDR        (6.7‘) 
The federal government collects tax revenue from wage income and distributes it to 
provinces as well as providing the federal transfers: 
 2121
~~~~
YYYYbNNbRR       (6.8) 
where 

s
iiii dsssswDY )()(        (6.9) 
etc. 
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6.5   THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING GAME 
We assume a simple alternating offer bargaining game, as in Marsiliani and 
Renström (2007). Take province A, with two elected representatives (type *1s and
*
2s
). If district 1 is the larger district, we assume district 1 makes the first offer. District 
2 can accept or reject. If district 2 rejects, then one representative is picked at 
random to make the final offer (the game could be extended to several rounds 
without altering the qualitative properties). In the last round if district i is picked to 
make the final offer, it will maximise its own utility subject to (6.7), implying setting 
Dj=Gj=0. Maximising (6.5) subject to (6.7) gives the optimal level of development 
expenditure and of the public good when all the budget is used in district i, and the 
resulting indirect utility: 
4
)(1 Rm
RD ii

                   (6.10) 
4
)(3 Rm
RG ii

        (6.11) 
      2*32*
,
* 16)1())(1()(3)(max,,,  iiiii
GD
i wsRmRmRsURwsV
ii
  
          (6.12) 
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Rws
Rm
i
i *
81)(

                                (6.13) 
If district 2 is not chosen in the last round, then since G2=0, it follows V2=0. If 
district 2 is chosen in the last round, utility is given by (6.13). Denote the probability 
that district 1 is chosen with p, then expected utility of district 2 to enter the last 
round is 
    2*22
3
2
2
2 16)1())(1()(3)1()]([
 wsRmRmRpRVE   (6.14) 
Thus, district 2 accepts any proposal that satisfies 
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When district 1 makes the first offer it maximises own utility subject to (6.15) and 
subject to (6.7). 
Notice that this problem can be written as: 
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Subject to 
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The first-order conditions imply that (6.9), (6.10), and (6.11) hold for the respective 
district evaluated at R1 and R2 respectively. R2 is chosen at the level where (6.17) 
holds with equality. That is: 
4
)(1 ii
ii
Rm
RD

        (6.18) 
4
)(3 ii
ii
Rm
RG

        (6.19) 
      2*2
32* 16)1())(1()(3,,,  iiiiiii wsRmRmRRwsV   (6.20) 
for i=1,2 and 
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Equations (6.18)-(6.21) completely characterise the bargaining equilibrium as a 
function of the provincial budget, R, and the federal tax rate, τ, and the benefit rate, 
θ. The same equations are obtained for province B, using the ~ notation. 
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6.6  FEDERAL DECISION MAKING 
We shall characterise the situation when one district within one province dominates 
at federal level. That is the situation where the finance minister comes from one of 
the provinces. The finance minister decides the allocation to the provinces, R and R
~
, 
taking into account the bargaining game at the provincial level, so as to maximise 
own utility. At first, it could look as if the finance minister would set R for the other 
province to zero. This is not the case, as then production would stop, and no taxes 
could be collected from that province. Instead it is optimal to maximise net tax 
revenue from the other province. Suppose the finance minister comes from province 
A, then R
~
is chosen so as to: 
  RbNYY
R
~~~~
max 21~        (6.22) 
Subject to (6.4), (6.9), (6.18), (6.21). 
The first-order condition to (6.22) gives R
~
 as a function of τ, θ, w, etc. 
R
~
= R
~
(τ, θ, w)        (6.23) 
Differentiating (6.23), and evaluating in a symmetric equilibrium (where the two 
districts within a province are equal), we obtain 
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Notice that by (6.6), b=(1-τ)θ, then 
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Where the second equality follows from (6.6), i.e. from b= (1-τ)θ, and the last 
equality from (6.24). Then we have; 
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Proposition: In the bargaining equilibrium the ratio of local expenditure to total 
expenditure is increasing in the federal transfer rate. 
Proposition implies that if the federal transfer rate, b, is larger, then the 
decentralisation measure is greater. Since a larger federal transfer rate alleviates 
poverty, we would expect poverty and expenditure decentralisation to be negatively 
related. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
7.1   INTRODUCTION  
The exiting literature, reviewed in chapters 2, 4 and 5, shows that the examination of 
the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and poverty reduction is still in its 
infancy in general and is very limited in case of Pakistan in particular. The literature 
on fiscal decentralisation and poverty is quite extensive. The two topics, however, 
have been discussed and analysed at a considerable length but separately. How do 
they interact and the impacts of one on another have not received a systematic 
empirical treatment. The empirical part of this thesis is aimed to fill this gap in 
related literature.    
This chapter lays down the methodology, describes variables and data for the 
following two empirical chapters, where we explore the empirical relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and poverty. In addition, it also develops the 
framework for empirical analysis to evaluate the effects of fiscal decentralisation on 
poverty reduction in Pakistan. We reveal the potential channels of association and 
interaction, the barriers or possible hindrance that may jeopardise the organic impact 
of fiscal decentralisation on poverty reduction strategies. 
The chapter begins by commencing with the conceptualisation of the main 
dependent variable – poverty – and explains its data sources. The core independent 
variable, fiscal decentralisation, and its data are presented in the following section. It 
proceeds by describing other controlling variables identified in the relevant literature 
as potential determinants of poverty. In the following, we describe the methodology 
for regression analyses and develop the testable hypotheses. In addition to this the 
chapter also discusses the econometric issues that we encounter while conducing 
time series and panel regression analyses respectively.  
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7.1.1  INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Following the empirical literature (Ravallion, 1992; Ravallion and Chen, 1997; 
Deaton, 2001), we use FST
72
 poverty indicators of headcount poverty, poverty gap 
and severity of poverty as independent variables in our empirical analysis. As we 
noted earlier, for some literature
73
 poverty cannot be defined only by income or 
consumption deprivation of individuals or households. Instead, other socio-economic 
dimensions like education, health, political freedom and security should also be 
taken into account. Furthermore, the same literature maintains that income or 
consumption poverty is not perfectly correlated with other dimensions of poverty 
mentioned above. Therefore, it may not accurately estimate all dimensions of 
poverty. Even though the literature understands and agrees with the limitations of 
monetary definition of poverty, having the complexities associated with the 
definition of other approaches to poverty and data availability, it overwhelmingly 
focuses on the monetary measurement and uses it in its analyses. Following the 
general trend, most of the studies conducted on poverty in Pakistan use FST 
measurement technique, which we discussed in great length in chapter 5.  
To broaden the scope of the study, we follow Braum and Grote (2002) and 
Lindamen and Thurmaier (2002) and use the UNDP‘s constructed HDI as an 
indicator of poverty. Since the HDI index contains important dimensions (healthcare, 
education and per capita income) that have significant impact on poverty, therefore, 
using HDI to capture the availability and quality of public services to the poor seems 
logical and suffices to the empirical need. The HDI is inversely related to the 
poverty: an increase in index indicates a reduction in poverty. Furthermore, the index 
contains education and health dimensions which have a particular relevance to this 
study. Therefore, it provides a good representation of other variables that are used as 
good proxies of poverty. The index is free from using any arbitrary poverty line thus 
is not confined to the poor only. Instead, it presents the level of socio-economic 
development that is important in improving the living standard of the entire 
community. Considering that the fiscal decentralisation may affect poverty through 
                                                 
72
 The formulation of FST index is calculated in chapter II 
73 This includes Deaton (2001); Ravillion (2001); Srinivasan (2001) 
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various channels, the use of the HDI in our analysis may be justified that helps in 
assessing the effectiveness of fiscal decentralisation on poverty reduction outcomes. 
7.1.2 DATA STRUCTURE FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
As suggested in chapter 5, officially calculated and updated data for poverty are 
available neither at national nor at provincial levels covering the sample period 
(1975-2009). Many authors calculated poverty trends in Pakistan using the 
household budget dataset provided by the FBS. Poverty literature of Pakistan 
although gives us a general trend of poverty over the decades on which majority of 
studies are agreed with but none of them provides a coherent data series for poverty 
that can cover our sample period. Based on household budget dataset for various 
years and other relevant studies on poverty, the SPDC calculated poverty statistics of 
Pakistan since 1973, which has been used for this study. Alongside with FST indices 
a part of the HDI
74
 data are also come from the SPDC.
75
 Table 7.1 presents variables 
used to proxy the poverty and their data sources.  
Table 7.1: Dependent Variables and their Data Sources 
Independent Variables Data sources 
Overall  headcount poverty Table 3.9 and SPDC 
Headcount Rural poverty Table 3.9 and SPDC 
Urban headcount poverty Table 3.9 and SPDC 
Overall poverty gap Table 3.9 and SPDC 
Overall severity of poverty  Table 3.9 and SPDC 
Human Development Index UNDP and SPDC 
It is worth noting that, the poverty data that are used in this thesis are from secondary 
sources, particularly from social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), an 
independent research centre, and from government source [Federal Bureau of 
Statistics (FBS) and Planning Commission]. Moreover, as stated earlier, the 
government does not measure and update poverty data regularly. Poverty has been a 
thoroughly researched and discussed subject in Pakistan, but due to the 
unavailability of regular and updated data, the majority of studies measured poverty 
                                                 
74
 Since the United Nations Development Programme provides the HDI data on 1980 and afterward 
for Pakistan, we need to use the SPDC HDI prior to that.   
75
 Poverty data are reported in appendix B. 
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by using micro-survey data collected and made available by the FBS. Therefore, it is 
obvious that there is not total agreement upon the incidence of poverty in the 
country, albeit all studies more or less unanimously agreed on the trends of poverty 
as was shown in chapter 5. 
Even the reliability of the officially provided data has also been a question of debate. 
International organisations such as World Bank and Asian Development Bank – the 
former also measured poverty for some year (see table 5.9) – raised their concerns on 
the consistency of poverty figures to the actual poverty in Pakistan. Nonetheless, the 
poverty data measured by the SPDC is considered to be more consistent hence may 
be accepted with the certain degree of confidence. 
7.2 CORE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Fiscal decentralisation is our main independent variable of interest. Due to its 
multidimensional approach the measurement of fiscal decentralisation appears to be 
challenging and complex (Song, 2013). Therefore, the public finance literature has 
not been successful in reaching to a collectively agreed definition and measurement 
for it. A country may exercise a greater subnational autonomy in public expenditures 
or revenue collections, yet the absence of democratically elected subnational 
governments makes the latter accountable to central authority rather than to the local 
people. Fiscal decentralisation processes may not be meaningful without taking into 
account the magnitude of political and administrative decentralisation, which jointly 
may reflect the actual autonomy of the sub-national governments. So, it is hard to 
come up with a comprehensive measurement that would be used as the best indicator 
of fiscal decentralisation.  
Even though the conventional definition of fiscal decentralisation as the share of sub-
national governments‘ expenditure (revenue) out of the total national expenditure 
(revenue) may fail to reflect the actual fiscal autonomy of sub-national 
governments
76
 and we consider the limitations mentioned in the literature.
77
 Under 
the data limitations – as encountered by other studies on fiscal decentralisation – we 
                                                 
76
 Prude‘ home (1995) and Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) provide a rigorous discussion on this issue.   
77
Prominent examples being the work of Davoodi and Zou (1998); Huther and shah (1998); Ebel and 
Yilmaz (2002); Martinez-Vazquer and McNab (2002). Bird and Francois (1997) argue that for in 
order to capture the multidimensionality of fiscal decentralisation so as to evaluate its impact on 
poverty reduction, a broad based quantification of decentralisation is desirable. 
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are unable to provide a better alternative. Thus, following the existing studies we use 
the standard, though imperfect (as stated by Oates, 1972), measure of 
decentralisation.78    
We use the ratio of sub-national governments (provincial governments) expenditures 
and revenues to total national expenditures and revenues alternatively as our 
principal explanatory variables. Yet relying entirely on these measures to reflect the 
level and degree of fiscal decentralisation may be misleading.79As already mentioned 
the federal government undertakes a sizable part of provincial governments‘ 
expenditures and finances them through grant-in-aids or special grants. In addition, 
debt payments, particularly the foreign debts, are the responsibility of federal 
government.  
In first adjustment the debt payment is excluded from the total national expenditure 
while calculating the ratio of sub-national governments‘ expenditures out of total 
expenditures. The provincial governments receive massive amounts from the federal 
governments in terms of grants-in-aid and use it to meet its expenses.  Since it is not 
the part of the provincial governments‘ own generated revenues, to adjust for this we 
exclude grants-in-aid from the provincial governments‘ revenues while calculating 
the ratio of latter to the total national revenues. Given this, the variables we use to 
reflect the degree of fiscal decentralisation in Pakistan in our analysis are as follows: 
1. The ratio of provincial governments‘ expenditures to total national (federal 
+ provincial governments) expenditures.  
                        
                                   
                          
 
Or 
    
   
  
   
   
 
                                                 
78
Whereas, Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of International Monetary Fund provides data on 
intergovernmental resource transfers. It does not report the nature of transfers: whether its conditional 
or other grants, loans, block etc. Despite this limitation, the GFS dataset virtually excludes many 
developing countries including Pakistan in one hand and on the other hand the government of 
Pakistan provides only sketchy and restricted information regarding intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers. As a result of the unavailability of essential primary data that is required to quantify fiscal 
decentralisation led us to use the limited available data in best possible way.   
79
 For more discussion refer to Philips and Noller (1997) 
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Where,     is the expenditure fiscal decentralisation;    is the provincial 
governments‘ expenditures and     is the total national expenditures.  
2. The ratio of provincial governments‘ revenues to total national (federal + 
provincial governments) revenues.  
                        
                               
                      
 
Or 
    
   
  
   
   
 
Where   is the revenue. 
 
3. The ratio of provincial governments‘ expenditures to total national (federal 
+ provincial governments) expenditures minus debt (re)payments.  
. 
            
                                   
                                        
 
Or 
     
   
  
   
      
 
 
4. The ratio of provincial governments‘ revenues minus grants-in-aids to total 
national (federal + provincial governments) revenues. 
 
            
                                                
                     
 
Or 
     
   
         
   
 
7.2.1 DATA STRUCTURE FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
For any statistical analysis, transparent, reliable and standardised data are the most 
important and fundamental prerequisite. Nevertheless, for a time series analysis the 
availability of accurate and uninterrupted data for an extended time period is very 
often challenging even for countries with relatively developed data structure, let 
alone developing countries like Pakistan where data constraint is felt in every field. 
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Therefore, collecting and processing a reliable set of data so as to calculate fiscal 
decentralisation in Pakistan has been a challenging and daunting task for us. It is 
worth highlighting that in Pakistan accessing qualitative and factual data to measure 
fiscal decentralisation is quite a demanding and laborious job. The data gathering 
took almost a year required personal visits to various government and non-
government organisations/departments/institutions in different cities of Pakistan and 
requests the concerned officials for relevant data. Despite difficulties the gathered 
data are free from any discrepancy. Therefore, calculated dataset for fiscal 
decentralisation can also be used for future research. 
The FBS - the central agency for collecting, publishing and providing primary/raw 
(upon request) data - does not however supply any information related to fiscal 
decentralisation. Thus, for the measurement of decentralisation along with many 
other variables, it was necessary to search and identify a wide range of statistical 
publications from various organizations and government departments for data and 
other relevant information. Data that have been used to calculate fiscal 
decentralisation and fiscal autonomy came from various sources that are reported in 
table 7.2. As majority of data are not available in soft form, to convert it into usable 
shape we manually collected, integrated and finally constructed a dataset for fiscal 
decentralisation. For measuring and capturing the various dimensions of fiscal 
decentralisation we use the afore-mentioned formulations to calculate expenditure as 
well as revenue decentralisation. For the former we use the total expenditure (current 
+ development expenditures) of both federal and provincial governments; which is 
measured in terms of ratios that scale from zero to one. Higher scale shows more 
expenditure decentralization. 
As noted earlier the expenditure decentralisation is reflected by two variables: first, 
the ratio of total provincial expenditures to consolidated national expenditures; 
whereas in second the debt payments are subtracted from the consolidated 
expenditure while calculating for expenditure decentralisation ratio. The reason for 
selecting total expenditures instead of current or development expenditure alone is 
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Table 7.2: Variables Used To Calculate Fiscal Decentralisation and Their Data 
Sources 
Variables Data Sources 
Federal 
Government 
Expenditures 
Pakistan Statistical Year Book (various issues), Federal Bureau of 
Statistics Government of Pakistan; Economic Survey of Pakistan 
(various issues) Ministry of Finance Government of Pakistan.  
Provincial 
Government 
Expenditures  
Pakistan Statistical Year Book (various issues), Federal Bureau of 
Statistics Government of Pakistan; Budget Documents (various 
issues), Finance Divisions and Planning and Development 
Departments of the governments of Sindh, Punjab, KP and 
Balochistan. 
Federal 
Government 
Revenues 
Pakistan Statistical Year Book (various issues), Federal Bureau of 
Statistics Government of Pakistan; Economic Survey of Pakistan 
(various issues) Ministry of Finance Government of Pakistan. 
Provincial 
Government 
Revenues 
Pakistan Statistical Year Book (various issues), Federal Bureau of 
Statistics Government of Pakistan; Budget Documents (various 
issues), Finance Divisions and Planning and Development 
Departments of the governments of Sindh, Punjab, KP and 
Balochistan. 
Debt Payments  Pakistan Statistical Year Book (various issues), Federal Bureau of 
Statistics Government of Pakistan; Economic Survey of Pakistan 
(various issues) Ministry of Finance Government of Pakistan. 
Grants-in-Aids Pakistan Statistical Year Book (various issues), Federal Bureau of 
Statistics Government of Pakistan; Budget Documents (various 
issues), Finance Divisions and Planning and Development 
Departments of the governments of Sindh, Punjab, KP and 
Balochistan. 
GDP 
Deflator/Consumer 
Price Index 
Hand Book of Statistics of Pakistan Economy, SBP (2010). 
that in Pakistan current expenditures dominate both federal and provincial 
governments‘ total expenditures. Current expenditures largely meet wages, salaries 
and other maintenance costs. Development expenditures typically have been the 
second priority at both federal and provincial governments‘ level:  after meeting 
current expenditures funds may be allocated to development projects. Thus, 
incorporating both while measuring total expenditure decentralisation may enable us 
to assess the sub-national governments‘ autonomy in allocating resources to 
development projects along with meeting the current obligations. It is worth 
mentioning that it is the development expenditures that potentially would affect the 
living standard of the people particularly the poor and disadvantaged.  
 Our second measure of fiscal decentralisation is the revenue decentralisation. It 
helps in assessing the revenue autonomy of sub-national governments by 
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incorporating the tax and non-tax revenues designed and collected by the provincial 
governments out of total consolidated revenues. Like the expenditure 
decentralisation, the revenue decentralisation is also measured in ratio that scales 
from zero to one. Higher scale indicates greater fiscal autonomy and self-dependence 
of the provincial governments. This measurement quantifies the revenue autonomy 
of provincial governments, and indentifies which revenues are collected by the latter. 
However, it fails to reflect the provincial governments‘ autonomy in designing the 
tax-base and imposing the tax-rate. Similarly, the same measure does not quantify 
the fiscal capacity of the provincial governments. Instead, it only shows how much 
tax and non-tax revenues the provinces generate out of the total revenues. Therefore, 
it is pertinent to state that through this measure the potential financial capacity of 
provincial governments to maintain its self-sustenance may not be assessed. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of any better measurement technique for revenue 
decentralisation due to the complexities enumerated above, this measurement is used 
as the ―second best‖ in fiscal decentralisation literature. Following the same 
literature we also apply second best available techniques in our analysis.80  
7.3 OTHER EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND THEIR DATA DESCRIPTION  
Alongside fiscal decentralisation, this study also includes a range of other 
explanatory variables in order to control other social and economic factors that 
potentially affect poverty. We follow the empirical literature, discussed in chapter 2, 
and include the control variables our empirical analysis these variables that are 
presented in table 7.3 with their data sources and expected signs vis-à-vis  poverty. 
An annual-based time series and pooled dataset for the variables are used in this 
analysis. Annual data are used because majority of the variables included are related 
with public finance of central or provincial governments, which are released 
annually.  
                                                 
80
 It is worth noting that for effective fiscal decentralisation the subnational governments must be 
given maximum revenue generating autonomy in order to meet its expenditures. Pakistan exercises 
more expenditure decentralisation compare with revenue decentralisation. Thus, in order to fill the 
revenue-expenditure gap of provincial governments‘ finances, the latter have to rely heavily on 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers.   
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Table 7.3: Control Variables 
Measurements, Definitions Data Sources and Expected Sign vis-à-vis  Poverty 
Variables Measurement/Definitions Expected 
sign  
Trade Openness The ratio of export plus import to total GDP 
Data sources: Hand Book of Pakistan Economy, State Bank of 
Pakistan (2010) 
_ 
Size of the 
Government 
Total public sector expenditure as percent of GDP 
Data source: Hand Book of Pakistan Economy, State Bank of 
Pakistan (2010) 
_ 
Political rights/ 
Political 
freedom/ Rule of 
Law Index 
The index 0 scales from 7 to 1. Lesser (near to one) the scale 
suggests a greater level of political freedom in terms of free and 
fair election, political opinion making and freedom of joining 
political parties/groups of their choice, voice and accountability, 
and justice. 
Data sources: Freedom House, Freedom in the World (2003 
&2010); Election Commission of Pakistan; and Pakistan Institute 
of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) (2011). 
_ 
Gini Coefficient Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income 
among individuals or households within the economy deviates 
from a perfectly equal distribution. Gini Index lies between 0 and 
1. Zero represents perfect equality, while 1 implies perfect 
inequality.  
Data source: SPDC (2009) and Economic Survey of Pakistan 
(various issues). 
    + 
Corruption Index An index on a scale of 0 and 6, which measures the perception of 
corruption. Corruption here is defined as use or exercise of public 
office to gain private gain. A higher score indicates lower level of 
corruption and vice versa. 
Data source: Transparency International and the International 
Group Risk Guide (2011) and Political Risk Group (2010). 
+ 
GDP Per Capita 
(Overall as well 
as Provincial 
level) 
Per capita income is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population, at Constant Factor Cost of 1980-81. 
Data source: Bangali and Sadaqat (2000); Hand Book of Pakistan 
Economy, SBP (2010) Federal & Provincial Budget Documents 
(various issues). 
- 
Literacy Rate Literacy rate is the ratio of those (use 10 years and above) to total 
population who can read newspaper and write a letter in any 
language. 
Data source: WDI, World Bank (2011) and Economic Survey of 
Pakistan (various issues) 
- 
Pro-poor 
Expenditure 
An index of public expenditures on social services (health, 
education, sanitation and welfare schemes) likely to affect poor 
more. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issue) 
- 
Life Expectancy 
at Birth 
The number of years a new born baby would before its death. 
Data source: WDI, World Bank (2011) 
+ 
Crude Death 
Rate 
Total number of people of society who die out of one thousand per 
year 
Data source: WDI, World Bank (2011) 
+ 
Infant Mortality 
Rate 
Total infants who die before reaching to the age of five out of 
thousand per year 
Data source: WDI, World Bank (2011) 
+ 
Population   Midyear population (in Million people) 
Data source: Hand Book of Pakistan Economy, State Bank of 
Pakistan (2010) and Economic Survey of Pakistan  (various 
Issues) 
+ 
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Subsidies 
The ratio of total subsidies given by public sector to GDP. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics(various Issue) 
_ 
Population Per 
Bed 
Hospitals beds available  per 100 people in public hospitals and 
dispensaries  
Data source: Hand Book of Pakistan Economy, SBP (2010) 
_ 
Fiscal 
Administration 
Total expenditure in million rupees devoted to fiscal 
administration by provincial governments. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues) and 
provincial governments‟ budget documents (various issues). 
_ 
Justice and 
Police 
Total expenditure in million rupees devoted to justice and police 
by provincial governments. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues) and 
provincial governments‟ budget documents (various issues). 
_ 
Public Health 
Services 
Total investment in million rupees to public health services by 
provincial governments. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues) and 
provincial governments‟ budget documents (various issues). 
_ 
Education  Total investment in million rupees to education by provincial 
governments. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues) and 
provincial governments‟ budget documents (various issues). 
_ 
Health Total investment in million rupees to health by provincial 
governments. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues) and 
provincial governments‟ budget documents (various issues). 
_ 
Social Security 
and Welfare 
Total investment in million rupees to social security and welfare 
by provincial governments. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues) and 
provincial governments‟ budget documents (various issues). 
_ 
Agriculture  Total investment in million rupees to agriculture by provincial 
governments. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues) and 
provincial governments‟ budget documents (various issues). 
_ 
Irrigation Total investment in million rupees to irrigation by provincial 
governments. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues) and 
provincial governments‟ budget documents (various issues). 
_ 
Rural 
Development 
Total investment in million rupees to rural development by 
provincial governments. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues) and 
provincial governments‟ budget documents (various issues). 
_ 
Transport and 
Communication  
Total investment in million rupees to transport and comm. by 
provincial governments. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues) and 
provincial governments‟ budget documents (various issues). 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues) and 
provincial governments‟ budget documents (various issues). 
_ 
Agriculture 
Machinery 
Agricultural machinery, tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land  
Data source: WDI, World Bank (2011) and Pakistan (various 
issues) 
_ 
Agricultural 
Value added 
Agriculture value added in constant price  of 1980 (in million 
rupees) 
Data source: Bangali and Sadaqat (2000), Federal Bureau of 
Statistics (various Issue); Provincial Budget Documents (various 
issues).  
_ 
Grants Annual grants in million rupees given by federal government to 
provincial governments. 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues). 
_ 
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Own Revenue  Percentage share of provincial government to total revenue 
collected 
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (various Issues), federal 
budget documents (various issues).provincial governments‟ budget 
documents (various issues) 
_ 
It needs to be emphasised that corruption is one the most prominent features of 
Pakistan‘s state and society. Although – as mention in above table – Transparency 
International, Country Risk Guide and Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development 
and Transparency provide data on corruption in Pakistan, however, since these data 
are on countrywide and do not provide disaggregated information, these data may 
not reflect the corruption at provincial level. Having this caveat these data need to be 
used and analysed with caution. For example, in province like Balochistan it is 
perceived that the corruption is very high, but it does not reflect in national 
corruption figures.   
7.4  HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
In conventional literature of public finance, as we saw in chapter 2, concepts of fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty are treated as two distinct approaches. Poverty 
reduction is considered mainly as redistributive agenda that may best be addressed 
by the central government on the ground of externality and free movement of 
citizens (see more in Feldstein, 1975; Bird and Francois, 1998; Smoke, 2001).  Fiscal 
decentralisation, on the other hand, is viewed purely on efficiency ground. 
Therefore, fiscal decentralisation may not be used as a policy reform strategy for 
poverty reduction (see more in Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972; Yilmaz and Ebel, 
2002). Nevertheless, recent trends in poverty literature consider as purely a local 
phenomenon. The bottom-up approach to tacking poverty is supported by the World 
Bank (2000); ADB (2002); Crook (2002); Shah (2005) among others, who argue that 
poverty alleviation programmes need to evolve through the involvement of local 
people. Fiscal decentralisation, in this regard, is adopted as major policy reform by 
many developing countries and international organisations for efficient public 
service delivery and implementation of poverty reduction programmes. As stated 
earlier, the indirect and intricate relationship of fiscal decentralisation and poverty 
may make the process complex. We argue that fiscal decentralisation as major policy 
tool can be adapted to impact poverty through better social services delivery as well 
as empowering subnational governments to identify and implement pro-poor 
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programmes. This argument is justified on the ground that sub-national governments 
have the knowledge and understanding about the local people‘s needs and priorities 
therefore design and implement poverty alleviation programmes accordingly, which 
the remote central government often fails to possess. In addition, the sub-national 
governments are expected to enhance local people participations in local decision 
making by increasing their representation in local governance (Fisman and Gatti, 
2002), which as a result, makes the office bearers accountable to the local people.  
The accountability and the quality of governance are essential, if not sufficient, 
conditions for pro-poor growth outcomes (Akai and Sakata, 2002), in which the 
poor-oriented social services may be delivered more effectively. Von Braum and 
Grote (2002) affirm that local people‘s participation improve the governance that 
consequently enhances the material well-being of the poor. Based on this theoretical 
understanding we suggest the following hypotheses in order to test the research 
questions raised in first chapter.   
In Pakistan the government machinery runs through three tiers of government: 1. the 
federal or central government; 2. the provincial government; and 3. the local or 
district governments. Considering the distinct nature of fiscal, political and 
administrative relationship between federal government and provincial governments 
we shall examine the following broad research question: whether or not fiscal power 
from federal to provincial governments (fiscal decentralisation) helps in poverty 
reduction. This research question is empirically investigated with the help of the 
following hypotheses:   
Hypothesis 1: The larger the share of provincial governments‘ expending and 
revenues share to total (read fiscal decentralisation), other things being equal, leads 
to poverty reduction (proxy alternatively by headcount poverty, poverty gap and 
severity of poverty) and improves the living standard of the poor and marginalised 
(proxy by the HDI). 
Based on the conceptual framework and theoretical analysis one can assume that the 
provincial governments are better able to identify critical areas where public 
resources are spent with more advantages to the poor. Moreover, it is suggested that 
the subnational governments provide pro-poor social services according to the needs 
and preferences of local people. The subnational governments can easily identify the 
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projects that are socially and economically beneficial to the poor and low income 
people and also fear being voted out if they fail to satisfy the votesr‘ needs. This 
proposition is supported by many including MacNab and Dean (2001) wherein they 
argue that fiscal decentralisation enhances the pro-poor social expenditures. 
Supporting the same argument of MacNab and Dean, Gupta et al. (2002) would 
propose that expenditure on pro-poor social services is the key in poverty reduction.  
In many countries including Pakistan, the key social service deliveries like basic 
education, healthcare services and access to safe drinking water, sanitation and 
agriculture are the subnational governments‘ subjects.  Phakphian‘s (2011) argument 
and UNCDF‘s (2003) findings may substantiate our proposition, where it is 
demonstrated that in the process of the social services delivery the sub-national 
(provincial) governments provide a progressive mechanism for poverty reduction‘s 
strategies through people‘s participation and better knowledge of local conditions. If 
the provincial governments have more resources they expectedly can enhance the 
quality and quantity of such services which are considered pro-poor.    
Three variables: 1. Education; 2. Healthcare; and 3. Agriculture, are considered to be 
the crucial elements through which the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments 
affects poverty reduction outcomes. As demonstrated in chapter 2 and 7, the sub-
national governments with more fiscal autonomy would increase spending on basic 
social services, including education. Education is recognised in the literature 
(Winkler, 1989; Carnoy and Hannaway, 1993; Florestal and Cooper, 1997; Winkler 
and Gershberg, 2000) as a main driving force for human resource development and 
employment generation among other things. Therefore, it is plausible to hold that 
more spending on education would lead to improving living conditions of the poor. 
This theoretical background leads us to construct the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 2: Provincial governments‘ fiscal autonomy (fiscal decentralisation) 
leads to more expenditure/investment on basic education that enhances the literacy 
rate, and hence will transform into improving the livelihood of the poor and the 
marginalised communities in Pakistan. 
In a similar fashion, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) suggest that fiscal 
decentralisation renders into improved basic healthcare facilities to local 
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communities including the poor, which subsequently translates into poverty 
reduction. Better healthcare services that result into a  healthy workforce plays a key 
role in increasing productivity and economic growth in one hand, and save the poor 
and low income groups from spending a big share of their already meager earnings 
on private hospitals/clinics and medicines on the other. Particularly, in Pakistan 
where the health sector constitutionally is a provincial subject – though the federal 
government runs certain health services in parallel to provincial governments‘ 
healthcare facilities in respective provinces – provincial governments with more 
resources would allocate more resources to health sector. Given this, we 
hypothetically suggest that: 
Hypothesis 3: Bigger the ratio of the share of provincial expenditure (revenue) to 
total national expenditure (revenue), Ceteris paribus, lesser will be the Child 
Motility Rate and the Crude Death Rate (subject to improved healthcare) that in turn 
shall lead to improve the condition of the poor.  
Third channel, through which fiscal decentralisation may improve the well-being of 
the poor is agriculture sector. In Pakistan agriculture virtually contributes 20% to the 
GDP, employs 40% of total and 60% of rural employment (Pakistan, 2010-11). Fan 
et al. (2004; 2007) illustrate that investment in agriculture sector leads to have a 
significant impact on poverty. In Pakistan the majority of the poor live in rural areas 
and agriculture plays a central role in rural economy. Thus, it is worthwhile to 
postulate that high public investment in agriculture will increase the poor‘s 
livelihood. Like health and education, agriculture sector also comes under the 
jurisdictional purview of the provincial governments in Pakistan. It may be 
postulated that more resourceful provincial governments would invest more on this 
sector which will have a considerable impact on the level of poverty. In the light of 
this background, the following testable hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 4: Everything being equal, fiscal decentralisation will increase the 
agricultural output (proxy by agriculture value-addition and fertilizer consumptions) 
that in turn will reduce poverty by enhancing the livelihood of the poor.      
Based on testable hypotheses developed in this section a comprehensive and robust 
empirical examination is conducted to see whether or not fiscal decentralisation is 
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effective in reducing poverty reduction both directly and indirectly through various 
potential channels. Their results are reported in the following two chapters.   
 
7.5 METHODOLOGY  
Following theoretical framework developed in chapter 7 and a number of empirical 
studies (for example, Ravallion and Chen, 1997; Xie et al., 1999; Deaton and 
Paxson, 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Jutting et al., 2004; 
Zang et al., 2004; Kappeler and Valila, 2008; Schaltegger and Feld, 2009)
81
, a ray of 
econometrical specifications is constructed here to address the deterministic factors 
of poverty. While it is true that none of the studies, except of course Jutting et al., 
(2004), mentioned above has empirically investigated a link between fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty per se they incorporate certain other factors which 
potentially affect poverty. For example, Dollar and Kraay (2002) analyse in their 
econometric analysis the role of economic growth in poverty reduction. Likewise, 
Fisman and Gatti (2002) examine the impact of fiscal decentralisation on corruption 
having cross country evidence. Therefore, the empirical methods used by these 
studies are useful in constructing the econometric models of this study.  
Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE), and 
Genralised Methods of Moment Instrumental Variables (GMM-IV) econometric 
techniques are undertaken to test the above-listed hypotheses. Why FE, RE and 
GMM-IV are used along with OLS is discussed later in the chapter. Two kinds of 
datasets, simple time series as well as panel, are used in the analysis.  
The panel analysis has the advantage of using both time series and cross-section 
datasets. Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) argue that panel data analysis has the 
merit to take into account the heterogeneity by allowing for country/region specific 
effects. It allows for more variability among the variables, restricts multicolinearity 
and gives more degree of freedom. As a result, it produces more efficient estimators 
(Baltagi, 2001). Given the high volatility of decentralisation and poverty across the 
countries or regions/provinces, policy makers have keen interest to disaggregate the 
                                                 
81
 This strand of literature is reviewed in chapter II. 
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estimates of both the variables and typically evaluate the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on the poverty.   
In Pakistan the four provinces differ in terms of magnitude of decentralisation, 
incidence of poverty and level of development in other socio-economic indicators. 
Looking at national level based on aggregated data may not help us analysing the 
impact of decentralisation on poverty. Therefore, a panel dataset of four provinces 
for a period of 35 five years (1975-2009) is constructed to explore this relationship at 
provincial level.  
To test the first hypothesis we apply the following equation using both the OLS and 
GMM-IV techniques, alternatively.  
  -,30-3,-  2, 1,= t;)()( tttt XFDPoverty                                      (7.1) 
Where (          indicator is proxied alternatively by FGT index (i.e. headcount 
ratio, poverty gap and severity of poverty) and by the HDI – the HDI is defined by 
the UNDP (2000). Practically, four measures of poverty are used as a dependent 
variable so as to establish a consistent relationship between fiscal decentralisation 
and poverty. The variable        is the level of fiscal decentralisation as is defined in 
this chapter as well as in chapter 2.  (      controls for a set of other determinants of 
poverty, which include: government size, the index of pro-poor expenditures, per 
capita GDP, corruption index, rule of law index, the combination of inflation and 
unemployment and devolution reform dummy.   (     is the error term and subscript 
(   denotes time.   
In order to examine the panel regression the following equation is used: 
  1,2,3,4  i and 35;---1,2,3,4,-  t;)()()(
)()Re()()(
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itititti
ititititit
DRDumPSDumPPExp
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7.2) 
          is alternatively proxied by FGT index for each province in panel dataset. 
The error tem (     is decomposed into two: the province specific unobserved 
effect,  , and a vector of idiosyncratic error term,    , -  that is,          .         is 
the level of fiscal decentralisation (expenditure or revenue). As discussed earlier the 
population of Pakistan is asymmetrically distributed among the provinces. For 
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instance, the Punjab contains more than 57% of total population, whereas, only 5% 
of population lives in Balochistan.
82
 Furthermore, as highlighted in chapter 4, the 
intergovernmental resource transfer takes place solely on population basis, which 
resultantly makes Punjab the biggest beneficiary.
83
 Considering the importance of 
population in terms of resource allocation and other, it is plausible to believe the 
population (       as a key deterministic factor of poverty.  
Second important determinant of poverty at the provincial level is the capacity and 
scope of the provinces to raise their own revenues so as to finance their expenditures 
by indigenous sources. Hypothetically, sub-national governments with better 
administrative capacity and source of generating own revenue would perform much 
better in undertaking pro-poor social expenditures. To control this effect, revenue 
share of each province to the total national revenue            is included in 
equation 7.2. Similarly per capita income        is included to control for other 
social and economic factors that affect the poor but are not captured by other 
variables included in equation 7.2. Obviously, higher is the level of per capita 
income at the province level the lower would be the level of poverty.   
Equation 7.2 also includes an index of pro-poor social expenditures (         as an 
effective determinant of poverty. Hypothetically, greater is the volume of pro-poor 
expenditures lesser should be the incidence of poverty. Likewise, we introduced a 
dummy variable          ) to capture the disparity among provinces in terms of 
development. The Punjab and Sindh with better social and economic infrastructure 
are expected to expedite the fiscal and political autonomy more effectively compare 
to less developed provinces of KP and Balochistan. And finally a dummy variable 
(       ) is used to capture the devolution reform effect (the devolution reform 
and its impacts are thoroughly discussed in chapter 10).  
It is worthwhile to mention that unlike a conventional approach (discussed in chapter 
2) that consider the role of sub-national government in redistribution as counter-
                                                 
82
 It is noteworthy that the Balochistan holds not only 44 % of total territory of Pakistan but is the 
most poorest and backward in terms of all socio-economic indicators compare to other three provinces 
within the federation, as discussed with greater detail in chapter III.  
83
Albeit since 2009-10 more criteria, like backwardness, revenue collections etc. are included in 
horizontal resource mechanism, population still contains 80 % weight. That preserves domination of 
Punjab over resources (refer to chapters III and IV for more information).  
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productive. We, on the contrary, postulate that the role of sub-national government 
in redistributive policies is effective and productive.  
As highlighted earlier, poverty due to its multifaceted dimensions may also be 
affected by fiscal decentralisation indirectly through certain channels, so an indirect 
linkage between the two variables is highly likely. Therefore, we propose that 
decentralisation can improve public service provisions by being more accountable to 
the local people as well as knowing their needs. A key argument here is that in 
general improved public services has a positive impact on poverty. We consider 
three essential services that are not only typically identified as vehicles in reaching 
out to the poor but constitutionally the same services are the sub-national 
governments‘ subjects in Pakistan. 
 One of potential channels of this relationship is education. There is a direct 
relationship between public spending, allocated to education as a result of fiscal 
decentralisation, and reduction in poverty. This is exactly the second testable 
hypothesis of this study. Hence, in order to test this hypothesis, the following 
regression equations are used to present both a time series and a panel data analysis 
respectively:   
2 3 4 5 6
7
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( 2 )
( )   ;                                                         t  1,2,3,4,----35  
t t t t t t t
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    (7.4) 
Where       ) denotes education outcomes, which alternatively is proxied by 
combined literacy rate (male and female both).       ) is the pupil-teacher-ratio, 
which represents the availability of more teachers and resource persons in schools, 
        is gross enrollment ratio and        ) is per capita health expenditures that 
reflects the quality and quantity of healthcare facilities. All three variables are 
considered as strong determinants of literacy rate.   
Similarly, our third hypothesis suggests that fiscal decentralisation affects poverty 
reduction outcomes through healthcare. In order to test this proposition, we lay down 
the following econometric specifications (Eq. 7.5 and Eq. 7.6) to provide an overall 
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country level impact of decentralisation on healthcare outcomes along with a cross-
province analysis by having a panel data approach. 
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            (7.6) 
               is the health outcomes, which is represented alternatively by Infant 
Mortality Rate, Crude Death Rate and Life Expectancy at Birth. Other included 
variables in equations 7.5 and 7.6 are already discussed.  
The third channel through which fiscal decentralisation has a potential impact on 
poverty outcomes is agriculture sector. As presented earlier, in Pakistan majority of 
the poor and marginalised are located in rural areas; and rural economy depends 
considerably on agriculture sector. Therefore, improving agriculture sector would 
potentially cut down the poverty rate significantly. In Pakistan where the agriculture 
sector is dealt with provincial governments, it is fair to suggest that fiscally more 
autonomous provinces can spend more on agriculture, which consequently affect the 
poor. Accordingly, this in turn would improve the level of employment and income 
of the people of respected province. In analysing the role of fiscal decentralisation on 
agricultural sector in Pakistan as well as at subnational level the following two 
models (7.7 and 7.8) are formulated and used. 
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             is agricultural output that is alternatively proxy by agriculture value-
addition and fertilizer consumption. We propose that agriculture productivity is 
determined by a ray of other variables alongside policies that may alter with the level 
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of fiscal decentralisation.          ) is agriculture machinery, (     is the trade 
openness and (      is consumer price index.    
7.6   ESTIMATION METHODS AND ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
Numerous estimation procedures are applied, like simple OLS, GLS Fixed Effects  
and Random Effects and GMM-IV, in an attempt to control several potential 
econometric concerns associated with both dependent variable (poverty) and core 
independent variable (fiscal decentralisation), given the multi-dimensional nature of 
both variables.  
The general formulation of the time series models used in chapter 8 and 9 is as 
under: 
35,.....3,2,1;  tXY ttt                                                     (7.9) 
     represents independent variable, (    is vector of both main and control 
independent variables,  (   is the coefficient of vector    that would be estimated,  
   is idiosyncratic error term with zero mean and constant variance [             
t= 1, 2, ....,35],  and subscript (   is the number of observations or time periods. 
Similarly, the general specification of the panel data framework used in the same 
analysis is as follow:  
4,3,2,1;35,.....3,2,1;  iteXY ittit                 (7.10) 
The error term contains two components; (     is idiosyncratic component of error 
term that captures random disturbances and      component that accounts for 
province specific characteristics that may not change over time but have consistent 
effects on poverty. Subscript     denotes the number of provinces included in the 
analysis.  
The use of panel data increases not only the quantity of data but also enhances the 
quality of the dataset, because the behaviour of each entity is observed across time.  
Furthermore, given the variability of both poverty and fiscal decentralisation across 
provinces simple time series analysis with only country level aggregates may not 
provide a statistically efficient inference regarding the effectiveness of 
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decentralisation. More to the point, panel data is expected to give appropriate 
analysis given the complex issues involved in multi-dimensional nature of both 
poverty and fiscal decentralisation.  As shown earlier the panel analysis also helps us 
to separate the components of idiosyncratic error and variance in order to examine 
the changes that take place in endogenous and exogenous variables.   
7.6.1 RANDOM EFFECTS AND FIXED EFFECT ESTIMATORS  
Using standard OLS on panel dataset produces inefficient, though unbiased results, 
given the presence of unobserved province fixed effects. Yet, if unobserved province 
specific effects are correlated with the regressors the OLS estimators become 
inefficient and biased. The RE and FE estimations, however, help to account for both 
problems encountered by using the standard OLS.  
The Fixed Effects Model investigates the relationship between the  outcome 
variables and predictor within an entity (in our case province). Each province has its 
own specific characteristics that may or may not affect and influence the outcomes 
of other provinces. While using FE estimator, it is assumed that some individual 
effect of entity (province) may make the estimators biased and inefficient, hence 
need to be controlled. That is, when one of the basic assumptions of zero correlation 
between explanatory variable and error [             is not met, OLS may fail to 
provide the efficient and unbiased results. On the contrary, using FE model removes 
the time variant characteristics from explanatory variables and enables us to assess 
the predictor‘s net effects. In FE model it is assumed that the time invariant 
characteristics distinctive to one entity may not be correlated with other included 
entities‘ characteristics. This is because entity‘s disturbance and constant terms that 
control individual descriptions may be uncorrelated with other explanatory variables.   
FE model is not without its loopholes. It cannot estimate the impact of the time 
invariant variables like province dummy, which is incorporated in some of the 
estimations to control province heterogeneity. Using FE model comes at the cost of 
loss of considerable degree of freedom, which consequently increases the estimators‘ 
standard error and reduces the effectiveness of the model to test coefficients.  
The Random Effect (RE) Model assumes that the variation across entities is 
uncorrelated with explanatory variables. Both the province specific effects and 
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independent variables are not correlated. Under such condition if standard OLS 
technique is applied, the estimators albeit remain unbiased but become inefficient. 
This inefficiency of the estimators is the result of not considering the correlation 
between standard disturbance term and within-entity error within provinces, which 
obviously makes the estimated standard error biased and creates serious problem for 
accurate statistical inference (Baum, 2006).   
RE model assumes that province-specific effects are not correlated with predictors. If 
this condition holds RE model produces efficient estimators.  In case of the violation 
of this assumption, the RE model yields inefficient and inconsistent estimators.   
What is more, in RE model we need to identify those entity characteristics that may 
or may not affect the explanatory variables.  
7.6.1.1 SELECTION BETWEEN RANDOM EFFECTS AND FIXED EFFECTS MODELS  
Given the cross province nature of panel dataset used in this study, the selection of 
FE model is supported by theory (Wooldridge, 2002) in order to control the potential 
cross province unobserved effect. Besides theoretical rationale our choice between 
fixed effect and random effect model is made based on Hausman test. Hausman 
(1978) test compares FE with RE, where the null hypothesis is that the coefficients 
of RE model are same as that of FE. The Hausman test shows the RE models 
inconsistent if the difference between FE model and the RE model is significant. 
This inconsistency may be due to the unobserved country effect and the regressors. 
The Hausman test is explained below: 
Null Hypothesis      = There is no correlation between entity‘s specific effects and 
regressors. 
Alternative Hypothesis      = There is a correlation between entity‘s specific effects 
and the independent variables.  
Under the null, though both random effect and fixed estimators are consistent but in 
terms of efficiency the former is preferred to the latter. In other words, alternative 
hypothesis states that FE model is efficient and consistent while RE model is not 
consistent. 
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It is important to mention that consistency of the parameters under both FE and RE 
models are conditioned to the assumption that there is no any correlation between 
disturbance terms and any of the explanatory variables included in the analysis. 
Nonetheless, this assumption rarely meets in our analysis. Given the 
multidimensionality of poverty, fiscal decentralisation and number of other control 
variables there is the potential danger of endogeneity. In case of endogeneity, using 
FE or RE models give us inconsistent and biased estimators. In order to handle the 
potential endogeneity problem, we use GMM-IV approach, which accounts not only 
for unobserved heterogeneity but also fixes the endogeneity.      
7.6.2 GENERALISED METHOD OF MOMENT –INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (GMM-
IV) ESTIMATIONS  
GMM-IV technique is used alongside OLS and FE and RE specifications because:  
1. OLS fails to account for the provincial specific effects that may generate 
unobserved heterogeneity. For instance in equation (7.2) the error term also contains 
   component that captures the provinces unobserved effects, and the OLS 
specification simply cannot control such effects, which consequently create 
heterogeneity.  
2. The OLS does not take into account the potential endogeneity: some of the 
explanatory variables may also be determined by dependent variable(s), and 
potential external shocks may have similar impact on both dependent and 
independent variables.  
3. The fixed effects or within groups estimator although takes into account the 
     component of the error term, it fails to account the potential endogeneity 
problem related to poverty, fiscal decentralisation and some of the control variables. 
Thus, considering the potential endogeneity issue the GMM-IV model is used.   
One of the assumptions of strict consistency is that estimators are exogenous. That is 
they are not determined by the models. The assumption of zero conditional mean 
must hold in order for linear regression to be used. And there are three possibilities 
where this assumption may not be met in regression analysis: 1. errors in variables; 
2. omitted variable bias; and 3. endogeneity (Baum, 2006:185).  In case of violating 
this assumption, it makes the estimators inconsistent and leads to produce spurious 
results. Given the complexity involved with the multidimensional nature of both 
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fiscal decentralisation and poverty dynamics, encountering issues that stem through 
potential endogeneity is highly likely. As already mentioned the use of simple OLS 
econometric technique does not take into account endogenous problem that may 
arise due to the contemporaneous determination of decentralisation and poverty. One 
of the best ways to treat with endogenous variables and to produce unbiased, 
efficient and consistent estimators is to use GMM-IV methods. While using GMM-
IV estimation techniques give consistent and efficient regression estimates if the 
estimators face heteroskedasticty of unknown form. But for application of GMM-IV 
required that we must find valid instrumental variables that are not correlated with 
error term and highly correlated with endogenous variables. A variable that meets 
these two conditions may be included in the analysis as an instrument. Since error 
term cannot be observed therefore the zero correlation assumption of error term and 
an instrumental variable cannot be tested. This is called orthogonality assumption 
(Baum, 2006). The second assumption must be tested and can be done so by 
regressing endogenous variable on potential instrument:  
iii ZX   2                                                                         (7.11) 
In case of null hypothesis of       is not rejected,    is not a valid instrument to be 
used. In our analysis internal lag of those variables which are suspect for 
endogeneity are used an instruments,  . Obviously we can reject the null hypothesis 
of     ; in other words, Z is a valid instrument to use.  
7.6.3 SOME OTHER ECONOMETRIC ISSUES  
Besides econometric issues discussed above, some other problems also have the 
potential to make the regression results biased (if not biased inconsistent in some 
cases both biased and inconsistent) and spurious if they are not found and 
consequently dealt with. Various econometric tests are carried out to diagnose these 
potential econometric problems and eventually necessary measures are taken for 
fixing them. Typically there are multiple ways of dealing with econometric problems 
once they are detected or suspected. While, given the similar nature of our regression 
procedures we expect the same potential econometric problems for all hypotheses. 
For the sake of simplicity and brevity a general discussion on major econometric 
issues will be presented here.  
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7.6.3.1 MULTICOLINEARITY 
The problem of multicolinearity occurs when the relative movements of two or more 
independent variables match. In this, the standard OLS estimates become unable to 
distinguish between the variables. Given the multidimensional nature of fiscal 
decentralisation and many other independent variables we may have a priori suspect 
of multicolinearity. For example, variables such as fiscal decentralisation, 
government size, pro-poor expenditures, per capita GDP, economic openness, per 
capita income, rule of law and inflation among others may highly be correlated. In 
order to overcome such and other related problems public finance literature adopts 
―one independent variable‖ approach. This resolves some of the econometric 
problems but it also creates the threat of ‗omitted variable(s)‘ biasness issue.  Thus, 
in order to deal with this and other matters with similar nature, we introduce ‗proxy 
variables‘ to replace highly correlated variables. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
test is conducted after each standard OLS regression to examine the level of 
correlation between the variables.  
7.6.3.2 HETEROSKEDASTICTY   
The problem of heteroskedasticty occurs when the residuals of the regression are 
heteroskedastic            . That is, the variance of residuals is not constant for all 
observations. In such a case the standard OLS estimators no longer produce 
minimum variance. The standard error of the coefficients gives inaccurate estimates. 
In the presence of heteroskedasticty the estimated parameters may remain consistent 
but inefficient. In order to test for heteroskedasticty we perform Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg (1979) test. The said test is Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 
that bases on the assumption that residuals are normally distributed with K degree of 
freedom. The null hypothesis states that variance of the disturbance terms are 
homoskedastic. In other words, variance of the error terms is constant. With 
alternative hypothesis when the test statistic is greater than the critical value. We 
panel data we used Poi and Wiggins (2001) test, such as LR test for panel 
heterogeneity. 
7.6.3.3 AUTOCORRELATION 
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One of the fundamental assumptions of Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) 
is that the covariance between the error terms over the time is equal to zero, or the 
error terms are not correlated with each other (Brooks, 2007). If however the error 
terms are correlated it creates the problem of autocorrelation or serial correlation, 
which leads to make the standard error biased. Hence, the standard OLS estimators 
no longer remain the minimum variance ones. This follows that a diagnostic test is 
required to check for the presence of serial correlation after each standard OLS 
regression of our analysis.  
With the analysis of a long time series of 35 year, we may have a priori suspect of 
autocorrelation. The graphical method is commonly used as a first hand method to 
judge the presence of autocorrelation. But to confirm the presence of autocorrelation 
a formal statistical test is required to apply. Tests such as Durbin-Watson (DW) and 
Breusch-Godfrey (BG) are the simplest and commonly used tests in time series 
analysis in order to deduct autocorrelation. DW statistic tests for the presence of 
correlation between the error term and its first lag value or first order autocorrelation.  
In order to test for autocorrelation under DW statistic the error term    ) is regressed 
on its previous value:  
ttt ee   1         (7.12) 
Where      is normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance 
(           . The following null and alternative hypotheses are used in DW 
statistics to test for autocorrelation:  
0:&0: 10   HH       (7.13) 
Under the null hypothesis, the error and its one period lag are uncorrelated. In case 
of the rejection of the null hypothesis, it is concluded that autocorrelation is present. 
Considering the nature of dataset used in our analysis, entirely uncorrelated variables 
may not be expected. Given such constraints, the DW statistic is also expressed as 
the approximation of value   , to provide boundaries beyond which serial 
correlation thought to be serious.  
)ˆ1(2 Dw         (7.13) 
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Where  ) is the estimated value of     of regression equation (7.14).  The DW test 
does not follow a standard statistical test, instead it provides an upper and a lower 
critical value and other inclusive regions in between. The criteria for rejecting or not 
rejecting the null hypothesis are that, the „null hypothesis is rejected and the 
existence of positive autocorrelation presumed if DW is less than the lower critical 
values. The null hypothesis is rejected and the existence of negative autocorrelation 
presumed if DW is greater than 4 minus the lower critical values. The null 
hypothesis is not rejected and no significant residual autocorrelation is presumed if 
DW is between the upper and 4 minus the upper limits‘ (Brooks, 2007: 169). 
Nevertheless, due to hard conditions - the regression should have a constant term, no 
lag dependent variable in the model and coefficient must be non-stochastic - of DW 
test, it may not be often applicable. The BG test on the other hand has a chi-square 
distribution with   degree of freedom. Under the BG test the null hypothesis is that 
no correlation is present in regression. When the test statistic is greater than critical 
value the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation will be rejected against the 
alternative. Following the literature we apply BG and DW statistics to test for the 
presence of autocorrelation or serial correlation in all standard OLS estimations. For 
panel dataset we used the Wooldridge (2002) test. 
7.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter outlines the dependent variable – poverty – that has already been 
defined in chapter 2 and described its data structure and sources. A similar 
description of the core independent variable – fiscal decentralisation – is also 
provided with the method of its measurement and data sources.  Alongside this the 
main independent variable, other than deterministic variables of poverty, are also 
explained with their data sources and expected coefficient‘s sign vis-à-vis poverty.   
The testable hypotheses which have been developed in this chapter are tested and 
their empirical results are reported in following two chapters. Eight econometric 
models were also constructed in the course of the current chapter to test the 
described testable hypotheses in the following chapters. Last section of the chapter 
discusses the selection of various econometric techniques: OLS, FE & RE, and 
GMM-IV models. The best model is selected to obtain the robust, efficient and 
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unbiased statistical inference. The potential econometric issues, the diagnostic 
techniques and the possible remedies to fix them are also discussed in the chapter. 
The empirical framework and methodology constructed in this chapter are used in 
the following two chapters to test the hypotheses developed here.   
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CHAPTER 8   
EMPIRICAL RESUTLS I: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
 
8.1   INTRODUCTION  
This chapter discusses the empirical results obtained in the study based on the first 
hypothesis. That is the potential impact of fiscal decentralisation on poverty 
reduction in Pakistan, which was covered in chapter 4. In first two sections, using 
both standard OLS and GMM-IV techniques on a time series dataset of overall 
Pakistan, we examine the effects of reduction in poverty due to fiscal 
decentralisation in the context of the macro economy. In third section we assess the 
efficacy of decentralisation in poverty reduction from a more micro-level 
(regional/provincial level) using a panel dataset of provinces.  
While a macro-level approach enables us to identify, evaluate and portray a larger 
picture of the impact of decentralisation on poverty reduction, it provides only a very 
narrow understanding about how decentralisation affects poverty reduction 
programmes at individual provincial or regional level. Although, a provincial level 
analysis does not reflect the overall impact of decentralisation on poverty, this 
approach shows with greater details the effectiveness of the fiscal decentralisation on 
poverty given the relative level of decentralisation, incidence of poverty and other 
characteristics of each province. We employ both approaches in order to be able to 
present a holistic and accurate analysis of the subject of our research.  
The regressions results are presented with the sign and level of significance of the 
coefficient of all included variables. The reported results are followed by a rigorous 
analytical discussion. Among provinces poverty reduction has been more prominent 
in the Punjab than other three provinces. Balochistan, on the other hand, has been 
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less successful in poverty reduction, although it followed a similar trend as of other 
provinces.   
Chapter 5 highlights the wide differences of the incidence of poverty in rural and 
urban areas of Pakistan. Moreover, our analysis of fiscal decentralisation is the 
transfer of expenditure or revenue powers from the federal to provincial 
governments, instead of transferring it to local governments. And decentralisation to 
the second tier of governments (provincial) hypothetically may be more effective in 
affecting urban poverty than the rural one. Since poverty is more prevalent in rural 
areas the effectiveness of decentralisation in terms of urban poverty reduction alone 
may not be sufficient to reduce the overall poverty in Pakistan. Under this milieu the 
impact of fiscal decentralisation is statistically examined separately on rural and 
urban poverty respectively. 
8.1   DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
The descriptive statistics of overall Pakistan variables based on various data 
sources
84
 are reported in table 8.1. The value of total incidence of poverty ranges 
from 17.29 to 41.43 with 6.08 standard deviation and 26.4 average, while the values 
of rural poverty and urban poverty range from 18.32 to 45.6 with 6.25 standard 
deviation and 29.3 average, and 37.17 to 11.1 with 6.44 standard deviation and 
average of 22.09, respectively. Similarly, the ratios of expenditure decentralisation (1 
and 2) vary from 0.17 to 0.68, with 0.159 dispersion and 0.35 mean, and 0.19 to 0.7 
with 0.165 standard deviation and 0.452 mean, respectively. The ratio of revenue 
decentralisation ranges from 0.08 to 0.27 with 0.056 standard deviation and 0.19 
mean for first measurement whereas it takes the ratio of 0.06 to 0.26 with 0.060 
standard deviation and 0.158 mean values for the second measurement.   
The data for HDI are available only for overall Pakistan and not for provinces. For 
panel analysis, where the same index is required for each province for an extended 
period, therefore, the HDI is not used as a proxy of poverty in panel analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
84
 Data sources and variables description are discussed in chapter VII.  
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Table 8.1: Summary Statistics (Overall Pakistan Sample) 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bottom 20% population share in 
National Income 
35 6.916286 0.558696 6.19 7.88 
Corruption Index 35 2.383793 0.217031 2.1 2.91 
Expenditure Decentralisation (1) 35 0.35 0.159023 0.17 0.68 
Expenditure Decentralisation (2) 35 0.452571 0.165447 0.19 0.7 
GDP growth 35 5.331429 1.901976 1.7 9 
Gini-Coefficient 35 0.387429 0.026496 0.35 0.43 
Human Development Index 35 0.409143 0.050338 0.321 0.499 
Misery Index 35 18.292 6.771174 5.3 30.33 
Overall Poverty  35 26.44771 6.080332 17.29 41.43 
Overall poverty Gap 35 5.528571 1.068776 3.94 8.21 
Overall Severity of Poverty  35 0.293639 0.175122 0.11848 0.9631323 
Per Capita GDP 35 3.6198 0.110446 3.431 3.818 
Per Capita Subsidies 
consumption  
35 182.0837 200.198 16.68 698.43 
Pro-poor expenditures 35 61.33229 43.35778 4.59 178.07 
Revenue Decentralisation (1) 35 0.190286 0.056333 0.08 0.27 
Revenue Decentralisation (2) 35 0.158571 0.060203 0.06 0.26 
Rule of Law 35 -0.70275 0.117837 -0.97167 -0.4840312 
Rural Poverty  35 29.30143 6.252005 18.32 45.6 
Rural Poverty Gap 35 6.370286 1.137447 4.7 8.87 
Severity of Poverty, Rural  35 0.391386 0.214837 0.203287 1.124178 
Severity of Poverty, Urban 35 0.174578 0.153543 0.053487 0.8145185 
Size of Government 35 22.8 3.094587 17 27 
Urban Population (%) 35 31.25714 2.944015 26 37 
Urban Poverty 35 22.09 6.444877 11.1 37.19 
Urban Poverty Gap 35 4.217429 1.126555 2.91 7.55 
 
Various measures of poverty are used; firstly, to ensure the consistent relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and poverty and secondly, to assess the effects of 
fiscal decentralisation on the various groups among the poor. For instance, the 
poverty gap or the depth of poverty indices, that describe the distribution of the poor, 
measures the average income shortfall as proportion of poverty threshold and reports 
on average how much income is required to bring them up to the poverty line. 
Likewise, severity of poverty index assigns more weight to the poorest of the poor in 
order to identify the very poor who need immediate help. Similarly, the use of the 
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HDI reflects how decentralisation is instrumental in affecting poverty through 
different dimensions including the HDI.       
8.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND 
POVERTY REDUCTION  
Based on the methodological framework elaborated earlier in this thesis, poverty is 
regressed on fiscal decentralisation, pro-poor public expenditures and a host of other 
explanatory variables. Given the data limitations and measurement errors associated 
with both fiscal decentralisation and poverty,  definitive conclusions may be hard to 
obtain but regression results indicate that fiscal decentralisation, if measured as the 
ratio of provincial governments‘ expenditure to total national expenditure helps 
reducing poverty – either measured by FGT (headcount poverty, poverty gap, 
severity of poverty) or the HDI. When fiscal decentralisation is measured as the ratio 
of provincial governments‘ revenue to total national revenue, it apparently 
ameliorates poverty. The potential reasons for revenue decentralisation‘s adverse 
impact on poverty are discussed in greater length later in the chapter. 
The regression results of econometric specification of equation (7.1) are reported in 
table 8.2 using simple OLS techniques. In first row of table 8.2, the headcount 
poverty, poverty gap and severity of poverty are reported alternatively. The 
regression results show that, in general, fiscal decentralisation has a significant 
impact on poverty reduction in Pakistan. In first column, where fiscal 
decentralisation is defined as ratio of provincial to total expenditure, the relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and headcount poverty is positive and strongly 
significant at 1% level. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of 
decentralisation supports our argument of the redistributive role of provincial 
governments. In contrast to this outcome, if the coefficient of fiscal decentralisation 
was statistically insignificant or significant but positive and close to zero then the 
greater share of provincial governments to total national expenditure would not have 
been associated with effective in reduction of poverty. Regarding the magnitude and 
the effect of decentralisation on poverty, everything else remains constant, the 
increase of one standard deviation in expenditure decentralisation (around 0.159% 
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point increase), the poverty will reduce by 0.067% of a standard deviation.
85
 In other 
words, with one unit increase in the share of provincial governments‘ spending to 
national expenditure, the headcount poverty will reduce by almost 0.65 units, ceteris 
paribus.  
Considering that fiscal decentralisation is measured as the share of provincial 
governments‘ expenditures to national expenditures after subtracting debt servicing 
from federal government‘s budget – ranges from 19% to 70% – the coefficient of 
fiscal decentralisation maintains its statistical significance at 1%, though the 
magnitude of relationship alters. 
It is noteworthy that adjusting for omitted variable biasness by including a ray of 
control variables does not seem to be changing the statistical relationship between 
fiscal decentralisation and poverty. The first control variable is the index of pro-poor 
expenditures that is the index of public expenditures on basic education, basic 
healthcare, housing and welfare scheme and sanitations, social services and social 
security, which are considered to be instrumental in affecting the poor positively and 
enhancing their living standard. Therefore, this index, which is expressed in per 
capita terms, is expected to have a positive and statistically significant impact on 
poverty reduction. Supporting the theoretical proposition, pro-poor expenditures‘ 
index has a negative and statistically significant coefficient vis-à-vis headcount 
poverty. This suggests that an increase in pro-poor expenditure will lead to have a 
considerable impact on poverty reduction. That is, one unit increase in pro-poor 
expenditure in national budget
86
 will decrease headcount poverty at national level by 
around 0.166 units.   
Another important control variable is the size of government, which is measured as 
the share of public sector in total real GDP. The size of government reflects the size 
and dimension of total national budget and the ability of public sector to carry out 
projects which potentially have a significant impact on the poor.  
                                                 
85
  Multiplying the coefficient of fiscal decentralisation (0.0.64) by the standard deviation of fiscal 
decentralisation (0.159) and then divide it through by the standard deviation of headcount poverty 
(6.080) we obtained figure 1.6.  
86
 While constructing pro-poor expenditure index, we combined federal as well as provincial budget 
allocations to education, basic healthcare, social services, social security and welfare and housing, 
which are in real terms based on 1980 constant prices. Furthermore, the same index is divided on total 
population to obtain the per capita pro-poor expenditure. Both population and pro-poor expenditure 
are expressed in millions.  
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Table 8.2: The Determinants of Headcount Poverty, Poverty Gap and Severity of Poverty 
 
Model: OLS (Core Independent Variable: Expenditure  Decentralisation) 
 Dependant Variables 
Headcount 
Ratio  ᶲ(overall) 
Headcount 
Ratio  ᶲ(overall) 
Headcount 
Ratio 
(ᶲRural) 
Headcount 
Ratio 
(ᶲRural) 
Headcount 
Ratio (ᶲUrban) 
Headcount Ratio 
(ᶲUrban) 
Poverty Gap  ᶲ
(1) 
Poverty Gap  ᶲ
(2) 
Severity of 
Poverty  Æ (1) 
Severity of 
Poverty Æ (2) 
Fiscal Decentralisation (Exp)1 -0.6482*** 
 
-0.6658*** 
 
-01.354*** 
 
-0.7917*** 
 
-0.361**  
(0.2292) 
 
(0.2361) 
 
(0.3129) 
 
(0.259) 
 
(0.1684)  
Fiscal Decentralisation (Exp) 2 
 
-0.334* 
 
-0.3727)* 
 
-0.2702** 
 
-0.452**  -0.339** 
 
(0.1704) 
 
(0.19119) 
 
(0.217) 
 
(0.1953)  (0.1232) 
Pro-poor Expenditure  ᶲ -0.1664*** -0.1435*** -0.0642*** -0.1533*** -0.1582*** (-0.1311*** -0.18)*** -0.1521*** -0.0205*** -0.0085 
 
(0.035) (0.031) (0.00989) (0.035) (0.0464) ,(0.0402) (0.0385) (0.0362) (0.0057) (0.006) 
Government Size -0.0639*** -0.0556*** (-0.1666)*** -0.0453*** -0.064*** -0.054*** -0.0613)*** -0.0461*** -0.242*** -0.225*** 
 
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.035) (0.011) (0.0131) ,(0.0127) (0.0108) (0.0114) (0.044) 0.0383 
Per Capita GDP  ᶲ -0.06* -0.00439* 0.0347 0.0029 -0.0172* -0.0207* 0.0405* -0.00408* -0.0005 (-0.0057) 
 
(0.0126) (0.01062) (0.0585) (0.1563) (0.0775) (0.0604) (0.0644) (0.0544) (0.009) 0.0081 
Corruption Index 0.1428* 0.3108** 0.3312** 0.1905* 0.5738*** 0.5586*** 0.495*** 0.3324** 0.3129*** 0.1654** 
 
(0.1079) (0.13935) (0.1357) (0.4139) (0.1798) ,(0.173) (0.1493) (0.1557) (0.089) (0.078) 
Rule of Law -0.801 -0.583 -0.7998* -0.6261 -1.106** (1.12** -1.26*** -0.9665** -0.992** (0.7169** 
 
(0.4084) (0.36902) (0.4007) 0.01191 (0.5309) ,(0.4676) (0.441) (0.4209) (0.3638) (0.295) 
Interaction term(Fiscal 
Decentralisation*Devolution 
Reform Dummy) 
-0.918*** -0.6033*** -0.902*** -0.387** -1.619*** -1.257*** -0.199 -0.1845 0.112 0.1218 
(0.3420) (0.1668) (0.3438) (0.1872) (0.4556) (0.2138) (0.378) (0.1924) (0.221) (0.117) 
Misery Index (Combination of 
Inflation and unemployment) 
0.0093*** 0.0083*** 0.0093*** 0.0109*** -0.00046 0.00468* 0.0006* 0.0004* 0.00012 -0.00002 
(0.0032) (0.002) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.00381) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.002) 
Constant 4.16*** 3.975*** 4.163*** 4.086*** 3.522*** 2.9164*** 1.941*** 2.08*** 0.357* 0.6104** 
 
(0.401) (0.4003) (0.3908) (0.449) 0.5179 (0.50105) (0.4301) (0.451) (0.271) (0.2415) 
N 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
R-squared 0.88 0.9 0.88 0.86 0.9 0.917 0.82 0.81 0.89 0.9 
Adj R-squared 0.85 0.88 0.84 0.82 0.87 0.892 0.76 0.76 0.85 0.86 
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. Æ  Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in severity in poverty due to potential presence of autocorrelation. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01,   ᶲvariable 
expressed in logarithm. 
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Albeit, in theory it may be argued that fiscal decentralisation changes the size of 
government by altering the public expenditure composition, it may not account for 
the size of total public expenditure. Thus the size of the government variable is 
included in our analysis to explain explicitly other possible factors of public sector 
that may not be fully captured by fiscal decentralisation variable. A larger public 
expenditure share to GDP is expected to accommodate projects that are aimed to 
target the poor at federal as well as provincial level. It also facilities other public 
sector schemes that may directly
87
 and indirectly
88
 enhances the well-being of lower 
and middle income groups. Furthermore, it may be maintained that with relatively 
smaller size of the government, more decentralisation would leave the federal 
government with less available resources to finance projects that are expected to 
have distributional impact on overall country rather than limited to a specific 
province. In this case the overall distributional impact of public projects would be 
narrower. Given this, fiscal decentralisation with smaller expenditure-GDP-ratio may 
lead to increase the regional income inequality. The reported results show that 
government size is appeared to have a predictive power in explaining poverty; 
having a negative sign and statistically significant with 1% confident interval.  
Similarly, among other macroeconomic variables, the variables that potentially have 
an adverse impact on poverty are inflation and unemployment. Following Martinez–
Vazquez and MacNab (2006) and Iqbal and Saima (2010) we construct the Misery 
Index, which is the aggregation of inflation and unemployment that is used as a 
proxy for macroeconomic stability and assesses its impact on headcount poverty. As 
expected, Misery Index with a significant coefficient seems to have an adverse 
impact on poverty (table 8.2).  
The rule of law index is included to assess the structural characteristics of the 
supremacy of law and equal social and economic opportunity available to all 
individuals across the country. The same index is expected to capture political 
freedom that shows the level of participation in political process and therefore have 
power to influence the trend and composition of public expenditure that 
consequently affect the level of poverty. Contrary to the theoretical explanation the 
                                                 
87
 Tertiary and public health projects may be given as example. 
88
 For instance, private income of these groups may increase due to the productivity gain of public 
sector schemes.  
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coefficient of the rule of law shows that the latter variable is negatively correlated 
with poverty, though it is not significant. The reason for the negative correlation may 
be that Pakistan has a very poor record of rule of law (TI, 2007). This is because 
justice is either denied or delayed to the majority of the people. Nepotism and 
favouritism is widespread across the society (Hussain, 2006). Ethnic and social 
stratification is very high (Cohen, 2006). And finally at political front, due to 
autocratic regimes through military dictators, the democratic norms are either non-
existent or very weak (Adeney, 2007b). Due to these reasons, the country therefore, 
obtained a high score in Freedom House‟s rule of law index.  
Similarly, the index of corruption is included to control for the impact of public 
funds‘ embezzlement as well as the political and elite capture that diverts public 
funds to suffice the specific groups‘ ends rather than benefiting the poor. The 
coefficient of corruption index is significant at 10% and showing an expected 
positive sign to poverty. It exhibits that high level of corruption has a negative and 
adverse impact on poverty.  
Since the overarching objective of the devolution reform
89
 was to reduce poverty by 
empowering the local people through their indigenous political representatives, it is 
likely to have a positive impact on poverty, particularly rural poverty. Following 
Assamoi Yao (2006) an interaction term of fiscal decentralisation and the devolution 
reform dummy is created to examine whether further devolution or decentralisation 
to the third tier of governments (local governments) along with expenditure 
decentralisation to the provinces helps reducing poverty or not. The regression 
coefficient of interaction term maintains a negative sign and strongly significant. It 
suggests that decentralisation to third tier of government is considerably instrumental 
in headcount poverty reduction.  
 Second, fiscal decentralisation (2) is used that is measured as the ratio of provincial 
governments‘ expenditure to national expenditure minus debt payment.90 As shown 
in table 8.2, the coefficient of fiscal decentralisation (2) is significant at 10% and 
negatively correlated with headcount poverty ratio. This suggests that even if we 
                                                 
89
 The devolution reform and its impact on social service provision and poverty are thoroughly 
elaborated in chapter X.  
90
 While being a highly indebted country, Pakistan devoted a considerable portion of its national 
budget on debt servicing (interest and principal amounts‘ repayment). Pakistan‘s external debts and 
liabilities were 31.6 % of GDP in 2010 (Pakistan, 2010-11).  
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deduct debt repayments from national expenditure before measuring for fiscal 
decentralisation, the latter still remains influential in reducing headcount poverty. All 
other variables are consistent with their level of significance and coefficient signs in 
second model as of the first one, though the magnitude of responses of explanatory 
variables to headcount poverty are slightly modified.  
As columns 4 and 5 of the table 8.2 show, the coefficients of fiscal decentralisation 
(1 and 2) are statistically significant and reporting the expected negative sign. 
Among other variables the magnitude of pro-poor expenditures‘ effectiveness and 
the coefficient sign of per capita GDP growth to headcount poverty reduction are 
noticeable. For rural poverty the coefficient of per capita GDP growth with positive 
sign suggests that it has an adverse impact on poverty, which is in contrast to our 
hypothesis. However, with insignificant parameter, per capita GDP growth seems to 
be irrelevant in explaining the rural poverty dynamics in Pakistan. The fundamental 
reason would be the abysmal performance of agricultural sector in the country over 
an extended period of time. As we showed earlier, more than 60% of rural 
population dependents on agriculture directly or indirectly to extract their livelihood 
(Pakistan, 2010-11). Thus, weak performance in agricultural sector is very likely to 
have a significant impact on rural poverty. Furthermore, around 60% contribution to 
GDP comes from service sector, which experienced a much higher growth rate over 
the last three decades than commodity producing sectors: i.e. agriculture and 
manufacturing. Obviously, urban people benefit more from services sector than their 
rural counterparts. Contrary to rural poverty, per capita GDP is significant, albeit 
only with 10%, and has a negative sign vis-à-vis urban poverty. Thus, it may be 
concluded that GDP growth with more and increasing share of service and 
manufacturing sectors than agriculture has the explanatory power for urban poverty. 
In addition, positive but insignificant coefficient of per capita GDP growth to rural 
poverty shows that the former is skewed towards urban areas therefore the rural poor 
have been failed to reap the fruits of GDP growth. Likewise, pro-poor expenditures 
seem to be less effective in terms of rural poverty reduction compare to urban 
poverty (see column 6 of table 8.2). The index of pro-poor expenditures contains 
basic healthcare and education including others. It is observed that urban areas 
received a much better investment in these areas than rural ones.  
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Columns 7 and 8 of table 8.2 report the regression results when the poverty gap is 
used as dependent variable, using the same baseline equation (7.1). The findings are 
almost similar to those already obtained by using headcount poverty as a poverty 
predictor. The regression results seem to support a negative relationship between 
fiscal decentralisation and poverty gap. This indicates that one percentage point 
increase in fiscal decentralisation tends to reduce the poverty gap by 0.79 percentage 
point between the average poor and the national poverty threshold.   
With the similar fashion, fiscal decentralisation seems to be effective in reducing 
equality among the poor, which is captured by the severity of poverty or squared 
poverty gap. Statistically significant coefficients of fiscal decentralisation vis-à-vis 
severity of poverty gap models - reported in last two columns of table 8.2 - illustrate 
that one percentage point increase in fiscal decentralisation would decrease the 
severity of poverty by 0.36 and 0.34  percentage point increase respectively.
91
 
Observing the value of R-squared and adjusted R-squared, it is clearly evident that 
all OLS models described in table 8.2 explain about 76% to 91% variation of 
poverty. Overall these models are fit considering the socio-economic nature of the 
dependent variables with multiple dimensions.  
As discussed earlier, given the presence of potential endogeneity associated with 
poverty, fiscal decentralisation, pro-poor expenditures and government size or any 
other explanatory variable, standard OLS procedure may lead to produce 
inconsistent and inefficient results. In this case GMM-IV estimation techniques with 
appropriate instrumental variables can be used to account for potential endogeneity. 
In our analysis the problem of endogeneity may occur with fiscal decentralisation 
and pro-poor expenditures variables. 
 Pakistan politically and socially is a very volatile country with frequent military 
interventions in political affairs she experiences social tensions in ethnic and 
sectarian lines. Moreover, the country has been highly dependent upon foreign 
aids/loans for her budgetary and balance of payments supports. Therefore, regimes 
change due to military coup d'états, internal and external wars, and unexpected 
                                                 
91
 One of the important determinants of severity of poverty, Gini coefficient, is not included due to the 
potential endogeneity (reverse causality), the potential impact of severity of poverty in explaining 
Gini-coefficient. In order to overcome this possible econometrical problem, we used GMM-IV for 
technique wherein Gini coefficient is included as control variable. The regression results of GMM-IV, 
which are reported in table E.1 in appendix E, are not different than what we obtained using OLS.    
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sectarian strife as well as the change in foreign lenders/donors‘ policies are highly 
likely to affect the poverty outcomes, the level of fiscal decentralisation, 
governments‘ expenditures on pro-poor social services and the subsidies.  
Given this, it is very likely that the use of standard OLS techniques therefore makes 
the estimated results biased and inconsistent. To account for these issues related to 
endogeneity, GMM-IV technique is adopted, where the lag values of potentially 
endogenous variables are used as relevant instruments. One year lag values of 
expenditure decentralisation, pro-poor expenditures and government expenditures to 
GDP are used as internal instrumental variables. 
The regression results of GMM-IV model are reported in table 8.3. It is worth noting 
that the variables of interest, fiscal decentralisation and pro-poor expenditures, 
maintain the same relationship with headcount poverty and poverty gap with similar 
level of significance as we observed while using standard OLS. Severity of poverty 
turns out to be insignificant when fiscal decentralisation (2) is used. Following the 
classical decentralisation literature, first measurement of expenditure decentralisation 
is thought to give more reliable information so it is used almost in all studies of 
decentralisation. Obtaining the similar results for expenditure decentralisation for all 
measures of poverty in GMM-IV procedure confirms the robustness of our analysis.     
Table 8.4 and table 8.5 provide the results where revenue decentralisation is used as 
core independent variable. The results suggest a positive but insignificant 
relationship between revenue decentralisation and headcount poverty reduction, 
suggesting that revenue decentralisation might not help in reducing headcount 
poverty. But prior to inferring any conclusions from the outcomes, it is worth 
pointing out that 
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Table 8.3: The Determinants of Headcount Poverty, Poverty Gap and Severity of Poverty 
Model GMM-IV (Core Independent Variable: Expenditure  Decentralisation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependant Variables 
Headcou
nt Ratio  ᶲ
(overall) 
Headcou
nt Ratio  ᶲ
(overall) 
Headcou
nt Ratio 
(ᶲRural) 
Headcou
nt Ratio 
(ᶲRural) 
Headcount 
Ratio 
(ᶲUrban) 
Headcount 
Ratio 
(ᶲUrban)  
Poverty 
Gap  ᶲ 
Poverty 
Gap  ᶲ 
Severity of 
Poverty   
Severity of 
Poverty  
Fiscal Decentralisation (Exp)1 
-1.265***  -1.177***  -1.567***  -0.896***  -0.401**  
(0.258)  (0.337)  (0.335)  (0.255)  (0.163)  
Fiscal decentralisation Exp (2) 
 -0.993***  -0.879**  -1.181**  -0.565**  -0.234 
 (0.349)  (0.377)  (0.478)  (0.287)  (0.162) 
Pro-poor Expenditure  ᶲ
-0.210*** -0.153*** -0.220*** -0.165*** -0.189*** -0.115** -0.193*** -0.148*** -0.224*** -0.203*** 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.037) (0.039) (0.045) (0.050) (0.042) (0.036) (0.031) 
Government Size -0.0840
*** -0.0486** -0.0791*** -0.0480* -0.0654*** -0.0235 -0.0659*** -0.0463*** -0.0236*** -0.0156* 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.026) (0.013) (0.030) (0.010) (0.017) (0.005) (0.008) 
Corruption Index 0.673
*** 0.286* 0.658*** 0.308** 0.636*** 0.168 0.530*** 0.286** 0.288*** 0.183*** 
 (0.097) (0.152) (0.111) (0.156) (0.103) (0.210) (0.096) (0.139) (0.059) (0.064) 
Rule of Law -1.539
*** -0.824** -1.813*** -1.136*** -1.424*** -0.525 -1.434*** -0.891*** -0.956*** -0.707*** 
 (0.408) (0.328) (0.462) (0.360) (0.411) (0.354) (0.403) (0.260) (0.264) (0.179) 
Per Capita GDP  ᶲ -0.0268** -0.0129 -0.0261* -0.0119 -0.0130 -0.00566 0.0144 0.000544 0.00267 -0.00411 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
Devolution Reform Dummy 
-0.244** -0.198 -0.201 -0.175 -0.354*** -0.315 -0.0590 -0.0758 0.0118 -0.00246 
(0.118) (0.186) (0.141) (0.196) (0.112) (0.237) (0.080) (0.132) (0.049) (0.069) 
 
Misery Index$  
0.0054**
* 
0.0075*** 0.0074**
* 
0.0208**
* 
-0.0069 0.00567* 0.0017* 0.0064** 0.00112 -0.00432 
(0.0032) (0.002) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.00381) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.002) 
Constant 3.641
*** 4.109*** 3.476*** 3.921*** 3.312*** 3.902*** 1.910*** 2.274*** 0.441** 0.609*** 
 (0.328) (0.273) (0.409) (0.308) (0.319) (0.376) (0.263) (0.203) (0.196) (0.149) 
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
R2 0.876 0.838 0.809 0.786 0.886 0.826 0.778 0.783 0.875 0.893 
adj. R2 0.843 0.794 0.757 0.728 0.855 0.779 0.719 0.724 0.841 0.864 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01, Variables expressed in logarithm.  $ Combination of Inflation and unemployment  
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revenue decentralisation has always lagged far behind the expenditure 
decentralisation in Pakistan, where the federal government controls the majority of 
tax and non-tax revenue sources and then transfers a portion of them to provinces 
through National Finance Commission (NFC) Awards based on certain criteria (see 
chapter 6 for more discussion on NFC and other resource transfers mechanisms). 
Given the weak revenue decentralisation and kind of a cyclic pattern of poverty in 
Pakistan over the last three and half decades, it is hard to conclude any statistical 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation, when it is measured in terms of revenue, 
and poverty.
92
  
          
                                                 
92
 Taking into account that revenue decentralisation (2), measured as the ratio of provincial revenue 
minus grants-in-aids to total revenue - ranges from 6 % to 26 % of total revenue - neither the 
statistical relationship between fiscal decentralisation and headcount poverty changes nor the 
coefficient of decentralisation becomes significant. 
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Table 8.4: The Determinants of Headcount Poverty and Poverty Gap and Severity of Poverty 
Model : OLS (Core Independent Variable: Revenue Decentralisation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependant Variables 
Headcount 
Ratio  ᶲ
(overall) 
Headcount 
Ratio  ᶲ(overall) 
Headcount 
Ratio (ᶲRural) 
Headcount 
Ratio (ᶲRural) 
Headcount Ratio 
(ᶲUrban) 
Headcount 
Ratio (ᶲUrban) 
Poverty Gap  ᶲ
(overall) 
Poverty Gap  ᶲ
(overall) 
Severity of 
Poverty Æ (1) 
Severity of 
Poverty Æ (2) 
Fiscal Decentralisation 
(Rev) 1 
0.6891 
 
0.4075 
 
1.46* 
 
1.172* 
 
1.352*** 
(0.56409) 
 
(0.648) 
 
(0.779) 
 
(0.6425) 
 
(0.4423) 
 
Fiscal Decentralisation 
(Rev) 2 
 
0.6654 
 
0.4117 
 
1.306 
 
0.4777 
 
0.9178 
 
(0.5316) 
 
0.6077 
 
(0.772) 
 
(0.6361) 
 
(0.545) 
Government Size -0.0659*** -0.0645*** -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.049*** -0.044*** -0.054*** -0.0544*** -0.0144** -0.014** 
 
(0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0121) (0.0118) (0.014) (0.015) (0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0055) (0.0057) 
Pro-poor Expenditure -0.004*** -0.00417*** -0.003** -0.0033** -0.0058*** (0.0061*** -0.005*** -0.0046*** -0.2741*** -0.27*** 
 
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.049) (0.0626) 
GDP Growth  ᶲ -0.0042 -0.004 -0.0028 (-0.0031) -0.0241* -0.024* 0.002 -0.0027 (-0.0068) -0.0064 
 
(0.0111) (0.0121) 0.0120 (0.013) (0.0154) (0.0175) (0.0127) (0.0144) (0.0059) (0.0082) 
corruption Index 0.4114** 0.4176** 0.312 0.315 (0.5168)** 0.513** 0.551*** 0.5263** 0.2099*** 0.228*** 
 
(0.1608) (0.164) (0.1849) (0.1879) (0.2223) (0.2387) (0.1832) ,0.1966 (0.062) (0.0782) 
Rule of Law -0.322 -0.318 -0.243 -0.2315 -0.8405 -0.837 (1.006** -0.944 -0.747*** -0.785** 
 
(0.4881) (0.496) (0.5611) (0.567) (0.6745) (0.72) ,0.556) (0.5935) (0.2536) (0.3105) 
Interaction 
term(FD*Economic Reform 
Dummy) 
-1.455*** -1.6175*** -1.204*** -1.375*** -2.13*** -2.16*** -0.495 -0.506 -0.142 -0.0454 
(0.3608) (0.4294) (0.4148) (-0.4909) (0.4987) 0.6235 (0.411) (0.5138) (0.1983) (0.2429) 
Misery Index 0.0108*** 0.0096** 0.0143*** 0.0134*** (0.0059)* 0.0041* 0.0035* 0.004* -0.0013 -0.0021 
,0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0057) (0.00393) (0.004) (0.0019) 0.0034 
Constant 3.572*** 3.5803*** 3.747*** 3.762*** 2.5890*** 2.593*** 0.9604** 1.187* 0.4424** 0.4734 
 
( 0.6062) (0.6268) (0.696) (0.716) (0.837) (0.91) (0.6905) (0.75) (0.2003) 0.2304** 
 
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.8 0.81 0.86 0.85 0.75 0.73 0.91 (0.89) 
Adj R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.75 0.75 0.82 0.8 0.68 0.64 0.88 0.85 
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. Æ  Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in severity in poverty due to potential presence of autocorrelation. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01% and 
1% level respectively 
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Table 8.5: The Determinants of Headcount Poverty and Poverty Gap and Severity of Poverty 
Model: GMM-IV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependant 
Variables 
Headcoun
t Ratio  ᶲ
(overall) 
Headcount 
Ratio  ᶲ
(overall) 
Headcount 
Ratio 
(ᶲRural) 
Headcount 
Ratio (ᶲRural) 
Headcount 
Ratio 
(ᶲUrban) 
Headcount 
Ratio (ᶲUrban)  
Poverty 
Gap  ᶲ 
Poverty 
Gap  ᶲ 
Severity of 
Poverty    
Severity of 
Poverty  
Fiscal 
Decentralisation 
(Rev) 1 
2.072
***
  2.514
***
  1.551
*
  1.396
***
  0.864
***
  
(0.570)  (0.657)  (0.798)  (0.534)  (0.323)  
Fiscal 
Decentralisation 
(Rev) 2 
 
 2.292
***
  2.600
***
  1.980
**
  1.608
***
  0.829
***
 
 (0.512)  (0.574)  (0.785)  (0.504)  (0.309) 
Pro-poor 
Expenditure 
-0.213
***
 -0.251
***
 -0.248
***
 -0.285
***
 -0.147
**
 -0.191
***
 -0.192
***
 -0.222
***
 -0.234
***
 -0.243
***
 
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.045) (0.055) (0.058) (0.060) (0.060) (0.064) (0.039) (0.043) 
Government Size -0.0733
***
 -0.0700
***
 -0.0651
***
 -0.0625
***
 -0.0593
***
 -0.0548
**
 -0.0589
***
 -0.0562
***
 -0.0188
***
 -0.0184
**
 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) 
corruption Index 0.345
***
 0.344
***
 0.309
**
 0.319
***
 0.307 0.288 0.303
**
 0.298
**
 0.169
***
 0.177
***
 
 (0.111) (0.104) (0.132) (0.119) (0.198) (0.195) (0.130) (0.128) (0.059) (0.062) 
Rule of Law -0.466 -0.528
*
 -0.788
**
 -0.866
***
 -0.140 -0.183 -0.677
**
 -0.718
***
 -0.606
***
 -0.634
***
 
 (0.341) (0.306) (0.341) (0.327) (0.443) (0.402) (0.287) (0.275) (0.155) (0.165) 
GDP Growth -0.00426 0.00382 0.000669 0.00887 -0.0314
**
 -0.0230
*
 -0.00797 -0.00196 -0.00596 -0.00370 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) 
Devolution 
Reform 
Dummy 
-0.502
***
 -0.433
***
 -0.428
***
 -0.353
***
 -0.698
***
 -0.633
***
 -0.244
**
 -0.194
*
 -0.0653 -0.0429 
(0.125) (0.121) (0.135) (0.130) (0.157) (0.165) (0.110) (0.113) (0.053) (0.057) 
Constant 4.336
***
 4.340
***
 4.119
***
 4.124
***
 4.178
***
 4.179
***
 2.402
***
 2.405
***
 0.660
***
 0.662
***
 
 (0.220) (0.223) (0.209) (0.218) (0.545) (0.525) (0.286) (0.289) (0.133) (0.138) 
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
R
2
 0.863 0.868 0.818 0.823 0.824 0.823 0.738 0.720 0.877 0.863 
adj. R
2
 0.826 0.832 0.769 0.776 0.777 0.776 0.668 0.645 0.844 0.826 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01.  ᶲVariables expressed in logarithm.  
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8.3 FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT  
In addition to FGT indices of income poverty we use the HDI as proxy of poverty. 
The HDI is used in order to assess the consistency in the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty reduction. Compared to FGT indices the use of the HDI 
gives us a broader understanding of welfare. Analysing the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation and public expenditures on pro-poor social services, the HDI helps 
us to see the   association of various dimensions of poverty and provincial autonomy 
in implementing and monitoring public expenditures.   
As stated earlier, the HDI index combines the indicators of basic education, 
healthcare and level of income. An increase in the HDI normally represents a 
decrease in the level of poverty. The measurement of the HDI is consistent due to its 
single and well-defined measures of health and education as well as per capita 
income, against FGT indices that may suffer from measurement inconsistency.   
Table 8.6 reports the results using the GMM-IV techniques. These results show that 
there is a positive and significant relationship between fiscal decentralisation – either 
measured as ratio of provincial governments‘ expenditures share to total expenditure 
or provincial governments‘ expenditure share to total expenditures minus debt 
payments – and the HDI. This suggests that transferring more power to provinces is 
likely to decrease poverty and increase the living standards, which is proxied here by 
the HDI. 
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Table 8.6: The Determinants of Human Development Index Ranking 
Model: GMM IV 
Dependant Variables HDI (1) HDI (2) 
Fiscal Decentralisation (Exp) 1 0.0387***  
 (0.012)  
Fiscal Decentralisation (Exp) 2  0.0209*** 
  (0.006) 
Pro-poor Expenditure  ᶲ
0.00104
** 0.00171*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Government Size 0.00127*** 0.000440 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Income Share of Bottom 20% of 
Population 
-0.0476
*** -0.0428*** 
(0.008) (0.007) 
Rule of Law -0.00454 -0.000993 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Corruption Index -0.00608 -0.00456 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
Devolution Reform Dummy 0.00537 0.00437 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Subsidies  ᶲ 0.00157 0.00147 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of Urban Population to total 
0.00543
*** 0.00498*** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
Constant 0.530*** 0.526*** 
 (0.112) (0.112) 
N 34 34 
R
2 0.84 0.82 
adj. R
2 0.80 0.79 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01.  ᶲVariables expressed in 
logarithm.  ᶲVariables expressed in logarithm.  
 
Likewise, the index of pro-poor expenditures appears to play a significant role in 
increasing the HDI. It is important to point out that the index includes education and 
health expenditures, and the latter variables are two of the three components of the 
HDI. Therefore, it casts a serious doubt of possible endogeneity. In order to avoid 
any potential inconsistency in regression results, the GMM-IV technique is used, in 
which the pro-poor expenditure index is instrumented by its own lag.  Obviously, the 
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HDI is considered as a strong barometer of poverty reduction, and pro-poor 
expenditures have a major impact on the HDI. Eventually, it supports our previous 
argument where the pro-poor expenditure index is shown to have a strong influence 
on poverty reduction.    
Another variable worth discussing here is the ‗income share of bottom 20% of 
population‘ that contains a significant coefficient with negative sign suggesting that 
income inequality has increased over the time in Pakistan. This understandably has a 
serious negative impact on the HDI. Similarly, urbanisation has shown to be a 
crucial predictor of the HDI: urban centres with better civic facilities have much 
better HDI indicators than rural areas. So our study suggests that greater is the level 
of urbanisation better would be the HDI indicator. Another point worth noting is the 
insignificant regressor of the devolution reform dummy. Since this dummy variable 
accounts for changes in the HDI after 2001 and the HDI has not improved drastically 
during this period, the coefficient seems to report an insignificant association 
between the HDI and the dummy variable.  
8.4 FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND POVERTY REDUCTION OUTCOMES: 
PANEL REGRESSIONS  
After looking at the impact of fiscal decentralisation on poverty reduction at country 
level we further analyse and assess this relationship on provincial level. Given the 
demographic and ethnic variability and social and economic inequality among the 
provinces the impact of fiscal decentralisation on each province‘s poverty profile 
may be different. For instances, in terms of  headcount poverty ratio, the province of 
KP recorded the highest poverty with 45.7% living below the poverty line followed 
by Balochistan with 40% poverty. Another important point may be considered is the 
lowest poverty rate (19.5%) in Sindh province in 2009, instead of the Punjab. 
However, the standard deviation of poverty (5.811) is the highest in Sindh and 
lowest in Punjab (3.188) (see table 8.7). This suggests that poverty varies not only 
among the provinces but it also experiences a great variation within the provinces.     
The level of fiscal decentralisation varies across the provinces as well. As it is shown 
in table B.5 in appendix B, expenditure decentralisation in the Punjab ranges from 
5% to 37%, while expenditure shares of Balochistan to total national expenditures is 
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one to 9% respectively. In terms of revenue decentralisation Balochistan‘s 
performance, as expected, is much lower. It contributes from almost zero to merely 
2% of total revenue collected nationally. Thus, considering variations in both fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty among the provinces it warrants having a cross province 
analysis of the effect of decentralisation on poverty.  
Table 8.7 summarises the preliminary statistics for provincial dataset used for panel 
analysis. Total poverty of all provinces varies from 19.5 to 45.7 with 32.65 average 
value and 5.52 dispersion. The urban poverty ranges from 13.43 to 37.87 with 26.67 
mean and 5.70 standard deviation and rural poverty ranges from 25.88 to 48.1 with 
36.64 mean value and 4.59 dispersion. Equally, expenditure decentralisation varies 
from 0.01 to 0.37 with the average value of 0.087 and 0.069 standard deviation with 
first measurement. For the second measurement the ratio varies from 0.01 to 0.379 
with 0.113 mean and 0.080 standard deviation. Likewise, the ratio of revenue 
decentralisation when applying first measurement ranges from almost zero to 0.171 
with average 0.059 and 0.049 dispersion across the mean. In second measurement 
the same ratio lies between 0.001 to 0.164 with the standard deviation value of  
0.458 and 0.052 mean.    
Table 8.7: Summary Statistics (Provinces) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expenditure Decentralisation (1) 140 0.087414 0.069814 0.01 0.37 
Expenditure Decentralisation (2) 140 0.113429 0.080417 0.01 0.379 
Infant mortality rate  140 93.6 17.2065 54.9 155 
Literacy Rate 140 32.99607 13.64027 9 59 
Overall Poverty  140 32.65457 5.524174 19.5 45.7 
Overall poverty Gap 140 5.338786 1.186197 3.01 8.81 
Overall Severity of Poverty  140 1.440143 0.48389 0.52 2.91 
Per Capita GDP 140 4060.793 1311.164 2239 7991 
Per capita Own revenue 140 85.5735 102.2172 5.44 778.1 
Per capita Subsidies  140 44.31564 35.80982 5.11 184.11 
Pro-poor expenditures 140 389.4192 355.0672 20.613 1577.863 
Revenue Decentralisation (1) 140 0.059621 0.04947 0.0004 0.171 
Revenue Decentralisation (2) 140 0.052529 0.045835 0.001 0.164 
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Rural Poverty  140 36.64 4.966976 25.88 48.1 
Rural Poverty Gap 140 5.885643 1.56932 2.28 9.87 
Severity of Poverty, Rural  140 1.645857 0.524171 0.72 3.19 
Severity of Poverty, Urban 140 1.315643 0.434735 0.67 2.6 
Urban Poverty 140 26.67943 5.707275 13.43 37.87 
Urban Poverty Gap 140 4.605571 1.376952 1.6 8.4 
 
8.5 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES AND REGRESSION RESULTS 
For estimations, the FE models and RE models and the GMM-IV approach are used 
to control for unobserved province specific effects, possible systematic estimation 
errors and omitted variables bias as well as endogeneity bias, respectively. The 
outputs of the regressions are presented on tables 8.8 and 8.9 for both on overall 
poverty as well as rural and urban poverty.  
 Number of changes has been made in variables‘ setting for this analysis compare to 
the simple time series analysis. First, government size variable that proxy the share 
of public sector expenditure to the GDP is not included. Despite having a thorough 
research on existing literature on Pakistani economy and consulting various federal 
and provincial level official documents, we have been unable to find out data for the 
provincial government‘s size that would cover our time series. Therefore, cited 
variable is dropped from the panel analysis. Second, corruption perception index‘s 
data is obtained from Transparency International and the International Country Risk 
Guide. It is provided only on country bases. Yet we should expect not to have 
corruption data on provincial level. Third, we also drop the rule of law variable due 
mainly to the non-availability of data on provincial level. The rule of law which is 
expected to capture quality of governance, prevalence of justice and equal social, 
economic and political opportunities for both rich and the poor, seems to be  
irrelevant in redressing the problem of the poor with insignificant coefficient 
statistics. Thus, while replacing these variables, numerous other important poverty 
predictors are included in this analysis that not only capture the economic aspect but 
have a great deal to explain the social dynamics of poverty as has been observed 
from the literature reviewed in chapters 2 and 5 .  
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As discussed in chapter 5, poverty has multi-faceted dynamics that includes factors 
other than economic needs. In order to account for those factors we incorporate adult 
literacy rate as a control variable. Along with education level, which of course plays 
a key role in poverty reduction
93
, the literacy rate also is expected to capture social 
awareness and political sagacity that are crucial in reducing poverty indirectly if not 
directly. In addition to this, healthcare is shown
94
 to be an important explanatory 
variable in poverty regressions so Infant Mortality Rate is included to reflect the 
level of health services. Another variable included in the analysis is per capita 
subsidies, provided both by federal and provincial governments. Public economics 
literature
95
 posits that subsidies are given mainly to those sectors that are expected to 
provide relief to the poor and dispossessed. Per capita revenue collected in respective 
provinces is also included as one of potential poverty predictors.  
The results of the regressions using equation (7.2) are presented in table 8.8. Third 
column of the table reports the FE and RE models regressions‘ outcomes in which 
poverty is regressed on fiscal decentralisation. The coefficient of decentralisation is 
significant at 5% level and negatively associated with overall poverty. This supports 
our assumption that decentralising public resources make a positive and considerable 
impact on poverty reduction. In order to choose between the FF and RE models the 
Hausman test is conducted for all 6 models shown in table 8.8. As presented 
underneath of table we have not failed to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between province unobserved fixed effects and the explanatory variables. The 
Hausman test that approximately follows a Chi-Square distribution with 10 degree of 
freedom is less than 1%, suggesting for Fixed Effects estimations for all models.  
As noted earlier the possible endogeneity problems cast serious doubt about the 
consistency and validity of the FEs regression results. In order to obtain consistent 
and valid regression outcomes, the GMM-IV procedure is applied using appropriate 
instruments for 
 
                                                 
93
 See for example Tilak (2007); Hopson and Lee (2011); Rolleston (2011); Gremin and Nakabugo 
(2012). 
94
  For a rigorous discussion on the relationship between poverty and healthcare, please see Diamond 
and R. Stephenson (2001); ADB (2001); and OECD (2002). 
95
 See for example see P. Schultz (2004); López and Galinato (2007) 
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Table 8.8: The Determinants of Headcount Poverty 
Models FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Dependent 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Headcount 
Poverty, 
Overall® 
Headcount 
Poverty, 
Overall® 
Headcount 
Poverty, 
Overall® 
Headcount 
Poverty, 
Overall® 
Headcount 
Poverty, 
Rural® 
Headcount 
Poverty, 
Rural® 
Headcount 
Poverty, 
Rural® 
Headcount 
Poverty, 
Rural® 
Headcount 
Poverty, 
Urban® 
Headcount 
Poverty, 
Urban® 
Headcount 
Poverty, 
Urban® 
Headco
unt 
Poverty, 
Urban® 
(a) -0.817** -0.468*   -0.820** -0.753*   0.275 -0.249   
 (0.457) (0.555)   (0.344) (0.391)   (0.713) (0.754)   
(b)   -0.921*** -0.665*   -1.045*** -0.946***   -0.399 -0.776 
   (0.308) (0.345)   (0.223) (0.236)   (0.488) (0.477) 
(c) -0.868*** -0.268*** -0.861*** -0.247*** -0.632*** -0.245*** -0.574*** -0.199*** -0.689*** -0.210** -0.72*** -0.200** 
 (0.090) (0.074) (0.091) (0.069) (0.068) (0.052) (0.066) (0.047) (0.141) (0.101) (0.145) (0.095) 
(d) -0.162*** -0.0401 -0.177*** -0.0518 -0.135*** -0.0503 -0.125*** -0.0489 -0.311*** -0.177** -0.32*** -0.19*** 
 (0.044) (0.051) (0.042) (0.048) (0.033) (0.036) (0.030) (0.033) (0.068) (0.069) (0.066) (0.067) 
(e) -0.0032*** -0.00446*** -0.00310*** -0.0039*** -0.00319*** -0.00381*** -0.00287*** -0.00338*** -0.0030*** -0.0028*** -0.00*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
(f) 0.0190
*** -0.0000642 0.0190*** 0.000223 0.0113*** 0.00101 0.0107*** 0.000187 0.0131*** -0.00358 0.013*** -0.0036 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
(g) -0.000119*** -0.000104*** -0.000113*** -0.0001*** -0.000111*** -0.000106*** -0.000104*** -0.000105*** -0.0001*** -0.0000112 -0.00*** -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(h) -0.000361 0.000535* -0.000405 0.000420 -0.0000915 0.000245 -0.000215 0.000173 -0.00098** -0.000102 -0.001** -0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(i) -0.000169 0.000685 -0.000398 0.000688 0.000306 0.000656
* 0.000197 0.000810** 0.000588 0.000272 0.00053 0.00038 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
(j) 0.270 0.393   0.830*** 0.659***   -0.0571 0.0553   
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Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. ® Variables are expressed in log form.  
 
Variable Definitions 
A Expenditure Decentralisation (1) b Expenditure Decentralisation (2) 
C Per Capita GDP d Devolution Reform 
E Infant Mortality Rate f Literacy Rate 
G Per Capita Pro-poor Expenditures h Per Capita Subsidies 
I Per Capita Own Revenues j Interaction Term 
(Decentralisation(1)*Devolution Reform 
Dummy 
K Interaction Term l Interaction Term (Own Revenue*Punjab-
 (0.295) (0.322)   (0.222) (0.227)   (0.461) (0.437)   
(k)   0.465** 0.415*   0.643*** 0.540***   0.193 0.246 
   (0.212) (0.240)   (0.153) (0.164)   (0.335) (0.331) 
(l) -0.000278 -0.00111** -0.0000429 -0.0011*** -0.000554* -0.000890** -0.000471 -0.00110*** -0.000911 -0.000684 -0.0009 -0.0008 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
(m) 1.153** -0.116   0.370 -0.0617   -0.276** -0.102*   
 (0.469) (0.502)   (0.354) (0.353)   (0.733) (0.681)   
(n)   1.017*** 0.0367   0.746*** 0.258   -0.709** -0.435* 
   (0.327) (0.321)   (0.237) (0.219)   (0.518) (0.444) 
(o) 10.44*** 6.176*** 10.40*** 5.977*** 8.842*** 6.024*** 8.375*** 5.653*** 8.935*** 5.464*** 9.193*** 5.389*** 
 (0.669) (0.564) (0.679) (0.521) (0.504) (0.397) (0.491) (0.355) (1.045) (0.765) (1.073) (0.719) 
(p) 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 
(q) 0.6951 0.5363 0.7042 0.5586 0.7226 0.6325 0.7517 0.6696 0.6655 0.6038 0.6673 0.6076 
(r) 0.0468 0.9214 0.0725 0.9338 0.1585 0.9296 0.0275 0.9456 0.0204 0.878 0.068 0.9030 
(S) 0.1223 0.6794 0.1119 0.6974 0.4473 0.7344 0.3731 0.7642 0.3590 0.6502 0.3227 0.6582 
(t) 25.9 (00.00) 271.2(00.00) 27.05(00.0) 294.9(.00) 29.60(0.00) 353.90(0.00) 34.40(0.00) 414.7(0.00) 22.6(0.00) 237.9(0.00) 22.7(0.00) 
246.5(0
0.0) 
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(Decentralisation(2)*Devolution Reform 
Dummy 
Sindh Dummy Variable) 
M Interaction Term (Decentralisation 
(1)*Punjab-Sindh Dummy Variable) 
n Interaction Term (Decentralisation 
(2)*Punjab-Sindh Dummy Variable) 
O Constant Term p Number of observations 
Q R- Square with r R-Square between  
S R-overall t Wald Test (P-value)  
 
Hausman Tests 
First Model  Chi2(10) [P. Value] 116.46 (0.0000) 
Second  Model Chi2(10) [P. Value] 106.88 (0.0000) 
Third  Model Chi2(10) [P. Value] 72.35(0.0000) 
Fourth Model Chi2(10) [P. Value] 70.41 (0.0000) 
Five Model Chi2(10) [P. Value] 38.42 (0.0000) 
Six Model Chi2(10) [P. Value] 33.74 (0.0002) 
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potential endogeneity of explanatory variables such as fiscal decentralisation, pro-
poor pubic expenditures and others. The insight for using GMM-IV is to minimise 
the objective function in order to satisfy the moment conditions.  It is assumed that 
the moment condition of (     ) = 0 is met.   
Table 8.9 portraits the results obtained from the estimation of equation (7.2) using 
GMM-IV techniques. The coefficient of fiscal decentralisation has negative sign and 
significant at 1% level indicates that less incidence of poverty outcomes are expected 
with more expending power to provincial governments. In other words, it illustrates 
that provincial governments are more effective in redistributing public sector 
resources along with reaching out to the poor compared to the federal government. 
 We also tested for fiscal decentralisation (2). As shown in table 8.9 the coefficient 
has negative relationship with poverty reduction outcomes and significant at 5%. 
Against decentralisation (1), the coefficient of decentralisation (2) is less significant 
and maintains a lesser magnitude to poverty reduction outcomes. It is noteworthy 
that the latter measurement of decentralisation gives a higher ratio. That is, fiscal 
autonomy to provincial governments may not be effective in terms of poverty 
reduction outcomes after a certain extent. 
From column 3 to 6 of table 8.9 we can observe that the coefficient of fiscal 
decentralisation is significant and positively associated with urban poverty reduction 
outcomes. However, for rural poverty it maintains its negative relationship.  Models 
5 and 6 in table 8.9 suggest that fiscal decentralisation has adverse impact in terms of 
urban poverty outcomes and such outcomes are contrary to our hypothesis (1). 
 In order to understand why there is a positive relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and urban poverty we incorporate an interaction term of fiscal 
decentralisation and the Punjab and Sindh dummy variable. As shown in columns 5 
and 6 the coefficient of fiscal decentralisation is highly significant with negative sign 
vis-à-vis urban poverty. It shows that in terms of urban poverty reduction 
decentralisation has contributed only in the Punjab and Sindh (provinces with 
comparatively better socio-economic infrastructure) rather than overall urban 
poverty reduction. In other two provinces (Balochistan and KP) decentralisation has 
not been instrumental in enhancing the income level of urban centres, where urban 
poverty is still record high. The main reasons for the difference of decentralisation‘s 
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effectiveness in urban poverty reduction between bigger and smaller provinces may 
be that; almost 85% of urban centres, including cosmopolitan cities of Karachi and 
Lahore, are situated in the Punjab and Sindh, and the  these provinces have been 
more successful in limiting poverty due to better job opportunities and improved 
civic facilities. On the other hand, main urban cities of Balochistan and KP, like 
Quetta and Peshawar, have even deteriorated further in terms of socio-economic 
infrastructure due chiefly to: 1. the huge influx of Afghan refugees from 
neighbouring Afghanistan during late 1970s and 1980s
96
; 2. being less populated 
than the former provinces – they could not attract  sufficient resources to finance 
their dwindling social sectors
97
; and  3. the political economy of Pakistani federation 
gives a weak and inadequate representation to Balochistan and KP in federal setup. 
Consequently, civil and military bureaucracy‘s lack of adequate attention towards 
the social and economic development of these provinces has made urban poverty 
reduction a difficult task.           
As elaborated in chapters 5, there exists a great geographical divide between urban 
and rural areas. Poverty is more prevalent in rural areas. Any policy that is effective 
in reducing rural poverty may be considered crucial in terms of reducing the overall 
incidence of poverty in the country.   
It is evident from results of table 8.9 that the coefficient of the devolution reform 
dummy variable has the expected sign and significant at 1% level. Looking at rural-
urban disaggregation level, the coefficient of the devolution reform dummy reveals 
that the devolution plan has contributed more in reducing urban poverty (columns 5 
and 6) than the rural one (columns 3 and 4 of table 8.9). 
The coefficient of the IMR, a proxy for healthcare variable, is significant and 
positively correlated with headcount poverty, suggesting that decreasing mortality 
rate – that may be considered as sign of improving healthcare condition of people – 
                                                 
96
 After Soviet Union‘s invasion Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan with the help of the United States of 
America and Saudi Arabia, sponsored and supported a war against Soviet presence in Afghanistan 
(Cohen, 2005). As a result, three millions people fled to Pakistan and took refuge either in 
Balochistan (near its capital city Quetta) or in KP (also near it capital city Peshawar) (Rashid, 2000).      
97
 As discussed in chapter IV, historically the provinces got resources/transfers from federal 
government through NFC Award based on sole criteria of population and these Provinces 
(Balochistan and KP) with less population received far lesser resources than the bigger provinces. 
Subsequently, they remained constrained to finance even those projects that are related to their basic 
services.  
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helps in controlling poverty. Nevertheless, the coefficient of same variable is 
insignificant for urban poverty reduction, albeit it maintains the same positive sign. 
Mortality in urban areas in Pakistan is much lower than its rural counterpart (See 
SPDC, 2008 for more details) and slow but steady decline in rural poverty compare 
to urban area poverty rate is therefore not surprising. On the other hand, rural areas 
with higher rate of the incidence of poverty as well as IMR in earlier period have 
experienced a decline in both of the variables over the years. Observing a significant 
coefficient for rural poverty but insignificant in urban poverty may be expected.  
 Adult literacy rate‘s regressor with negative sign is significant at only 10% for 
overall poverty and rural poverty. However, literacy rate turns out to be strongly 
significant vis-à-vis urban poverty. Given the definition of literacy used in this study 
(refer to table 7.1 in chapter 7), it is highly likely that literacy rate would be more 
effective in urban areas, where it has increased with a much faster rate than in rural 
ones. Therefore, having a strong relationship between literacy rate and urban poverty 
reduction should not be surprising. In rural areas of Pakistan the majority of people 
are directly or indirectly associated with the agriculture sector to extract their 
livelihood. Given the poor quality of education, being only literate, without any 
formal skill/training, will hardly make any difference in people‘s lives and well-
being. 
The coefficient of the index of pro-poor expenditures is significant at 10% for 
overall poverty and 1% for rural and urban poverty respectively. Its magnitude is 
close to zero for all six models - from columns 1 through 6. It may be argued that 
after excluding two components from the index – healthcare and education due to the 
reason elucidated above – the variable become less effective in reducing poverty. For 
instance, other major components of the index include sanitation facilities, welfare 
programmes and housing and water supply scheme. They may not have 
instantaneous effects on poverty reduction. Their impact on poverty, however, would 
come with a time lag. 
It is important to note that per capita subsidy is positively associated with overall 
poverty reduction outcomes and appears to be irrelevant in explaining any variation 
in overall as well as rural poverty due to its insignificant coefficient. Nonetheless, it 
becomes inversely related with urban poverty with 5% level of significance. This 
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indicates that the amount of subsidies allocated to various goods and services 
providing sectors have not reached to the poor and needy. This happens because the 
majority of the poor live in rural areas. Any policy incentive that fails to affect the 
rural poverty may be considered unproductive in terms of scaling down the overall 
incidence of poverty.  
Per capita revenue collected from provinces has positive relationship with poverty 
reduction outcomes. With significant coefficient at 1% to 10% from model (1) 
through model (5), it apparently suggests that higher per capita revenue collection in 
provinces leads to increase poverty rate. But this contradicts our hypothesis (1). In 
order to investigate the reason for this puzzle we include an interaction term of fiscal 
decentralisation and a dummy variable that takes 1 for the Punjab and Sindh and zero 
otherwise to account for these provinces effects.
98
 The coefficient of the interaction 
term of own revenue and Punjab and Sindh dummy is strongly significant with 
negative sign. It suggests that although revenue decentralisation has a strong 
explanatory power in reducing poverty, the per capita revenue in Balochistan and KP 
has not increased over the time.
99
 Therefore, overall revenue decentralisation 
variable indicates a positive relationship with poverty reduction, as we have earlier 
analysed. As a result, positive and strong effects of these provinces outweigh the 
overall impact of own revenue and turns its coefficient positive against poverty 
reduction outcomes.   
The expenditure decentralisation has remained higher since 2001, and in the same 
year the devolution plan was also implemented. So in order to confirm whether the 
combination of provincial autonomy (expenditure decentralisation) and the 
devolution to local governments helps in reducing poverty we add an interaction 
term of decentralisation and devolution reform dummy. As shown in table 8.9, the 
coefficient of interaction term is significant at 1% for all models except 4 and 5, and 
maintains a positive association with poverty reduction outcomes. The positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the interaction term and poverty 
reduction raises multiple issues. First, it shows the involvement of provincial 
governments in redistributive policies starts deteriorating and becomes 
                                                 
98
 Punjab and Sindh contribute more that 85% of total revenues collected by provincial governments 
in Pakistan (Pakistan, various issue). 
99
 They not only experienced a static revenue share to total provincial governments‘ revenue, but due 
to their increasing population per capita revenue has reduced over time. 
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counterproductive once decentralisation reaches to a certain limits. This argument is 
supported by the evidence of fiscal decentralisation literature (Sepulveda, 2010; 
Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez, 2010) in which it is shown that after 33% fiscal 
decentralisation may have an adverse impact on poverty reduction outcomes. We 
also introduced a dummy variable for each year to account for time specific effect.      
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Table 8.9: The Determinants of Headcount Poverty 
Model : GMM-IV 
Dependant Variable Headcount 
Ratio©(overall) 
Headcount 
Ratio©(overall) 
Headcount 
Ratio ©(Rural) 
Headcount Ratio 
©(Rural) 
Headcount Ratio 
©(Urban) 
Headcount Ratio ©(Urban) 
Fiscal Decentralisation (Exp)1            -0.5645*** -1.054*** 
 
2.356*** 
 
(0.226) 
 
(0.1515) 
 
(0.46807) 
 
Fiscal Decentralisation (Exp) 2 
 
-0.3569** 
 
-0.655*** 
 
1.956)*** 
 
(0.1558) 
 
(0.1135), 
 
(0.33849) 
Per Capita GDP© -0.2215** -0.2197** -0.2087*** -0.2081*** -0.0004* 0.0003* 
 (0.0949), (0.09443) (0.0669) (0.0675), (-0.00024) (-0.00024) 
Devolution Reform Dummy -0.407*** -0.3992*** -0.3050*** -0.2893*** -0.66528*** -0.735*** 
 (0.1095) (0.1098), (0.0934) ,(0.0928), ,(0.1426) (0.14844), 
Infant Mortality Rate 0.0034*** 0.0035*** 0.00276*** 0.00288*** 0.004 -0.00017 
 (0.00048), (0.00046) (0.00034) (0.00035), (0.00051) ,(0.00053) 
Adult Literacy Rate -0.00018* -0.0003)* -0.0027* 0.00244 -0.0109*** -0.00984*** 
 (0.0023) (0.00229) (0.00155) (0.0015), (0.00197) (0.00214), 
Per CapitaPro-poor Exp. © -0.00003* -0.00035* -0.00071*** -0.0007*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.00002) (0.0002) (0.000016) (0.00016) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Subsidies© 0.00026 0.0003 0.000197 0.00027 -0.00063** -0.0006** 
 (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00015) (0.00016), ,(0.00027) (0.00027), 
Own Revenue© 0.00161** 0.0016*** 0.00127*** 0.00112*** 0.00071* 0.00044 
 (0.00046) ,(0.00046) (0.00036) ,(0.00036) (0.00037) (0.00035), 
Interaction term(Own 
Revenueᶲ*Punjab/Sindh Dummy) 
-0.00178*** -0.0018*** -0.00127*** -0.00131*** -0.00088** -0.00055* 
(0.00035) (0.00035) (0.000263) (0.00026), ,(0.00035) (0.00036), 
Interaction term(FD*Devolution Reform 
Dummy) 
0.93171*** 0.7272*** 1.144*** 0.7698 0.3148 1.0122*** 
(0.2098) (0.18269) (0.16667) 0.1504 (0.2474) (0.2435), 
Interaction term(FD*Punjab/Sindh 
Dummy)  
-1.533*** -1.9455*** 
(0.4139) (0.4465), 
Constant 5.7204*** 5.7036*** 5.6524*** 5.642*** 3.5785*** 3.6012*** 
 (0.7244) (0.721) (0.5193) 0.522 (0.09131) (0.0856), 
Time Dummies (Y12-Y134) Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared  0.82 0.82 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.88 
Adj R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.81 0.8 0.81 0.82 
Robust Standards Errors are in parentheses,. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01,. ᶲ Variable expressed in per capita term. © Variable expressed in Logarithm.  
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8.6 CONCLUSION  
The regression results suggest an overall negative and statistically significant 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and poverty reduction. However, the 
impact of fiscal decentralisation on poverty reduction outcomes is much stronger in 
the Punjab and Sindh, which indicates that provinces with larger administrative 
component appear to be more effective for the success of fiscal decentralisation in 
poverty reduction. Thus, one may conclude that relative impact of fiscal 
decentralisation in terms of poverty reduction outcomes is far greater in the Punjab 
and Sindh compare to KP and Balochistan. The results show that fiscal 
decentralisation has an additional effect on poverty reduction in determining through 
other explanatory variables such as GDP per capita and pro-poor expenditures.  
Based on OLS, FE & RE and GMM-IV analyses, where poverty is proxied by FGT 
indices and the HDI, it may be argued that fiscal decentralisation and poverty 
reduction have a statistically strong association. Normally, the association does not 
change irrespective of the proxy used for poverty as well as econometric 
specifications. This underlines the fact that if expenditure decentralisation in 
countries like Pakistan is implemented wisely and adequately it would work as 
another crucial policy instrument to tackle issues related to poverty. However, one 
reason for Pakistan‘s endless difficulties is its present geopolitical structure, which is 
not based on rational reasoning.
100
 Our assertion is that the sub-national/provincial 
governments due to their proximity and accountability are more responsive to local 
people‘s needs. Therefore, the provincial governments can implement programmes 
more efficiently with better redistributive effects than the central/federal 
government. Moreover, in Pakistan social services like health and education are 
constitutionally provincial subjects. Our analyses reveal that the index of pro-poor 
expenditures appears to be influential in reducing poverty. Thus, devolving more 
economic power to provincial governments would significantly reduce poverty in 
provinces.     
                                                 
100
  Critics, like Harrison (1981) and Cohen (2005) among others believe that the nature, construct 
and structure of Pakistan are such that the system is inherently irrational, with extractive political and 
economic institutions. Given such an extractive economic and political framework even fiscal 
decentralisation may not be effective policy tool in poverty reduction.  
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Albeit, our main focus is to assess the relationship between fiscal decentralisation 
and poverty reduction outcomes we come across many other findings related to the 
effects of control variables on the incidence of poverty. For instance, contrary to our 
proposition, per capita subsidy appears to be irrelevant in affecting the poor. 
However, the same variable turns to be significant with an expected sign for urban 
poverty. Given the positive and significant relationship between the interaction term 
of fiscal decentralisation and the devolution reform dummy variable against poverty 
we may argue that fiscal decentralisation beyond a certain limit appears to be 
disadvantageous in terms of poverty reduction. We also observe that the devolution 
reform has been effective in terms of poverty reduction at provincial level, which 
suggests that fiscal and administrative empowerment of local governments enhances 
the scope of fiscal decentralisation regarding essential social services delivery and 
poverty reductions outcomes. 
The results of this chapter indicate that the fiscal decentralisation is instrumental in 
reducing the overall level of poverty, the poverty gap and severity of poverty. 
Statistically significant outcomes of fiscal decentralisation against all poverty 
proxies somehow support our first hypothesis.  
Poverty is a multifaceted concept. One way that it can be reduced is by means of 
fiscal decentralisation. Looking at the potential channels through which fiscal 
decentralisation policies may be effective in reducing poverty would further 
strengthen our argument. In following chapter we conduct an empirical inquiry to 
explore the interaction of both variables through education, health and agriculture. 
As discussed in chapter 2 these services are considered by the public finance and 
development economics literature having a strong impact on poverty.   
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CHAPTER 9 
 EMPIRICAL RESULTS II:  FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
AND POVERTY REDUCTION OUTCOMES THROUGH PRO-
POOR SECTORS 
 
9.1   INTRODUCTION   
This chapter presents empirical findings of 2, 3 and 4 hypotheses101 on potential 
channels through which fiscal decentralisation affects poverty. As described earlier, 
the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and poverty may not be 
straightforward; rather the former may affect the latter through many different 
channels. In chapter 2 we have proposed three pro-poor sectors through which this 
relationship may take place: 1. Basic education; 2. Healthcare; and 3. Agriculture. 
The first two sectors are expected to have a strong impact by increasing earning 
opportunity. They also provide a long and healthy live that enables economic agents 
to earn and invest more. In addition, they make the people empowered in their socio-
economic and political issues. The last channel (agriculture) may be considered 
critical in terms of poverty reduction for a country like Pakistan where the majority 
of the population dwell in rural areas and depend largely on this sector to extract 
their livelihood. Bearing this background in mind we conduct an empirical 
investigation in this chapter to examine the relationship between poverty and fiscal 
decentralisation through these pro-poor sectors.  
In the following we explain some relevant facts and present the descriptive statistics. 
In the second section we discuss the impact of fiscal decentralisation on basic 
education. This is followed by an examination of the statistical relationship between 
decentralisation and healthcare. The fourth section assesses the empirical data on the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and agricultural sector.       
                                                 
101
These hypotheses are discussed in chapter VII. 
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Table 9.1 illustrates the summary statistics for overall country as well as provincial 
dataset used both for time series and panel analyses. Core dependent variables for 
healthcare outcomes are CDR and IMR. The highest IMR recorded in the country 
from 1975 to 2009 is 85 per 1000. Standard deviation of the IMR with the value of 
27.38 reveals the extent of variation of the variable in Pakistan. For the provinces the 
highest IMR is 155 per 1000 that is recorded for Balochistan province. The 
minimum IMR with the value of 54.9 recorded for the Punjab, although very high, 
but far less than what is found in Balochistan. For education outcomes adult literacy 
rate is used as a dependent variable. Literacy rate for overall Pakistan in 2009 is 
57.5, which is the highest rate since 1975. In provinces 9% lowest literacy rate is 
recorded, and that is in Balochistan. The agriculture outcomes variables – agriculture 
value addition and fertilizer consumption – maintain high variations. For example, 
the standard deviation of agriculture value addition for overall country is 276.37, 
whereas for provinces the mean deviation is 1153. Likewise, the lowest amount of 
fertilizer is 0.55 mt, and that is recorded for Balochistan. 
The correlation matrix of these variables are supplied in appendix C table C.1. The 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and infant mortality rate presents a 
negative sign, showing that there is a negative relationship between both variables. It 
indicates that higher level of fiscal decentralisation ratio leads to have low rate of 
infant mortality. Similarly, as shown in appendix E fiscal decentralisation is 
positively correlated with literacy rate, a strong indicator of education outcomes. 
Likewise, the correlation of decentralisation with the agriculture outcomes – per 
capita agriculture value addition and per capita fertiliser consumption – is positive.    
Table 9.1: Summary Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bottom 20% population share in National Income 35 6.916286 0.558696 6.19 7.88 
Corruption Index 35 2.383793 0.217031 2.1 2.91 
Crude Birth Rate 35 37.33743 4.847015 29.66 43.2 
Crude Death Rate 35 9.551714 1.478659 7.11 12.4 
Crude Death Rate 140 8.928571 1.656219 6 12 
Crude Death Rate 140 8.928571 1.656219 1.656219 12 
Expenditure Decentralisation (1) 35 0.35 0.159023 0.17 0.68 
Expenditure Decentralisation (1) 140 0.087414 0.069814 0.01 0.37 
Expenditure Decentralisation (2) 35 0.452571 0.165447 0.19 0.7 
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Expenditure Decentralisation (2) 140 0.113429 0.080417 0.01 0.379 
Female secondary School Enrolment (Net) 35 16.57143 7.195937 9 29 
Gini-Coefficient 35 0.387429 0.026496 0.35 0.43 
Gross Enrolment (female) 140 41.44143 20.88948 8 95 
Gross Enrolment (total) 140 57.65714 18.36304 19.6 100 
Infant Mortality Rate 35 41.57143 27.38321 1 85 
Infant mortality rate 140 93.6 17.2065 54.9 155 
Life expectancy at birth 140 57.48714 5.382945 46.6 71 
Literacy Rate 35 38.13429 9.749025 24.2 57.5 
Literacy Rate 140 32.99607 13.64027 9 59 
Per Capita Agri Value Addition 140 1153.267 301.5558 696.95 1948.87 
Per Capita Agriculture Value Addition 35 1174.564 276.3712 892.0781 1784.327 
Per capita Development exp 140 352.3834 565.849 30.703 3532.475 
Per Capita Education Expenditure 140 226.866 171.7984 2.088452 757.1822 
Per capita fertilizer consumption 140 13.30037 7.744769 0.5571031 31.3063 
per capita health expenditure 140 121.571 112.9628 10.34 468.6 
Per Capita Manu value addition 140 619.9968 416.8128 30.64 1605.43 
Pro-poor expenditures 35 61.33229 43.35778 4.59 178.07 
Pro-poor expenditures 140 389.4192 355.0672 20.613 1577.863 
Pupil Teacher Ratio 140 38.34181 9.206662 23.4 65.2 
Pupil-teacher Ratio (male) 35 38.22857 5.770542 30 55 
Revenue Decentralisation (1) 35 0.190286 0.056333 0.08 0.27 
Revenue Decentralisation (1) 140 0.059621 0.04947 0.0004 0.171 
Revenue Decentralisation (2) 35 0.158571 0.060203 0.06 0.26 
Revenue Decentralisation (2) 140 0.052529 0.045835 0.001 0.164 
Trade Openness 35 34.08571 3.090511 28 39 
Urban Population (%) 35 31.25714 2.944015 26 37 
 
9.2 THE IMPACT OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION ON EDUCATION OUTCOMES 
In the last two decades basic education has been largely funded and monitored by 
sub-national/local governments in many developing and developed countries.  
Decentralising the control and delivery of basic education services has been a 
debated policy issue among economists102 and policymakers.103 Despite broad 
disagreements on the rationale and process of fiscal decentralisation, a consensus 
exists on the institutional changes following decentralisation that allows the sub-
national governments to finance and manage basic education services more 
effectively and efficiently than the central government.   
                                                 
102
 See for example, Cheng (1994); Fiszbein (1997); Parry (1997); Blair (2000); Therkildsen (2000); 
de Oliveira (2002); Shankar and Shah (2003); Nygren (2005); Kristiansen and Pratikno (2006);    
Faguet and Sanchez (2007); Zhao (2009). 
103
 For example UNDP (1993); WB (1995). 
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This sub-section investigates the impact of fiscal decentralisation on the 
improvement of education sector in Pakistan. As discussed earlier basic education 
has remained a provincial subject since the promulgation of the 1973 constitution. 
Therefore, it is pertinent to assume that increasing the fiscal space of provincial 
governments will have a positive impact on education. Insufficient allocation 
resources to education sector happened due to the domination of federal government 
over the provinces. The federation stands that since basic education is a provincial 
subject therefore the provinces are solely responsible for not prioritizing the sector in 
terms of resource allocations. The provincial governments however maintain that 
due to the inadequate resource transfers from the federal government they are unable 
to allocate sufficient funds to the basic education.  
How fiscal decentralisation has changed or potentially can change the structure of 
education may be a valid argument. However, this question comes out of the scope 
of this study so we leave it for future research to tackle this issue. Since we consider 
basic education as a potential channel through which fiscal decentralisation affects 
reduction in poverty we limit our empirical investigation to the relationship between 
basic education and fiscal decentralization.   
Table 9.2 presents the regression results of education proxied by adult literacy rate 
and fiscal decentralisation, measures alternatively as share of provincial governments 
to total national expenditure (revenue) to total expenditure (revenue) along with 
other control variables. Results in table 9.2 suggest a statistically significant and 
positive association between expenditure decentralisation and the literacy rate. They 
show that transferring expenditure responsibilities to provincial governments would 
improve basic education. However, the relationship between revenue 
decentralisation and literacy rate is not only statistically insignificant but it also 
records a negative coefficient sign. As showed earlier revenue collection 
responsibility has not been decentralised in Pakistan. Hence, a negative relationship 
in this case is not surprising. Likewise, the coefficient of pro-poor social service 
expenditures is strongly significant and positively correlated with the literacy rate:  
one unit increase in the share of provincial governments‘ expenditure share leads to a 
rise in the literacy rate by 0.4% point in first model (1) and 0.99% in second model 
(2).   
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Table 9.2: The Determinants of Education Outcomes 
Model : OLS 
Dependant Variable 
Adult Literacy Rate Adult Literacy Rate 
(1) (2) 
Fiscal Decentralisation (Expenditure) 0.59***  
(0.012) 
 
Fiscal Decentralisation (Revenue) 
 -0.62 
 (0.4) 
Per capita Pro-poor Expenditure ® 0.4*** 0.99*** 
(0.4296) (0.723) 
Pupil-Teacher Ratio -0.017 -0.016 
 
(0.0419) (0.0511) 
Per Capita Health Expenditure 0.0415*** 0.0375*** 
(0.0541) (0.054) 
Interaction term(Fiscal 
Decentralisation*Corruption Index) 
-9.704*** -17.01** 
(3.079) (7.277) 
Interaction term(Fiscal Decentralization*Share of 
Urban pop to total 
21.332** 1.95 
(9.199) (2.514) 
Economic Reform Dummy 2.982*** 2.941*** 
 
(1.016) (1.046) 
Constant 15.67*** 18.86 
 
(2.613) 2.44 
N 35 35 
R-squared  0.98 0.98 
Adj R-squared 0.92 0.91 
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. ®variable expressed in 
logarithm 
 
  
LM test, Breusch-Pagan/cook-weisberg test and Ramsey RESET test are applied and found no 
evidence of Autocorrelation, Heteroskesdasticity and Omitted Variables biasness.   
This inference is supported by empirical literature. Gupta et al. (2002) and 
Psacharopoulos (1994) show that more expenditure on social services, such as 
education, is highly likely to enhance economic growth, decrease income inequality 
and reduce poverty. For example, Psacharopoulos (1994) illustrates how expenditure 
on basic education is associated with high social rate of return. 
 Another control variable worth commenting here is pupil-teacher ratio. Smaller ratio 
is expected to increase the overall education performance, which means instructors 
with less number of pupils in a class are more likely to have a better interaction with 
the latter and consequently increase their learning outcomes.   
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9.2.1 PANEL REGRESSION  
 Basic education performance varies across provinces and regions in Pakistan. For 
instance, SPDC‘s (2009-10) estimates show that total literacy rate in Punjab is 59%: 
with 50% female literacy and 69% male. Whereas, in Balochistan total literacy rate 
is recorded as 45%: with 62% male and only 23% female literacy rate.  
The relationship between fiscal decentralisation and literacy rate at provincial level 
is strongly significant and positive. This suggests that different degrees of fiscal 
decentralisation across provinces do not affect its impact on education outcomes. 
However, a portrayal of this positive and statistically significant association 
underlines the fact that poorer provinces like Balochistan and KP with high illiteracy 
rate since 1990s have made noticeable improvement in their literacy rate 
thereafter.104 Therefore, despite fiscal constraints the correlation between 
decentralisation and literacy rate is strongly significant with a positive coefficient 
across all provinces. The results presented in table 9.3 indicate that keeping 
everything else constant, one unit increase in expenditure decentralisation (1 and 2) 
will increase the literacy rate by 0.82, 0.42, 0.92 and 0.8 points respectively in model 
1, 2, 3 and 4. Surprisingly, the devolution dummy variable registers a negative 
coefficient though insignificant in model 1 and 3. When an interaction term of the 
devolution reform and Punjab-Sindh dummy is included the relationship becomes 
positive. However, its predictor remains insignificant. This indicates that from 2001 
to 2009 – during which the devolution reform dummy takes the value of 1 – the 
literacy rate has not increased substantially.  
In a nutshell, we may argue that the regression analysis partially confirms our 
hypothesis (2) that fiscal decentralisation leads to increase the basic education 
services. These findings are in line with many academic studies regarding the role of 
education in reducing poverty. For example, Ranis et al. (2000) argue that education 
increases the human development and the latter in turn enhances productivity, boosts 
economic growth, reduce income inequality, and reduce poverty.   
 
                                                 
104
 For example Balochistan has increased its overall literacy rate by 29.3 percentage point from 1990 
to 2009 (16.3% in 1990 and 45 % in 2009), whereas, in KP it increased by 26.5 percentage point 
during the same time period (24 % in 1990 and 50.5 % in 2009) (SPDC, 2009-10).  
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Table 9.3: The Determinants of Literacy Rate 
Model : GMM IV 
Dependent Variables 
Adult 
Literacy rate 
Adult 
Literacy rate 
Adult 
Literacy rate 
Adult 
Literacy rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fiscal Decentralisation 
(Exp) 1 
0.82
***
 0.42
***
   
(0.488) (0.141)   
Fiscal Decentralisation 
(Exp) 2 
  0.92
***
 0.80
***
 
  (0.084) (0.770) 
Gross Enrolment Rate 
(primary) 
0.181
***
 0.151
***
 0.181
***
 0.158
***
 
(0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.020) 
Devolution  Reform 
Dummy 
-1.379 -2.836
**
 -1.291 -3.358
**
 
(0.932) (1.285) (0.932) (1.352) 
GDP Growth© 0.0751
***
 0.00605
***
 0.00696
***
 0.0581
***
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Pupil-teacher ratio 0.0301 0.0267 0.0315 0.0211 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) 
Pro-poor Expenditures©  0.0266
***
 0.0289
***
 0.0288
***
 0.0282
***
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Interaction term(Fiscal 
Decentralisation*Devolutio
n Reform Dummy) 
0.398 6.732   
(5.350) (5.469)   
Interaction term(Fiscal 
Decentralisation*Devolutio
n Reform Dummy) 
  3.574 13.29 
  (4.107) (4.362) 
Time Dummies    Included  Included 
Constant 40.78
***
 43.48
***
 40.59
***
 43.89
***
 
(1.568) (2.008) (1.486) (2.089) 
N 136 136 136 136 
R
2
 0.856 0.904 0.861 0.902 
adj. R
2
 0.848 0.864 0.854 0.862 
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses Fiscal decentralisation, GDP and Gross Enrollment Rate are 
instrumented by their first lag; p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01© Variable expressed in per capita 
term. 
Moreover, basic education is also crucial in reducing gender inequality, improving 
healthcare, and creating social and political awareness, which also are considered as 
potential channels and means to address poverty 
9.3 THE IMPACT OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION ON HEALTHCARE 
OUTCOMES  
In spite of the theoretical discussion about the role of fiscal decentralisation in 
improving the healthcare systems, there exists some, but with mixed, empirical 
evidence of the potential impact of decentralisation on healthcare sector. As Oates 
(1999) argues that fiscal decentralisation may increase the accountability of policy 
makers and local representatives to local electorates therefore allows for better 
matching between peoples‘ basic needs and social service delivery. Healthcare being 
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an essential social service is expected to receive much better treatment under 
provincial/local governments than the federal/central government (Khaleghian, 2004; 
Uchimura and Jütting, 2009; Jiménez-Rubio, 2010). For instance, in Ecuador, 
Younger (1999) finds out that public healthcare services are more pro-poor. 
Likewise, Soto et al. (2012) concludes that fiscal decentralisation has a positive and 
substantive impact in reducing IMR in Colombia. However, it is equally argued that 
the local governments have to provide healthcare services within the local 
institutional context that may characterise market failure and spillover effects, which 
consequently may discourage the local authorities in health service provisions.
105
 
Nonetheless, a good amount of literature shows an empirically significant and 
negative relationship between fiscal decentralisation and IMR.106 Following the 
second argument, we propose that fiscal decentralisation is to improve healthcare 
services in Pakistan - where in fact the health sector is constitutionally a provincial 
and local matter. However, notwithstanding the recognised advantages of 
decentralising the policy-making and expenditure authorities of healthcare services 
to the provinces in Pakistan, there appears no or very limited empirical evidence of 
the relationship between decentralisation intervention and healthcare services.  
Fiscal decentralisation may help in reducing the inequality within the provinces in 
terms of healthcare and other social services as provincial governments possess more 
knowledge of their voters‘ priorities and needs. They can focus better on rural and 
backward areas to bring them at par to rest of the province. More importantly, since 
healthcare is identified as a crucial predictor of poverty reduction107thereby 
examining this association would help us in understanding our main issue of 
correlation between fiscal decentralisation and poverty reduction.  
The empirical results of the relationship between healthcare and fiscal 
decentralisation are reported in table 9.4. Healthcare service is proxied by Crude 
                                                 
105
 For an in-depth discussion on this issue see Foster and Rosnezweig (2001); Enikolopov and 
Zhuravskaya (2007). 
106
 This literature includes  Robalino et al. (2001); Habibi et al. (2003); Asfaw et al. (2007); Cantarero 
and Pascual (2008); Jimenéz-Rubio (2010) who conducted research respectively on Argentina 
provinces, Canadian Provinces, Spanish Regions, Rural India, and a panel of low and high income 
countries.  
107
 Access to decent healthcare services plays a critical role in reducing poverty in any society. A 
healthy population can provide healthy work force to the economy who could contribute to economic 
growth and development a great deal. 
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Death Rate (CDR) and IMR while fiscal decentralisation is represented by 
expenditure decentralisation. A negative relationship between fiscal decentralisation 
and healthcare (IMR and CDR) is expected with a coefficient having a negative sign 
vis-à-vis the core regressor, the fiscal decentralisation. The results show that the 
elasticity of CRD with respect to fiscal decentralisation is high and statistically 
significant at 5%. Broadly speaking, other factors remaining the same one unit 
increase in the share of provincial expenditure to total expenditure leads to a the 
reduction of CRD and IMR by 5.29 and 13.47 points respectively. 
 
Table 9.4: The Determinants of Health Outcomes 
Model : GMM- IV 
Dependent Variables Crude Death 
Rate 
Infant Mortality rate 
Female Secondary School enrollment (% Gross) -0.359
***
 -0.231 
(0.084) (0.153) 
Fiscal Decentralisation -5.293
**
 -13.47
**
 
 (2.448) (5.860) 
Population Per Bed 0.00322
***
 0.00942
***
 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
Economic Reform Dummy -2.177
***
 -0.530 
 (0.626) (1.361) 
Interaction term(Fiscal Decentralisation* Rule 
of Law) 
-1.551 -10.04 
(1.994) (6.801) 
Interaction term(Fiscal 
Decentralisation*Corruption Index) 
-1.540
*
 1.183 
(0.874) (1.155) 
Interaction term(Fiscal 
Decentralization*Devolution Reform Dummy) 
6.361
***
 6.626
**
 
(2.016) (3.292) 
Adult Literacy Rate -0.0417 0.221 
 (0.084) (0.142) 
Urban Population (%) 0.152
*
 -1.176
***
 
 (0.085) (0.161) 
Constant 8.587
***
 119.0
***
 
 (2.570) (6.684) 
N 34 34 
R
2
 0.935 0.998 
adj. R
2
 0.910 0.997 
Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
The empirical results presented in the table 9.4 show that provincial governments 
gained an increasing role in the allocation of expenditure in healthcare. However, 
since the expenditure decentralisation process in Pakistan is depended upon the 
transfers from the federal government, the overall decentralisation volatility would 
equally affect the provincial expenditures on healthcare. 
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9.3.1 Panel Regression  
In Pakistan the impact of fiscal decentralisation on socio-economic indicators, 
including healthcare outcomes varies across provinces and regions. As we noticed in 
preceding discussions fiscal decentralisation certainly helped in reducing IMR and 
CDR in Pakistan but whether this reduction is higher in relatively developed 
provinces than in poorer provinces needs further investigation. Table 9.5 reports the 
panel regression results on four provinces where healthcare is proxied only by IMR 
due to the lack of data on CDR on provincial level.  
Overall there is a strong and statistically significant positive relationship between 
decentralisation, measures both as the share of provincial government expenditures 
to total and share of provincial to total expenditures minus debt serving, and the 
IMR. This relationship is not only in contrast to our earlier analysis in which fiscal 
decentralisation is found to reduce the IMR in Pakistan, it also warrants further 
investigation at provincial level. As discussed earlier Sindh and the Punjab are more 
developed in terms of all socio-economic indicators in one hand and receive more 
than two-third of total intergovernmental resource transfers from the federation on 
the other hand.  Equipped with better infrastructure and more financial resources, the 
Punjab and Sindh are expected to perform much better in terms of reducing the IMR 
than relatively underdeveloped and resource-scared provinces of KP and 
Balochistan.  
For this purpose an interaction term of fiscal decentralisation and Punjab-Sindh 
dummy is set up to assess whether decentralisation has different effects on the IMR 
reduction across provinces or not. As reported in table 9.5, the coefficient of the 
interaction term is significant at 10% and 5% with negative sign suggesting that 
fiscal decentralisation has reduced the IMR in Sindh and the Punjab. The results 
underline that devolving fiscal resources for the provision of basic healthcare 
services helps reducing the IMR, which is considered in the literature108 as a good 
healthcare predictor. In those provinces where infrastructure and administrative 
machinery is relative developed, decentralisation has a strong impact on healthcare 
services.  
                                                 
108
 See for example, Uchimura (2009); Jimenez-Rubio (2011); Soto et al (2012).  
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This outcome supports our argument that fiscal decentralisation improves the 
allocation efficiency of resources by allowing the sub-national/provincial 
governments to allocate the funds as per local people basic needs and preferences. 
Therefore, this resource allocation efficiency makes the basic healthcare services 
improved. Oates (1972) in his classic public finance theory posts that such kind of 
efficiency mainly comes due to the heterogeneous nature of localities or regions in 
the shape of basic needs and preferences. And Pakistan, because of her multiethnic 
and diverse historical and cultural background of each region easily fits to such 
definition of heterogeneity. As discussed in chapter 3 and 4, income distribution 
among provinces and regions is extremely unequal, where Provinces like KP and 
Balochistan show a persistence occurrence and resurgence of chorionic and other 
terminal diseases. The same provinces record the highest incidence of poverty as 
well (as shown in chapter 5). All these socio-economic, cultural, geographic, 
demographic, political and ethnic differences indicate to some kind of heterogeneity 
across provinces. Such diversities and heterogeneities support the argument of 
decentralisation as a policy tool in many countries including Pakistan. Our empirical 
results substantiate this claim.  
Moreover, our empirical results also indicate towards a very crucial point that when 
the basic healthcare services are decentralised without substantial intergovernmental 
transfers, it tends to reinforce the poorer provinces hard to finance these services. 
Consequently, they may even consider slashing the health expenditures down. Given 
the insufficient transfers from the federal government and inadequate local revenue 
generation creates a serious resource constraint that hit the KP and Balochistan‘s 
social sector hard. This will result in the failure of these provinces to reduce the 
IMR.  
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Table 9.5: The Determinants of Infant Mortality Rate
109
 
Model: GMM – IV 
Dependant Variable Infant Mortality 
Rate 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fiscal Decentralisation 
(Exp) 1 
4.036
***
 2.856
***
   
(1.316) (1.074)   
Fiscal Decentralisation 
(Exp) 2 
  2.878
***
 2.873
***
 
  (0.860) (0.868) 
Interaction term(Fiscal 
Decentralisation*Punja
b-Sindh Dummy) 
-2.068
**
 -1.366
*
 -1.453
**
 -1.452
**
 
(0.880) (0.727) (0.621) (0.627) 
Gross Enrolment Rate 
(primary) 
-0.00521
***
 -0.00626
***
 -0.00535
***
 -0.00536
***
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Devolution Reform 
Dummy 
-0.0384 0.0259 -0.00125 0.00770 
(0.034) (0.048) (0.031) (0.048) 
Interaction term(Fiscal 
Decentralisation*Devol
ution Reform Dummy) 
-1.320
***
 -0.773
**
 -0.928
***
 -0.913
***
 
(0.409) (0.325) (0.262) (0.257) 
Time dummy  Included  Included 
Health Expenditure  ᶲ -0.00690 -0.00429 -0.00392 -0.00366 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 4.670
***
 4.829
***
 4.655
***
 4.656
***
 
 (0.102) (0.083) (0.096) (0.097) 
N 136 136 136 136 
R
2
 0.416 0.553 0.461 0.463 
Adj. R
2
 0.389 0.484 0.436 0.406 
Robust Standard Error are in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01; ᶲ Variable expressed in 
per capita terms 
 
   
Our results also present that primary gross enrollment rate is a powerful predictor of 
the reduction of the IMR. The coefficient with negative sign is significant at 1% 
suggests that, holding everything else constant, one% increase in gross enrollment 
rate leads to decrease the IMR by 0.52%.  This result supports the argument of 
empirical literature (World Bank, 1995) that considers increasing literacy rate is an 
important determinant in improving social services including healthcare. This 
conclusion is in line with the previous literature (for example, World Bank, 1995; 
Younger, 1999; Gupta et al., 2002), which shows that fiscal decentralisation 
enhances expenditures on health and education. These services have strong positive 
implications on poverty.   
                                                 
109
 Fiscal decentralization and Gross Enrolment Rate are instrumented by their first lag. 
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9.3.1 THE IMPACT OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION ON AGRICULTURE 
OUTCOMES 
Agricultural sector remains the core component of the economy of Pakistan. It 
contributes around 20% to the GDP and employs 45% of total workforce of the 
country (Pakistan, 2010 -11). In the same way, agriculture occupies a central place in 
poverty reduction as two-third of total poor in Pakistan lives in rural areas, and 
around 75% of them extract their livelihood from this sector in one way or another 
(Zaidi, 2006; FBS, 2010-11).  Naturally, any policy mechanism that aims to increase 
the productivity and overall performance of agriculture seems to play a critical role 
in reducing poverty.  
Responsibility for agriculture, like basic education and healthcare, constitutionally 
also falls within the realm of provincial governments in Pakistan. Thus, agriculture 
that is the foundation of local people‘s economy is expected to be prioritised with 
fiscal decentralisation. Given this, it may be hypothesised that fiscal decentralisation 
provides more fiscal space to provincial governments and empowers the local 
communities through their elected representatives who may prioritise the resource 
allocation to promote agriculture related activities. This helps reducing poverty in the 
rural areas. Considering this, we empirically investigate the relationship between 
fiscal decentralisation and poverty reduction through agriculture sector. Agriculture 
is proxied alternatively by per capita agriculture value-addition and per capita 
fertilizer consumption. These variables capture the quality and quantity of 
agriculture production on annual basis. Value addition accounts for improvement, 
efficiency and productivity in agriculture sector. The fertilizer consumption shows 
the enlargement and extension of the sector. Other variables included in the analysis 
are mechanisation of agriculture sector – proxied by agriculture machinery -, the 
index of pro-poor expenditures, trade openness, and inflation rate – proxied by the 
CPI, quality of governance – captured by the rule of law– corruption index and the 
devolution reform dummy. 
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Table 9.6: The Determinants Agriculture Outcomes 
Model : GMM IV 
Dependant Variable Agriculture Value 
Added‡ 
Fertilizer Consumption ‡ 
(1) (2) 
Fiscal Decentralisation  
1452.6
***
 6827.8
***
 
 (546.533) (2493.284) 
Agricultural machinery  2.386
***
 16.21
***
 
 (0.374) (1.716) 
Pro-poor expenditures ‡ 2.873*** 2.948 
 (0.835) (3.056) 
Trade Openness -14.02
***
 -36.97
***
 
 (2.631) (11.174) 
Interaction term(Fiscal 
Decentralisation*Devolution Reform 
Dummy) 
237.5
***
 135.6 
(65.270) (330.952) 
Interaction term(Fiscal Decentralisation* 
Rule of Law) 
1153.2
***
 4784.6
**
 
(396.296) (1951.797) 
Consumer Price Index 4.402
**
 -9.305 
 (1.725) (8.087) 
Devolution Reform Dummy  -50.49
*
 250.6
**
 
(28.625) (98.269) 
Interaction term(Fiscal Decentralisation* 
Corruption Index) 
-138.5 -1371.5
***
 
(124.347) (523.555) 
Constant 1011.4
***
 1226.6
***
 
 (78.386) (293.454) 
N 34 34 
R
2
 0.981 0.982 
adj. R
2
 0.974 0.975 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 Agricultural machinery is 
instrumented by its one lagﬃ Variables expressed in per capita term 
 
Regressions results are reported in table 9.6 suggest that fiscal decentralisation has a 
positive and statistically significant and positive impact on agriculture. This happens 
because fiscal decentralisation may assist in empowering the local people use the 
available knowledge in an efficient way. Local representatives due to their proximity 
to local areas and people can effectively monitor the resource utilszation in 
agriculture sector. The results reveal a strongly significant (significant at 1%) 
coefficient of fiscal decentralisation with positive sign with consumption of 
fertilizer. This uncovers that fiscal decentralisation not only facilitates productivity 
but also plays a crucial role in terms of expansion of agricultural sector.  
Another important result worth considering is the negative association of free trade 
and competitiveness with agriculture sector. It was assumed that opening the sector 
to the outside competitors would facilitate trade and hence assist the local farmers to 
 278 
 
sell their products in international market. But the openness to world economy has 
had an opposite effect. The negative relationship is caused by two factors. First, the 
agriculture sector in Pakistan lags far behind other countries. This in turn is one of 
the causes of high costs and low productivity in this sector. Second, the sector is 
constantly plagued by the shortage of electricity and dysfunctional infrastructure. 
These and several other reasons show the trade openness is detrimental to the 
productivity and expansion of the sector.  
Compounded these problems are the rule of law, quality of governance and 
corruption. Better quality of governance or low level of corruption has significant 
impact on the outputs in this sector. In the first model of table 9.6 we have the 
coefficient of corruption variable, which is insignificant although shows a negative 
sign.  It illustrates that provincial governments play a better and more active role in 
monitoring the resource allocation to the sector. The accountability, transparency and 
the involvement of local people in agricultural service provision, in turn, discourages 
bureaucratic and other leakages, and enhances and promotes efficiency. Likewise, 
the coefficient of the CPI is significant at 1% with positive sign in relation to adding 
value to total output. This suggests that as a result of increasing in prices of 
agricultural commodities, the income level in rural areas has enhanced. This as a 
result enables the farmers to incorporate more machinery and other important inputs 
to increase the quantity as well as the productivity of their land.  
Indeed our empirical analysis reveals a statistically significant association between 
fiscal decentralisation and higher productivity in agriculture sector. Higher 
productivity in turn means pulling out more people out of the circle of poverty. 
However, this relationship warrants greater investigation as agriculture primarily is 
limited to the Punjab and Sindh. Balochistan and KP, on the contrary, with high 
mountains, rough terrains and water scarcity make relatively insignificant 
contribution towards total agricultural production. With this fact in mind, 
decentralisation is expected to have a different affect on agriculture sector in the 
Punjab and Sindh than to Balochistan and KP. For this reason, we conduct a panel 
regression to explore the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and its impact 
on agriculture sector at provincial level.                    
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9.3.2 PANEL REGRESSION 
Table 9.7 illustrates the panel regression results. The agricultural output that is 
proxied alternatively by per worker agriculture value addiction is regressed on 
expenditure decentralisation and numerous other variables. As first row of the results 
reveal the coefficient of fiscal decentralisation is insignificant and negatively 
correlated with the output in the agriculture sector. The same negative sign maintains 
to fertiliser consumption as well, though it becomes significant at 5% when the year 
dummies are included in model 3. However, to agriculture value addition the 
inclusion of the time dummy does not improve the level of significance. These 
results lead us to include an interaction term of fiscal decentralisation and Punjab-
Sindh dummy in order to investigate why panel regressions produce different 
outcomes from the ones that we obtained in simple time series analysis for over all 
Pakistan. The coefficient of interaction term is strongly significant with positive 
sign. It demonstrates that fiscal decentralisation is only instrumental in increasing 
agricultural output in Sindh and the Punjab. In Balochistan and KP fiscal 
decentralisation does not change the agriculture output. This may explain the fact 
that in Balochistan and KP the agriculture sector is not as important a factor in 
shaping the provincial economies as it is in Sindh and the Punjab. Agriculture sector 
has failed to attract considerable attention in former provinces (KP and Balochistan) 
in terms of resource allocation and investment. On the contrary, in the Punjab and 
Sindh, the agriculture outcomes have registered a mark improvement with fiscal 
decentralisation which highlights the critical and crucial role of the sector in defining 
the provincial economy by providing livelihood to the majority of rural communities 
directly and indirectly.     
Although fiscal decentralisation does not seem to make any improvement in 
agriculture outcomes in all provinces, however, it shows a good response in terms of 
increasing the productivity and extension of agriculture in Sindh and the Punjab. One 
can deduce two conclusions from this relation.  First, in latter provinces where more 
than 78% of total population dwells (FBS, 2009-10) fiscal decentralisation proved to 
be an effective tool in enhancing the agricultural output. This also tells us the level of 
responsiveness of local representatives to their local communities. 
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Table 9.7: The Determinants of Agriculture Outcomes 
Model : GMM IV 
Dependant 
Variables 
Agriculture 
value 
addition  ᶲ
Agriculture 
value 
addition  ᶲ
Fertilizer 
Consumption  ᶲ
Fertilizer 
Consumption  ᶲ
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fiscal 
Decentralisation 
-1495.0 -2711.9 -4882.7
**
 -515.4 
(995.925) (1705.612) (2109.056) (4552.373) 
Development 
Expenditure  ᶲ
0.133
*
 0.469
***
 -0.136
*
 -0.124
*
 
(0.072) (0.122) (0.077) (0.070) 
Devolution  
Reform 
396.0
***
 169.3
**
 96.50 46.24 
(135.355) (85.782) (275.635) (110.735) 
Interaction 
term(FD*Punjab/S
indh Dummy) 
2660.4
***
 3550.9
***
 8840.4
***
 6008.2
**
 
(677.288) (1224.155) (1440.303) (2879.448) 
Interaction 
term(FD*DF) 
-628.5 316.4 2660.3
***
 1616.9 
(392.718) (492.208) (940.300) (1551.628) 
Constant 1198.0
***
 945.2
***
 374.3 196.1 
 (91.872) (54.619) (239.220) (180.028) 
Time Dummy Included Not included Included Not included 
N 136 136 136 136 
R
2
 0.837 0.608 0.767 0.703 
adj. R
2
 0.775 0.593 0.678 0.692 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 ᶲ; Variable expressed in per 
capita term 
 
Due to their overwhelming dependence on this sector for livelihood, the local 
communities may demand their representatives to respond effectively by allocating 
more resources to the sector. In this way the sector can be monitored and improved 
more effectively. Second, it may illustrate that agriculture value addition is lower in 
Balochistan and KP compare to other provinces, where farming still lacks 
mechanization and proper use of fertilisers and pesticides. Consequently, the fiscal 
decentralisation appears to be unresponsive to agriculture outcomes in these 
provinces. It also underlines the fact that because of the lack of cultivable lands and 
scarcity of water, agricultural farming is hard to undertake in KP and Balochistan. 
Given the relatively weak importance of agriculture sector to the livelihood of local 
communities they may not demand their representatives to prioritise the sector in 
terms of resource allocation and investment. 
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9.4 CONCLUSION  
The results partially substantiate our hypotheses (hypotheses: 2, 3 and 4) relative to 
the impact of fiscal decentralisation and its impact on basic health care, education 
and agriculture. Fiscal decentralisation may improve basic health care service. In 
addition, we find the effect of fiscal decentralisation on health outcomes to be 
weaker for Balochistan and KP compared to other provinces, which in other words 
indicates that fiscal decentralisation is more an effective policy tool in terms of pro-
poor social service delivery in the Punjab and Sindh. The findings suggest that good 
quality of governance (i.e., using corruption index and the degree of civil liberty) has 
a positive impact on basic health care.   
For education, overall, our findings support our hypothesis that fiscal 
decentralisation improves education. These findings have some implications for 
poverty reduction that is directly or indirectly related to education. Indeed, 
education, especially basic education, has proven to help reduce poverty. 
Improvement in the quality of human capital enhances productivity, broadens 
employment opportunities, increases growth and income levels of the poor 
(Psacharopolous and Woodhall 1985; Ranis et al. 2000).  
The results suggest that fiscal decentralisation has a statistically significant effect on 
productivity in agricultural sector. It happens because fiscal decentralisation 
facilitates the use of local knowledge, local participation and interest. The 
relationship, however, is non-linear. In particular, fiscal decentralisation improves 
the agriculture value added per worker up to a threshold beyond which more fiscal 
decentralisation may reduce agricultural productivity. Thus we can conclude that, for 
the third pro-poor channel – agriculture sector – our empirical results suggest a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between decentralisation and 
agricultural output. Decentralisation has the potential to enhance transparency and 
accountability in the delivery of agricultural services.  
In current and preceding chapters it is shown that fiscal decentralisation from federal 
government to provincial governments maintains a positive impact on poverty 
reduction both directly and indirectly through certain pro-poor sectors. In the 
following part, that contains one comprehensive chapter, we look at the devolution to 
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third tier (local) governments and analyse its effectiveness in services delivery to 
local people in general and the poor in particular.   
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PART IV 
DOES DEVOLUTION INCREASE RESPONSIVENESS TO 
LOCAL NEEDS IN PAKISTAN? 
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CHAPTER 10 
 DEVOLUTION REFORMS IN PAKISTAN: HOW EFFECTIVE 
THE LOCALGOVERNMENTS ARE IN SOCIAL SERVICE 
DELIVERY 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter examines the devolution reforms launched in Pakistan since 2001. 
These reforms paved the way for limited political, financial and administrative 
powers being transferred to local governments. Second section of the chapter 
provides a historical overview of the development of local governments and their 
evolution in Pakistan. The third and fourth sections discuss the devolution plan and 
the key question of why decentralisation is revived only during the military regimes, 
the political economy of the devolution reforms. Sections five and six of the chapter 
deal with the question of social services provision and coverage of Multiple 
Deprivation at province level in pre and post devolution reforms. Section seven 
provides some stylized facts in comparative manner regarding the investments on 
some key social and economic services and see whether or not the devolution has 
changed the pattern, trend and magnitude of investments in these services. Section 
eight explains the methodology of empirical analysis. Section nine deals with the 
major objective of the devolution plan: whether or not (if yes, how) the devolution 
reforms policy has improved social service delivery and reduced poverty. Section ten 
concludes.  
After the devolution the responsibility of social services delivery has shifted to the 
local governments from the provincial governments. Presumably, the local 
governments because of their proximity and accountability to local people are more 
 285 
 
efficient and effective in increasing those services that should benefit the local 
community particularly the poor and disadvantaged social groups.  
The devolution reforms brought a large scale change in governance and public 
finance of Pakistan where numerous important social and economic services have 
been devolved to local governments. Such a drastic change is expected to bring a 
widespread transformation in nature, extent and magnitude of essential social and 
economic services delivery to common people. Nonetheless, in spite of the 
importance of the matter, to best of our knowledge, literature has not provided a 
systematic research to evaluate the efficacy of the devolution in critical services 
provision. This chapter is aimed to fill this gap in the literature.        
In order to test and statistically examine how effective the local governments have 
worked, a systemic empirical method is employed by using a panel dataset from four 
provinces of Pakistan. Various regression techniques such as the standard OLS, FE 
and RE models, and the Tobit models are applied and regression results are reported 
and analysed in section nine of this chapter. The regression outcomes show that after 
the devolution when these social and economic services have come under the 
responsibility of local governments, their provisions have been augmented and 
improved.   
10.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM OF 
PAKISTAN 
The local government system was first introduced in the Sub-Continent in 19
th
 
century by the British India government aimed primarily to facilitate the well-being 
of the local elites. The local government under the British Raj was not empowered, 
as it was not democratically elected. Instead the representatives of the local 
governments were nominated by the central bureaucracy (Nath, 1929; 
Venkatarangaiya and Pattabhiram 1969). The system was run through an extreme 
‗top-down manner‘ with circumscribed functions of local representatives. The key 
administrative role at the local level was performed by the agents of the central 
bureaucracy, the Deputy Commissioner, and other bureaucratic operatives, such as 
the Assistant Commissioner, Tehsildars, Naibdehsildars and Patwaris (Tinker, 
 286 
 
1968; AERC
110
, 1990). It is important to highlight that the newly introduced local 
government system was not absolutely new but a reformed version of ancient 
panchayat. The municipal administration however was an addition that was entirely 
new to Indian local polity.  
Prior to the British rule in India, the people had their local system of governance in 
the shape of village panchayats, similar to the administrative system of later form of 
local government (Hussain, 2003). The panchayats were the self-governing bodies 
that were organised and run by the local people. Therefore, when Britain first 
introduced the formal local bodies system in India, it reflected the administrative 
structure of the centuries old panchayat system. The local government system 
though was different from the pure western democratic setup, in as much as it was an 
active body of representation to manage the local people issues, including 
development, administrative and judicial, as per the wishes and needs of the local 
communities. It was largely geared to the needs of British Indian government in 
terms of buying favours from local elites. But more importantly it laid-down a 
democratic system that later evolved to become more mature and inclusive.  
It is worth pointing out that during late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries the provincial 
level, rather than local level, was the focus of Indian nationalist politics. This, 
therefore, led the British government granting more provincial autonomy rather than 
strengthening the local governments (Cheema et al., 2005). The greater importance 
and concentration of regional and provincial governments against local governments 
created a wide urban-rural divide in terms of social, economic and political 
development that consequently impeded the evolution of local government system 
(Rizvi, 1976). 
The urban councils were expected to provide basic social services to the urbanities.  
The rural council on the other hand were typically used as a vehicle to patronage the 
rural elite through the deconcentrated agents of the central government, 
accompanying local elites. This phenomenon, therefore, limited the already 
dysfunctional rural governments‘ role in essential service provisions (van den 
Dungen, 1972; Siddiqui, 1992). 
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 Applied Economics and Research Centre (AERC) is researched-based centre in the University of 
Karachi, Pakistan.    
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It is true that the local government systems existed and flourished to a large extent 
during the colonial period. Nevertheless, imperial bureaucracy with the collaboration 
of native elite played a strong role in engineering local affairs, making it conducive 
for the British Raj to govern unabated. In addition, the rise of the nationalist politics 
on central and regional realm led to shift the focus away from the local polity. 
Therefore, local governments remained at the periphery throughout the British rule 
in India. 
10.2.1 POST INDEPENDENCE (1947 TO 2001) 
After the division of India on 14
th
 August, 1947 the new state of Pakistan with 
numerous social and economic problems such as a dysfunctional economy, primitive 
agriculture, communal tensions and massive influx of refugees necessitated the 
country to adopt strong central governance system. This state of affairs later on 
cemented the tendency towards a strong central government at the expense of sub-
national governments. Hence, during late 1940s and entire 1950s an ever increasing 
centralisation gave birth to a powerful military bureaucracy that diluted the already 
limited sub-national governments (Waseem, 1994; Jalal, 1995; Talbot, 1998). 
In 1959 the military regime of Ayub Khan (re)introduced the local governments after 
the dissolution of both central and provincial level governments. The new local 
government system was established under the laws of: 1. Basic Democracies Order 
(BDO) in 1959; and 2. Municipal Administration Order in 1960, to provide 
representation to rural and urban areas respectively. Under the new system union 
council was the lowest tier of local governments comprising elected members who 
then elected one of their members as the chairman of the council. However, in higher 
tiers, municipal administration and district council for example, the central 
government nominated some of its officials as members who normally became the 
chairmen of these bodies (Siddiqui, 1992; Wajidi, 2000). 
 Similar to pre-partition style, local bodies system of Ayub era was overwhelmingly 
controlled by the central bureaucracy through its appointed officials at the local level 
who had the discretionary power to restrict any kind of action the elected 
representatives might desire to pass or implement. Furthermore, given the limited or 
no financial capacity the local governments were even unable to perform those few 
regulatory and development functions assigned to them by the central bureaucracy. 
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Akin to the British rule, Ayub regime in order to garner and maintain the support of 
local elites – considering the vital role of rural representatives in forming the 
electoral college of allegedly manipulated presidential election
111
 as well as for the 
members of national and provincial assemblies – substantially increased the targeted 
resources to the rural local elites that led to reverse the development resource 
allocation in the favour of the latter. This was in direct contrast to the general trend 
of 1950s112 (Amjad and Ahmed, 1984). However, whereas the prime aim of resource 
allocation was not to encourage social and economic development in rural areas but 
to buy political support of the rural elites, consequently, the funds were not utilised 
for the welfare of the masses.  
In the aftermath of the breakup in 1971 when the east wing resultantly drifted away 
and became Bangladesh, the remainder of Pakistan subsequently embraced her first 
ever democratically elected government that promulgated the 1973 constitution.113 
Nevertheless, during the democratic dispensation (1971-77) in the presence of 
functional national and provincial assemblies local governments were pushed to the 
background and again became dysfunctional.  
With the arrival of the military dictatorial regime again in 1979, the local 
government system was revived with the political and administrative structure 
similar to the 1960s of over centralisation of administrative and economic power at 
the provincial and federal levels. The new Local Government Ordinance was 
promulgated simultaneously in 1979 from Punjab, Sindh and KP, while in 
Balochistan the same ordinance was implemented in 1980. Under the new system 
four levels of governments: town committees, municipal corporation and 
city/metropolitan corporation – became functional in urban areas, while in rural areas 
three levels of governments; union council, tehsil council and district council, were 
formed.  
Similar to 1960s, the local government system in 1980s was used by the military 
regime to legitimise its hold on power, instead of true financial and administrative 
decentralisation to the local governments from the federal and provincial 
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 See Cohen (2005). 
112
 During 1950s the urban centres remained the centre of economic and social development at cost of 
rural areas.  
113
 The constitution was passed and implemented despite the fact that majority members – three of 
out five – from Balochistan province did not sign it (Breeseg, 2004).  
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governments ((Jalal, 1995; Cheema and Mohmand, 2003). However, despite many 
similarities in spirit the 1980s local bodies system maintained differences to 1960s 
system on many grounds. For instance, the former abolished the direct nomination of 
the officials from the bureaucracy as the members and chairman of the local 
governments. Instead, in the new system it was mandatory for all members of local 
councils, including the chairmen, to be elected through adult franchise (Cheema et 
al., 2005).  
General Zia-ul-Haq continued the old system of rural-urban divide of the colonial 
and Ayub‘s periods. Noman (1988) and Hasan (2002) suggest that Zia regime sought 
to accommodate urban middle class, because it was believed that the latter class 
formed a strong movement and supported the army in toppling the Z.A Bhutto 
government. Hence patronising the same class was thought to cement not only the 
anti-Bhutto sentiment in urban areas but with same token gather much support for 
Zia himself. On the contrary, the rural areas were considered to be the political 
support base for the Z.A Bhutto regime. Thus, rural local councils were deprived of 
getting sufficient resources to run even the basic local functions (Wilder, 1999).     
It is interesting to note that with the death of Zia-ul-Haq and subsequently with the 
advent of democracy in 1988 after party-based general elections for both federal and 
provincial governments, the local governments were dispensed with. They were 
dissolved in the Punjab, Sindh and KP on 1993, 1992 and 1991 respectively (based 
on multiple factual or otherwise charges). For instances, in the Punjab provincial 
government rolled back the local government system to curb the influence of 
incumbent elected local representatives in general elections that were scheduled in 
1993. In KP and Sindh corruption and mismanagement of the public resources were 
cited as the main reason for its dissolution (Zaidi, 2005).  
Historical evidence suggests that the provincial governments in the country have 
never been comfortable with local governments. Whenever the former found a room 
to dispense with the latter it exactly did the same. It is believed that the reason for the 
tension between the local and provincial governments has largely been due to the 
encroachment of the federal government into the constitutional domain of provincial 
governments (World Bank, 1996; 2000). The provinces then clung onto whatever 
limited administrative, fiscal and political power left to them and unwilling to 
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relinquish power to the local bodies. This resultantly culminated into serious 
problems related to functional responsibilities of provinces and local bodies.  
After the 1999 military coups d'état, the local government system was once again 
reinstated but this time with entirely different structure, functions and responsibilities 
under the auspices of the devolution plan of 2000-01. In the following section an 
attempt has been made to provide an overview of the various aspects and 
characteristics of the devolution plan introduced and implemented by yet another 
military regime in 2000 and 2001, respectively 
10.3 THE DEVOLUTION PLAN 
This section presents a concise stylised description of the current devolution reforms 
or ―Devolution of Power‖ introduced by yet another military government in Pakistan 
in 2000-01. The Devolution Plan introduced a devolved local government or in other 
words the District Government Structure, which is an integrated three-tier system of 
governance. As we will see later in this chapter, the devolution reform has brought 
many positive changes to the political economy structure of Pakistan, it is important 
to note that this system is still not a part of the constitution. On paper at least, the 
major departure took place in the structure of political economy through the 
devolution reform. Albeit for the first time the administrative and expenditures 
responsibilities were devolved to the local level. However, the devolution process 
took place under the tight grip of military regime, and at the time there existed 
neither provincial nor provincial elected governments. Therefore, despite the success 
(or failure, that we will discuss during the course of this chapter) the political 
legitimacy of the devolution reform has been controversial and questionable 
However, despite the criticism of the political legitimacy – that the devolution 
reform was initiated by the military and establishment to consolidate their power 
bypassing the federating units – it substantially changed the administrative and fiscal 
structure of the government.  In the following we discuss the salient features of the 
devolution plan. 
The District Government system  runs through three integrated tiers of district/city 
district government system, with the apparent aims of serving the interest and 
safeguarding the rights of the local people as well as to refocus and narrow-down, if 
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not completely abolish, the rural-urban divide. The NRB specifies the new local 
government model through―5Ds‖, which are presented in figure 10.1. 
Figure 10.1: 5Ds Local Government System 
    
 
Source: NRB, Government of Pakistan 
The salient features of the Devolution Plan are discussed below: 
1- The goal of the local governments is to entrust the representative role to the 
people‘s elected members, who come through an electoral process. 
Moreover, it seeks to empower the traditionally voiceless, particularly 
women, workers, peasants and minorities at the lowest level of government 
tier so that they can bring socio-economic change through their locally 
elected representatives. Thus, the devolution of political power typically aims 
to preserve the political rights of local people and protect them from being re-
centralised by both federal and provincial governments.  
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2- Second pillar of new local government system is the 
decentralisation/devolution of administrative authority, which seeks to 
address the local communities‘ problems at their door-steps. 
3- While many of management and administrative functions may not 
completely be devolved, a great part of it may be to repose the local 
governments through de-concentration of management functions in order to 
reduce the concentration of authority to the upper tier of government(s). In 
the previous setup the Deputy Commissioner who happened to be the 
administrative head of the district performed co-ordination for fiscal (revenue 
collection) and magisterial functions and was answerable to the authorities at 
either provincial or federal level. However, in post devolution reform, the 
district is not headed only by an elected nazim (see below for more 
discussion on the procedure of nazim‘s election) but various functions are 
also distributed between offices and make them accountable to the elected 
members so as to strengthen the checks and balance system.   
4- In order to weaken, if not permanently eliminate, any kind of potential elite 
capture that may exist due to possible projection of strong power-authority 
nexus, the new local government system has incorporated numerous 
measures to counter such risks. Prominent among them are: Public Safety 
Commission (PSC), Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) and Zila Mohtasib, 
which are meant to resist any kind of corruption activity or power abuse 
exercised either by  elected representatives or public officials.  
5- The fifth and perhaps the most vital segment of new system is the distribution 
of financial resources. Moves towards financial empowerment, the local 
councils now have the authority to impose taxes in addition to interalia taxes 
that were already in local governments‘ discretion and the inter-governmental 
transfers and grants from the federal and provincial governments.114 Unlike 
the inter-governmental transfer between federal and provincial governments, 
the transfer from provinces to local governments has been made formula-
based that makes the mechanism more transparent, equitable and non-
discretionary. Furthermore, it is spelled out in the ordinance that the upper 
tier of government (be it provincial or federal) does not assign any 
                                                 
114
 It is to be noted that majority of inter-governmental resources are transferred from the provincial 
governments under the Provincial Finance Commission.  
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administrative or service delivery functions to the local government without 
accompanying it with adequate finances.  
10.3.1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 
The administrative hierarchy of the new local government system is based on the 
union council, the tehsil council and the district council. The union council is the 
lowest tier and the district council is the upper and more important tier of the system. 
The union council has a body of elected representatives with Union Nazim as the 
head. The Union Nazim is assisted by Union Naib Nazim. The latter is elected on 
joined ticket with The Union Nazim. The Nazim is responsible for making the 
Annual Development Plan and other required budget and sets the developmental 
priorities with the consultation of the council members. In case the required 
resources are beyond the budgetary capacity of the union council the Nazim sends 
the proposals to Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA) and district council for 
approval and inclusion in district budget. The union council with 21 members is 
elected on non-party basis and comprises several sub-towns, villages and small 
villages with the average population of around 25,000 members (Zaidi, 2005). Figure 
10.2 provides a snapshot of the union council administration: 
Figure 10.2: Structure of Union Administration  
 
Source: NRB, Government of Pakistan 
Tehsil council is the middle tier of the local government system in which all union 
councils Nazims become part of it. The council is headed by the tehsil Nazim who is 
indirectly elected by the electoral college of union councils‘ members who in turn 
are elected through direct elections. The tehsil council is consisted of Union Naib 
 294 
 
Nazim and one-third of the indirectly elected representatives from workers, peasants, 
women and minorities. The tehsil Nazim is the head of the tehsil council, who is 
assisted by numbers of officials, including tehsil officers. Figure 10.3 summarises 
the administrative structure of the tehsil council, where the local bureaucracy is 
integrated with the locally elected representatives to run the business of the 
government. 
Figure 10.3: Governance Structure of the Tehsil Municipal Administration 
 
Source: NRB, Government of Pakistan 
The council is entitled to prepare the annual budget for municipal and spatial 
services including the Annual Development Plan. As shown in figure 10.3, the tehsil 
council, with slightly more complex and advanced administrative system compare to 
union council has multiple functions that ranges from planning and finances to basic 
infrastructure and other social services. 
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The highest tier, and probably the most important one, is the district government. 
The district council is administered by Zila or district Nazim who is assisted by a 
good team of district level officials. The district administration structure is presented 
in figure 10.4, in which we observe that each department or a cluster of departments, 
which hitherto were under the direct control of provincial governments, is headed by 
a local bureaucrat, Executive District Officer (EDO). The district administration is 
coordinated by District Coordination Officer (DCO) who is answerable to the elected 
district Nazim. 
Figure 10.4: Structure of District/Zila Administration 
 
Source: NRB, Government of Pakistan 
The district council consists of the union council members indirectly elected from 
monitories, peasants, workers and women as well as directly elected members of 
union council Nazims. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the elected members of union 
councils have their representation at tehsil and district levels with Naib Union Nazim 
and Union Nazim as members of the tehsil and district council respectively. All 
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provincial capitals: Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta, are declared as city 
district governments, and if a city grows and meets a certain urbanised standard, it 
would be granted the status of city district (Zaidi, 2005). Although the size of local 
government varies according to population and taxable capacity in each province, the 
same three tiers system is placed in all four provinces. Table 10.1 presents the total 
number of local governments in each province. 
Table 10.1: Local Governments in Pakistan 
Provinces  District Govt. Tehsil Govt. Union Council Govt. 
Punjab 35 144 3464 
Sindh 23 121 1115 
KP 24 54 986 
Balochistan 28 77 567 
Total 110 396 6131 
Source: NRB, Government of Pakistan 
 
District being the upper tier of government is responsible for delivering most of the 
local government services such as education, healthcare, industrial development and 
agriculture extension, while services such as water supply, sanitation and urban 
services are delivered by tehsil councils.   
10.3.2 FINANCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
A critical factor for the smooth running of any tier of government is the availability 
of adequate financial resources. Besides political empowerment the efficient social 
service delivery is one of the cornerstones of the devolution reform of 2000-2001. 
And effective social service mechanism may not be in place unless the financial 
issues concern to it are not sorted out.  
 The LGO clearly spell outs the expenditure and revenue raising powers and 
responsibilities of all three tiers of local governments. Under this provision, they are 
entitled to allocate and disburse resources according to their own priorities without 
any interference or direction from upper tiers of governments (federal or provincial). 
However, in practice the provincial governments very often exercise control over 
certain expenditure areas, particularly on expenditures which are undertaken by the 
conditional transfers from the provinces (Bahl and Cyan, 2009).   
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Theoretically the local governments are expected to meet a greater share of their 
expenditures responsibilities by raising revenues through the financial wherewithal 
assigned to them after the devolution (table 10.2). However, in practice, revenues 
collected by the local governments cannot meet even a fraction of the expenses in 
discharging the obligations transferred to them. The taxes assigned to local 
authorities have narrow and inelastic bases, and the weak and inefficient tax 
administration and lack of incentive in gathering own resources make it difficult to 
expedite even whatever tax bases available to them. Thus, because of the narrow tax 
base with inefficient tax collecting infrastructure, revenue contribution of local 
government is less than 0.1% of the GDP (Kardar, 2006). The reason for this 
substantially low tax contribution may be that the local governments in Pakistan are 
assigned with immovable tax bases which are albeit easy to administer but have very 
narrow bases thereby do not produce much revenues. Tax assignment to local 
governments is low. What takes place in this sector may not qualify for the public 
finance terminologies like ‗revenue adequacy‘, ‗administrative feasibility‘, ‗vertical 
equity‘ and ‗political feasibility‘.   
The devolution reform has been adopted as a development and service provision 
strategy therefore the local governments have been given some important functions 
and responsibilities to discharge. However, the minor taxes that have been 
accompanied with the expenditures obligations are far from enough to cover the 
development and service delivery cost and ensures the accountability of the elected 
representatives. While it is true that tax administration cost is high for local 
governments for some taxes, this may not for all, thus administratively feasible and 
lower cost taxes may be assigned to the local governments. Furthermore, whereas it 
is also true that the local governments may not efficiently impose taxes related to 
income distribution, however, it may consider all taxes as user charges on social 
services provided locally and collect them by using local administration. If it leads to 
the fear of exempting those whose incomes fall below the poverty line from using 
such services, a targeted subsidisation mechanism may be set up to compensate the 
poor.  
The district governments have the discretionary power over taxes on items such as 
service fees for education and health. Tehsil councils retain power to levy taxes over 
services and immovable properties that are not taxed under the district councils. 
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Likewise, the fees for profession and vocations along with some taxes and 
fees/charges belong to the local councils. However, as shown in table 10.2 that rather  
Table 10.2: Revenue-Raising Authorities of Local Government 
District 
Governments 
Tehsils and Town Councils Union Councils 
 Education tax. 
 Health tax. 
 Tax on vehicles 
other than motor 
vehicles. 
 Local rate on lands 
assessable to land 
revenue. 
 Fees with respect 
to schools, 
colleges, and 
health facilities 
established or 
maintained by the 
district 
governments. 
 Fees for licences 
granted by the 
district 
government. 
 Fees for specific 
services rendered 
by a district 
government. 
 Collection charges 
for recovery of 
taxes on behalf of 
the government as 
prescribed. 
 Tolls on new 
roads, bridges, 
within the limits of 
a district, other 
than national and 
provincial 
highways and 
roads. 
 Local tax on services. 
 Tax on the transfer of immovable 
property.  
 Property tax on annual rental value of 
buildings and lands. 
 Fee on advertisement, other than on radio 
and television, and billboards. 
 Fee for fairs, agricultural shows, cattle 
fairs, industrial exhibitions, tournaments 
and other public events. 
 Fee for approval of building plans and 
erection and re-erection of buildings. 
 Fee for licences or permits and penalties 
or fines for violation of the licensing 
rules. 
 Changes for execution and maintenance of 
works of public utility like lighting of 
public places, drainage, conservancy, and 
water supply. 
 Fee on cinemas, theatrical shows and 
tickets thereof, and other entertainment. 
 Collection charges for recovery of any tax 
on behalf of the Government, District 
Government, Union Administration or any 
statutory authority as prescribed. 
 Fees for licensing 
of professions and 
vocation. 
 Fee on sales of 
animals in cattle 
markets. 
 Market fees. 
 Fees for 
certification of 
births, marriages 
and deaths. 
 Charges for specific 
services rendered 
by the union 
council. 
 Rate for the 
remuneration of 
village and 
neighbourhood 
guards. 
 Rate for the 
execution or 
maintenance of any 
work of public 
utility like lighting 
of public places, 
drainage, 
conservancy and 
water supply. 
Source: NRB, Government of Pakistan, and Kardar (2006) 
             
odd tax levying power granted to local government, with tehsil council having more 
taxation power than district council, even though the district government exercises 
far greater expenditures obligations than the tehsil council.     
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Therefore, the district governments encounter the largest fiscal imbalance between 
expenditures obligations and own revenues. This mismatched is largely met through 
the provincial government transfers through Provincial Finance Commission 
(PFC).115 This locally-raised resources and expenditures discrepancy holds for all 
four provinces although with various degree and magnitude. For example, ADB‘s 
(2009) estimates on selected districts of all provinces of Pakistan show that major 
part of expenditures is covered through transfers. In all 6 districts included in the 
study, 76 to 91% of district governments‘ revenue sources are derived from the 
provincial governments (table 10.3).   
Table 10.3: District Government Revenues 
                   (Percent Distribution of Finance) 
Provinces &Districts  Tax Revenue  Non-tax Revenue  Provincial Transfers 
Punjab 
1. Lahore 0.025 5.135 82 
2. Faisalabad 0.046 2.292 76 
3. Sialkot  0.200 79 
4. Chakwal 1.380 2.292 76 
5. Attack  0.000 0.509 85 
Sindh 
1. Karachi 21.858 7.122 74 
Balochistan 
1. Quetta 1.758  87 
2. Sibi   93 
3. Qilla Abdullah   91 
4. Pishin   92 
KP 
1. Mardan   83 
2. Peshawar 0.106 1.770 37 
Source: ADB Decentralisation Support Programme (2009) and Bahl and Cyan (2009). 
 
In Sindh only Karachi city district is included in the sample, because the data are not 
availability for other districts of the province. Local tax revenue from Karachi 
contributes more than 21% to total finances of the city council, which compare to 
other districts included in the study is quite high. However, Karachi being the 
biggest city of the country with a vibrant finance and industrial base may not reflect 
the revenue raising capability of other districts in Sindh. Therefore, it may be 
maintained that other than Karachi Sindh is not different from other provinces in 
terms of resource-expenditure mismatch. In Balochistan except Quetta district – 
which contributes less than 2% to total revenue to its finances – local governments 
                                                 
115
 PFC is described below with great length.   
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contribute virtually zero tax and non-tax revenues to their finances, which in other 
words reveal their entire dependency on provincial transfers to finance their 
expenditures.  In case of KP the survey could include only two districts, Peshawar 
and Mardan. Both are urban districts. Total tax and non-tax contribution of the 
former is less than 1.87% of total revenue, while in latter case it is almost nil (table 
10.3). 
The district governments collect tax revenues through two main agencies: 1. the 
District Excise; and 2. the Taxation Department and Board of Revenue. These 
agencies historically have been provincial level departments mainly concerned with 
tax collection for provincial governments. The District Excise collects provincial 
level tax including property tax, while the Taxation Department and Board of 
Revenue collects land revenue, agriculture income tax and mutation and registration 
fee which are to be transferred to the provincial government. Thus, revenue colleting 
agencies are nominally the parts of district governments, but practically they perform 
on the behest of provincial governments, which in practice leaves the district 
councils without any formal tax gathering machinery.   
As shown earlier, compared to the district governments, except city districts, the 
tehsil councils have more tax mobilising power. For example, the old Octroi and Zila 
tax have been abolished under the new system. To compensate for these taxes, 2.5% 
has been added to the federal Generalised Sales Tax (GST). The additional GST is 
transferred to the local governments as grants. However, instead of district councils 
that had collected Octroi and Zila tax, the additional GST is given to the tehsil 
councils. This eventually makes the latter the recipient of one-sixth of the total GST 
collected by the federal government. Initially the transfer of GST to tehsil councils 
from the federal government was troublesome because of the indirect channel of 
provincial governments and a deduction by the latter prior to distribution. But for the 
last few years it has become more smooth and predictable (Bahl and Cyan, 2009). In 
addition, tehsil councils have also been assigned to collect the urban immovable 
property tax, which transfers 15% of it to the district councils. Therefore, tehsil 
councils with more tax and non-tax revenue sources (see table 10.4 below) are less 
dependent on intergovernmental transfers to finance their expenditure obligations 
than district governments, which arguably makes it plausible to state that tehsil 
councils are more close to the decentralised local government concept.   
 301 
 
Table10.4: Tehsil Council Revenue Sources                         
(Percent of total revenue) 
Provinces/Tehsil 
Councils  
Tax 
Revenue 
Non-tax 
Revenue 
Transfers Capital/Op 
Balance 
Unclassified 
Punjab      
1. Attock 27.8 41.0 30.6 0.3 0.3 
2. Gulberg Town 
(Lahore) 
46.2 9.7 20.2 0.0 23.8 
3. Bhalwal 6.8 29.8 58.3 3.7 1.4 
4. Sialkot 29.3 35.5 34.6 0.6 0.0 
Sindh      
1. Liaqatabad 
Town (Sukkur) 
36.1 6.9 19.0 32.8 5.2 
Balochistan      
1. Barshore (Pishin) 0.0 0.0 63.0 29.3 7.6 
2. Qilla Abdullah 
(Chaman) 
0.0 0.0 77.8 16.3 5.8 
3. Zarghoon Town 
(Quetta) 
12.8 0.0 79.7 1.0 6.5 
KP      
1. Charsadda 4.2 0.0 34.6 2.9 58.4 
2. Mardan 19.9 0.0 10.9 6.5 62.7 
3. Nowshera 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: ADB Decentralisation Support Programme and Bahl and Cyan (2009). 
 
10.3.3 PROVINCIAL FINANCE COMMISSION   
A significant change accompanying the devolution plan has been the introduction of 
a formula-based system of resource sharing between the provincial and local 
governments. All four provinces have constituted their respective Provincial Finance 
Commission (PFC) in 2001 to formulate the resource transfer mechanism and 
distribution of finances between provincial and districts governments.116  The PFC is 
the statuary body that respective has the finance minister of that respective province 
as the chairman of the commission, three district Nazims, the finance and planning & 
development departments‘ secretaries as well as three independent members            
nominated by the Governor of that province as members. The PFC that has both 
development and recurring transfers is supposed to ensure the allocations of 
resources between the provincial government and local governments. Under the PFC 
the provincial governments are to disburse resources to three tiers of local 
                                                 
116
 The PFC is a formula-based resource distribution mechanism which is different from one province 
to another and each province constitutes its PFC according to the financial conditions of the local 
governments and the socio-economic and political needs (Ahmed and Lodhi, 2008).  
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governments out of the proceeds of the Provincial Consolidated Fund and Provincial 
Allocable Amount.   
The Provincial Allocable Amount is distributed under the PFC ruled-based transfer 
mechanism in a similar head of the account. The Provincial Consolidated Fund 
between the provincial and local governments is yet to be defined by the PFCs. This 
is a legislative requirement under the LGO (Cheema and Ali, 2005). 
The PFC projects the anticipated flows of funds that are expected to be available to 
the provincial government in the concerned financial year from all sources. These 
sources include federal transfers through the NFC117, conditional and unconditional 
grants from the federal government, own-tax and non-tax receipts and foreign 
loans/grants. As mentioned earlier, the PFC in each province considers the financial 
and other factors within its jurisdiction. For example, in Sindh, Punjab, KP and 
Balochistan, the provincial governments would retain 45%, 60.2%, 60 % and 69% 
from the Net Provincial Divisible Pools and redistribute the remaining 55%, 39.8%, 
40% and 31% respectively to the districts.  
Table 10.5: Intergovernmental Resource Transfer Criteria 
Total pool and distribution criteria Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
Local share of the Provincial Divisible Pool 39.8% 40% 40% 31% 
Formula factors with weights 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Population 75% 50% 50% 50% 
Backwardness of district 10% 17.5% 25%  
Tax  collection effort 5% 7.5%   
Fiscal austerity 5%    
Area    50% 
Development incentive/ infrastructure 
deficiency 
5%  25%  
District governments‘ deficit transfers   25%   
Source:  Shah (2003) and Sindh (2004) 
As table 10.5 illustrates population appears to be the most important criterion being 
used by all provincial governments in resource transfers to district governments.  
The Allocable Amounts fixed for local governments are determined and distributed 
on the basis of the criteria118 elaborated in table 10.5. Balochistan applies only two 
criteria: the area and backwardness with 50% weight each. KP provides 25% weight 
                                                 
117
 The NFC is discussed thoroughly in chapter IV of this thesis.  
118
 Local government share of Provincial Divisible Pool (PDP) is constant. Rather the PFC committee 
is authorised to increase/decrease local government share from PDP. 
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to development incentives and remaining 25% to backwardness in addition to 50% 
weight to the population. Similarly, the Punjab gives 75% weight to the population 
and remaining 25% distribution is made on bases of backwardness, tax collection 
effort and fiscal austerity at the rate of 10%, 5% and 5% respectively. Sindh assigns 
25% weight to district deficit financing, 50% to the population and the remaining 
25% to backwardness and tax collection effort. In Balochistan and KP there is no 
incentive for revenue mobilisation so as to encourage the district governments for 
putting more efforts in gathering revenues.  
It is worthwhile to state that the PFC formulates the vertical distribution between the 
provincial government and district governments and horizontal distribution among 
districts. It does not spell out transfer mechanism to the tehsil or union councils.  
Provincial transfers to last two tiers of local governments are simply based on 
resources received from the federal government in the lieu of 2.5% of GST in order 
to compensate the tehsil councils for the removal of Octori and Zila taxes.  
10.3.3.1 EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS 
The constitution of Pakistan clearly sets out the federal and provincial governments‘ 
expenditure responsibilities undertaken by them separately as well as jointly.  
However, the constitution does not specify the functional responsibilities of local 
governments. The latter are considered as the extension of the provincial 
governments. However, under the Local Government Budget Rules (2002) the local 
governments have the power to formulate their budgets and prioritise public 
expenditures without the legal consent of the provincial governments. The same 
rules categorically elaborate the procedure for budget making and its approval from 
the concerned local council.  
Before the commencement of each financial year the Nazim presents the budget 
before the respective local council for final approval. Normally the budget making 
exercise takes once the provincial government informs the districts about their total 
development and non-development share under the PFC Award. It is mandatory for 
the local councils to budget both development and non-development expenditures. 
The funds allocation for development expenditures is undertaken once the expenses 
of non-development expenditure are met.  
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Under the devolution a significant number of functions and responsibilities have 
been shifted from the provincial government to local governments. These functions 
and responsibilities are summarised in table 10.6.    
Table 10.6: Functional Reassignments from Provincial to Local Governments      
                 Under Devolution 
Province  District  Tehsil Council  
Education 
Primary education 
Secondary education 
Colleges (nonprofessional) 
Professional colleges 
Teacher education 
 Education 
Primary education 
Secondary education 
Colleges (nonprofessional) 
  
Health 
Basic and Rural Health 
District and Tehsil (HQ) 
hospitals 
Provincial hospitals 
Medical colleges 
Population Welfare 
 Health 
Basic and Rural Health 
District and Tehsil (HQ) 
hospitals 
  
Agriculture 
Agriculture extension 
On-farm management 
Soil conservation 
Fisheries 
Forests 
 Agriculture 
Agriculture extension 
On-farm management 
Soil conservation 
Fisheries 
Forests 
  
Water Supply and 
Sanitation 
   Water Supply and 
Sanitation 
Sewerage    Sewerage 
Transport 
Inter-district roads 
Intra-district roads 
Intra-tehsil roads 
 Transport 
 
Intra-district roads 
 Transport 
 
 
Intra-Tehsil roads 
Street lighting    Street lighting 
Parks and 
playgrounds 
   Parks and playgrounds 
Municipal regulation    Municipal regulation 
Irrigation     
Police     
Mines and mineral 
development 
    
Industrial and labour 
regulation 
    
     
 Fully devolved Partially devolved 
Source:  Asian Development Bank and World Bank (2004) 
 
10.3.3.2 NON-DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT BUDGETS 
Non-development budget of each respective council that accounts almost 90% of 
total budget is to cater to the recurring expenditures of departments/institutions and 
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social service provisions. The Finance and Budget Department at the provincial level 
is responsible to make the non-development budget for district council (Zaidi, 2005). 
The development budget, on the other hand, is designed and aimed to conduct 
investment on new assets and improve and maintain the existing ones at local level. 
The office of the EDO Finance and Planning at the district level is responsible for 
the consolidation and co-ordination of allocations to various development projects. 
The tehsil officer for planning is in-charge of consolidation and allocation of 
development funds at the tehsil council level. The over-sight body of CCBs plays a 
pivotal role in planning and budgeting at district council level. Under the new 
structure of local government it has become mandatory to spend at least 25% of 
development funds through these CCBs. The local governments are restricted by law 
to undertake development projects only within its jurisdictional area.  
While all three tiers of local government are expected to select development projects, 
the district council is to concentrate on social sector related projects (projects 
particularly related to healthcare and education). The union councils are to focus on 
union level projects. Tehsil council plays a fundamental role in providing municipal 
level services such as water supply schemes and sewerage systems as presented in 
table 10.6.   
10.4 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVOLUTION PLAN 
The central question here is why the upper tiers of government (federal and 
provincial) willingly transfer their own power to the local governments? To 
understand this, it is imperative to critically evaluate the political economy of the 
devolution plan. This theme is the subject matter of this section.     
The above analysis reveals that in post independence period the revitalization of 
local governments has been an instrument of non-representative governments to gain 
political legitimacy through it. From Ayub‘s ―Local Democracies‖ to the current 
―Devolution Reform‖ all three military dictators created a patronised political 
structure at the local level. This was intended to connect the local people and central 
authority and subdue the former to the latter. Notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan‘s 
socio-economic, political, ethnic and geographical conditions required a true 
devolution system, it was never adopted unless a military regime required a political 
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legitimisation through local body elections. Even under the devolution plan of 2000-
01, which is far more comprehensive compare to its predecessors, the political power 
has not been transferred to the sub-national governments. Instead the autocratic 
federal government exercised the said power unabated without accountability and 
electoral checks and balances. Whatever limited politico-economic and 
administrative authorities are given to the local governments, all of them have come 
from the provincial governments that already lacked power. Consequently, it led to 
create a conflict between provincial and local governments. Although, the LGO was 
passed and implemented by the provincial governments, but they perceived it as a 
decree dictated and imposed from above: i.e. the federal government.   
Provincial governments were discontent with the devolution plan. Because under the 
plan the majority of the provincial level functions are devolved to local governments 
without any prior fiscal decentralisation from federal to provincial governments. As 
discussed earlier in this thesis, the federal government holds greater functional 
responsibilities that should be given to the provincial governments considering the 
federal nature of the country. Hence, the provincial governments maintain that unless 
true decentralisation takes place from federal government, devolution of the already 
restricted functions to local governments makes provincial governments irrelevant.  
The provincial governments therefore see the local governments as an alternate 
power structure that has been erected to undercut the power of provincially elected 
representatives.  
On paper, the power of bureaucracy has been curtailed by reassigning a larger part of 
its power to the elected representatives at district and tehsil levels. The bureaucracy 
has also been made accountable to district and municipal/tehsil level elected 
representatives. Hence, it can be assumed that the loosening of bureaucratic control 
over administrative and financial matters at district level and below is one of the 
radical reforms brought forward by the devolution plan. This would indicate a big 
step towards decentralisation. In practice however bureaucracy still exercises 
considerable authority at the expense of district and tehsil council Nazims (Manning 
et. al 2003). Despite the fact that district Nazim is the head of the district 
government, the local bureaucracy under the facade of DCO, EDOs, TMOs and 
TMAs exercise substantial fiscal and administrative power. These officials may 
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undermine the political and administrative power of elected representatives. 
Moreover, they are accountable either to central or provincial governments.119  
It may also be argued that one of the motives behind the devolution plan was to 
weaken the organisational structure of political parties and undermine the electoral 
politics at the provincial as well as national level. This is for the reason that the 
elections for local governments are contested on non-party bases. 
Nonetheless, despite the political and economic intentions of the devolution reforms 
and their ramifications on the power struggle, it has been a relatively productive 
process. The reforms have improved social service deliveries and curtailed, to a great 
extent, the power of local bureaucracy. Although, the specific political economy 
interests of the ruling elite who carved-out and implemented the devolution plan may 
not be ruled out while analysing it, particularly, the political legitimisation of  the 
military in power. But it is important to state that to a certain degree the reforms 
have been successful in empowering the local communities through their elected 
representatives and the delivery of better basic social services.  
In regards to a question that warrants further analysis is the success and failure of the 
local governments in providing social services. Remainder of this chapter will 
examine the impact of the devolution on social and economic services. 
10.5 SOCIAL SERVICE PROVISIONS AND THE DEVOLUTION  
Expenditure on social services particularly on education and health has been 
recognised as an important source for the human development and poverty reduction. 
Countries like Pakistan with compelling fertility rate, widespread and chronic 
poverty and increasing rate of unemployment need to enhance efficiency of its public 
expenditure on social services.  
Despite having a decent economic growth over the last five decades human 
development record of Pakistan has been very dismal. Many social sector indicators, 
                                                 
119
 For instance, the DCO is entitled to prepare the first draft of the district budget and maintains 
oversight over the other officials working in the district. Likewise, the Nazim cannot remove/transfer 
the DCO without the consent of provincial government. Instead he/she can make a request to the latter 
for the transfer of the DCO accompanying a performance evaluation report, which is sent to the chief 
secretary for countersign. The chief secretary recommends it to the chief minister of the province for 
final approval. Similarly, for EDOs and TMOs or TMAs‘ transfer the district and tehsil Nazims 
respectively can request the provincial governments where the latter retain the authority to appoint 
them.   
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predominantly in health and education, lags far behind some of the neighbouring 
South Asian and South East Asian countries. For instance, as table 10.7 indicates 
except Bangladesh, Pakistan records the lowest HDI (0.499) amongst all seven 
countries in the region included in the sample. Pakistan spends only 0.9% and 1.8% 
of GDP on health and education which is far below than other regional countries – 
For example, on health and education Iran  spends 2.9% and 4.685% of her GDP, 
Malaysia 2% and 5.789%, and Bangladesh 2.234% of the GDP on education.  
Similarly literacy rate in Pakistan (56.53%) is less than the average rate of Least 
Developing Counties (60%).120 And the IMR, a barometer for healthcare facility, is 
very high compare to other countries included in table 10.7.  Part of the reason for 
this abysmal social sector performance is the inadequate and ill-targeted public 
sector expenditures on social services.  
Table 10.7: Selected Social Indicators (2009) 
Indicators Pakistan Bangladesh India S. Lanka Iran Malaysia Thailand 
Life Exp. 63 65 64 71 71 74 68 
IMR 78 48 55 15 35 35 55 
Health Exp. (% of GDP) 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.8 2.9 2 3.1 
Literacy Rate (%) 56.53 55 N/A 90.6 85.02 92.1 96.2 
Pupil-Teacher Ratio 39.69 45.76 N/A 23.15 20.34 13.25 18.44 
Education Exp. (% of GDP) 1.8 2.234 4.1 2.08 4.685 5.789 4.126 
Human Dev. Index 0.499 0.448 0.542 0.538 0.703 0.658 0.673 
Source: WDI, World Bank (accessed on 3/07/2012) & UNDP (accessed on 3/07/2012)  
N/A: Not available 
As highlighted above one of the reasons for the implementation of the devolution 
plan was to improve the social services delivery. A substantial descriptive literature 
is available that addresses the effectiveness of the devolution on social service 
provision. Parallel to this there is a need for a systematic empirical research body 
analysing its efficacy in terms of social services provision.  
An empirical assessment of social service delivery by any tier of government in 
Pakistan appears to be quite daunting given the overlapping local and provincial 
governments structure, where the same service is provided jointly by both tiers of 
government. In the post devolution period services like education and health 
                                                 
120
 Watson and Khan (2010) for more discussion on  education provision in Pakistan 
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administratively and functionally have largely become under the district 
governments‘ domain. Due to the unavailability of data at local level a micro 
analysis despite its urgency seems very difficult to conduct.  
Luckily we have access to a unique dataset, compiled by the Social Policy and 
Development Centre (SPDC) (2007; 2012), of Multiple Deprivations Index (MDI) of 
all district of Pakistan for 1998, 2005 and 2009. Using this dataset we can compare 
the three period MDIs and to evaluate the performance of local governments in terms 
of social service delivery and more importantly poverty reduction.   
As we discussed in chapter 2 and 5 poverty is a multidimensional approach. It cannot 
be fully explained only by looking at through income or consumption approach. 
Thus in order to capture the multidimensionality of poverty, various Indices like 
Human Poverty Index, the HDI and the MDI are suggested and used by many 
researchers and development economists. Following the literature we use the MDIs 
of districts that not only help us in understanding the quality and quantity of social 
services provision but also it explains the incidence of poverty at district levels.  
10.6 THE COVERAGE OF THE MDI 
The MDI like the HDI commands multiple domains or separate dimensions which 
largely reflect the deprivation of society. Four dimensions: 1. Education; 2. Health; 
3. Housing and residential housing services; and 4. Employment, are included in the 
MDI with equal weight. Each dimension is the cluster of numbers of indicators that 
represents different deprivation and explains all aspect of the dimension in a best 
possible way.121 Health is a vital social indicator that is normally included while 
calculating the MDI. But in here given the data limitation at the district level health 
variable is not included.    
The education domain reflects the current and future deprivation of education. It 
includes both adult literacy rate and school age (5-9 Years) who are out of school for 
male and female separately to account for the gender disparity. The housing quality 
dimension includes the number of sub-indicators representing the quality of the 
houses as well as the ownership status of the dwellers. Having accessed to basic 
                                                 
121
 Appendix F table F.1 presents a schematic view of the sub-statistical indicators for each domain 
included in MDI.  
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utilities consumed on daily bases are the fundamental factors to affect human lives. 
Household deprived of these services would fall under the category of poverty. 
Another important dimension of the MDI is employment, which is constituted by the 
unemployment rate and employed labour force in non-manufacturing sectors. The 
latter is used as proxy to capture the disguised employment (SPDC, 2007).        
Initially, the indicators for each sector are combined to construct the sectoral indices. 
Except person per room, which is standardised with the maximum and the minimum, 
for housing quality dimension, other indicators are expressed in percentage terms. 
After computing of each sector with different weight, the IMD is constructed by 
aggregating them. The formula for MDI derivation is: 
      
 
 
                            
 
 
                                                            (10.1) 
Where: 
MDI = Multiple Deprivation Index 
E = Index of Education Deprivation 
HQ = Index of Deprivation in Housing Quality 
HS = Index of Deprivation in Housing Services 
L = Index of Deprivation in Employment 
α = 3 
The parameter (α) has an important role to play. For example with the value of 1, the 
MDI would be the average outcome of included dimensions. As (α) increases more 
weight will be assigned to sectors with greater deprivation. However, Following 
UNDP (1997), the SPDC (2007) fixes the value of (α) at 3 in order to avoid from 
assigning overwhelming weight to any of the included dimensions. The IMD varies 
from zero to 100; with the former no deprivation and the latter with the maximum 
degree of deprivation. 
Table 10.8:  Indices of Multiple Deprivations in Pakistan 
Provinces MDI in 
1998 
MDI in 
2005 
MDI in 
2009 
Index of Progress 
(1998 to 2005)
122
 
Index of Progress 
(1998 to 2009) 
                                                 
122
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Punjab 58.41 52.53 27.8 11.19 88.96 
Sindh 62.03 54.95 31.3 12.88 75.56 
KP 66.17 58.43 35.1 13.24 66.47 
Balochistan 73.15 69.19 50.2 5.72 37.83 
Overall 64.51 58.45 31.6 10.36 84.97 
Source: SPDC (2007 and 2012) 
Table 10.8 shows a reduction in the deprivation level in overall Pakistan by 32.91 
percentage point during 1998 and 2009. From 1998 to 2005 the deprivation declined 
by 6.06 percentage point - from 64.51 to 58.45. During 2005 to 2009 it has 
drastically decreased by 26.85 points – from 58.45 6o 31.6. The fastest declining rate 
in the MDI is recorded in KP. Balochistan with highest MDI of 69.19 in 2005 and 
50.2 in 2009 possesses the lowest declining rate. The overall 10.36% progress level 
in MDI between 1998 and 2005, 84% progress between 2005 and 2009, may be 
considered a marked social and economic development. Among provinces Punjab 
with 88.96 occupies the highest index of progress, while the MDI during the same 
period in Balochistan maintains 45.71 index of progress.   
10.6.1 DEPRIVATION IN THE PUNJAB PROVINCE 
Table 10.9 presents the deprivations of each district in the Punjab in 1998, 2005 and 
2009. The index of progression in two districts - Rawalpindi and Sialkot – has been 
negative out of total 34 districts during 1998 and 2005. However, the same districts 
have shown a remarkable performance in terms of the MDI reduction during 2005 
and 2009. Chakwal district showed the highest and Faisalabad the lowest progress in 
MDI in 1998-2005 period. Gujranwala has been the best performer in 2005-2009 
among the districts in Punjab.  Lodhran, a southern district of the Punjab is the most 
deprived one, whereas Lahore, the capital city and a district in central Punjab is the 
least deprived one. Districts which have witnessed a noticeable decline in 
deprivation include Leiah, D.G. Khan, Rajanpur, Bhakhar and Chakwal. A 
noticeable point is that districts that produced a mark declined in deprivation are all 
southern Punjab districts, except Chakwal, and also amongst the deprived districts of 
the province.  
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In southern districts of Punjab average per capita expenditure is around five times 
lower in comparison to the northern districts of the province (IPP
123
, 2011).The 
fundamental reason of inequitable distribution of financial resources between 
southern and northern districts of Punjab has been the inclination of provincial 
government towards latter districts (IPP, 2008). After the devolution, however, the 
southern districts have started receiving a far better treatment in terms of resource 
allocation from the provincial governments. As presented in table10.5, the formula-
based PCF Award assigns 75% and 10% to population and backwardness 
respectively in Punjab that resulted into creating a wider fiscal space for districts 
particularly in backward southern districts to raise their investments in development 
projects which potentially have strong impact on human development. The 
devolution has proved to certain extent to be an effective policy instrument for 
human development and poverty reduction in the Punjab.   
 
 
 
                                                 
123
 Institute of Public Policy (IPP) is an independent centre for applied economic, social and strategic 
research was created by the Beaconhouse National University, Lahore, Pakistan, in 2006.  
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Table 10.9:   Indices of Multiple Deprivations in Punjab Province 
Districts MDI  1998 MDI  2005 MDI  2009 Index of 
Progress 
Index of 
Progress (2005 
to 2009) 
Districts MDI  1998 MDI  2005 MDI  2009 Index of 
Progress (1998 
t0 2005) 
Index of 
Progress (2005 
to 2009) 
Lodhran 68.9 64.9 37.73 5.81 72.012 Sahiwal 61.3 53.5 25.56 12.72 109.3114 
Muzaffargarh 70.8 64.2 39.44 9.32 62.779 H. Abad 58.1 52.9 18.74 8.95 182.2839 
Rajanpur 74.8 61.8 14.21 17.38 334.905 Multan 56.8 51.9 28.18 8.63 84.17317 
Leiah 69.1 60.1 30.07 13.02 99.867 Narowal 54.9 51.8 18.10 5.65 186.1878 
D.G. Khan 70.6 59.6 45.89 15.58 29.876 Kasur 58.3 51.8 22.63 11.15 128.8997 
Pakpathan 66 59.5 35.57 9.85 67.276 M. Bahauddin 55.6 50.9 15.24 8.45 233.9895 
Bahawalpur 65.3 58.4 36.05 10.57 61.997 T.T. Singh 52.8 50 20.25 5.30 146.9136 
R.Y. Khan 66 58.4 38.72 11.52 50.826 Attock 53.7 48 21.82 10.61 119.9817 
Jhang 64.6 58.1 34.94 10.06 66.285 Jhelum 51.3 47.7 34.94 7.02 36.51975 
Vehari 62.1 58.1 30.68 6.44 89.374 Chakwal 56.9 47.2 15.50 17.05 204.5161 
Khanewal 64 58 30.81 9.38 88.251 Sheikhpura 53.8 46.6 18.39 13.38 153.3986 
Okara 62 57.5 25.04 7.26 129.633 Faisalabad 45.6 44.2 22.21 3.07 99.00946 
Khushab 61.5 57.1 22.27 7.15 156.399 Gujrat 46.5 42.7 13.04 8.17 227.454 
Bhakhar 67.9 56.5 32.56 16.79 73.526 Rawalpindi 41 41.4 14.21 -0.98 191.3441 
Bahawalnagar 64.1 56.2 34.08 12.32 64.906 Sialkot 40.3 40.9 13.37 -1.49 205.9088 
Mianwali 62.3 54.8 29.39 12.04 86.458 Gujranwala 45.1 38.5 10.68 14.63 260.4869 
Sargodha 59.3 53.6 25.32 9.61 111.690 Lahore 34.3 29.2 10.26  184.6004 
Source:   SPDC (2007; 2012) 
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10.6.2 DEPRIVATION IN SINDH PROVINCE 
According to SPDC‘s (2007; 2012) estimates Tharparkar and Karachi respectively 
are the most deprived and least deprived districts of Sindh.  As table 10.10 indicates, 
Tharparkar, Badin, Shikarpur, Sukkur and Ghotki are registered the highest declining 
rate of deprivations over the periods of 1998, 2005 and 2009. Larkana is the only 
district in Sindh where the magnitude of deprivation has increased overtime during 
1998-2005 – the index of progress is negative. The index of progress is the highest 
for Sukkur and the lowest for Dadu. Majority of deprived districts are rural ones that 
historically have been neglected from the provincial governments, whereas urban 
districts like Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur have remained the main beneficiaries 
in terms of receiving the financial resources. However, after the devolution, by the 
virtue of multi-indicators PFC, the rural districts started receiving a reasonable share 
of resources. Similarly, because of the local representatives‘ accountability to their 
electors a significant part of allocated funds are expected to be invested on economic 
and social sectors. This led to increase in quality and quantity provision of social 
services. Unlike other provinces the PFC in Sindh reserves 25% of Provincial 
Allocable Fund for district governments‘ deficit financing. This financial cushion 
provides ample space to the district governments to enhance their expenditure, 
particularly development expenditure, beyond their own revenues and other 
provincial transfers.  
Like Punjab in Sindh high declining rate in deprivation is observed in backward 
districts, except of course Sukkur (table 10.10). This shows that the impact of the 
devolution has been felt in terms of reducing the poverty and human development in 
deprived districts of the province.  
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Table 10.10:  Indices of Multiple Deprivations in Sindh Province 
10.6.3 DEPRIVATION IN KP PROVINCE 
Table 10.11 depicts that Kohistan is the most deprived and Peshawar is the least 
deprived districts of KP province. Peshawar is not only the most populous (11.4% of 
total province population) district but also is the biggest manufactured goods value 
added contributor (11.83%). On the other hand, Tank is the least populated district 
(1.3% share of total KP‘s population share) that contributes only 0.46% to province 
with respect to agricultural and manufacturing goods (Ahmed and Lodhi, 2008). If 
population or economic base/tax collection effort was the only criterion of resources 
transfer to districts, Peshawar would get the lion share and Tank the least in 
transfers, despite being the least deprived and one of the most deprived districts of 
KP. The provincial transfer in KP though is not as broad-based as in Sindh and 
Punjab but allocates 50% on the basis of infrastructure deficiency and backwardness 
that implicitly benefit the poor and backward districts.  Similar to the Punjab and 
Sindh in KP progression in the MDI is observed almost in rural districts with 
rampant poverty.  
Districts MDI  1998 MDI  2005 MDI  2009 Index of Progress 
(1998 to 2005) 
Index of Progress 
(2005 to 2009) 
Tharparkar 75.4 64 54.50 15.12 17.431 
Thatta 72.7 65.3 52.10 10.18 25.336 
Badin 71.6 61.1 43.91 14.66 39.148 
Sanghar 64.6 59.7 31.14 7.59 91.715 
Nawab Shah 60.4 57.2 30.15 5.30 89.718 
Mirpur Khas 65.8 56.3 29.16 14.44 93.073 
Jacobabad 68.2 60.1 37.55 11.88 60.053 
Khairpur 62.6 57.4 29.16 9.059 96.845 
Larkana 59.9 61.2 20.83 -2.17 193.807 
Dadu 63.1 62.5 25.67 0.95 143.475 
Ghotki 67.7 55.6 24.79 17.87 124.284 
Noshero Feroz 60.4 53.5 27.30 11.42 95.971 
Shikarpur 64.2 52.7 23.77 17.91 121.708 
Hyderabad 53.2 47.2 13.39 11.28 252.502 
Sukkur 58 44.5 24.36 23.28 82.677 
Karachi 24.6 20.9 9.31  124.490 
Source:  SPDC (2007 and 2012) 
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Table 10.11:  Indices of Multiple Deprivations in KP Province 
 
 
 
 
Districts MDI  1998 MDI  2005 MDI  2009 Index of 
Progress 
Index of Progress 
(2005 to 2009) 
Districts MDI  1998 MDI  2005 MDI  2009 Index of Progress 
(1998 t0 2005) 
Index of 
Progress (2005 
to 2009) 
Kohistan 83 71.7 70 13.61 2.429 Swat 66.3 57.6 33.37 13.12 72.610 
Batagram 78 67.9 28.58 12.95 137.579 L. Marwat 63.5 57.1 41.08 10.08 38.997 
Chitral 69 64.8 29.52 6.09 119.512 D.I. Khan 68.1 56.8 41.06 16.59 38.334 
Upper Dir 74.6 64.6 35.57 13.40 81.614 Kohat 62.1 54.9 29.58 11.59 85.598 
Shangla 78.6 64.5 44.48 17.94 45.009 Lower Dir 66.9 54.4 29.06 18.68 87.199 
Buner 69.2 63.6 44.52 8.09 42.857 Mardan 61.4 53.8 28.11 12.38 91.391 
Tank 68.5 63.2 37.82 7.74 67.107 Nowshera 58.8 52.9 21.63 10.03 144.568 
Karak 65.7 63.1 41.93 3.96 50.489 Bannu 62.4 52.9 21.92 15.22 141.332 
Hangu 69 61.1 27.16 11.45 124.963 Swabi 64.1 52.9 29.88 17.47 77.041 
Mansehra 66.1 60.2 33.97 8.93 77.215 Abottabad 57.5 51.7 23.47 10.09 120.281 
Charsadda 65.7 58.8 23.86 10.50 146.438 Haripur 54.5 51.6 16.60 5.32 210.843 
Malakand 64.3 58.2 28.35 9.49 105.291 Peshawar 50.8 44.2 17.87 12.99 147.342 
Source:   SPDC (2007 and 2012) 
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10.6.4 DEPRIVATION IN BALOCHISTAN PROVINCE 
Balochistan is the most deprived province among all provinces. The deprivation was 
still as high as 82.8 in district Musa Khel in 2005 and 64.96 in Barkhan in 2009 
(table 10.12), more so nine of the ten most deprived districts of the country belong to 
Balochistan (SPDC, 2007; 2012). Albeit, the deprivation has declined in the majority 
of districts but compare to other provinces the rate is far behind in Balochistan. The 
annual rate of 2% is not evident in many of the districts. For instance, in Qilla 
Saifullah and Ziarat the magnitude of the MDI has increased during 1998 and 2005 
with alarmingly high enhancement in the latter. District Jafarabad with 13.31 index 
of progress remained the highest performer among the districts in Balochistan and 
Awaran with 0.75 index of progress has the least performing district in terms of the 
MDI reduction during 1998-2005. Quetta has registered no improvement in terms of 
deprivation during 1998-2005 but shown a marked reduction during 2005-2009 
(SPDC, 2012).This is surprising given the social and economic deterioration that 
have taken place particularly for last five years! 
In Balochistan it appears that the devolution has not been as successful as in other 
three provinces. Multiple political, socio-economic, demographic and geographic 
factors may be kept responsible for the slow declining rate of deprivation in 
Balochistan. The most fundamental factor among them is the weak political will of 
federal and provincial governments to implement the plan. 
Moreover, unlike other provinces socio-economic infrastructure in Balochistan was 
very weak and inadequate in pre-devolution.  
As described earlier, the main purpose of the devolution was to ensure that the local 
governments were empowered in order to meet the local needs. Apparently catering 
to the needs of the people as well as targeting the poor was the main idea behind the 
devolution. For this to happen the pattern of public investment should change in the 
favour of subsectors that are influential in affecting the poor. Therefore, it is 
worthwhile to investigate empirically whether or not the pattern of public investment 
has changed.  
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Table 10.12:  Indices of Multiple Deprivations in Balochistan Province 
 
 
                                                 
124
 Districts‘ indices of multiple deprivations for Pakistan, (2011), research report no.82. Social Policy and Development Centre 
Districts MDI  1998 MDI  2005 MDI  2009 Index of 
Progress 
Index of 
Progress 
(2005 to 
2009) 
Districts MDI  1998 MDI  2005 MDI  2009 Index of Progress 
(1998 t0 2005) 
Index of 
Progress (2005 
to 2009) 
Musa Khel 89.1 82.8 61.14 7.07 35.427 Bolan 75 68.3 42.56 8.93 60.479 
Awaran 80.4 79.8 44.65 0.75 78.723 Mastung 73.5 68.1 33.80 7.35 101.479 
Kharan 82.9 77.6 45.42 6.39 70.850 Nasirabad 76.7 67.8 45.97 11.60 47.487 
Zhob 79.3 77.1 47.36 2.77 62.796 Lasbela 71.6 67.7 58.84 5.45 15.058 
Qilla Saifullah 76.2 76.8 54.87 -0.79 39.967 Loralai 70.8 66.2 65.03 6.50 1.799 
Panjgur 79.2 75.6 46.11 4.55 63.956 Gwadar 67.8 65.4 42.84 3.54 52.661 
Jhal Magsi 79.2 74.7 40.66 5.68 83.719 Sibbi 67.2 63.6 28.57 5.36 122.611 
Qilla Abdullah 76.1 73.9 26.36 2.89 180.349 Kalat 70.5 63.2 40.38 10.35 56.513 
Khuzdar 79 72.8 44.06 7.85 65.229 Ziarat 59.8 62.5 24.54 -4.52 154.686 
Chaghi 72.8 70.1 61.37 3.71 14.225 Jafarabad 71.4 61.9 37.32 13.31 65.863 
Barkhan 76.7 69.3 61.96 9.65 11.846 Pishin 65.1 60.6 17.83 6.91 239.877 
Kech/Turbat 69.5 68.7 50.36 1.15 36.418 Quetta 46 46 13.18 0.00 249.014 
Source:  SPDC (2007 ;  2012)
124
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As suggested by Faguet (2004) and our theoretical model presented in chapter 6, if 
the devolution has failed to change the pattern of public investments then one can 
argue that decentralisation and centralisation would largely be equivalent in terms of 
fiscal or economic perspective, though it may differ in terms of political or 
administrative matters. If the devolution has been successful in shifting the pattern of 
public investments and making it more responsive to the people‘s needs then it 
seems pertinent to claim that the devolution has largely achieved its targeted goals.   
We postulate that since the local governments are more responsive to the local 
people needs because of being accountable to local communities therefore they are 
expected to change the pattern of investment in the favour of those sectors which are 
thought to have more benefits to the poor. Given this the following hypothesis is 
formulated to test the predictions that are drawn from theoretical model of this study: 
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, after the devolution pattern of public investment 
changes and sectors related to social services provision receive more expenditure.  
 
10.7 DID DEVOLUTION CHANGE INVESTMENT ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
SERVICES? DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS  
Table 10.13 describes the data that are used for the empirical analysis of the impact 
of the devolution on social service provisions. In this chapter we also draw the data 
for most of variables from the FBS (various issue); provincial governments budget 
documents (various years); SPDC (2000; 2007; 2012); State Bank of Pakistan 
(2010); Pakistan (various Issues). At the provincial level population estimates are 
obtained by dividing the total population on all four provinces based on the latter‘s 
respective share in 1998 census. Provinces in Pakistan are demarcated on ethnic 
bases and inter-provincial migration is negligible. Accordingly, it is plausible to 
expect that the population share of the provinces is virtually time-invariant. Besides 
this, the population needs to be incorporated as an independent variable. 
Additionally, the same variable is used to obtain per capita expenditures of the 
provinces.  
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In order to get public expenditures, per capita income and other variables in real 
terms, their nominal values are deflated with the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Once 
the data are collected from the sources mentioned above and brought to a usable 
shape a reasonable annual time series dataset is constructed that span from 1975 to 
2008. Unlike the previous two chapters the end tale of time series for this analysis is 
2008 instead of 2009. The reason being, since the local governments completed their 
four year tenure in 2008 and next elections have been suspended till the time of 
writing, hence it is worthwhile to limit it till 2008 and investigate the efficacy of 
local governments in pro-poor social and economic service provisions. The reported 
data are annual because budgetary allocations to both provincial and local 
governments are undertaken annually therefore concerned data are made available on 
annual basis. The cross section comprises all four provinces of Pakistan.  Table 
10.13 reports the summary of the basic statistics for the relevant variables.
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Table 10.13: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Devolution reform (dummy) 136 0.235294 0.425751 0 1 
Population (in millions) 136 28.08185 23.86578 3.59 90.07 
Per Capita GDP 136 4008.559 1264.578 2239 7686 
Agri. Value Add.* 136 1136.948 288.9449 696.9466 1948.867 
Civil Work * 136 20.8603 85.585 0.3527 842.806 
Pop. Per Bed 136 1508.684 171.6524 1269 1963 
Welfare Expenditure* 136 0.731106 1.011983 0.00322 6.941837 
Public Health Expenditure* 136 2.116858 3.431105 0 19.11971 
Social Sector Expenditure* 136 43.49989 50.24139 1.191492 249.2615 
Education Expenditure* 136 44.64446 47.66713 0.126267 223.6559 
Health Expenditure* 136 9.672765 10.01052 0.231037 40.75399 
Irrigation Expenditure* 136 5.469899 4.801413 0.177114 24.1072 
Rural Development 
Expenditure* 
136 1.794452 5.016514 0 39.68176 
* Value Expressed in Per Capita term  
                                                 
125
 For correlation matrix of the variables see appendix F, table F.3 
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The data limitation at the level of district and beyond restricts our analysis to 
provincial level. But the provinces are expected to reflect the local expenditures 
because the provincial expenditures are the aggregation of districts level. 
Furthermore, considering the financial and expenditure records the provincial level 
provides similar information for both pre and post devolution periods that enable us 
in determining and investigating the impact of the devolution reforms on social and 
economic services provision.  
The extent and magnitude of changes in social and economic services that the 
devolution has brought in Pakistan may be best described from figures 13 through 
24.  For instance, it is evident from figures 13, 14, 25 and 19 that the annual per 
capita public expenditure on education, healthcare and welfare services witnessed a 
sharp rise after 2001 almost in all provinces. This illustrates the fact that after the 
devolution the public sector has been more responsive in increasing investment in 
those sectors and sub-sectors that are pro common people, particularly the poor and 
marginalised, who otherwise would not be able to have access to these services.  
Likewise, figures 10.7 through 10.10 present that the economic service provision 
also received a noticeable increase in its investment after the devolution.  
It is worth noting that among economic services public expenditures on civil work 
noticed a drastic change after the devolution (figure 10.9), which raised concerns 
about patronisation to the local elites and political associates. The civil expenditures 
contain projects on small roads, bridges, footpaths and such projects are very prone 
to corruption. In order to buy or maintain the loyalty and political support of the 
local elite the representatives arguably would allocate more funds to civic works and 
bestow their work contracts to political loyalists. In terms of civic work Balochistan 
province registered a mark jump and consistent increase in civic work expenditures 
till 2005 (figure 10.9). It is argued that although the province attracted a substantial 
amount of resources for its physical infrastructure, nonetheless, but due to rampant 
corruption and political patronisation only a small part of allocated resources have 
been utilised in terms of   actual infrastructure development (Rolls, 2008).126  
                                                 
126
 Rolls, Mark (2008) ―Will ‗devolution‘ improve the accountability and responsiveness of social 
service deliverty in Balochistan, Pakistan? A Political economy perspective‖ Working paper series: 
No. 08-86, London School of Economics. 
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The geographical distribution of social and economic services has also witnessed a 
noticeable change in post devolution period. Prior to devolution the per capita 
expenditures on all social and economic services were more or less the same in all 
provinces. After the devolution, nevertheless, the geographical composition of 
expenditures has changed in many of services. For instance, in terms of healthcare 
expenditures Balochistan was similar to other provinces in per capita terms but has 
begun to lag behind its counterparts in post devolution period. In case of per capita 
education expenditure the Balochistan remained ahead of other provinces.  
Thus, overall the devolution appears to have helped increasing investment on those 
social and economic services which potentially can affect local communities – 
particularly the poor and marginalised section of society.  
Figure 10.5: Annual Per Capita Expenditure on Education 
  
Figure 10.6: Annual Per Capita Expenditure on Healthcare Facilities 
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Figure10.7:  Annual Per Capita Expenditure on Welfare Services 
  
Figure 10.8: Annual Per Capita Expenditure on Water Management                              
 
Figure 10.9: Annual Per Capita Expenditure on Civil Work 
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Figure 10.10: Annual Per Capita Growth in Agriculture Value Addition 
 
Figure 10.11: Per Capita Education and Health Expenditures 
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investigation to test whether or not the devolution has changed the magnitude of the 
social services provision.  
Following Faguet (2004); Faguet and Sanchez (2008); Aslam and Yilmaz (2011)  we 
identify nine sub-sectors with in larger public sector which potentially affect the 
living standard of local communities in general and the poor and marginalised social 
groups in particular.127 Normally the social service/public good provision is 
‗measured in quality adjusted units of output, separated by the type‘ (Faguet, 2004: 
876). Given the data constraint for such measurements we measure the real 
investment quantity in terms of public expenditures on these sectors. Such an 
approach, although restricts from analysing whether the devolution has enhanced the 
quality of delivery of the public goods (for example, in case of education, adequate 
supply of school text books, teaching equipments and teacher training courses), it 
enables us to compare the inter-sectoral resource allocations in pre-devolution with 
the post devolution period as well as the pattern of public sector investments that 
changed with the devolution.  
The dependent variable is the inflation-adjusted annual per capita amount of 
investments undertaken in respective sectors, except ‗population per bed‘ variable, 
which is not expressed in per capita term. The primary independent variable is the 
devolution reform, which is captured by a dummy variable. As it is noted above that 
the devolution was launched in 2000-01, the dummy variable takes 1 on 2001 and 
afterward (2001 to 2008) and 0 otherwise (i.e. from 1975 to 2000). Following 
Neyapti (2010) per capita Gross National Product is added as an independent 
variable to proxy for the overall level of development. Arguably population - which 
is an important time-variant factor - can affect the extents and magnitudes of the 
social services (Aslam and Yilmaz, 2010), and regions/provinces with larger 
population receive better treatment than less populated regions (Herna´ndez et al. 
2002).  
Urban-rural as well as inter-provincial disparity in Pakistan is widespread. The urban 
areas have far better access to social services than their rural counterparts. With 
regard to inter-provincial disparity, Balochistan lags far behind other provinces, 
                                                 
127
These sectoral variables are described in appendix F table F.2. 
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particularly the Punjab, in terms of social and economic development. As noted in 
chapter 4 the Punjab receives more than half of the total federal transfers to the 
provinces. Therefore, it is expected that a rise in the population will increase the size 
of social service provision.  
Cheema et al. (2005) argue that factors such as the institutionalisation and 
distribution of land and tenancy reforms, equality among the various communities, 
ethnic harmonisation and openness to trade are likely to increase the accessibility of 
communities to social services. Given the limitation in data to include them as 
control variables we treat them as time-invariant. As documented earlier, the 
governance structure in Pakistan although remained mixed with the periods of 
democracy and dictatorship, the socio-economic structure mentioned above has 
remained the same. Hence, the final findings of our research may not be affected due 
to the exclusion of these variables.  
Any systematic change in politics or economic system in Pakistan, such as external 
shocks, donor funding or any national policy initiatives that have similar effect on all 
provinces or any other time-specific variations are captured by the year dummies. As 
shown earlier in chapter 4 Punjab and Sindh‘s share in total resources allocated to 
the provinces is disproportionally high. Therefore, they are likely to have a better 
fiscal capacity to allocate resources to local governments after the devolution and 
hence more funds for social service sector. Following this proposition and the 
argument established in chapter 4 and 5 a dummy variable is used to capture the 
Punjab and Sindh effect.  
Based on the above descriptions of independent and dependent variables and panel 
dataset (34*4), the following model is constructed and statistically estimated:  
4,3,2,1;34,.....3,2,1;)(5
)(4)(3)(


ititieitGDP
itPopitDevitPDumitSec


 (10.2) 
The subscript      stands for province i at time t.          alternatively represents all 
sectors
128
 included in our analysis.          is the provincial dummy and 
                                                 
128
 See the list of sectors included in table F.2 in Appendix F. 
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          is the year dummy. The provincial and time dummies are supposed to 
capture all of the characteristics associated with the provinces at a given time. 
         is the dummy variable for the devolution with the value of 1 on 2001 and 
afterward and 0 otherwise (pre-devolution). The devolution dummy         
represents the role of local governments and other institutions129 that came into effect 
after the implementation of the Plan in terms of the pattern of public investment. 
        is the population of the provinces expressed  in million  and         is real  
per capita GDP described in 1980 constant price terms. The per capita GDP of 
provinces is expected to control for the overall economic condition of the provincial 
economy among other things. The relationship of province level per capita GDP and 
expenditure on social and economic services is expected to be positive: higher 
average per capita income of one province may lead to increase the expenditures on 
above services because of the additional resource availability to that province from 
own revenue sources.  
Our variable of interest is the devolution reform dummy        that helps us in 
examining whether after the devolution the expenditures on social and economic 
services have changed. In equation (10.2) the positive coefficient of             
suggests that the expenditure on respective service have increased at a faster rate 
compare to the pre devolution period, ceteris paribus. This leads us to conclude that 
the devolution has been effective in terms of increasing the expenditures on social 
and economic services which are essential for the human development and the 
poverty reduction. Conversely, the negative coefficient suggests an adverse impact 
of the devolution on expenditures on social and economic infrastructure provisions 
and the zero or very close to zero coefficient shows that the devolution has been 
neutral in changing the pattern and magnitude of these expenditures. In other words, 
the expenditures on these services which thus far were undertaken by provincial 
governments remain persistent and increasing with the same rate irrespective of 
being devolved to local governments.   
We may have unobservable province specific time-invariant characteristics with 
independent effect on the level and magnitude of the social and economic services 
                                                 
129
 The Devolution Plan reform was accompanied with many social, economic and political 
institutions, which hitherto had not existed in socio-economic and political realm of Pakistan.   
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delivery. Then the use of the standard OLS would cause unobserved heterogeneity 
and produce biased results. Thus, a firsthand remedy comes to mind is the FE and 
RE estimations method that allows us accounting for unobservable province-specific 
effects. For the sake of comparison we report the OLS results alongside FE and RE 
models in tables .10.14 through 10.16. In addition, given the fact that majority of the 
right side variables are in dummy form (including year dummies), Tobit estimation 
method for Eqn. (10.2) is also used to strengthen our regression analysis and check 
for robustness. As a result, the last column of table 10.14 through 10.16 presents the 
regression results for Tobit estimation. Another major threat to validity of our 
outcomes could come from the time-variant factors that simultaneously correlate 
services and the devolution indicators, which may create the problem of 
endogeneity. This would occur if the federal and provincial governments‘ choices of 
devolution were purposely based on quality and quantity of social and economic 
indicators of localities. In this case the devolution reforms have been nation-wide 
policy that applied to all districts in all four provinces on Pakistan. Thus, 
endogeneity is not likely to be a major issue.  
10.9 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
For each service four models (standard OLS, Random and Fixed effects and Tobit) 
are estimated separately and their results are reported in table 10.14 though 10.16. 
We find that the devolution indicator enters into regressions with significant and 
positive (negative sign for population per bed as expected) sign across all social and 
economic indicators in all models. It therefore suggests that the devolution on 
average has positively impacted the provision of social and economic services 
provided to local communities. That is to say, given the statistically significant 
coefficients of the devolution variable, it is plausible to conclude that following the 
devolution, the magnitude of all nine vital socio-economic services has increased.   
As the major objective of the devolution was to make the local public services 
accessible to the local people and the improvement of social infrastructure, it is 
reasonable to group the included services into two broad categories: 1. economic 
services; 2. social services. The former includes development expenditures on 
sectors such as agriculture, civil work, water management and rural development, 
whereas the latter includes sectors like health, education, water supply and sanitation 
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facility, and social welfare and recreational services. As stated earlier, more than 
80% of the local governments‘ finances are utilised for revenue expenditures. 
However, with it, the development expenditures make up a sizeable spending, which 
flows to various social and economic development schemes. 
For example, the first reported outcome variable – the public expenditure on 
education – is strongly correlated with the devolution indicator. The coefficient of 
the latter has a strong positive slope and statistically significant at less than 1% level.  
It is important to highlight that the level of significance and sign of coefficient 
remains persistent irrespective of whichever model is used, though the magnitude 
changes. Healthcare variables (annual expenditures on healthcare and population per 
bed) maintain positive (negative) and strongly significant coefficient vis-à-vis the 
devolution reform variable. It suggests that health services have increased in both 
quantity, proxied by expenditures, and quality, proxied by population per bed after 
the devolution reforms.  
Results presented in tables 10.14 and 10.16 show that impact of the devolution is not 
limited to social services. Rather the economic services such as agriculture, 
infrastructure development (proxy by civil work) and water management have 
registered a mark improvement after the devolution. Similar to the social indicators, 
the devolution coefficient has a strong and positive association with the agriculture 
value addition, expenditure on civil work and others. Again, the nature of the 
relationship and the level of significance are not changing while applying different 
models.   
Interestingly, these outcomes are in accordance with our theoretical prediction; that 
is, socio-economic services may be better provided by the sub-national government 
compare to their central counterpart. In the same vein it is also in the line of the 
empirical literature (for instance, Faguet, 2004) that shows local governments 
because of the better local knowledge are more effective in providing these social 
services.  
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Table 10.14: Determinants of Public Expenditures on Rural Development, Agriculture and Civil Work 
Variables Public Exp. on Rural Development @ Δ  Agriculture  Valued Addition Δ Annual Public Exp. on Civil Work@ Δ 
Models OLS RE FE Tobit OLS RE FE Tobit OLS RF FE Tobit 
Devolution 
Reform 
(Dummy) 
9.951
*
 8.918
**
 10.69
**
 26.10
**
 0.288
***
 0.288
***
 0.303
***
 9.934
**
 3.770
***
 3.770
***
 5.434
***
 4.236
***
 
(5.323) (4.353) (5.068) (12.917) (0.090) (0.078) (0.093) (4.929) (1.095) (0.758) (1.036) (0.897) 
Punjab-Sindh 
(Dummy) 
    
0.748
***
 0.748
***
 
 
4.625 2.060
**
 2.060
**
 
 
0.780 
    
(0.090) (0.092) 
 
(18.290) (0.838) (0.902) 
 
(1.131) 
Population -0.126
**
 -0.128
*
 0.0474 -0.0917 -0.0138
***
 -0.0138
***
 -0.00694
***
 -0.159 -0.0510
***
 -0.0510
***
 -0.00701 -0.0247 
(0.056) (0.074) (0.379) (0.073) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.365) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) 
Per Capita 
GDP 
0.00524
***
 0.00507
***
 0.00148 0.00330
*
 0.000195
***
 0.000195
***
 0.000134
***
 0.00357 0.000131 0.000131 -0.000803
**
 -0.000244 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 9.418 7.480 2.213 22.64
*
 6.342
***
 6.342
***
 6.588
***
 -1.897 2.878
***
 2.878
***
 5.346
***
 3.835
***
 
(5.803) (6.675) (12.901) (12.642) (0.066) (0.068) (0.087) (10.137) (0.468) (0.663) (0.963) (1.067) 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R
2  
(Within) 
 
0.1633 0.1678 
  
0.8656 0.8807 
  
0.5538 0.5832 
 
R
2  
(Between) 
 
0.9968 0.1693 
  
0.8848 0.0121 
  
0.7878 0.2980 
 
R
2  
(Overall) 0.213 0.2202 0.1693 
 
0.866 0.8658 0.4461 
 
0.575 0.5752 0.4475 
 
F/WaldChai2 2.544 
(0.0000) 
33.88 
(0.005) 
1.57 
(0.09) 
79.23 
(0.000) 
39.14 
(0.000) 
638.70 
(0.000) 
20.45 
(0.0000) 
37.61 
(0.0044)  
134.04 
(0.0000) 
3.88 
(0.000) 
176.12 
(0.000) 
@ Value expressed in log form; Δ values are in million Rs.; Panel regressions robust standard error in parentheses        
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.0 
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Table10.15: Determinants of Expenditures on Education, Basic Healthcare Indicators 
Variables Annual Public Exp. Education@ Δ Annual Public Exp. on Basic Health@ Δ Population Per Bed 
Models (OLS) (RE) (FE) (Tobit) (OLS) (RE) (FE) (Tobit) (OLS) (RE) (FE) (Tobit) 
Devolution 
Reform 
(Dummy) 
1.926
***
 1.926
***
 3.733
***
 0.886
***
 3.484
***
 3.454
***
 3.094
***
 3.124
***
 -282.0
***
 -125.5
***
 -297.3
***
 -353.4
***
 
(0.490) (0.233) (0.192) (0.186) (0.217) (0.172) (0.159) (0.138) (28.142) (29.124) (12.401) (11.922) 
Punjab-Sindh 
(Dummy) 
    0.0624 0.000629  -0.679
***
     
    (0.121) (0.123)  (0.247)     
Population -0.00439
*
 -0.00439 -0.0176
***
 -0.00558 -0.00805
***
 -0.006
***
 0.0086
***
 0.00740
**
 4.211
***
 3.721
***
 -2.569
***
 -3.208
***
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.171) (0.458) (0.326) (0.337) 
Per Capita 
GDP 
0.000128
**
 0.000128
**
 0.000183
**
 0.000501
***
     -0.0269
***
 -0.0453
***
 0.0206
***
 0.0410
***
 
(0.000) (0.0433) (0.0334) (0.0000)     (0.002) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 4.078
***
 4.078
***
 2.538
***
 3.286
***
 1.720
***
 1.714
***
 1.452
***
 1.644
***
 1767.2
***
 1642.9
***
 1750.1
***
 1719.2
***
 
(0.510) (0.278) (0.217) (0.456) (0.088) (0.117) (0.113) (0.133) (23.967) (39.431) (12.910) (25.089) 
Year Dummy  Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included   Included Included Included  
N 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R
2  
(Within)  0.7452 0.9563   0.9696 0.9753   0.7330  0.9875  
R
2  
(Between)  0.0282 0.492   0.8594 0.8590   0.9132   0.9007  
R
2  
(Overall) 0.73 0.729 0.9027  0.966 0.9659 0.8628    0.970 0.7843 0.2553  
F/WaldChai2 185.04 
(0.000) 
296.77 
(0.000) 
81.34  
(0.000) 
822.3  
(0.000) 
165.3  
(0.000) 
2893.90 
(0.000) 
114.02 
(0.000) 
5212.60 
(0.000) 
84.82 
(0.000) 
357  
(0.000) 
293.. 
(0.000) 
10430  
(0.000) 
@ Value expressed in log form; Δ values are in million Rs; Panel regressions robust standard error in parentheses        
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Table 10.16: Determinants of Expenditures on Water and Sanitation, Social Welfare and Water Management 
 
Variables Annual Public Exp. On Water and 
Sanitation@
 Δ 
Annual Public Exp. On Social Welfare@
 Δ  Annual Public Exp on Water 
Management@
 Δ  
Models (OLS) (RE) (FE) (Tobit) (OLS) (RE) (FE) (Tobit) (OLS) (RE) (FE) (Tobit) 
Devolution 
Reform Dummy 
39.55
*** 39.55*** 55.79*** 87.19 4.499*** 4.499*** 5.272*** 0.606*** 2.513*** 2.513*** 3.079*** 3.039*** 
(10.151) (7.309) (10.083) (944.591) (0.505) (0.443) (0.527) (0.217) (0.217) (0.167) (0.225) (0.151) 
Punjab-Sindh 
Dummy 
44.67
*** 44.67*** 
 
30.05
* 0.760 0.760 
 
2.664
** 0.953*** 0.953***  1.077
*** 
(7.705) (8.692) 
 
(17.874) (0.583) (0.527) 
 
(1.057) (0.192) (0.199)  (0.159) 
Population -1.231*** -1.231*** -0.846*** -0.976*** -0.0204* -0.0204* 0.0236** -0.0510*** -0.016*** -0.0161*** -0.0164*** -0.0176*** 
(0.175) (0.175) (0.209) (0.344) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Per Capita GDP 0.0012 0.0012 -0.007** -0.001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0002*** 0.00020*** 0.000015*
 
0.000036
* 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 6.589 6.589 36.54*** -34.03 -1.956*** -1.956*** -0.707 -0.882 1.057*** 1.057*** 1.861*** 1.590*** 
(4.897) (6.390) (9.369) (944.605) (0.481) (0.388) (0.489) (0.649) (0.193) (0.146) (0.209) (0.159) 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included included 
N 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R
2  
(Within) 
 
0.6918 0.7105 
  
0.8829 0.9003 
 
 0.9427 0.9490  
R
2  
(Between) 
 
0.9761 0.8347 
  
0.5224 0.120 
 
 0.9096 0.6256  
R
2  
(Overall) 0.788 0.7885 0.6430 
 
0.85 0.8586 0.6458 
 
0.9419 0.9419 0.6668  
F/WaldChai2 14.09 
(0.000) 
369.00 
(0.000) 
6.80 
(0.000) 
320.79 
(0.000) 
31.91 
(0.000) 
601.30 
(0.0000) 
25.03 
(0.000) 
104.46 
(0.000) 
94.02 
(0.000) 
1604.82 
(0.000) 
51.62 
(0.000) 
2558.94 
(0.0000) 
@ Value expressed in log form; Δ values are in million Rs; Panel regressions robust standard error in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
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As for the other explanatory variables in the regressions analysis are concerned, the 
per capita GDP is positively correlated to education expenditures, although with the 
coefficient close to zero. However, the association of the per capita GDP and the 
health indicator is mixed. For instance, for the OLS and GLS (RF) the relationship 
between the population per bed and the GDP per capita is negative which is of 
course what was predicted. Nevertheless, when it comes to the GLS (FE) and Tobit 
estimations – that basically are the actual models for final analysis based on the 
explanation given above – the coefficient of per capita GDP maintains a positive and 
statistically significant slope vis-à-vis health indicator.  
Similar to the education and health indicators, the GDP per capita‘s association with 
other included outcomes variables – economic and social alike – is mixed. The 
variable either appears irrelevant in explaining any change in the services or if 
relevant in some of the cases, the agriculture for instance, is not consistent across 
different models or if both significant and consistent then retains a coefficient that is 
close to zero. But the relationship between the per capita GDP and the services is 
somewhat not unexpected. That is because considering the geographical conditions 
and the demographic composition of the provinces in Pakistan the per capita GDP is 
unlikely to capture the overall development level of provinces. Therefore, the 
expenditures on these services may not follow an identical trend. For example, 
Balochistan and Sindh due to the numerous political and economic reasons 
witnessed a sharp decline relative to the per capita GDP compare to Punjab (Bangali 
and Sadaqat, 2000). However, the rate of change in public expenditures on socio-
economic services has been increasing more or less with the similar rate as in other 
two provinces.   
Of the other control variables, the population has either showed unexpected 
(negative) sign or appears insignificant vis-à-vis all socio-economic services except 
health indicators. The negative coefficients of the population in relation to services 
like education, water & sanitation and civil work suggest that the per capita 
investment on such services have been higher in Balochistan. This may explain that 
in Balochistan with very vast land and disperse population the per capita cost of 
providing a certain social or economic service remains much higher compare to other 
provinces.  
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Similarly, the Punjab-Sindh dummy variable has positive and statistically significant 
association with most of the outcomes variables.130 This finding perhaps reflects the 
differential effects of the devolution reform between bigger (more populous), socio-
economically better developed and more influential in national polity province(s) 
compare to the other two provinces, particularly Balochistan where the devolution 
has not been as affective as in its counterparts.   
In general, the overall fit of the regression models is consistent with the 
decentralisation literature because it explains up to 70% or more of the variation in 
social service delivery (reflected by the R-squares of respective model reported in 
table 10.14 through 10.16).  
To sum up, the regression results show that the devolution has increased the overall 
delivery of services. The efficacy of the devolution is evident much more in services 
like rural development and water management facilities than the education. This to 
some extent indicates the presence of the local elite capture on which a whole range 
on fiscal federalism literature (permanent among them is Bardhan and Mookherjee, 
2005) suggests. Because, establishments in the shape of irrigation projects and small 
size physical infrastructure investments in rural areas may be given to local 
―notables‖  from the local representatives as political patronage.  
10.10 CONCLUSION  
After outlining a brief history of the system of local government in Pakistan and the 
rationale behind it, the chapter thoroughly discussed the idea, structure and content 
of the devolution. This was followed by critical examination of the impact of the 
devolution on selected number of the essential social and economic services.   
The evidence from Pakistan shows that the devolution significantly changed the size 
and magnitude of social and economic investment. In all provinces, the investment 
increased in sectors such as education, healthcare, agriculture, water management, 
water supply and sanitation, rural development and the civil work. Since these 
services are strongly associated with local needs, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
devolution implicitly enhanced the living standard of the local communities, 
                                                 
130
 For those services where it maintains a negative relationship, its coefficients are not reported.  
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especially the poor. The evidence suggested that public investment in education has 
increased disproportionately in province like KP.  
In terms of econometric analysis, the relationship between the devolution indicator 
and the majority of socio-economic variables is robust and insensitive of the use of 
different specification techniques. This implies that the public investment in human 
and social services that by and large improve the living conditions of poor have 
increased significantly following the introduction of the reforms since 2000-01. The 
results also revealed that investment on agriculture, water and civil work sectors 
respectively was much higher in the Punjab and Sindh, which therefore suggests that 
the relative impact of devolution is higher in Sindh and the Punjab in comparison to 
other two provinces (the Punjab and Sindh effect is captured through a dummy 
variable). Moreover, the results also showed population apparently is not a 
significant determinant of social and economic provisions. This may be due to the 
fact that except the population per bed and agriculture variables all other socio-
economic indicators are expressed in per capita terms. Likewise, the per capita GDP, 
as expected, appears to have a positive relationship with the public service 
provisions. The close-to-zero coefficient of the variable indicates that the per capita 
GDP was not a pivotal determinant of the investment in public services.  
Constraint experienced with data has made it difficult to draw a definite conclusion 
on the skewness of the social service provision. The data limitation also limited this 
research from measuring and analysing the quality of these services in terms of units 
of output rather than sticking only to the supply of such services measured through 
public expenditures. Therefore, more research is required to understand whether or 
not effective – if yes how much – the devolution has been in enhancing the quality of 
‗untargeted services‘ that potentially affect the local communities without any 
differentiation. And theoretically an unskewed and untargeted pattern of service 
distribution is likely to impact positively the poor and disadvantaged communities 
more compare to their rich counterparts. 
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CHAPTER 11 
 CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
Many countries around the world embark upon active policies to fight against 
poverty. One of the mechanisms to pursue this policy has been the provision of 
social services by means of fiscal decentralisation. Many of the benefits of fiscal 
decentralisation are anticipated on the premise that decentralisation as policy reform 
brings decision makers closer to the local people and their needs for better service 
delivery. Much scholarly research has been conducted on the relationship between 
fiscal decentralisation and poverty. This research question was also the subject of 
this study too. 
To research this question, this thesis discovered the wide array of possible effects the 
fiscal decentralisation may have on poverty outcomes. First we built a conceptual 
framework to assess the direct and indirect relationship of these two variables, 
because conceptually decentralisation affects poverty both directly and indirectly.  
The direct affects are redistributive ones that involve changes in fiscal policies or 
any such reforms that have a direct redistributive bearing on the poor. Transferring 
more funds to poverty related schemes through provinces is a classic example of 
direct redistributive effect. The indirect effects, in contrast, are associated with the 
macroeconomic framework. Among these macroeconomic indicators include 
economic growth, price stability, high tax and investment to GDP ratios, sustainable 
deficits, improved governance and local political freedom that are crucial in 
determining the level of poverty. Fiscal decentralisation potentially affects these 
indicators.   
Although conceptually fiscal decentralisation affects poverty through direct and 
indirect means. However, without a systematic theoretical and empirical research it 
was hard to anticipate in advance the possible impact of fiscal decentralisation on 
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poverty, given the multidimensional nature of the variables. Thus conducting a 
methodical theoretical and empirical research is only an answer to this predicament. 
For theoretical understanding we developed a legislative bargaining model of fiscal 
federalism. Our theoretical model was based on Kanbur and Feroni (1991); 
Lockwood (2002); Besley and Coate (2003); Faguet (2004); Renstrom and 
Marsiliani (2007). The model explicitly introduced welfare and poverty dimensions, 
implicitly where it was shown that federal transfers empowered the subnational 
governments to spend more on poverty reduction related schemes. The model 
provided a framework which implied that under the decentralisation services 
delivery would tailor to the needs of the median voter that gave relative power to the 
poor. The role of decentralised governments in terms of public resources allocation 
and utilization was more efficient – given their proximity and accountability to the 
local median voter. The decentralised governments‘ role in this regards was also 
welfare enhancing with positive impact on their redistributive policies. The 
theoretical model showed that in the bargaining equilibrium the ratio of local 
expenditure to total expenditure is increasing in the federal transfer rate. Thus, the 
model proposed that if the federal transfer rate is larger, then the fiscal 
decentralisation measure is greater. Since a larger federal transfer rate alleviates 
poverty, we often would expect poverty and expenditure decentralisation to be 
negatively related. We tested this proposition empirically and found fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty negatively correlated.  
 On the empirical side, we have examined potential impacts of fiscal decentralisation 
on poverty by testing the main proposition of the theoretical model. The focus of the 
case study was Pakistan. It demonstrated that how fiscal decentralisation has been 
effective in terms of poverty reduction and provision of social services over the 
period of 1975 to 2009.  
We used data from various national and international sources to undertake the 
empirical investigation. We employed four different definitions of poverty: 1. the 
headcount poverty; 2. poverty gap; 3. severity of poverty; and 4. the HDI.  For fiscal 
decentralisation expenditure decentralisation and revenue decentralisation measures 
were used. The econometric specifications included other control variables that have 
been identified in the economic literature as appropriate predictors of poverty.  
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Empirically, besides the standard Ordinary Least Squared, the Random Effects 
model and Fixed Effects model, Tobit model and the Generalized Method of 
Moment Instrumental Variable (GMM-IV) procedures were adopted to draw robust 
statistical inferences.  
11.2 REFLECTIONS AND FINDINGS  
The outcomes of the first empirical chapter indicated a significantly negative linear 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and poverty in Pakistan. In terms of the 
HDI the relationship is significantly positive. In addition, we found a strong and 
significant correlation between pro-poor expenditures‘ index and poverty. 
Consequently, the results placed fiscal decentralisation as an important policy 
instrument for poverty reduction in countries like Pakistan. The chapter presented a 
macro-level approach by providing an overall picture of this association with a 
country level dataset as well as a micro-level perspective by presenting a regional 
and provincial level assessment with a panel dataset of the provinces. 
The regression results of this chapter proposed statistically a significant relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and poverty reduction outcomes. Nevertheless, the 
same relationship is much stronger for the Punjab and Sindh, suggesting that 
provinces with better administrative structure appear to be more effective for the 
success of fiscal decentralisation in poverty reduction. Hence, it is plausible to 
conclude that relative impact of fiscal decentralisation in terms of poverty reduction 
outcomes is far greater in the Punjab and Sindh compare to other two provinces: KP 
and Balochistan. The empirical results of this chapter also reveal that fiscal 
decentralisation has an additional impact on poverty outcomes through other 
explanatory variables such as GDP per capita and the index pro-poor expenditures.  
Based on OLS, FE & RE and GMM-IV analyses, where poverty is proxied by FGT 
indices and the HDI, one may conclude a robust relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty. Because, normally the association do not change 
irrespective of the proxy used for poverty as well as econometrics models. This 
unveils the fact that if expenditure decentralisation in Pakistan, or for that matter in 
other countries having similar political, economic, social and ethnic structure, is 
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implemented wisely and adequately it would work as a crucial policy instrument to 
tackle issues related to poverty.  
Our first and main hypothesis is that, an increase in provincial governments‘ 
spending power, as measured by fiscal decentralisation, leads to an improvement in 
the standard of living of the poor, as proxy either by headcount poverty, poverty gap, 
squared poverty gap or the Human Development Index, has been empirically tested 
and proved. In addition, we hold that the provincial governments because of the 
proximity and accountability to the people are more responsive to local their needs. 
Consequently, the provincial governments can implement programmes more 
efficiently with better redistributive effects than the central/federal government. 
Moreover, in Pakistan social services like health and education constitutionally are 
provincial subjects. The empirical analyses of this illustrate that the index of pro-
poor expenditures appears to be influential in reducing poverty. Thus, delegating 
more economic power to provincial governments would significantly reduce poverty 
in provinces. 
Albeit, our core hypothesis of this chapter is to assess the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and poverty, we also come across many other findings related to the 
effects of controlled variables on the incidence of poverty. For example, contrary to 
our assumption, per capita subsidy appears to be irrelevant in affecting the poor. 
Nevertheless, the same variable turns out to be significant with an expected sign for 
urban poverty. Given the positive and significant relationship between the interaction 
term of fiscal decentralisation and the devolution reform dummy variable against 
poverty we can conclude that fiscal decentralisation beyond a certain limit appears to 
be disadvantageous in terms of poverty reduction, because fiscal decentralisation 
ratio after devolution reform has increased compare to the pre devolution period. We 
also notice that the devolution reform has been effective in terms of poverty 
reduction at provincial level; showing that fiscal and administrative empowerment of 
local governments enhances the scope of fiscal decentralisation regarding essential 
social services delivery and poverty reductions outcomes. Thus, the results of this 
chapter somehow support our first hypothesis. 
The chapter showed that in Pakistan poverty is largely a regional phenomenon: the 
poor are predominately concentrated in Balochistan, KP, rural Sindh and southern 
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Punjab. Thus, under a decentralised setting, the poor gain from resource allocation 
specific to poverty reduction schemes as well as from allocation of income 
generating projects. In Pakistan poverty is unequally distributed across the provinces 
and regions. The provinces are constituted on the line of ethnicity and nationality. 
Therefore, the response to poverty in each province warrants an efficient response 
from that respective province.  
The structural differences of provinces may be taken into account while forming 
poverty reduction policies. Although the empirical analysis of this thesis did not 
explicitly model the structural differences, given the dissimilarities between the 
provinces in terms of economy, topography and politics, culture and history, we can 
speculate that these factors have a potential correlation with poverty. For instance, 
given the vast agricultural base, the Punjab and Sindh may prioritise their investment 
in this sector, whereas Balochistan may place higher priority on rural development, 
rural-urban connectivity, provision of essential social services (education and health) 
and the exploitation of untapped natural resources given its underdeveloped 
infrastructure, poor socio-economic indicators and the abundance of natural 
resources.  
Our results presented statistically an insignificant and positive relationship between 
revenue decentralisation and poverty reduction strategies. This is extensively 
attributed to the low and stagnant share of the provincial governments to total 
national revenues.  
Poverty is a multifaceted concept. One way that it can be reduced is by means of 
fiscal decentralisation directly. However, as pointed out in this thesis, the impact of 
decentralisation on poverty reduction outcomes may also be indirect: that is this 
relationship could occur through certain other channels. As discussed in chapter 2 
these services are considered by the public finance and development economics 
literature having a strong impact on poverty. Looking at the potential channels 
through which fiscal decentralisation policies may be effective in reducing poverty 
would further strengthen our argument. Therefore, in second empirical chapter we 
tested the second, third and fourth hypotheses, described in chapter I. 
The leading argument of the second empirical chapter was the apparent comparative 
advantage of the provinces in the provisions of basic social services such as basic 
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education, healthcare and enhancing agricultural productivity. The results showed a 
major relationship between expenditure decentralisation and the expansion of 
education. Education was proxy by literacy rate among the adult population. In 
general, the provinces with specific information about the unique problems and 
requirements concerning the state of education in their respective jurisdictions are 
more effective in the provision of education. Moreover, decisions that are made 
locally about education not only would encourage community participation but to a 
large extent also make local authorities accountable to the local people.  
 
The empirical results presented in this chapter partially verified our hypotheses (2, 3 
and 4) relative to the impact of fiscal decentralisation and its impact on basic 
healthcare, education and agriculture outcomes. On the impact of decentralisation‘s 
effectiveness on healthcare services, the empirical results overall indicate an 
effective outcomes. Nonetheless, we observe that the effect of fiscal decentralisation 
on health outcomes is weaker for Balochistan and KP compared to other provinces, 
which in other words indicates that fiscal decentralisation is more powerful and 
effective policy tool in terms of pro-poor social service delivery in the Punjab and 
Sindh. The findings suggest that good quality of governance (i.e., using corruption 
index and the degree of civil liberty) has a positive impact on basic health care. For 
education, overall, our empirical findings support the hypothesis that fiscal 
decentralisation improves education. These findings have some implications for 
poverty reduction; that are directly or indirectly related to education. Certainly, 
education, especially basic education is considered to be one of the strong 
instruments of denting poverty in every society. That is because improvement in the 
quality of human capital enhances productivity, increases employment opportunities, 
and boosts up growth and income levels of the poor. The empirical results of this 
chapter further suggest that fiscal decentralisation has a statistically significant effect 
on productivity in agriculture sector. It occurs because fiscal decentralisation assists 
the use of local knowledge, local participation and interest, and above all the 
provincial governments likely to invest more agriculture compare to central 
government. Thus we can conclude that, for the third pro-poor channel – agriculture 
sector – our empirical results suggest a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between decentralisation and agricultural output. Decentralisation has 
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the potential to enhance transparency and accountability in the delivery of 
agricultural services.  
These results also described a significant relationship between fiscal decentralisation 
and the provision of better healthcare. The healthcare was proxy alternatively by the 
IMR and the CDR. It implied that provincial governments are better equipped and 
more informed in dealing with the basic healthcare issues when compare to the 
federal government. The evidence of the same chapter also showed a strong case for 
a positive impact of fiscal decentralisation on growth and efficiency of the 
agricultural sector. For this sector it was proxy by the sector‘s productivity and use 
of fertilizers. All the statistics suggested that agriculture has improved with the 
greater involvement of provincial government in planning and investment in the 
sector. Which in other words suggests that fiscal decentralisation is effective in 
enhancing the agriculture sector performance.     
From the third empirical chapter we have concluded that the devolution that was 
launched in 2000-01 significantly changed the public investment patterns in 
Pakistan. In all four provinces the investment unambiguously changed in the favour 
of education, healthcare, water and sanitation, rural development and agriculture 
after the devolution reforms. These shifts were strongly related to the real needs and 
preferences of local people. Thus, it is plausible to conclude from the evidence of 
this chapter that the devolution implicitly enhanced the living standard of the local 
communities, especially the poor. In terms of econometric analysis, the relationship 
between the devolution indicator and the majority of socio-economic variables was 
robust irrespective of the use of different specification techniques. This implied that 
the public investments in human and social services, by and large, improved the 
living conditions of the poor and have increased significantly following the 
introduction of the devolution reforms. The changing pattern of investment 
chronicled above was determined by the public needs. This suggests that the 
devolution to the local governments in Pakistan led to an investment increase in 
precisely those areas that are more likely to benefit the poor. 
The statistical evidence of this chapter illustrate that the devolution significantly 
changes the size and magnitude of social and economic investment. In all provinces, 
the investment increases in sectors such as education, healthcare, agriculture, water 
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management, water supply and sanitation, rural development and the civil work. 
Since these services are strongly associated with local needs, it is plausible to 
conclude that the devolution implicitly enhances the living standard of the local 
communities, especially the poor. The data and results further demonstrate that 
public investment in education has increased disproportionately in province like KP.  
In terms of econometric analysis, the relationship between the devolution indicator 
and the majority of socio-economic variables is robust and insensitive of the use of 
different specification or econometric models. This involves that the public 
investment in human and social services that by and large improve the living 
conditions of poor increases significantly following the introduction of the reforms 
since 2000-01. The results also exhibits that investment on agriculture, water and 
civil work sectors respectively is much higher in the Punjab and Sindh, which 
therefore implies that the relative impact of devolution is higher in Sindh and the 
Punjab in comparison to other two provinces (the Punjab and Sindh effect is capture 
through a dummy variable). In addition, the population, which is included as a 
controlled variable, apparently is not a significant determinant of social and 
economic provisions. This may be due to the fact that except the population per bed 
and agriculture variables all other socio-economic indicators are expressed in per 
capita terms. Likewise, the per capita GDP, as expected, appears to have a positive 
relationship with the public service provisions. The close-to-zero coefficient of the 
variable indicates that the per capita GDP is not a pivotal determinant of the 
investment in public services.  
Furthermore, it is worthy to locate and compare the empirical results of this study to 
the exiting literature of fiscal decentralisation and poverty. As highlighted through 
the course of this thesis that the study on this topic is not only in its infancy but 
whatever little attempts have been made could not figure out definitive and 
encouraging results. In the following we compare and contrast our result with the 
similar studies. For example, Bird and Rodriguez (1999) finds empirical results 
similar to our results. They examine the relationship between fiscal decentralisation 
and poverty alleviation focus on the Philippine. Albeit their statistical findings show 
a negative and significant impact of decentralisation on poverty, but they equally 
caution that unless socio-economic, political and economic factors are taken into 
account and modeled properly, inferring any conclusion whether fiscal 
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decentralisation actually is affective in poverty reduction seems very hard. Another 
important study on the same issue is done by Bird et al. (1998), which shows a 
linkage between intergovernmental grants to poverty alleviation. They conclude in 
the favour of greater fiscal decentralisation and better intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements in order to increase the expenditure on pro-poor schemes that reflect 
the wishes, needs and preferences of each district and sub-national units. The 
empirical findings of this study somewhat reach to the same conclusion as is attained 
by this thesis. Similar to the  Bird and Rodriguez‘s (1999) findings, Crook (2002), 
using Saharan African countries as case study, emphasises that the impacts of 
decentralisation on poverty reduction and local government responsiveness to the 
poor widely depends on the political nature of federal-provincial or provincial-local 
relations. He also demonstrates that without a broader mechanism of accountability 
at the lower level of governing system, decentralisation is very unlikely to be 
effective in poverty alleviation. As highlighted in Chapter 2 Rao (2000) also offers a 
conceptual framework for the examination of fiscal decentralisation and poverty, and 
consequently supports a positive and effective role for fiscal decentralisation in 
poverty reduction. Another systematic study that supports our findings is conducted 
by Von Braun and Grote (2000).They although show a significant impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on poverty reduction, on a cross-country analysis of 50 countries, 
but they equally ascertain the importance of other form of decentralisation (political 
and administrative) for the success of fiscal decentralisation as well.  Bardhan and 
Mookherjee‘s (2004) work on West Bengal, India, that shows evidence for the 
efficacy of fiscal decentralisation to achieve poverty reduction goals, also supports 
our empirical results. Similarly, we also can locate our results in Galasso and 
Ravallion‘s (2005) empirical conclusion, who illustrate that pro-poor programmes 
would benefits from decentralisation in West Bengal. Likewise, this study‘s results 
are in accordance with Lindaman and Thurmaier (2002) who provide evidence of a 
strong relationship between fiscal decentralisation and health and education 
outcomes. Moreover, they show that an increase in fiscal decentralisation leads to 
have a significant impact on Human Development Indicator.  
However, as we noted in Chapter 2, several other studies concluded an adverse 
impact of fiscal decentralisation on poverty reduction and pro-poor service delivery, 
which are of course in contrast to our conclusion. For example, West and Wong 
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(1995) find out that decentralisation leads to very poor public services delivery in 
poorer regions in China. Equally, the Jalan and Ravallion‘s (1999) empirical results 
shows that fiscal decentralisation causes significant regional inequality in Argentina. 
And for Uganda, Azfar and Livingston (2002) do not see any improvement in public 
service delivery and equity from decentralisation. Empirical results obtain by Braun 
and Grote (2000), who use a time-series data on China, India, Ghana and Egypt on to 
analyse the impact of decentralisation on poverty reduction, contrast our empirical 
findings. Contrary to this thesis‘ findings, they explain an inverse relationship 
between decentralisation and poverty. Nonetheless, they conclude that political 
decentralisation if undertaken parallel to the fiscal decentralisation, the latter could 
be an effective policy tool in impacting the poor. However, since they present many 
case studies to support their arguments which may not necessarily work to support 
the overall conclusion derived from the empirical analysis. That is because they 
discover significant variations in experience of these countries studies related to 
fiscal decentralisation. Likewise, Gunatilaka‘s (2000) analysis on Sri Lanka suggests 
that fiscal decentralisation may not help in reducing rural poverty if the rural areas 
are properly connected to the bigger markets and urban agglomeration. 
Similarly, the conclusions of this study also contrast the conclusion drawn by Aaron 
and Schneider (2003). Aaron and Schneider study the pattern and trend of 
decentralisation and its subsequent impact on poverty in 68 countries. Albeit they 
infer a positive impact for administrative decentralisation on social policies and 
poverty, with regard to fiscal and political decentralisation, their empirical results 
show respectively no impact or negative impact of fiscal and political 
decentralisation on social expending. Another study contrasting our findings carried 
out by Khaleghian (2003). Based on 140 countries dataset, he concludes mixed 
results: fiscal decentralisation appears to help in improving the healthcare outcomes 
in low income countries, however, for middle income countries the opposite 
outcomes are concluded. Nonetheless, since Pakistan in a low income country, we 
can maintain that our empirical conclusion on the role of fiscal decentralisation in 
affecting healthcare outcomes is not in direct contrast of Khaleghian‘s (2003) work.   
Correspondingly, our empirical results on fiscal decentralisation‘s impact on 
healthcare outcomes are in harmony with Mills (1994); Robalino et al (2001); 
Schwartz‘s (2002); Arze et al.‘s (2003) respective studies, who show a positive 
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relationship between fiscal decentralisation and healthcare outcomes. Nonetheless, 
Pritchett, (1996); Inchauste, (2000); DeMello (2004); Khemani‘s (2004), among 
others, empirical results contrast our empirical outcomes. In terms of fiscal 
decentralisation‘s usefulness in enhancing education outcomes and increasing 
agriculture productivity and extension, the empirical literature is also divided: some 
of the studies (for example, World Bank, 2000; Johnson, 2003) are in 
synchronization with our findings, while others ( for instance, Winker, 1994; Hector, 
2006; Winkler and Gershberg, 2000) show contracting outcomes to our results.  
The dissimilarities of studies mentioned above to our empirical outcomes can be 
explained, to a large extent, by the dataset, case study as well as the different 
empirical models used. Moreover, as highlighted in this thesis that political, 
economic, social and other structural differences of countries would affect the 
outcomes of fiscal decentralisation. Therefore, it is not surprising to hold contrasting 
results to some of the existing studies.   
Additionally, the thesis showed that in Pakistan fiscal decentralisation entailed great 
political economy complexities in terms of intergovernmental fiscal relations and 
coordination failure in fiscal relations between the federal and provincial 
governments that likely to have strong bearing on fiscal positions of provincial 
governments in pursuing social services and poverty reduction polices. We analysed 
various dimensions of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Pakistan in the light of 
the NFC Awards and other resource distribution mechanisms and examined their 
potential impact on poverty reduction outcomes. We argued that fiscal policy making 
in Pakistan was not mainly guided by economic principles. Instead, various lobbyists 
such as military, politicians and bureaucrats influenced and diverted the majority of 
public sector resources to unproductive sectors leaving insufficient share for social 
sector. The horizontal and vertical composition of the NFC Award revealed that 
albeit expenditure share of provincial governments to total national expenditure has 
increased, however, population being the sole criterion for horizontal resource 
distribution has given the most populated province (the Punjab) a very 
disproportionate share in resources. This led to a great regional inequality among 
provinces, and socio-economic backwardness and rampant poverty in less populated 
provinces. 
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The overall findings of this thesis suggested that the provinces are indeed in need of 
more resources and greater political power to decide and plan to tackle the high level 
of poverty in their jurisdictional areas. The federal government‘s role may be limited 
in dealing with the core national issues, such as defence, foreign policy and 
monetary affairs. Moreover, the federal government may also undertake certain 
revenue collections and services that potentially have greater spillover effects and 
economies of scale. The provincial governments, contrary to the federal government, 
because of their proximity and more accountability to the local people have a greater 
advantage in planning and implementing poverty reduction strategies and other 
social services schemes that accord to local people‘s interests. 
During the course of the thesis, it was revealed that the expenditures on pro-poor 
services, carried out for the most part either by federal or provincial governments, 
were not solely decided based on economic needs and preferences of the people. 
Political consideration was a deciding part of this process. Public expenditures were 
made by taking into account the question of how to bring the electorates on board. 
So political economy dynamics may not be ruled out in determining the public 
expenditures and subsequent influence on the poor. If this argument holds, the 
provincial governments are expected to implement and monitor the expenditures on 
pro-poor services with relative efficiency because of the local governments‘ 
proximity and accountability to the electorates.  
Another important issue this thesis highlighted was the institutional capacity of the 
provincial governments. Participation of the local people in governance is essential 
since they hold the political leaders accountable for social and economic policies and 
their implementation. Insufficient administrative structure and the lack of democracy 
would impair both accountability and active public participation of the majority of 
people in critical decisions that are made for them. This drawback in turn would 
limit the provincial governments‘ capability to pursue policies that may aim to 
improve the living condition of their constituents in general and the poor in 
particular. 
Analysing the overall outcomes of this thesis in the light of Musgrave‘s (1959) 
seminal public finance theory and Oates‘ (1972) work on fiscal federalism regarding 
the role of public sector in distributing and allocating the public resources may point 
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to the following findings. Greater fiscal decentralisation makes the provincial 
governments more autonomous in seeking schemes that potentially enhance the well-
being of people in general and the poor in particular. Furthermore, fiscal 
decentralisation potentially would also increase the efficiency in allocation of 
resources. That is because the provincial governments are subject to greater 
responsibility to the people under their dominion. Since they are elected from the 
same people, therefore, they tend to utilise the public resources more effectively in 
order not to be voted out. The disadvantaged and poor would benefit from this policy 
in two ways. The first one comes from the direct investment in basic services that are 
in accordance with the needs and preferences of each province or district. And the 
second benefit to the poor incurs because of the greater efficiency in utilising scarce 
resource that resultantly would faster the economic growth and help creating more 
employment. Greater employment opportunity certainly helps in terminating the 
vicious circle of poverty.  
The theoretical proposition and empirical results of this thesis may contain a number 
of implications in regards to policy making. The core policy implication of this 
thesis is that the subnational governments (provinces and districts) need autonomy 
and finance to launch comprehensive poverty reduction schemes, and the fiscal 
autonomy comes through fiscal decentralisation. The subnational governments 
because of their proximity to the local people and knowing their needs and 
preferences have a relative advantage in designing and undertaking poverty 
reduction policies and schemes. However, it is imperative to mention that without 
substantive administrative and political decentralisation, fiscal decentralisation only 
is not adequate in designing and implementing these policies and schemes. Political 
decentralisation would increase the accountability and improve the participation 
mechanisms at the grassroots level. Likewise the administrative decentralisation 
would make local officials accountable to the representatives that may augment their 
social service delivery as well as poverty reduction schemes.  
Moreover, the effectiveness of fiscal decentralisation depends largely on many other 
political economy factors, such as rent-seeking or corruption behaviour, both at 
federal and provincial levels. Besides this, certain other issues, such as democracy, 
the rule of law, justice and equity, have great deal to determine the impact of fiscal 
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decentralisation. For example, it will be naive to expect a sustainable impact of 
decentralisation without consistent democratic process – without strong democratic 
institutions in place fiscal decentralisation is likely to promote rent seeking 
behaviour at sub-national level. However, due to the data limitation this thesis could 
not model these factors to assess the political impact of fiscal decentralisation on 
them. A vast body of literature, for example, Fisman and Gatti (2002); Sato, (2003); 
Fan (2009): Lecuna (2012), shows that fiscal decentralisation, which inherently 
involves more tiers of government to the public sector, leads to encourage corruption 
and rent-seeking. That is because in a more complex governance system, as one 
would expect from fiscal decentralisation, more public officials are involved in 
public sector delivery. Therefore, it is highly likely that bureaucratic corruption will 
increase.  
This thesis focused only on fiscal dimension of decentralisation. However, it should 
be noted that it is equally important to look at the other dimensions of 
decentralisation and their impact on poverty reduction outcomes. The evidence from 
Pakistan revealed that institutional, socio-cultural, economic and political factors 
were the main determinants of the success of fiscal decentralisation.  
The case of Pakistan, covered in this thesis, demonstrated that the federal 
government‘s interventions in certain social policies and poverty reduction schemes 
create more inefficiency and biasness by favouring one province or region at the 
expense of other(s) in social service provisions that led to more inter and intra 
provincial inequality. Thus more provincial and regional autonomy couple with the 
equal representation of provinces in federation not only helps the latter strengthening 
itself politically and economically, but equally it consolidates provinces and regions‘ 
politico-economic position to tackle social and economic issues like poverty.    
Fiscal decentralisation as a policy reform may not be applied equally across all 
countries. Instead, the degree and magnitude of fiscal decentralisation should be set 
on the premises of political, socio-cultural and economic structure of that country. 
That is because countries vary in terms of social and economic system, political and 
administrative structure, culture and tradition and the level of economic 
development. In addition to this, each country also varies in terms of the fiscal 
capacity of each tier of government.  
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For the effective impact of fiscal decentralisation on poverty reduction outcomes and 
improved efficiency, there should be some appropriate institutional and structural 
designs in place. And these designs should not rely entirely on fiscal federalism 
principles, but equally consider the social, economic and political realities of that 
country. In the case of Pakistan this thesis supports a fiscal decentralisation system 
that assigns greater autonomy to provincial and local governments so that they 
pursue their own policies while simultaneously being accountable to the local people 
for their actions.  
11.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While addressing the research question of fiscal decentralisation and poverty 
reduction outcomes through theoretical examination and empirical analysis, some 
academic and research issues have come out.  First, in conducting the research on 
Pakistan it was felt that fiscal policy issues have not attracted adequate research. 
And, even whatever research is conducted on fiscal issues and topics, the majority of 
them have macro level consideration rather than local finance.  
Second, researchers in Pakistan have been highlighting the importance of fiscal 
decentralisation for social and economic development of the country. Nevertheless, 
the greater concern of these studies has been the fiscal decentralisation from federal 
government to provincial governments, ignoring the decentralisation to local tier of 
government. To fill this literary gap, this thesis took the first step in highlighting the 
importance of local governments in social service delivery. Therefore, we should 
anticipate that the public finance experts and academic community will pay a 
considerable attention to address the qualitative and quantitative research questions 
related to efficacy of local government‘s empowerment for the improved social 
services provision and implementing poverty reduction polices. 
Third, for the measurement of fiscal decentralisation the IMF‘s Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS) is a rich database that provides information of the majority of 
countries‘ public finances around the world. However, Pakistan is one of those 
countries that do not have subnational governments‘ finances reported in the GFS. 
Thus, the GFS should broaden its database of local finances and include Pakistan 
and other such countries. And finally it helps to realise the importance of fiscal 
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decentralisation as policy tool in those countries where substantive public sector 
reforms are being initiated.         
The data presented in this thesis are from one of the poorest and least developed 
countries in the world. It took almost a year to collect and organise the data. Given 
the data limitations in which some of the major variables are measured, the empirical 
findings of this research may be considered as a first step to know how the 
relationship between decentralisation and poverty would work.  Equally, the quality 
of the data is sufficient to draw significant and counter-intuitive outcomes. This 
suggests that with the similar analysis of local political economy, if identical 
methodology with detailed econometric analysis is applied to more advanced 
countries, better empirical results can be anticipated.  
11.4 LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
The theoretical model built although gave a prediction which is proven empirically 
using a classic but not tested hitherto case of Pakistan with federal structure suitable 
for a comprehensive empirical analysis of the impact of fiscal decentralisation on 
poverty reduction.  However, the model is yet to be expanded to endogenous various 
key parameters, such as taxes, ―t‖, and federal transfer, ―b‖. The extension of the 
model would describe a more advanced setting, where federal transfer to the 
provinces is determined by the model itself, rather than considered to be 
exogenously given. Similarly, the same can be done with the tax rate where it would 
be analysed that when various political economy dynamics interact to determine the 
federal and subnational level tax rate, instead of assuming as given. In addition to 
this, a suitable dataset could be utilised to calibrate the model using a suitable 
computer package such as Matlab or Dynier.  
On empirical side, although for the same of figuring out the causal relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and poverty and to check the robustness of this 
relationship, we use the standard Ordinary Least Square, Generalised Method of 
Moment – Instrumental Variables, Fixed Effects model and Random Effects models 
and Tobit estimation methods. However, given the nature of poverty a dynamic 
panel regression could be run to check the consistency of the key result. This could 
certainly enrich the empirical analysis, considering the persistency of poverty. Such 
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a dynamic panel is feasible given the reasonably long time series. An Arrelano-Bond 
type of dynamic panel regression can be used.  
In order to assess the impact of fiscal decentralisation on education, healthcare and 
agriculture, this study use the outcome variables – education, healthcare and 
agriculture are proxied by literacy rate, infant mortality rate crude death rate, and 
agriculture value addition and fertilizer consumption. Nevertheless, besides 
outcomes variables, if intermediately variables such as schools‘ quality, teachers‘ 
availability and kids‘ enrollment rate and other measures of the quality of education; 
for healthcare the availability of heath infrastructure, staff and medicines are 
modeled, the impact of fiscal decentralisation can be better judged on these sectors.   
Although a very rich dataset from Pakistan and her four provinces is used to test the 
validity of the theoretical proposition, therefore, some sound and robust empirical 
conclusions are drawn. However, the empirical analysis can be enriched further if 
similar regressions are run for a comparable neighbouring country according to the 
size of the GDP. Of course this would involve more work, but certainly it can be 
rewarding in terms of aiming publication in International Journals.  
Albeit this study considers the devolution to the local governments and consequently 
explains the impact the devolution on social services delivery and poverty reduction 
using provincial level data. Nonetheless, access to a more micro level (district or 
even beyond) data could make the analysis more robust and marketable in terms of 
publications in high quality Journals.  
An important caveat of fiscal decentralisation is local or elite capture. 
Decentralisation literature points that the fruits of fiscal decentralisation are likely to 
be jeopardised because of the presence of the ‗elite capture‘ on the public resources 
once they are devolved. Therefore, decentralisation may fail to produce the desire 
outcomes due to the elite capture. If data limitation was not an issue, this study could 
further extend its research area and empirically test the presence of elite capture, its 
potential impact on the performance and effectiveness of fiscal decentralisation on 
social service delivery and poverty reduction. Pakistan is kind of a society where 
strong landlords, chieftains, tribal elders and few rich families have a high stake to 
determine the political economy of the country, and influence of these influential 
individuals or families is more visible in rural areas. In case of decentralisation and 
 353 
 
devolution, they potentially have the power to divert the public resources to their 
own interest as well as bestow their associates at the expense of public benefits at 
large. Therefore, modeling and empirically assessing elite capture obviously could 
give us a clearer picture of the effectiveness of fiscal decentralisation on poverty 
reduction and essential social and economic services delivery.  
For chapter 10, the main constraint experienced is the availability of data that has 
made it difficult to draw a definite conclusion on the skewness of the social service 
provision. The data limitation also restricts this research from measuring and 
analysing the quality of these services in terms of units of output rather than sticking 
only to the supply of such services measured through public expenditures. Therefore, 
more research is required to understand whether or not effective – if yes how much – 
the devolution has been in enhancing the quality of ‗untargeted services‘ that 
potentially affect the local communities without any differentiation. And 
theoretically an unskewed and untargeted pattern of service distribution is likely to 
impact positively the poor and disadvantaged communities more compare to their 
rich counterparts. 
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX A: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TAX AND EXPENDITURE 
    Table A.1:  Percentage Distribution of Federal Government Tax Revenue                                  
year 
Direct taxes Indirect Taxes 
Income 
Tax 
Corporation 
Tax 
Wealth 
Tax 
Gift Tax 
& Estate 
Duty 
Workers 
Welfare 
Tax 
Capital 
Value Tax 
Customs 
Duties 
Federal 
Excise 
Duties 
Sales Tax Surcharge Stamp-
non 
Judicial 
Others 
1979-85 14.837 3.0085 0.202 0.03 0.078 0 41.062 29.508 8.23 3.025 0.01 0 
1986-90 15.102 0.216 0.076 0 0.15 0 49.036 23.296 12.124 0 0 0 
1991-95 21.784 0 0.48 0 0.404 0.048 40.006 20.984 16.296 0 0 0 
1996-00 30.74 0 0.968 0 0.464 0.372 25.596 19.12 22.74 0 0 0 
2001-05 30.806 0 0.1 0 1.16 0.19 15.974 10.412 41.358 0 0 0 
2006-10 35.314 0 0 0 1.04 0.57 14.978 8.58 38.014 0 0 1.506 
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy, State Bank of Pakistan (2011)  
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Table A. 2: Percentage Distribution of Various Expenditure of Federal Government  
 Current  Development  Total  
year General 
Administration 
Defense Law & 
Order 
Comm. 
Services 
Social 
Services 
Economic 
Services 
Subsidies .Debt 
Servicing, 
Investible 
Funds 
and 
Grants 
Grants to 
Provinces 
Un-
allocable 
Others 
79-85 4.86 39.12 2.36 1.89 3.08 3.00 5.30 28.42 0.00 0.02 0.00 11.95 100 
86-90 4.47 33.65 1.80 1.47 3.23 1.38 4.05 37.72 0.00 0.30 0.00 11.94 100 
91-95 4.94 34.47 2.02 1.44 2.91 1.41 2.55 38.52 4.17 1.46 0.00 6.13 100 
96-00 4.16 28.52 1.58 1.30 1.95 1.08 1.88 51.02 3.24 1.46 0.00 3.81 100 
01-05 4.77 20.20 0.97 0.67 1.09 0.42 2.80 37.28 4.70 1.94 19.75 5.43 100 
06-10 0.00 18.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 67.51 14.23 100 
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy, State Bank of Pakistan (2011)      
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APPENDIX B: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION MEASUREMENTS AND DATA 
Table B.1: Measurement of Fiscal Decentralisation in overall Pakistan                              Total Annual Expenditures (expressed in millions rupees) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
year Fed. 
Exp. 
Punjab Sindh KP Bal. All prov. 
exp 
All 
Exp=7+2 
Decent1=7/8 Exp 
Decent1 
Debt 
payments 
fed - debt 
=2-11 
7+12 decent2=7/
13 
Exp 
Decnt2 
1975 19415 2060 1481 868 259 4668 24083 0.19383 0.19 0 19415 24083 0.19383 0.19 
1976 20240 1571 1686 1165 327.7 4749.7 24989.7 0.190066 0.19 0 20240 24989.7 0.190066 0.19 
1977 16938 1661 1959 930 276.7 4826.7 21764.7 0.221767 0.22 998 15940 20766.7 0.232425 0.23 
1978 20138 5363 2244 855 334.6 8796.6 28934.6 0.304017 0.3 948 19190 27986.6 0.314315 0.31 
1979 24685 6200 2836 2400 846.7 12282.7 36967.7 0.332255 0.39 799 23886 36168.7 0.339595 0.39 
1980 21881 7046 3185 2153 1750 14134 36015 0.392448 0.42 10111 11770 25904 0.54563 0.57 
1981 26980 8464 3768 3157 2735 18124 45104 0.401827 0.4 13102 13878 32002 0.56634 0.56 
1982 33608 9277 4387 2884 3217 19765 53373 0.370318 0.37 17052 16556 36321 0.544176 0.54 
1983 34886 7543 2272.3 3960 1539 15314.3 50200.3 0.305064 0.3 16962 17924 33238.3 0.460743 0.46 
1984 37299 7833 3005.4 3907 1488 16233.4 53532.4 0.303244 0.3 20863 16436 32669.4 0.496899 0.49 
1985 36253 9144 5741.7 4453 2126 21464.7 57717.7 0.371891 0.37 24812 11441 32905.7 0.652309 0.65 
1986 37532 11660 3911.9 3409 2710 21690.9 59222.9 0.366259 0.36 25320 12212 33902.9 0.639795 0.63 
1987 51147 11651 9961.2 2439 2800 26851.2 77998.2 0.344254 0.34 23460 27687 54538.2 0.492337 0.49 
1988 47572 9473 6390.4 2813 3096 21772.4 69344.4 0.313975 0.31 24339 23233 45005.4 0.483773 0.48 
1989 57787 12924 6176.5 2214 3368 24682.5 82469.5 0.299292 0.29 32950 24837 49519.5 0.49844 0.49 
1990 59864 5682 8857.2 4779 4126 23444.2 83308.2 0.281415 0.28 41794 18070 41514.2 0.564727 0.56 
1991 90619 6227 10010.3 5777 5801 27815.3 118434.3 0.234858 0.23 66263 24356 52171.3 0.533153 0.53 
1992 91713 6428 11215.3 5843 5913 29399.3 121112.3 0.242744 0.24 64266 27447 56846.3 0.517172 0.51 
1993 96245 6024 9534.8 2617 4330 22505.8 118750.8 0.189521 0.18 71469 24776 47281.8 0.475993 0.47 
1994 106829 8437 10705.4 1790 4852 25784.4 132613.4 0.194433 0.19 15311 91518 117302.4 0.219811 0.21 
1995 110679 9362 13359.4 4123 8267 35111.4 145790.4 0.240835 0.24 23543 87136 122247.4 0.287216 0.28 
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1996 134601 8323 10119.8 2336 7890 28668.8 163269.8 0.175592 0.17 31399 103202 131870.8 0.217401 0.21 
1997 129927 11927 9802.7 2522 7911 32162.7 162089.7 0.198425 0.19 48520 81407 113569.7 0.283198 0.28 
1998 149703 10777 10544.7 2081 10802 34204.7 183907.7 0.185988 0.18 44634 105069 139273.7 0.245593 0.24 
1999 137074 33190 10599.8 1999 10271 56059.8 193133.8 0.290264 0.29 35549 101525 157584.8 0.355744 0.35 
2000 188401 39347 30064 5956 11931 87298 275699 0.316642 0.31 18463 169938 257236 0.339369 0.33 
2001 254282 39865 20721.4 6940 14122 81648.4 335930.4 0.243052 0.24 12344 241938 323586.4 0.252323 0.25 
2002 151999 44228 14845.4 17869 13335 90277.4 242276.4 0.372622 0.37 13477 138522 228799.4 0.39457 0.39 
2003 125348 63956 29935.1 20514 17657 132062.1 257410.1 0.513042 0.5 14758 110590 242652.1 0.544245 0.54 
2004 119672 78975 31870.3 26758 26343 163946.3 283618.3 0.578053 0.57 17658 102014 265960.3 0.616431 0.61 
2005 124140 96973 49858.3 32542 26378 205751.3 329891.3 0.623694 0.62 19874 104266 310017.3 0.663677 0.66 
2006 130335 155977 56819 37975 38542 289313 419648 0.689418 0.68 8777 121558 410871 0.704146 0.7 
2007 149128 168242 70202.8 50984 37556 326984.8 476112.8 0.68678 0.68 8977 140151 467135.8 0.699978 0.69 
2008 191465 201804 60991 95263 39419 397477 588942 0.6749 0.67 10122 181343 578820 0.686702 0.68 
2009 189451 203688 56398 93368 37687 391141 580592 0.673693 0.67 11425 178026 569167 0.687217 0.68 
Punjab Exp1. 
Decent1= 3/8 
Sindh Exp1. 
Decent1=4/8 
KP Exp1. 
Decent1=5/8 
Baloch Exp1. 
Decen1t=6/8 
Punjab Decent2= 
3/13 
Sindh Exp 
Decent2=4/13 
KP Exp 
Decent2=5/14 
Baloch Exp 
Decen2t=6/14 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
0.085538 0.061496 0.036042 0.0107545 0.085538 0.061496 0.036042 0.010754 
0.062866 0.067468 0.046619 0.0131134 0.062866 0.067468 0.046619 0.013113 
0.076316 0.090008 0.04273 0.0127132 0.079984 0.094334 0.044783 0.013324 
0.185349 0.077554 0.029549 0.011564 0.191627 0.080181 0.03055 0.011956 
0.167714 0.076716 0.064922 0.0229038 0.171419 0.07841 0.066356 0.02341 
0.195641 0.088435 0.059781 0.0485909 0.272004 0.122954 0.083115 0.067557 
0.187655 0.08354 0.069994 0.0606376 0.264483 0.117743 0.09865 0.085463 
0.173814 0.082195 0.054035 0.0602739 0.255417 0.120784 0.079403 0.088571 
0.150258 0.045265 0.078884 0.0306572 0.226937 0.068364 0.11914 0.046302 
0.146323 0.056142 0.072984 0.0277963 0.239766 0.091994 0.119592 0.045547 
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0.158426 0.099479 0.077151 0.0368345 0.277885 0.17449 0.135326 0.064609 
0.196883 0.066054 0.057562 0.0457593 0.343923 0.115385 0.100552 0.079934 
0.149375 0.127711 0.03127 0.0358983 0.21363 0.182646 0.044721 0.05134 
0.136608 0.092155 0.040566 0.0446467 0.210486 0.141992 0.062504 0.068792 
0.156712 0.074894 0.026846 0.0408393 0.260988 0.124729 0.04471 0.068014 
0.068205 0.106318 0.057365 0.0495269 0.136869 0.213354 0.115117 0.099388 
0.052578 0.084522 0.048778 0.0489807 0.119357 0.191874 0.110731 0.111191 
0.053075 0.092602 0.048244 0.0488225 0.113077 0.197292 0.102786 0.104017 
0.050728 0.080293 0.022038 0.0364629 0.127406 0.201659 0.055349 0.091579 
0.063621 0.080726 0.013498 0.0365876 0.071925 0.091263 0.01526 0.041363 
0.064215 0.091634 0.02828 0.0567047 0.076582 0.109282 0.033727 0.067625 
0.050977 0.061982 0.014308 0.0483249 0.063115 0.07674 0.017714 0.059831 
0.073583 0.060477 0.015559 0.0488063 0.105019 0.086314 0.022207 0.069658 
0.0586 0.057337 0.011315 0.058736 0.07738 0.075712 0.014942 0.07756 
0.17185 0.054883 0.01035 0.0531807 0.210617 0.067264 0.012685 0.065178 
0.142717 0.109046 0.021603 0.0432755 0.152961 0.116873 0.023154 0.046382 
0.11867 0.061684 0.020659 0.0420385 0.123197 0.064037 0.021447 0.043642 
0.182552 0.061275 0.073755 0.0550404 0.193305 0.064884 0.078099 0.058282 
0.24846 0.116293 0.079694 0.0685948 0.263571 0.123366 0.084541 0.072767 
0.278455 0.11237 0.094345 0.0928819 0.296943 0.119831 0.100609 0.099049 
0.293954 0.151136 0.098645 0.0799597 0.312799 0.160824 0.104968 0.085086 
0.371685 0.135397 0.090493 0.0918436 0.379625 0.138289 0.092426 0.093806 
0.353366 0.14745 0.107084 0.0788805 0.360157 0.150283 0.109142 0.080396 
0.342655 0.10356 0.161753 0.0669319 0.348647 0.105371 0.164581 0.068102 
0.350828 0.097139 0.160815 0.0649113 0.35787 0.099089 0.164043 0.066214 
Source: own calculation based data source explained  in table 7.2 
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Table B.2: Expenditure Decentralisation(1), Overall and in each Province 
Year Pakistan Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan 
1975 0.194 0.085 0.061 0.036 0.01 
1976 0.190 0.062 0.067 0.046 0.013 
1977 0.222 0.076 0.09 0.042 0.012 
1978 0.304 0.185 0.077 0.029 0.011 
1979 0.332 0.169 0.077 0.065 0.012 
1980 0.392 0.195 0.088 0.059 0.048 
1981 0.402 0.187 0.083 0.069 0.06 
1982 0.370 0.173 0.082 0.054 0.06 
1983 0.305 0.15 0.045 0.078 0.03 
1984 0.303 0.146 0.056 0.072 0.027 
1985 0.372 0.158 0.099 0.077 0.036 
1986 0.366 0.196 0.066 0.057 0.045 
1987 0.344 0.151 0.129 0.031 0.036 
1988 0.314 0.136 0.092 0.04 0.044 
1989 0.299 0.156 0.074 0.026 0.04 
1990 0.281 0.068 0.106 0.057 0.049 
1991 0.235 0.052 0.084 0.048 0.048 
1992 0.243 0.053 0.092 0.048 0.048 
1993 0.190 0.05 0.08 0.022 0.036 
1994 0.194 0.063 0.08 0.013 0.036 
1995 0.241 0.064 0.091 0.028 0.056 
1996 0.176 0.05 0.061 0.014 0.048 
1997 0.198 0.073 0.06 0.015 0.048 
1998 0.186 0.058 0.057 0.011 0.058 
1999 0.290 0.171 0.054 0.01 0.053 
2000 0.317 0.142 0.109 0.021 0.043 
2001 0.243 0.118 0.061 0.02 0.042 
2002 0.373 0.182 0.061 0.073 0.055 
2003 0.513 0.248 0.116 0.079 0.068 
2004 0.578 0.278 0.112 0.094 0.092 
2005 0.624 0.293 0.151 0.098 0.079 
2006 0.689 0.37 0.135 0.09 0.091 
2007 0.687 0.353 0.147 0.107 0.078 
2008 0.675 0.342 0.103 0.161 0.066 
2009 0.674 0.35 0.097 0.16 0.064 
Source: own calculation based data source explained  in table 7.2 
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Table B.3: Expenditure Decentralisation(2), Overall and in each Province 
Year Pakistan Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan 
1975 0.19 0.085 0.061 0.036 0.01 
1976 0.19 0.062 0.067 0.046 0.013 
1977 0.23 0.079 0.094 0.044 0.013 
1978 0.31 0.191 0.08 0.031 0.011 
1979 0.39 0.173 0.079 0.067 0.023 
1980 0.57 0.272 0.122 0.083 0.067 
1981 0.56 0.264 0.117 0.098 0.085 
1982 0.54 0.255 0.121 0.079 0.088 
1983 0.46 0.226 0.068 0.119 0.04 
1984 0.49 0.239 0.091 0.119 0.045 
1985 0.65 0.277 0.174 0.135 0.064 
1986 0.63 0.343 0.1153 0.1 0.079 
1987 0.49 0.217 0.186 0.045 0.051 
1988 0.48 0.21 0.141 0.062 0.068 
1989 0.49 0.261 0.124 0.044 0.068 
1990 0.56 0.136 0.213 0.115 0.099 
1991 0.53 0.119 0.191 0.11 0.111 
1992 0.51 0.113 0.197 0.102 0.104 
1993 0.47 0.127 0.201 0.055 0.091 
1994 0.21 0.071 0.091 0.015 0.041 
1995 0.28 0.076 0.109 0.033 0.067 
1996 0.21 0.063 0.076 0.017 0.059 
1997 0.28 0.105 0.086 0.022 0.069 
1998 0.24 0.077 0.075 0.014 0.077 
1999 0.35 0.211 0.067 0.012 0.065 
2000 0.33 0.152 0.116 0.023 0.046 
2001 0.25 0.123 0.064 0.021 0.043 
2002 0.39 0.193 0.064 0.078 0.058 
2003 0.54 0.263 0.123 0.084 0.072 
2004 0.61 0.296 0.119 0.101 0.099 
2005 0.66 0.312 0.16 0.104 0.085 
2006 0.7 0.379 0.138 0.092 0.093 
2007 0.69 0.36 0.15 0.109 0.08 
2008 0.68 0.348 0.105 0.164 0.068 
2009 0.68 0.357 0.099 0.164 0.066 
Source: own calculation based data source explained  in table 7.2 
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Table B.4: Measurement of Fiscal Decentralisation (Revenue) in overall Pakistan                          (Values are expressed in million rupees) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
year Federal  
Revenue 
Provincial 
tax 
receipts 
Provincial 
non-tax 
receipts 
3+4 Total 
Revenue=3+2 
Revenue 
Decent1=4/6 
Rev 
Dec1. 
Grants K=5-9 Rev 
Decent. 
2=10/6 
Rev 
Dec2. 
Punjab 
Revenues 
Sindh 
Rev 
1975 14970 1038 2598 3636 18606 0.195421 0.19 852 2784 0.149629 0.14 2121 1102 
1976 17879 1133 2821 3954 21833 0.181102 0.18 979 2975 0.136262 0.13 2242 1214 
1977 21968 1355 3125 4480 26448 0.169389 0.16 1067 3413 0.129046 0.12 2762 1274 
1978 25725 1452 3466 4918 30643 0.160493 0.16 1164 3754 0.122508 0.12 3206 1450 
1979 29862 1605 3468 5073 34935 0.145213 0.14 1407 3666 0.104938 0.11 4431 1939 
1980 37949 1852 3240 5092 43041 0.118306 0.11 1472 3620 0.084106 0.08 6130 2644 
1981 46349 2227 3293 5520 51869 0.106422 0.1 2071 3449 0.066494 0.06 6552 2852 
1982 51167 2371 4217 6588 57755 0.114068 0.11 2967 3621 0.062696 0.06 7083 3154 
1983 59080 2613 5621 8234 67314 0.122322 0.12 3555 4679 0.06951 0.06 10722 3498 
1984 72309 2935 8288 11223 83532 0.134356 0.13 3604 7619 0.091211 0.09 7619 3760 
1985 77971 3206 11702 14908 92879 0.16051 0.16 7423 7485 0.080589 0.08 9297 4164 
1986 91420 3391 16981 20372 111792 0.182231 0.18 9643 10729 0.095973 0.09 9924 4565 
1987 106324 3770 22960 26730 133054 0.200896 0.2 8424 18306 0.137583 0.13 11743 4987 
1988 119601 4209 16089 20298 139899 0.14509 0.14 8247 12051 0.086141 0.08 16194 7110 
1989 143077 4880 23753 28633 171710 0.166752 0.16 7688 20945 0.121979 0.12 14318 8902 
1990 163525 5022 30648 35670 199195 0.179071 0.17 8310 27360 0.137353 0.13 21874 9992 
1991 170344 6731 33526 40257 210601 0.191153 0.19 2394 37863 0.179785 0.17 34144 17407 
1992 216586 7536 57991 65527 282113 0.232272 0.23 4047 61480 0.217927 0.21 37206 18675 
1993 242619 7869 60505 68374 310993 0.219857 0.21 2337 66037 0.212342 0.21 47146 23537 
1994 273239 8697 81175 89872 363111 0.247506 0.24 3132 86740 0.23888 0.23 55894 28028 
1995 321323 9035 97721 106756 428079 0.249384 0.24 2071 104685 0.244546 0.24 70136 35577 
1996 370509 11255 120446 131701 502210 0.262243 0.26 2008 129693 0.258245 0.25 80177 38504 
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1997 384263 14726 131556 146282 530545 0.27572 0.27 7861 138421 0.260903 0.26 72792 36782 
1998 433636 16712 114419 131131 564767 0.232186 0.23 8235 122896 0.217605 0.21 76459 37118 
1999 464372 19025 118659 137684 602056 0.22869 0.22 22347 115337 0.191572 0.19 86103 44963 
2000 531300 19460 143157 162617 693917 0.234346 0.23 18507 144110 0.207676 0.2 98413 53181 
2001 535091 20686 167838 188524 723615 0.260531 0.26 20317 168207 0.232454 0.23 101596 52998 
2002 619069 21607 174113 195720 814789 0.240209 0.24 29981 165739 0.203413 0.2 110562 50417 
2003 701576 23329 194039 217368 918944 0.236541 0.23 32326 185042 0.201364 0.2 129142 77033 
2004 760983 30365 212148 242513 1003496 0.241668 0.24 44904 197609 0.196921 0.19 147002 86435 
2005 875306 32828 251218 284046 1159352 0.245004 0.24 73519 210527 0.18159 0.18 173664 109013 
2006 1022704 40589 298912 339501 1362205 0.249229 0.24 63051 276450 0.202943 0.2 227481 86246 
2007 1214043 48955 333051 382006 1596049 0.239345 0.23 68341 313665 0.196526 0.19 264169 102492 
2008 1402768 50914 392317 443231 1845999 0.240104 0.24 85774 357457 0.193639 0.19 300842 127208 
2009 1679300 61312 466896 528208 2207508 0.239278 0.23 85774 442434 0.200422 0.2 377316 149566 
 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
KP Rev Baloch 
Rev 
P grants S Grants K 
Grants 
B 
Grants 
Pun. Rev. 
Grants=13-
17 
S. Rev. 
Grants=1
4-18 
KP Rev. 
Grants=15-
19 
Bal. Rev. 
Grants=16-20 
Punjab Rev 
Dec.= 13/6 
PFDR1 
402 253 179.7 90.5 216.8 165.2 1941.3 1011.5 185.2 87.8 0.113995 0.113995 
457 322 161 85.1 432.1 275.9 2081 1128.9 24.9 46.1 0.102689 0.102689 
520 532 833 382.7 428 522.7 1929 891.3 92 9.3 0.104431 0.104431 
609 604 1071 601.4 474.2 517.2 2135 848.6 134.8 86.8 0.104624 0.104624 
865 668 159 311 579.8 657.3 4272 1628 285.2 10.7 0.126836 0.126836 
1203 872 11.5 11.5 554.6 795.1 6118.5 2632.5 648.4 76.9 0.142422 0.142422 
1310 914 244.5 50.2 912 864.3 6307.5 2801.8 398 49.7 0.126318 0.126318 
1439 1092 343.8 232 1221.3 1069.7 6739.2 2922 217.7 22.3 0.122639 0.122639 
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1618 1369 1744.1 887 1367 1256.9 8977.9 2611 251 112.1 0.159283 0.159283 
1730 1249 3237.7 1589.7 1324.8 1152 4381.3 2170.3 405.2 97 0.091211 0.091211 
1916 1651 5709.5 2630 1081.6 1002 3587.5 1534 834.4 649 0.100098 0.100098 
1929 2293 8469.2 4030 1423.5 1719.6 1454.8 535 505.5 573.4 0.088772 0.088772 
2349 2241 8997 4504 1977.9 1945.4 2746 483 371.1 295.6 0.088257 0.088257 
3426 1768 5016 4196.4 2471.1 1564.1 11178 2913.6 954.9 203.9 0.115755 0.115755 
4391 1793 1469 1354.9 3714 1149.8 12849 7547.1 677 643.2 0.083385 0.083385 
10195 2365 1555 1645 3457 1526.8 20319 8347 6738 838.2 0.109812 0.109812 
13890 4255 1161.9 700 402.5 129.7 32982.1 16707 13487.5 4125.3 0.162126 0.162126 
14936 5405 2041.4 1682.6 205.3 117.4 35164.6 16992.4 14730.7 5287.6 0.131883 0.131883 
16599 7341 1278 700 250.3 107.4 45868 22837 16348.7 7233.6 0.151598 0.151598 
20030 7176 48.4 2070.1 1007.7 7.4 55845.6 25957.9 19022.3 7168.6 0.153931 0.153931 
21218 8010 23.2 1632.9 4.8 410.2 70112.8 33944.1 21213.2 7599.8 0.163839 0.163839 
23241 9624 31.6 260 4.8 1707.4 80145.4 38244 23236.2 7916.6 0.159648 0.159648 
21380 12006 449.2 0 3327.6 4085 72342.8 36782 18052.4 7921 0.137202 0.137202 
22072 12569 23.7 0 3675 4536.8 76435.3 37118 18397 8032.2 0.135381 0.135381 
24316 14501 5834.4 7213.9 4057.3 5241.7 80268.6 37749.1 20258.7 9259.3 0.143015 0.143015 
26714 15020 3906.6 5711 3827.6 5051.8 94506.4 47470 22886.4 9968.2 0.141822 0.141822 
26533 15069 3343.9 7798.9 3915.4 5261.2 98252.1 45199.1 22617.6 9807.8 0.140401 0.140401 
41027 15409 11122 8880.9 4119.3 5859.2 99440 41536.1 36907.7 9549.8 0.135694 0.135694 
34364 10214 14241.4 8182.8 3898 6001.3 114900.6 68850.2 30466 4212.7 0.140533 0.140533 
38647 12035 22282.2 11207.2 4500 6915.3 124719.8 75227.8 34147 5119.7 0.14649 0.14649 
44249 12889 34513 13437.8 17473.2 8095.1 139151 95575.2 26775.8 4793.9 0.149794 0.149794 
51698 16544 18347.9 22730.8 9765.3 12207.2 209133.1 63515.2 41932.7 4336.8 0.166995 0.166995 
62012 17556 17067.5 27198.2 11799.2 12276.5 247101.5 75293.8 50212.8 5279.5 0.165514 0.165514 
72388 29717 23343 34391 14432.2 21607.5 277499 92817 57955.8 8109.5 0.16297 0.16297 
85711 31315 22331 31458 13245.5 20311.4 354985 118108 72465.5 11003.6 0.170924 0.170924 
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27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
Sindh Rev 
Decent1=14
/6 
SFDR1 KP 
RevDecent1=15
/6 
KFDR
1 
Baloch 
RevDecen1t=1
6/6 
BFDR1 Punjab 
RevDecent2
= 21/6 
PFDR2 Sindh 
RevDecent2
=22/6 
SFDR2 KP Exp 
Rev=23/
G 
KFDR
2 
Baloch Rev 
Decen2=24/
G 
BFDR2 
0.059228 0.0592 0.021606 0.0210 0.013598 0.0139 0.104337 0.1043 0.054364 0.0543 0.00995 0.0099 0.004719 0.0047 
0.055604 0.0556 0.020932 0.0203 0.014748 0.0144 0.095314 0.095 0.051706 0.0517 0.00114 0.0011 0.002111 0.0021 
0.04817 0.0481 0.019661 0.0196 0.020115 0.0201 0.072936 0.072 0.0337 0.0337 0.00347 0.0034 0.000352 0.0005 
0.047319 0.0473 0.019874 0.0197 0.019711 0.0191 0.069673 0.069 0.027693 0.0276 0.00439 0.0043 0.002833 0.0028 
0.055503 0.0555 0.02476 0.0246 0.019121 0.0192 0.122284 0.1222 0.046601 0.0466 0.00816 0.008 0.000306 0.0004 
0.06143 0.0614 0.02795 0.0275 0.02026 0.0206 0.142155 0.1421 0.061163 0.0611 0.01506 0.0156 0.001787 0.0017 
0.054985 0.0549 0.025256 0.0255 0.017621 0.0172 0.121604 0.1216 0.054017 0.054 0.00767 0.0076 0.000958 0.0005 
0.05461 0.0546 0.024916 0.0241 0.018907 0.0180 0.116686 0.1166 0.050593 0.0505 0.00376 0.0037 0.000386 0.0008 
0.051965 0.0519 0.024037 0.0243 0.020338 0.0203 0.133373 0.1333 0.038788 0.0387 0.00372 0.0037 0.001665 0.0016 
0.045013 0.0450 0.020711 0.0201 0.014952 0.0145 0.052451 0.0524 0.025982 0.0259 0.00485 0.0048 0.001161 0.0011 
0.044833 0.0448 0.020629 0.0202 0.017776 0.0177 0.038626 0.0386 0.016516 0.0165 0.00898 0.0089 0.006988 0.0069 
0.040835 0.0408 0.017255 0.0175 0.020511 0.0201 0.013013 0.013 0.004786 0.0047 0.00452 0.0045 0.005129 0.0051 
0.037481 0.0374 0.017654 0.0175 0.016843 0.0164 0.020638 0.0206 0.00363 0.0036 0.00278 0.0027 0.002222 0.0022 
0.050822 0.0508 0.024489 0.0248 0.012638 0.0123 0.0799 0.0799 0.020826 0.0208 0.00682 0.0068 0.001457 0.0014 
0.051843 0.0518 0.025572 0.0257 0.010442 0.0104 0.07483 0.0748 0.043953 0.0439 0.00394 0.0039 0.003746 0.0037 
0.050162 0.0501 0.051181 0.0518 0.011873 0.0117 0.102006 0.102 0.041904 0.041 0.03382 0.0338 0.004208 0.0042 
0.082654 0.0826 0.065954 0.0655 0.020204 0.0200 0.156609 0.1566 0.07933 0.0793 0.06404 0.064 0.019588 0.019 
0.066197 0.0661 0.052943 0.0524 0.019159 0.0195 0.124647 0.1246 0.060233 0.06 0.05221 0.052 0.018743 0.018 
0.075683 0.0756 0.053374 0.0533 0.023605 0.0236 0.147489 0.1474 0.073433 0.073 0.05256 0.0525 0.02326 0.0232 
0.077189 0.0771 0.055162 0.0556 0.019763 0.0196 0.153798 0.1537 0.071488 0.0714 0.05238 0.0522 0.019742 0.019 
0.083108 0.0830 0.049566 0.0496 0.018711 0.0181 0.163785 0.1637 0.079294 0.079 0.04955 0.0495 0.017753 0.017 
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0.076669 0.0766 0.046277 0.0467 0.019163 0.0196 0.159585 0.1595 0.076151 0.076 0.04626 0.0462 0.015764 0.015 
0.069329 0.0692 0.040298 0.0409 0.02263 0.0223 0.136356 0.1363 0.069329 0.069 0.03402 0.034 0.01493 0.014 
0.065723 0.0652 0.039082 0.0398 0.022255 0.0225 0.13534 0.1353 0.065723 0.0657 0.03257 0.0325 0.014222 0.014 
0.074682 0.0748 0.040388 0.0408 0.024086 0.0248 0.133324 0.1333 0.0627 0.0627 0.03364 0.0336 0.015379 0.0153 
0.076639 0.0763 0.038497 0.0389 0.021645 0.0214 0.136193 0.1361 0.068409 0.0684 0.03298 0.0329 0.014365 0.014 
0.073241 0.0734 0.036667 0.0366 0.020825 0.0202 0.13578 0.1357 0.062463 0.0624 0.03125 0.031 0.013554 0.013 
0.061877 0.0617 0.050353 0.0505 0.018912 0.0181 0.122044 0.122 0.050978 0.0509 0.04529 0.045 0.011721 0.011 
0.083828 0.0832 0.037395 0.0379 0.011115 0.0111 0.125035 0.125 0.074923 0.0749 0.03315 0.0331 0.004584 0.0045 
0.086134 0.0863 0.038512 0.0381 0.011993 0.0119 0.124285 0.1242 0.074966 0.0749 0.03402 0.034 0.005102 0.0051 
0.094029 0.0942 0.038167 0.0386 0.011117 0.0111 0.120025 0.12 0.082438 0.0824 0.02309 0.023 0.004135 0.0041 
0.063314 0.0631 0.037952 0.0375 0.012145 0.0124 0.153525 0.1535 0.046627 0.0466 0.03078 0.0307 0.003184 0.0031 
0.064216 0.0641 0.038853 0.0385 0.011 0.011 0.154821 0.1548 0.047175 0.0471 0.03146 0.031 0.003308 0.0033 
0.06891 0.0681 0.039213 0.0391 0.016098 0.0169 0.150325 0.1503 0.05028 0.0502 0.03139 0.031 0.004393 0.0043 
0.067753 0.0675 0.038827 0.0382 0.014186 0.0148 0.160808 0.1608 0.053503 0.0535 0.03282 0.0328 0.004985 0.0049 
Source: own calculation based data source explained  in table 7.2 
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Table B.5: Revenue DecentraliSation_1 in each Province 
Year Pakistan Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan 
1975 0.19 0.114 0.059 0.022 0.014 
1976 0.18 0.103 0.056 0.021 0.015 
1977 0.16 0.104 0.048 0.020 0.020 
1978 0.16 0.105 0.047 0.020 0.020 
1979 0.14 0.127 0.056 0.025 0.019 
1980 0.11 0.142 0.061 0.028 0.020 
1981 0.1 0.126 0.055 0.025 0.018 
1982 0.11 0.123 0.055 0.025 0.019 
1983 0.12 0.159 0.052 0.024 0.020 
1984 0.13 0.091 0.045 0.021 0.015 
1985 0.16 0.100 0.045 0.021 0.018 
1986 0.18 0.089 0.041 0.017 0.021 
1987 0.2 0.088 0.037 0.018 0.017 
1988 0.14 0.116 0.051 0.024 0.013 
1989 0.16 0.083 0.052 0.026 0.010 
1990 0.17 0.110 0.050 0.051 0.012 
1991 0.19 0.162 0.083 0.066 0.020 
1992 0.23 0.132 0.066 0.053 0.019 
1993 0.21 0.152 0.076 0.053 0.024 
1994 0.24 0.154 0.077 0.055 0.020 
1995 0.24 0.164 0.083 0.050 0.019 
1996 0.26 0.160 0.077 0.046 0.019 
1997 0.27 0.137 0.069 0.040 0.023 
1998 0.23 0.135 0.066 0.039 0.022 
1999 0.22 0.143 0.075 0.040 0.024 
2000 0.23 0.142 0.077 0.038 0.022 
2001 0.26 0.140 0.073 0.037 0.021 
2002 0.24 0.136 0.062 0.050 0.019 
2003 0.23 0.141 0.084 0.037 0.011 
2004 0.24 0.146 0.086 0.039 0.012 
2005 0.24 0.150 0.094 0.038 0.011 
2006 0.24 0.167 0.063 0.038 0.012 
2007 0.23 0.166 0.064 0.039 0.011 
2008 0.24 0.163 0.069 0.039 0.016 
2009 0.23 0.171 0.068 0.039 0.014 
Source: own calculation based data source explained  in table 7.2 
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Table B.6: Revenue Decentralisation (2)2 in each Province 
Year Pakistan  Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan 
1975 0.14 0.1043 0.0543 0.0099 0.0047 
1976 0.13 0.095 0.0517 0.0011 0.0021 
1977 0.12 0.072 0.0337 0.0034 0.00035 
1978 0.12 0.069 0.0276 0.0043 0.0028 
1979 0.11 0.1222 0.0466 0.008 0.00034 
1980 0.08 0.1421 0.0611 0.01506 0.0017 
1981 0.06 0.1216 0.054 0.0076 0.00095 
1982 0.06 0.1166 0.0505 0.0037 0.00038 
1983 0.06 0.1333 0.0387 0.0037 0.0016 
1984 0.09 0.0524 0.0259 0.0048 0.0011 
1985 0.08 0.0386 0.0165 0.0089 0.0069 
1986 0.09 0.013 0.0047 0.0045 0.0051 
1987 0.13 0.0206 0.0036 0.0027 0.0022 
1988 0.08 0.0799 0.0208 0.0068 0.0014 
1989 0.12 0.0748 0.0439 0.0039 0.0037 
1990 0.13 0.102 0.041 0.0338 0.0042 
1991 0.17 0.1566 0.0793 0.064 0.019 
1992 0.21 0.1246 0.06 0.052 0.018 
1993 0.21 0.1474 0.073 0.0525 0.0232 
1994 0.23 0.1537 0.0714 0.0522 0.019 
1995 0.24 0.1637 0.079 0.0495 0.017 
1996 0.25 0.1595 0.076 0.0462 0.015 
1997 0.26 0.1363 0.069 0.034 0.014 
1998 0.21 0.1353 0.0657 0.0325 0.014 
1999 0.19 0.1333 0.0627 0.0336 0.0153 
2000 0.2 0.1361 0.0684 0.0329 0.014 
2001 0.23 0.1357 0.0624 0.031 0.013 
2002 0.2 0.122 0.0509 0.045 0.011 
2003 0.2 0.125 0.0749 0.0331 0.0045 
2004 0.19 0.1242 0.0749 0.034 0.0051 
2005 0.18 0.12 0.0824 0.023 0.0041 
2006 0.2 0.1535 0.0466 0.0307 0.0031 
2007 0.19 0.1548 0.0471 0.031 0.0033 
2008 0.19 0.1503 0.0502 0.031 0.0043 
2009 0.2 0.1608 0.0535 0.0328 0.0049 
Source: own calculation based data source explained  in table 7.2  
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APPENDIX C: POVERTY DATA 
Table C.1: Headcount poverty, severity of Poverty, Poverty Gap and HDI in overall Poverty in Pakistan 
year Headcount 
Poverty 
Rural Headcount 
Poverty 
Urban Headcount 
Poverty 
Poverty Gap Rural Poverty 
Gap 
Urban Poverty 
Gap 
Severity of 
Poverty 
Rural Severity 
of Poverty 
Urban Severity 
of Poverty 
HDI 
1975 41.43 45.6 37.19 8.21 8.87 7.55 67.4 78.67 57 0.358 
1976 38.89 42.14 33.73 7.32 8.64 6.8 53.58 74.64 46.24 0.365 
1977 36.15 38.44 29.76 6.43 7.6 5.13 41.34 57.76 26.31 0.37 
1978 33.41 36.53 27.3 6.28 6.77 4.66 39.43 45.83 21.71 0.374 
1979 30.68 32.51 25.94 5.74 6.43 4.52 32.94 41.34 20.43 0.377 
1980 29.86 31.05 24.2 5.47 6.32 4.33 29.92 39.94 18.74 0.387 
1981 28.23 31.36 23.33 5.33 6.33 4.21 28.4 40.06 17.72 0.393 
1982 26.76 29.55 22.22 5.21 6.12 4.1 27.14 37.45 16.81 0.402 
1983 25.45 27.8 22.95 5.19 6.09 4 26.93 37.08 16 0.408 
1984 24.3 25.87 21.17 4.98 5.5 3.55 24.8 30.25 12.6 0.415 
1985 22.31 23.72 20.53 5.12 5.23 3.65 26.21 27.35 13.32 0.423 
1986 19.47 20.2 19.2 4.76 5.3 3.98 22.65 28.09 15.84 0.428 
1987 17.32 18.32 16.65 4.25 5.2 3.78 18.06 27.04 14.28 0.437 
1988 17.29 19.17 16.12 4.08 4.77 3.65 16.64 22.75 13.32 0.443 
1989 20.34 22.44 18.15 3.94 4.7 3.65 15.52 22.09 13.32 0.452 
1990 22.1 23.59 18.64 4.12 4.78 3.43 16.97 22.84 11.76 0.458 
1991 21.34 23.35 19.5 4.15 4.81 3.21 17.22 23.13 10.3 0.462 
1992 22.4 27.35 20.8 4.27 5.6 3.43 18.23 31.36 11.76 0.468 
1993 25 29.7 23.1 5.22 6.25 3.74 27.24 39.06 13.98 0.476 
1994 27.3 30.2 22.13 5.3 6.01 3.81 28.09 36.12 14.51 0.482 
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1995 29.5 31.88 22.54 5.04 5.32 3.65 25.4 28.3 13.32 0.489 
1996 29.6 31.6 27 4.78 5.25 3.41 22.84 27.56 11.62 0.495 
1997 31.2 32.62 28.4 5.75 6.11 3.94 33.06 37.33 15.52 0.497 
1998 32.6 35.9 31.7 6.58 7.55 4.27 43.29 57 18.23 0.506 
1999 32.14 36.2 30.67 6.62 7.77 4.33 43.82 60.37 18.74 0.511 
2000 30.9 34.3 28 6.82 7.81 4.48 46.51 60.99 20.07 0.517 
2001 29.17 32.1 25 7.03 8.04 4.55 49.42 64.64 20.7 0.516 
2002 28.4 30.71 21.42 6.42 8 4.28 41.21 64 18.31 0.5521 
2003 27.43 29.65 20 6.12 7.2 3.6 37.45 51.84 12.96 0.54 
2004 23.9 28.1 13.1 6 7.1 3.7 36 50.41 13.69 0.552 
2005 22.3 27 12 5.2 6.44 3.15 27.04 41.47 9.92 0.553 
2006 20 25.2 11.2 4.92 6.12 3.11 24.2 37.45 9.67 0.555 
2007 17.5 21.5 11.1 4.33 6.06 2.91 18.74 36.72 8.46 0.558 
2008 19.5 23.8 13.01 5.23 6.4 3.88 27.35 40.96 15.05 0.559 
2009 21.5 26.1 15.4 5.32 6.37 3.96 28.3 40.57 15.68 0.556 
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Table C.2: Headcount Poverty, Severity of Poverty and  Poverty Gap in Punjab 
year Urban Headcount 
Poverty 
Rural Headcount 
Poverty 
Headcount 
Poverty 
Urban Headcount 
Poverty 
Rural Poverty 
Gap 
Poverty Gap Urban Severity 
of Poverty 
Rural Severity 
of Poverty 
Severity of 
Poverty 
1975 31.62 37.98 37.7 6.25 7.34 7.21 39.06 53.88 51.98 
1976 31.31 37.8 35.47 5.9 7.2 6.77 34.81 51.84 45.83 
1977 31.6 36.12 34.7 4.76 6.94 6.76 22.66 48.16 45.70 
1978 29.52 38.75 33.76 4.54 6.65 6.21 20.61 44.22 38.56 
1979 30.11 37.32 33.11 4.44 5.51 6.1 19.71 30.36 37.21 
1980 29.76 36.6 32.21 4.34 7.1 5.66 18.84 50.41 32.04 
1981 28.23 33.1 30.12 4.72 6.44 5.78 22.28 41.47 33.41 
1982 27.21 31.1 29.21 4.67 6.39 5.65 21.81 40.83 31.92 
1983 25.45 32.9 29.175 4.44 6.36 5.12 19.71 40.45 26.21 
1984 25.1 32 28.55 4.27 6.15 5.1 18.23 37.82 26.01 
1985 25.02 29.71 27.365 3.96 5.9 4.22 15.68 34.81 17.81 
1986 24.19 28.18 26.185 3.78 5.38 5.2 14.29 28.94 27.04 
1987 23.21 27.11 25.16 4.1 5.7 4.7 16.81 32.49 22.09 
1988 22.32 27.91 25.115 3.97 5.32 4.3 15.76 28.30 18.49 
1989 22.1 26.11 24.105 3.78 4.89 4.21 14.29 23.91 17.72 
1990 21.98 25.73 23.855 3.77 4.81 3.11 14.21 23.14 9.67 
1991 21.71 26.29 22.12 3.92 4.9 3.1 15.37 24.01 9.61 
1992 22.21 25.51 24.02 3.41 5.6 4.27 11.63 31.36 18.23 
1993 21.24 25.37 24.25 3.71 4.4 4.21 13.76 19.36 17.72 
1994 17.01 32.95 28.55 3.22 6.47 5.57 10.37 41.86 31.02 
1995 18.1 33.9 29.5 3.45 5.55 5.22 11.90 30.80 27.25 
1996 17.88 31.62 26.81 3.76 6.74 5.22 14.14 45.43 27.25 
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1997 16.61 27.89 24.66 2.6 4.9 4.24 6.76 24.01 17.98 
1998 16.9 28.3 25 4.2 5.8 5.82 17.64 33.64 33.87 
1999 24.24 34.62 31.62 5.04 7.53 6.81 25.40 56.70 46.38 
2000 25.5 36 33 5.19 7.1 6.18 26.94 50.41 38.19 
2001 24.6 35.88 33.66 5.43 7.34 6.36 29.48 53.88 40.45 
2002 23.33 35.86 32.24 5.23 7.48 6.83 27.35 55.95 46.65 
2003 21.4 34.11 30.76 5.04 7.41 5.6 25.40 54.91 31.36 
2004 21.05 33.61 29.76 4.11 7.23 4.77 16.89 52.27 22.75 
2005 20.6 33.9 29.7 4.2 7.3 6.3 17.64 53.29 39.69 
2006 19.34 32.22 27.12 4.3 7.1 6.4 18.49 50.41 40.96 
2007 18.38 31.1 24.21 5.2 6.7 5.8 27.04 44.89 33.64 
2008 17.32 30.19 23.33 4.4 5.1 5.2 19.36 26.01 27.04 
2009 17.23 30.09 23.22 4.3 4.99 5 18.49 24.90 25.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 372 
 
Table C.3: Headcount Poverty, Severity of Poverty and  Poverty Gap in Sindh 
year Urban Headcount 
Poverty 
Rural Headcount 
Poverty 
Headcount 
Poverty 
Urban Headcount 
Poverty 
Rural Poverty 
Gap 
Poverty Gap Urban Severity of 
Poverty 
Rural Severity 
of Poverty 
Severity of 
Poverty 
1975 23.98 41.55 36.81 5.62 7.77 6.87 31.58 60.37 47.20 
1976 23.72 41.68 34.67 5.2 7.45 6.67 27.04 55.50 44.49 
1977 22.67 40.33 32.4 4.6 7.21 6.32 21.16 51.98 39.94 
1978 20.11 38.9 31.64 4.22 6.87 5.87 17.81 47.20 34.46 
1979 20.32 38.34 31 4.31 6.5 5.77 18.58 42.25 33.29 
1980 19.76 38.76 31.6 4.32 6.6 5.65 18.66 43.56 31.92 
1981 21.29 37.12 29.205 4.21 6.2 5.26 17.72 38.44 27.67 
1982 20.36 35.19 27.775 4.1 6.14 5.15 16.81 37.70 26.52 
1983 19.21 34.81 27.01 3.6 6.01 5.02 12.96 36.12 25.20 
1984 19.01 34 26.505 3.37 5.5 4.24 11.36 30.25 17.98 
1985 18.82 33.81 26.315 3.24 5.1 4.3 10.50 26.01 18.49 
1986 18.11 31.96 25.035 3.1 5.07 4.6 9.61 25.70 21.16 
1987 17.93 29.17 23.55 3.54 4.22 4.8 12.53 17.81 23.04 
1988 17.01 29.38 23.195 3.5 4.1 4.13 12.25 16.81 17.06 
1989 17 28 22.5 3.12 4 3.5 9.73 16.00 12.25 
1990 16.03 27.11 21.57 3.09 3.91 3.99 9.55 15.29 15.92 
1991 17.12 28.15 24.1 2.78 4.2 3.43 7.73 17.64 11.76 
1992 15.21 29.21 21.1 2.87 4.78 3.74 8.24 22.85 13.99 
1993 16.65 28.56 23.29 2.74 5.03 4.02 7.51 25.30 16.16 
1994 11.33 30.24 21.5 1.82 5.18 3.63 3.31 26.83 13.18 
1995 11.8 31.8 22.6 1.61 4.23 2.9 2.59 17.89 8.41 
1996 11.79 27.82 17.88 1.91 4.1 3.6 3.65 16.81 12.96 
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1997 11.77 19.22 15.39 1.6 3.03 2.29 2.56 9.18 5.24 
1998 12 19.6 15.7 2.01 5.8 3.17 4.04 33.64 10.05 
1999 15.57 34 26.01 2.79 7.27 5.32 7.78 52.85 28.30 
2000 16.1 34.7 26.6 2.11 7.98 6.18 4.45 63.68 38.19 
2001 18.6 41.4 29.7 3.14 9.71 6.66 9.86 94.28 44.36 
2002 20.06 45.07 35.32 3.32 10.03 7.41 11.02 100.60 54.91 
2003 18.54 40.72 32.1 3.12 7.5 5.62 9.73 56.25 31.58 
2004 16.8 37 27.6 2.65 5.8 5.71 7.02 33.64 32.60 
2005 14.3 28.4 22.4 2.6 5.7 4.4 6.76 32.49 19.36 
2006 13.43 27.11 21.56 2.5 5.2 4.2 6.25 27.04 17.64 
2007 14.21 26.93 20.9 2.55 6.11 4.08 6.50 37.33 16.65 
2008 13.01 25.78 18.11 2.02 5.2 4 4.08 27.04 16.00 
2009 12.1 25.88 17.5 1.99 5.3 4.12 3.96 28.09 16.97 
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Table C.4: Headcount Poverty, Severity of Poverty and  Poverty Gap in KP 
year Urban Headcount 
Poverty 
Rural Headcount 
Poverty 
Headcount Poverty Urban Headcount 
Poverty 
Rural Poverty 
Gap 
Poverty Gap Urban Severity 
of Poverty 
Rural Severity of 
Poverty 
Severity of 
Poverty 
1975 37.87 48.1 45.7 8.4 9.84 8.12 70.56 96.83 65.93 
1976 36.48 47.89 44.51 6.81 9.2 7.54 46.38 84.64 56.85 
1977 34.87 45.8 44.7 6.1 7.97 7.32 37.21 63.52 53.58 
1978 33.76 44.89 43.1 5.61 7.27 6.97 31.47 52.85 48.58 
1979 32.12 44.43 43.72 4.58 7.15 6.77 20.98 51.12 45.83 
1980 32.63 44.71 42.77 5.21 6.87 6.87 27.14 47.20 47.20 
1981 31.15 42.19 40.32 4.86 6.61 6.2 23.62 43.69 38.44 
1982 30.39 42.81 40.91 4.79 6.45 6.01 22.94 41.60 36.12 
1983 28.17 40.11 41.11 4.23 6.41 5.65 17.89 41.09 31.92 
1984 31.21 39.81 38.15 4.1 6.21 5.44 16.81 38.56 29.59 
1985 30.92 37.32 37.91 4 6.1 5.3 16.00 37.21 28.09 
1986 29.77 36.28 37 3.81 5.6 5.5 14.52 31.36 30.25 
1987 29 37.43 37.32 3.98 5.8 5.2 15.84 33.64 27.04 
1988 27.12 38.21 35.11 3.88 5.05 5.04 15.05 25.50 25.40 
1989 26.81 35.21 34.18 3.86 5.11 4.66 14.90 26.11 21.72 
1990 26.11 35.01 34.01 3.79 5.6 4.12 14.36 31.36 16.97 
1991 25.28 34.21 33.2 3.99 4.87 4.5 15.92 23.72 20.25 
1992 25.19 34.99 34.07 4.38 5.2 4.76 19.18 27.04 22.66 
1993 24.37 34.91 33.62 4.41 4.94 4.87 19.45 24.40 23.72 
1994 25.31 38.22 36.37 4.2 6.53 6.19 17.64 42.64 38.32 
1995 26.9 40 38.1 5.1 6.67 6.32 26.01 44.49 39.94 
1996 26 40.12 39.75 5.55 7.26 7.2 30.80 52.71 51.84 
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1997 26.92 42.36 40.23 4.51 7.33 6.94 20.34 53.73 48.16 
1998 27.2 43.4 41.2 5.19 8.33 7.87 26.94 69.39 61.94 
1999 27.13 43.72 41.28 5.66 9.47 8.91 32.04 89.68 79.39 
2000 29.2 44.9 42.6 5.3 8.19 7.62 28.09 67.08 58.06 
2001 30.1 44.3 41.55 5.19 8.08 7.32 26.94 65.29 53.58 
2002 29.18 43.61 41.47 5.22 7.86 7.47 27.25 61.78 55.80 
2003 28.76 41.6 40.24 5.2 7.22 5.43 27.04 52.13 29.48 
2004 27.51 40.7 39.74 4.2 7.32 5.22 17.64 53.58 27.25 
2005 26.5 41.4 38.9 4.9 8.3 4.4 24.01 68.89 19.36 
2006 25.21 40.19 36.32 4.44 7.8 4.3 19.71 60.84 18.49 
2007 25.01 38.61 32.21 3.9 7.2 4.88 15.21 51.84 23.81 
2008 24.71 37.77 30.9 3.11 7.11 5.2 9.67 50.55 27.04 
2009 23.77 37.43 29.21 3.03 6.88 5.3 9.18 47.33 28.09 
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Table C.5: Headcount Poverty, Severity of Poverty and  Poverty Gap in Balochistan 
Year Urban Headcount 
Poverty 
Rural Headcount 
Poverty 
Headcount 
Poverty 
Urban Headcount 
Poverty 
Rural Poverty 
Gap 
Poverty Gap Urban Severity 
of Poverty 
Rural Severity 
of Poverty 
Severity of 
Poverty 
1975 36.52 47.9 40.01 7.77 8.54 7.59 60.37 72.93 57.61 
1976 35.75 46.81 40.65 6.19 8.7 7.1 38.32 75.69 50.41 
1977 34.84 45.89 37.93 5.72 7.43 6.43 32.72 55.20 41.34 
1978 33.84 44.65 36.76 5.32 7.32 6.79 28.30 53.58 46.10 
1979 34.21 43.21 36.97 5.44 6.8 6.58 29.59 46.24 43.30 
1980 34.72 42.7 37.5 5.71 7.3 6.54 32.60 53.29 42.77 
1981 32.75 40.17 34 4.92 6.43 6.1 24.21 41.34 37.21 
1982 30.19 38.26 33.1 4.54 6.39 5.9 20.61 40.83 34.81 
1983 29.12 37.55 29.1 4.01 6.35 5.43 16.08 40.32 29.48 
1984 28.87 36.32 29.39 3.92 6.2 5.21 15.37 38.44 27.14 
1985 27.9 34.11 28.17 3.72 5.4 5.1 13.84 29.16 26.01 
1986 25.32 35.31 27.11 3.63 5.21 5.3 13.18 27.14 28.09 
1987 24.01 33.21 29.71 3.58 5.7 5.19 12.82 32.49 26.94 
1988 23.91 32.9 27.23 3.43 5.41 5.16 11.76 29.27 26.63 
1989 23.72 28.32 27.21 3.98 5.01 4.41 15.84 25.10 19.45 
1990 21.1 27.21 26.91 3.77 4.79 4.07 14.21 22.94 16.56 
1991 25.21 27 26.11 4.2 4.98 4.23 17.64 24.80 17.89 
1992 26.21 26.04 24.2 4.54 5.76 5.21 20.61 33.18 27.14 
1993 30.44 26.21 26.77 4.82 4.28 4.35 23.23 18.32 18.92 
1994 15.62 36.75 34.36 2.14 6.72 6.2 4.58 45.16 38.44 
1995 16.8 37.9 33.5 3.1 7.22 6.6 9.61 52.13 43.56 
1996 18.65 39.8 35.71 3.54 8.19 7.32 12.53 67.08 53.58 
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1997 22.98 41.61 37.69 3.53 8.02 7.07 12.46 64.32 49.98 
1998 23 42.5 38.4 4.11 5.83 4.43 16.89 33.99 19.62 
1999 22.94 21.34 38.55 3.95 3.76 3.79 15.60 14.14 14.36 
2000 24.3 22.5 36.8 4.11 4.12 4.12 16.89 16.97 16.97 
2001 25.72 21.4 31.53 4.46 5.78 5.21 19.89 33.41 27.14 
2002 26.18 37.45 35.49 4.52 6.86 6.03 20.43 47.06 36.36 
2003 24.71 36.5 34.54 4.21 6.44 5.5 17.72 41.47 30.25 
2004 23.6 35.7 34 4.47 5.7 4.65 19.98 32.49 21.62 
2005 22.4 33.9 33.1 4.4 7.4 6.8 19.36 54.76 46.24 
2006 21.11 32.12 34.21 4.2 4.3 6.2 17.64 18.49 38.44 
2007 21 32.1 29.09 4.01 5.4 5.2 16.08 29.16 27.04 
2008 20.1 28.1 25.22 3.33 4.1 4.2 11.09 16.81 17.64 
2009 20 29.2 25 3.35 4.3 4.2 11.22 18.49 17.64 
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APPENDIX D: DETERMINANTS OF SEVERITY OF POVERTY  
Table d.1: the Determinants of Severity of Poverty 
 
 
                       Model : GMM IV   
Dependant Variable Severity of Poverty 
 (1) 
Severity of Poverty 
 (2) 
Fiscal Decentralisation (Exp) 1 -0.222** 
 (0.0862) 
 Fiscal Decentralisation (Exp) 2 
 
-0.267*** 
 
(0.0972) 
Government Size 0.00517 0.0124 
 
(0.011) (0.0102) 
Pro-poor Expenditure  ᶲ     -0.3716*** -0.3567*** 
 
(0.0668) (0.0631) 
Gini Coefficient     7.525*** 7.246*** 
 
(2.834) (2.376) 
Corruption Index    0.1508** 0.0754* 
 
(0.0712) (0.0696) 
Rule of Law -0.5874** -0.484)** 
 
             (0.2478) (0.2089) 
Interaction term(Fiscal 
Decentralisation*Devolution Reform Dummy) 
            -0.0288 0.0484 
(0.1336) (0.0785) 
Misery Index -0.00004* -0.00053 
 
(0.002) (0.0019) 
Constant .021** 1.8411* 
 
(0.9509) (0.8152) 
R-squared  0.88 0.87 
Adj R-squared 0.76 0.74 
Robust Standard Error are in parentheses 
 Instrumental Variable used: Income of bottom 20% of the population 
Instrumented Variable: Gini coefficient  
 ᶲvariable expressed in logarithm 
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APPENDIX E: CORRELATION MATRIX OF SELECTED VARIABLES 
Table E.1: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) 1                
(2) 0.98 1.00               
(3) 0.91 0.86 1.00              
(4) 0.87 0.89 0.73 1.00             
(5) 0.74 0.80 0.56 0.93 1.00            
(6) 0.81 0.79 0.74 0.76 0.68 1.00           
(7) 0.85 0.84 0.78 0.82 0.72 0.95 1.00          
(8) 0.83 0.83 0.74 0.82 0.78 0.96 0.98 1.00         
(9) 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.57 0.92 0.95 0.94 1.00        
(10) -0.50 -0.40 -0.63 -0.21 -0.05 -0.66 -0.65 -0.61 -0.68 1.00       
(11) -0.52 -0.43 -0.75 -0.25 -0.05 -0.35 -0.36 -0.32 -0.36 0.62 1.00      
(12) -0.79 -0.74 -0.84 -0.63 -0.46 -0.58 -0.58 -0.55 -0.50 0.44 0.80 1.00     
(13) 0.08 0.18 -0.06 0.25 0.29 -0.20 -0.18 -0.17 -0.25 0.71 0.12 -0.18 1.00    
(14) 0.08 0.16 -0.01 0.18 0.20 -0.26 -0.24 -0.24 -0.31 0.66 -0.02 -0.27 0.96 1.00   
(15) -0.42 -0.32 -0.55 -0.14 0.02 -0.62 -0.60 -0.56 -0.65 0.99 0.55 0.35 0.77 0.72 1.00 
(16) -0.40 -0.28 -0.57 -0.08 0.07 -0.43 -0.45 -0.41 -0.46 0.92 0.74 0.45 0.65 0.56 0.90 
(17) 0.37 0.27 0.49 0.10 -0.05 0.60 0.59 0.55 0.65 -0.98 -0.50 -0.29 -0.80 -0.75 -0.99 
(18) 0.40 0.30 0.51 0.13 -0.02 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.68 -0.98 -0.48 -0.29 -0.78 -0.75 -0.99 
(19) -0.34 -0.24 -0.50 -0.05 0.10 -0.57 -0.54 -0.50 -0.61 0.97 0.56 0.32 0.78 0.72 0.98 
(20) -0.53 -0.42 -0.62 -0.26 -0.12 -0.69 -0.68 -0.65 -0.70 0.99 0.56 0.41 0.72 0.69 0.99 
(21) -0.49 -0.48 -0.37 -0.64 -0.65 -0.56 -0.54 -0.56 -0.38 0.22 0.06 0.36 0.06 0.15 0.18 
(22) -0.06 -0.15 0.25 -0.34 -0.47 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.25 -0.64 -0.57 -0.16 -0.53 -0.41 -0.65 
(23) -0.40 -0.28 -0.61 -0.05 0.14 -0.37 -0.38 -0.33 -0.40 0.88 0.83 0.52 0.56 0.43 0.86 
(24) 0.48 0.43 0.47 0.41 0.35 0.59 0.52 0.54 0.56 -0.33 -0.25 -0.44 0.04 0.02 -0.30 
(25) 0.12 0.18 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.33 0.23 0.25 0.36 -0.02 0.17 -0.01 0.12 0.08 -0.02 
(26) -0.40 -0.29 -0.52 -0.11 0.04 -0.61 -0.59 -0.55 -0.64 0.99 0.54 0.32 0.78 0.73 1.00 
(27) -0.45 -0.33 -0.61 -0.15 0.02 -0.58 -0.57 -0.53 -0.60 0.99 0.67 0.43 0.72 0.65 0.98 
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(28) -0.29 -0.25 -0.19 -0.22 -0.21 -0.60 -0.58 -0.59 -0.58 0.64 -0.11 -0.09 0.68 0.75 0.68 
(29) 0.29 0.16 0.54 -0.07 -0.26 0.26 0.26 0.20 0.30 -0.83 -0.85 -0.48 -0.54 -0.40 -0.80 
(30) -0.51 -0.40 -0.64 -0.25 -0.08 -0.60 -0.59 -0.55 -0.58 0.95 0.68 0.47 0.67 0.61 0.93 
(31) 0.34 0.25 0.48 0.02 -0.12 0.56 0.51 0.48 0.59 -0.95 -0.52 -0.25 -0.74 -0.68 -0.96 
(32) -0.36 -0.24 -0.56 -0.05 0.12 -0.44 -0.44 -0.40 -0.47 0.94 0.75 0.43 0.69 0.59 0.93 
(33) -0.31 -0.21 -0.58 0.06 0.26 -0.28 -0.27 -0.21 -0.32 0.79 0.77 0.45 0.53 0.39 0.77 
(34) 0.39 0.49 0.19 0.40 0.45 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.10 0.34 0.05 -0.28 0.69 0.67 0.41 
(35) 0.31 0.38 0.20 0.38 0.42 -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 -0.20 0.48 -0.06 -0.29 0.78 0.79 0.56 
(36) -0.21 -0.30 -0.18 -0.31 -0.32 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.45 0.20 0.40 -0.83 -0.83 -0.54 
(37) -0.45 -0.35 -0.58 -0.16 0.01 -0.62 -0.62 -0.58 -0.66 0.99 0.59 0.38 0.73 0.68 0.99 
(38) -0.45 -0.35 -0.54 -0.19 -0.04 -0.67 -0.66 -0.63 -0.71 0.98 0.50 0.34 0.75 0.72 0.99 
(39) -0.40 -0.40 -0.27 -0.59 -0.67 -0.28 -0.31 -0.35 -0.09 -0.07 -0.18 0.12 -0.02 0.06 -0.09 
(40) -0.26 -0.14 -0.45 0.03 0.19 -0.45 -0.44 -0.39 -0.50 0.95 0.57 0.27 0.83 0.76 0.97 
(41) -0.59 -0.52 -0.60 -0.42 -0.30 -0.82 -0.81 -0.79 -0.81 0.92 0.40 0.39 0.64 0.65 0.91 
(42) -0.51 -0.43 -0.60 -0.26 -0.13 -0.72 -0.71 -0.69 -0.76 0.95 0.52 0.40 0.69 0.65 0.95 
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  (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28 (29) (30) 
(16) 1                
(17) -0.88 1.00               
(18) -0.84 1.00 1.00              
(19) 0.88 -0.99 -0.98 1.00             
(20) 0.90 -0.98 -0.97 0.96 1.00            
(21) 0.14 -0.16 -0.18 0.14 0.28 1.00           
(22) -0.63 0.65 0.65 -0.72 -0.55 0.36 1.00          
(23) 0.97 -0.82 -0.80 0.85 0.84 0.04 -0.70 1.00         
(24) -0.15 0.28 0.32 -0.27 -0.33 -
0.13 
0.25 -0.16 1.00        
(25) 0.28 0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.01 7 0.13 0.23 0.38 1.00       
(26) 0.90 -1.00 -0.99 0.99 0.98 0.17 -0.66 0.85 -0.29 -0.04 1.00      
(27) 0.96 -0.96 -0.95 0.97 0.98 0.20 -0.66 0.92 -0.28 0.08 0.98 1.00     
(28) 0.40 -0.72 -0.74 0.65 0.70 0.36 -0.12 0.27 -0.22 -0.27 0.69 0.57 1.00    
(29) -0.94 0.77 0.74 -0.81 -0.77 0.06 0.77 -0.98 0.12 -0.22 -0.80 -0.88 -0.16 1.00   
(30) 0.95 -0.91 -0.89 0.90 0.95 0.30 -0.52 0.90 -0.23 0.16 0.93 0.97 0.54 -0.85 1.00 
(31) -0.85 0.96 0.96 -0.96 -0.93 -
0.02 
0.75 -0.82 0.31 0.15 -0.96 -0.93 -0.63 0.79 -0.86 
 (32) 0.98 -0.91 -0.88 0.92 0.91 10 -0.71 0.96 -0.16 0.17 0.93 0.97 0.42 -0.95 0.95 
(33) 0.82 -0.73 -0.72 0.78 0.72 -
0.08 
-0.80 0.90 -0.11 0.08 0.76 0.81 0.15 -0.92 0.75 
(34) 0.44 -0.42 -0.38 0.40 0.34 1 -0.38 0.36 0.26 0.54 0.41 0.41 0.20 -0.38 0.38 
(35) 0.38 -0.61 -0.60 0.59 0.48 -
0.09 
-0.53 0.30 0.00 -0.12 0.57 0.48 0.52 -0.31 0.38 
(36) -0.37 0.57 0.56 -0.53 -0.50 -
0.03 
0.23 -0.28 -0.07 -0.13 -0.55 -0.47 -0.67 0.23 -0.43 
(37) 0.92 -0.98 -0.98 0.97 0.98 17 -0.65 0.87 -0.28 -0.01 0.99 0.98 0.64 -0.82 0.93 
(38) 0.86 -0.99 -0.99 0.97 0.98 0.23 -0.60 0.80 -0.30 -0.09 0.99 0.95 0.73 -0.73 0.91 
(39) -0.06 0.13 0.13 -0.19 0.04 0.66 0.63 -0.17 0.00 0.43 -0.12 -0.07 0.18 0.28 0.06 
(40) 0.93 -0.97 -0.95 0.97 0.94 0.09 -0.72 0.88 -0.20 0.09 0.97 0.97 0.58 -0.86 0.92 
(41) 0.76 -0.92 -0.93 0.88 0.95 0.41 -0.38 0.68 -0.38 -0.13 0.92 0.88 0.81 -0.57 0.85 
(42) 0.80 -0.95 -0.97 0.94 0.95 0.23 -0.59 0.75 -0.41 -0.22 0.95 0.91 0.75 -0.68 0.86 
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  (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) 
(31) 1            
(32) -0.89 1.00           
(33) -0.78 0.86 1.00          
(34) -0.33 0.46 0.32 1.00         
(35) -0.56 0.46 0.33 0.75 1.00        
(36) 0.49 -0.41 -0.18 -0.66 -0.71 1.00       
(37) -0.96 0.93 0.78 0.38 0.52 -0.48 1.00      
(38) -0.95 0.88 0.70 0.37 0.56 -0.50 0.98 1.00     
(39) 0.24 -0.15 -0.29 -0.05 -0.32 -0.06 -
0.10 
-0.08 1.00    
(40) -0.93 0.95 0.80 0.56 0.64 -0.58 96 0.94 -0.16 1.00   
(41) -0.84 0.77 0.53 0.23 0.45 -0.47 0.91 0.94 0.12 0.82 1.00  
(42) -0.92 0.84 0.66 0.23 0.51 -0.45 0.94 0.96 -0.10 0.88 0.94 1.00 
 
Definitions of Variables 
 
 
 
1 Overall Poverty  15 Total Population 29 Age Dependency Ratio 
2 Rural Poverty  16 Per Capita Health Expenditure  30 Pro-poor expenditures (Per Capita) 
3 Urban Poverty 17 Infant Mortality Rate 31 Fertility Rate 
4 Overall poverty Gap 18 bottom 20% population share in 
National Income 
32 Agriculture Value Addition, Per Capita 
5 Rural Poverty Gap 19 Gini-Coefficient 33 Devolution Reform, Dummy 
6 Urban Poverty Gap 20 Per Capita GDP 34 Misery Index (CPI +Unemployment Rate 
7 Overall Severity of 
Poverty  
21 Trade Openness 35 Unemployment Rate 
8 Severity of Poverty, 
Rural  
22 Government Size  36 Workers‘ Remittances 
9 Severity of Poverty, 
Urban 
23 Per Capita Subsidies cons 37 Urban Population (%) 
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10 Human 
Development Index 
24 Corruption Index 38 Life Expectancy at Birth 
11 Expenditure 
Decentralisation (1) 
25 Consumer Price Index 39 Pupil-Teacher-Ratio 
12 Expenditure 
Decentralisation (1) 
26 Population Density 40 Female secondary School Enrolment (Net)  
13 Revenue 
Decentralisation (1) 
27 Literacy Rate 41 Agriculture Machinery, Per Capita 
14 Revenue 
Decentralisation (2) 
28 Per Capita Primary School 42 Fertilizer Consumption, Per Capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 384 
 
Table E.2: Correlation Matrix Table of Variables for Panel Analysis 
 (1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 1                   
2 0.78 1.00                  
3 0.94 0.67 1.00                 
4 0.62 0.48 0.69 1.00                
5 0.46 0.28 0.55 0.84 1.00               
6 0.66 0.62 0.71 0.79 0.54 1.00              
7 0.52 0.31 0.60 0.54 0.46 0.53 1.00             
8 0.32 0.09 0.40 0.45 0.44 0.25 0.91 1.00            
9 0.50 0.26 0.57 0.39 0.41 0.23 0.87 0.90 1.00           
10 -0.49 -0.48 -0.48 -0.22 0.10 -0.29 -0.37 -0.27 -0.33 1.00          
11 -0.56 -0.44 -0.57 -0.33 -0.01 -0.35 -0.46 -0.36 -0.41 0.92 1.00         
12 -0.45 -0.42 -0.39 -0.11 0.20 -0.30 -0.19 -0.10 -0.11 0.65 0.65 1.00        
13 -0.42 -0.36 -0.33 -0.09 0.14 -0.27 -0.14 -0.07 -0.04 0.57 0.53 0.95 1.00       
14 -0.55 -0.64 -0.51 -0.43 -0.10 -0.78 -0.19 0.12 0.06 0.42 0.35 0.40 0.36 1.00      
15 -0.56 -0.58 -0.55 -0.42 -0.22 -0.60 -0.20 0.00 -0.09 0.51 0.36 0.30 0.32 0.76 1.00     
16 -0.48 -0.55 -0.43 -0.27 0.07 -0.70 -0.18 0.14 0.07 0.33 0.33 0.44 0.36 0.91 0.51 1.00    
17 -0.43 -0.63 -0.39 -0.48 -0.30 -0.54 -0.16 -0.05 -0.06 0.48 0.28 0.20 0.23 0.64 0.83 0.33 1.00   
18 -0.17 -0.41 -0.17 -0.46 -0.45 -0.48 -0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.06 0.41 0.63 0.14 0.79 1.00  
19 0.09 -0.18 0.08 -0.16 -0.22 -0.22 0.18 0.23 0.24 -0.13 -0.25 -0.24 -0.19 0.25 0.34 0.07 0.46 0.61 1.00 
20 -0.15 -0.20 -0.21 -0.24 -0.32 -0.19 -0.23 -0.27 -0.26 0.06 -0.03 -0.24 -0.18 0.03 0.45 -0.19 0.50 0.55 0.28 
21 -0.26 -0.29 -0.31 -0.36 -0.42 -0.27 -0.22 -0.24 -0.27 0.09 -0.03 -0.27 -0.20 0.17 0.58 -0.12 0.67 0.71 0.35 
22 -0.48 -0.62 -0.42 -0.25 0.02 -0.52 -0.02 0.22 0.11 0.48 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.79 0.77 0.61 0.77 0.43 0.28 
23 -0.12 0.24 -0.21 -0.10 -0.28 0.17 -0.20 -0.27 -0.32 -0.13 0.06 -0.17 -0.18 -0.47 -0.41 -0.35 -0.49 -0.43 -0.34 
24 -0.43 -0.62 -0.43 -0.54 -0.24 -0.64 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.48 0.53 0.49 0.68 0.70 0.49 0.77 0.59 0.32 
25 -0.42 -0.34 -0.38 -0.13 0.12 -0.14 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22 0.63 0.66 0.90 0.83 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.11 -0.18 -0.32 
26 0.41 0.46 0.48 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.19 0.11 0.07 -0.12 -0.16 -0.09 -0.13 -0.45 -0.51 -0.23 -0.56 -0.61 -0.47 
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27 0.04 0.34 -0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.28 -0.17 -0.27 -0.29 -0.21 0.02 -0.10 -0.18 -0.56 -0.69 -0.31 -0.73 -0.65 -0.52 
28 -0.50 -0.71 -0.45 -0.38 -0.06 -0.70 -0.21 0.00 -0.03 0.55 0.43 0.58 0.55 0.86 0.78 0.74 0.77 0.58 0.29 
29 -0.31 -0.60 -0.30 -0.46 -0.17 -0.56 -0.11 -0.04 0.01 0.49 0.35 0.51 0.48 0.62 0.64 0.44 0.81 0.64 0.35 
30 0.28 0.21 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.49 0.39 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.02 -0.42 -0.33 -0.40 -0.16 -0.29 -0.11 
31 -0.30 -0.59 -0.26 -0.26 -0.15 -0.37 -0.14 -0.03 -0.08 0.44 0.23 0.10 0.11 0.48 0.70 0.23 0.82 0.72 0.34 
32 -0.52 -0.51 -0.43 -0.18 0.15 -0.32 -0.14 -0.06 -0.09 0.73 0.70 0.95 0.89 0.44 0.39 0.42 0.34 -0.02 -0.17 
33 -0.48 -0.60 -0.40 -0.26 0.05 -0.36 -0.13 -0.01 -0.06 0.83 0.67 0.57 0.55 0.60 0.66 0.41 0.70 0.26 0.11 
34 -0.60 -0.61 -0.55 -0.29 0.08 -0.56 -0.24 -0.07 -0.13 0.68 0.66 0.83 0.75 0.68 0.59 0.68 0.44 0.15 -0.07 
35 0.00 -0.25 -0.02 -0.41 -0.40 -0.46 0.06 0.10 0.19 -0.08 -0.17 -0.02 0.03 0.41 0.41 0.22 0.58 0.80 0.63 
36 -0.55 -0.40 -0.49 -0.03 0.28 -0.41 -0.32 -0.09 -0.20 0.52 0.57 0.78 0.69 0.57 0.33 0.72 0.04 -0.23 -0.31 
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  20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
20 1.00                 
21 0.87 1.00                
22 0.14 0.32 1.00               
23 -0.11 -0.15 -0.49 1.00              
24 0.14 0.26 0.65 -0.49 1.00             
25 -0.17 -0.23 0.19 -0.02 0.45 1.00            
26 -0.30 -0.39 -0.31 0.22 -0.70 -
0.07 
1.00           
27 -0.33 -0.42 -0.64 0.82 -0.62 0.05 0.45 1.00          
28 0.22 0.30 0.77 -0.56 0.84 0.38 -0.50 -0.65 1.00         
29 0.24 0.34 0.65 -0.56 0.90 0.41 -0.58 -0.64 0.86 1.00        
30 -0.09 -0.19 -0.14 0.11 -0.08 0.24 0.29 0.19 -0.29 -0.06 1.00       
31 0.52 0.61 0.65 -0.45 0.61 0.04 -0.37 -0.70 0.66 0.65 -0.07 1.00      
32 -0.16 -0.18 0.46 -0.20 0.63 0.90 -0.19 -0.20 0.65 0.58 0.11 0.23 1.00     
33 0.08 0.18 0.73 -0.37 0.71 0.47 -0.27 -0.51 0.68 0.67 0.11 0.59 0.69 1.00    
34 0.04 0.01 0.57 -0.29 0.68 0.70 -0.32 -0.32 0.82 0.64 -0.10 0.34 0.88 0.64 1.00   
35 0.15 0.30 0.34 -0.45 0.60 -
0.13 
-0.67 -0.60 0.53 0.65 -0.28 0.44 0.02 0.16 0.13 1.00  
36 -0.25 -0.29 0.38 -0.08 0.28 0.61 0.07 0.01 0.56 0.22 -0.24 0.00 0.73 0.37 0.82 -0.20 1.00 
 
Definitions of Variables 
1 Overall Poverty  13 Revenue Decentralisation (2) 25 MCWC 
2 Urban Poverty 14 Per Capita GDP 26 Rural health facilities 
3 Rural Poverty  15 Per Capita Agri. value addition  27 Crude Death Rate 
4 Overall poverty Gap 16 Per Capita Manu value addition 28 Literacy Rate 
5 Rural Poverty Gap 17 per capita health expenditure 29 Gross Enrolment (total)  
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6 Urban Poverty Gap 18 Pro-poor expenditures 30 Pupil Teacher Ratio 
7 Overall Severity of 
Poverty  
19 Per capita Subsidies  31 Economic Reform Dummy 
8 Severity of Poverty, 
Rural  
20  PCCE 32 Total Population  
9 Severity of Poverty, 
Urban 
21 Per capita Development exp 33 Per Cap. Gross Fixed C. Formation 
10 Expenditure 
Decentralisation (1) 
22 Per capita Own revenue 34 Per capita fertilizer consumption  
11 Expenditure 
Decentralisation (2) 
23 Infant mortality rate  35 Per Capita Education Expenditure  
12 Revenue 
Decentralisation (1) 
24  Life expectancy at birth 36 Punjab/Sindh Dummy 
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     APPENDIX F: MUTIPLE DEPRIVATION INDEX INDICATORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table G.1: Variables Used To Calculate Sectoral Deprivations 
Education 
Illiteracy Rate (10 years and above) – Female 
Illiteracy Rate (10 years and above) – Male 
Out of School Children (5-9 Years) – Female 
Out of School Children (5-9 Years) – Male 
Housing Quality and Congestion 
Percentage of Non-Owner Households 
Percentage of Homeless Population*** 
Inadequate Material Used in Roof 
Inadequate Material Used in Wall 
Households with no Bathroom Facility*** 
Household with no Kitchen Facility*** 
Households with no Latrine Facility 
Housing Units with One Room 
Persons Per Room 
Residential Housing Services 
Un-electrified Households 
Households not using Cooking Gas 
Households with no Inside Piped Water Connection 
Households with no Telephone (landline) Connection** 
Employment 
Unemployment Rate [15-65 years]. 
Employed Labour Force in Non-Manufacturing Sectors 
*** These indicators are not available in PSLM survey 2005. 
** This indicator is not available in the Census 1998 
Source: Indices Of Multiple Deprivations 2005, SPDC (2007) 
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Table F.2:  Variables Used to Determine Sectoral Allocation Public Resources 
1 Police 7 Agriculture 
2 Public health 8 Irrigation 
3 Social Services  9 Rural Development 
4 Education  10 Transport and Communication  
5 Health 11 Civil Work 
6 Social Security and Welfare   
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Table F.2: Correlation Matrix 
 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M 
A 1.000 
            
B 0.2248* 1.000 
           
 
0.009 
            
C 0.4501* 0.4243* 1.000 
          
 
0.000 0.000 
           
D 0.6780* 0.3879* 0.7502* 1.000 
         
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
          
E 0.3337* -0.145 -0.008 0.2818* 1.000 
        
 
0.000 0.093 0.928 0.001 
         
F -0.255* 0.2889* -0.394* -0.335* -0.113 1.000 
       
 
0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.192 
        
G 0.5976* 0.035 0.2729* 0.4664* 0.2458* -0.400* 1.000 
      
 
0.000 0.683 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.000 
       
H 0.2210* -0.312* -0.074 0.182* 0.176* -0.541* 0.4936* 1.000 
     
 
0.010 0.000 0.394 0.034 0.039 0.000 0.000 
      
I 0.2860* -0.021 0.1782* 0.2123* 0.052 -0.534* 0.5558* 0.7198* 1.000 
    
 
0.001 0.807 0.038 0.013 0.548 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
J 0.6609* 0.039 0.2920* 0.5014* 0.2962* -0.538* 0.6907* 0.7406* 0.7586* 1.000 
   
 
0.000 0.655 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
K 0.4495* 0.066 0.2899* 0.3871* 0.090 -0.560* 0.5132* 0.6750* 0.8820* 0.8693* 1.000 
  
 
0.000 0.447 0.001 0.000 0.297 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   
L 0.5145* 0.2357* 0.4432* 0.5256* 0.151 -0.423* 0.5225* 0.5465* 0.6891* 0.8334* 0.8348* 1.000 
 
 
0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
M 0.2881* 0.021 0.2691* 0.2272* -0.015 -0.283* 0.2291* 0.3101* 0.4503* 0.4797* 0.5576* 0.5426* 1.000 
 
0.001 0.811 0.002 0.008 0.861 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
* shows 5% level of significance 
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Variables Definition  
A = Devolution reform (dummy) H = Public Health Expenditure* 
B = Population (in millions) I = Social Sector Expenditure* 
C = Per Capita GDP J = Education Expenditure* 
D = Agri. Value Add* K = Health Expenditure* 
E = Civil Work * L = Irrigation Expenditure* 
F = Population Per Bed M = Rural Development Expenditure* 
G = Welfare Expenditure*  
*Variables are expressed in Per Capita terms 
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